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ABSTRACT	Altruistic	and	greater-good	considerations	are	not	only	fundamental	aspects	of	ethical	maturity,	but	also	a	basic	means	for	coming	to	know	each	other.	Rational	egoism	(the	view	that	practical	rationality	requires	some	form	of	personal	pay-off	for	the	goal-driven	agent)	is	not	so	easily	snubbed,	nor	has	it	fallen	terribly	out	of	fashion	in	the	social	sciences	and	economics.	I	argue	that	it	is	not	a	truism	that	altruism	is	less	natural	than	egocentrism	for	an	ordinary	self.	It	is	false.	I	aim	to	reconceive	the	problem	that	altruistic	considerations	seem	less	rational	than	justified,	egocentric	considerations.	I	conclude	that	the	self	can	identify	with	subjectivity	as	such,	and	thereby	advance	the	interests	of	a	“we-self.”	While	epistemically	distant,	the	“we-self”	is	ontologically	prior	to	the	ego.		I	conceive	the	problem	in	terms	of	a	central	distinction	in	Indian	philosophy;	the	distinction	between	an	ego-self	(ahaṅkāra)	and	either	a	bundle	of	property	tropes	(as	we	find	in	schools	of	Buddhist	philosophy),	or	a	persisting	synthesizer	of	experiences	that	is	not	solely	identified	as	“this	body”	(as	we	find	in	Monistic-Śaivism).	For	Mādhyamika-Buddhist	thinkers	like	Śāntideva	(c.	8th	century	C.E.),	an	error-theory	of	self	provides	good	reasons	for	altruism.	I	argue	that	this	is	logically	unconvincing.	In	chapter	3,	I	appropriate	Levinas’s	discussion	of	the	Other/other	to	develop	a	Buddhist-inspired,	Emptiness	Ethics.	However,	I	dismantle	this	in	chapter	4,	where	I	appeal	to	aspectual	metaphysics,	particularly,	the	notion	of	composition	as	identity	(CAI),	to	clarify	not	only	the	rational	status	of	other-centric	considerations,	but	the	very	possibility	of	acting	on	such	considerations.			In	chapter	4,	I	offer	a	Śaivist-inspired	solution	to	the	problem	of	other	minds.	Borrowing	from	Abhinavagupta	(c.	10th-11th	century	C.E.),	I	contend	that	the	possibility	of	identifying	with	and	acting	for	a	larger	whole	lies	in	recognizing	ourselves	as	both	individuals	and	others	(bhedābheda).	I	develop	this	by	showing	how	normativity	and	a	concept	of	selfhood	go	hand	in	hand;	and,	furthermore,	the	reflexivity	of	consciousness	allows	us	to	recognize	a	self	that	is	not	limited	to	only	practical	and	narrative	identities,	but	to	self	as	such.					
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INTRODUCTION: AN ETHICAL DEFENSE OF SELFHOOD AS OTHER-CENTRICITY  It is not a truism that altruism is less natural than selfishness, or has less normative authority—for an ordinary self. It is false, or so I shall argue. The self can be naturally unselfish, and by that, I mean at least two things: self-regarding desires are not primary in any sort of ethically relevant sense, and the self is in large part constituted by its commitments to others. Moreover, the self can act as and for another, a metaphysical point I will develop throughout the entirety of this essay, but especially in my final chapter.  As early as Plato’s Republic, the Greek and Euro-American traditions have grappled with the rationality of morality construed in terms of a potential conflict with prudence and rational self-interest. When Glaucon and Adeimantus challenge Socrates with the Ring of Gyges scenario, Socrates argues that it is better to be seemingly unjust (or, falsely perceived as exclusively pursuing egocentric considerations), but actually just, than to be seemingly just, but actually unjust. By the final chapters, Plato, through the mouthpiece of Socrates, argues that it is to our advantage to be moral. More specifically, he argues that it is to the individual’s advantage to maintain moral integrity. For even Thrasymachus—the moral rascal and antagonist of Book I—would admit that there is obviously some benefit to society operating within a moral framework. However, the clever egoist will readily take advantage of that very framework, and, when possible, act amorally (and perhaps even immorally) to further his own advantage. To the contrary, Plato argues that it is always advantageous for the individual to lead a just life (in the sense of adequately promoting the greater good). Still, Plato’s driving premise is construed in 
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self-regarding terms; the just person will enjoy the benefits of a healthy mental life, and the unjust person will not.    The problem is that a socially acceptable egocentric consideration sometimes comes into direct conflict with considerations for the greater good. For those of us who are unconvinced by Divine Command Theory, we do not want to be forced between sensible, reasonable action, and a moral command that runs against the grain of what it would otherwise make sense to do. More precisely, self-interest and 
prudence are eminently rational; it makes practical sense to advance one’s own interests and to seek the best life possible for oneself in terms of personal rewards and achievements.  
The first, and most obvious, question here is, “What sort of self-interest are we 
talking about?” I will limit the conversation to commonsense interests that operate within a legally and socially sanctioned framework. For example, say Mr. Price has been a law-abiding, and for the most part, good-natured citizen and neighbor. He has amassed considerable wealth in the health industry. He does not endorse a health mandate requiring healthy individuals to pay into a coffer that would cover the expenses of lower cost health insurance for the most vulnerable and poorer citizens. If Mr. Price has a legally sanctioned choice between keeping more of his salary or keeping less (by way of taxes), and he sees no personal reward in keeping less (it will not directly improve his life-standard), we would need to provide some good reason for him to keep less. Improving his own life-standard within a legally acceptable framework makes immediate sense. It makes so much sense that Mr. Price might argue that this mandate is an unjustified “penalty” for those who reap 
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no benefits from it. While those who disagree with Mr. Price might claim that moral 
incentives provide him with a good reason to pay into the coffer, they must either show him how moral incentives make rational sense, or convince him that morality in some instances overrides rationality (say, “rationality” understood as instrumental reason). But if they insisted on the latter claim, then they would be committed to the view that morality (specifically as it relates to altruistic and unselfish behavior) is either sometimes extra-rational or irrational. In other words, it represents either an entirely different order of practical motivations that (hopefully) encompasses calculative and instrumental reasoning, or somehow transcends it, or simply makes no material sense. We can safely rule out the last option here.   So, if we want morality to be reasonable, then we must assume that the following is true: altruistic and unselfish behavior are eminently rational; it makes sense not to always pursue what would secure the best life possible for oneself in terms of personal rewards and achievements.  Now, a parent might not want to sacrifice her time and personal goals to 
improve her child’s situation, but she often feels not only compelled to do so, but justified as well. However, like Mr. Price, she might not want to sacrifice a portion of income she could otherwise spend on her child (say, as an added boost that would allow her to send her child to an academy for gifted science students) to help secure 
services for her neighbor’s or a complete stranger’s child. The bone of contention lies in this seemingly innocuous statement. When exactly does the greater good override self-regarding and mildly hedonistic considerations? Perhaps there are 
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extra-practical reasons to endorse altruistic considerations and considerations for the greater good, but if we believe we can provide an answer to the question, “Why 
should I do that,” and if one serious answer is, “Because it is morally right to do so,” then morality is practical, in the broader sense that it has a right to be taken seriously, and sometimes followed at the sacrifice of one’s own good. Perhaps, then, we do not want to limit our sense of practicality to only instrumental reasons. If it is obvious that we have a moral reason to contribute to a coffer that prevents 24 million people from being uninsured, and if it is obvious that health care is a right and not a privilege, then we’d better have reasons to provide those who disagree, and fist-pounding moral declarations will not usually do the trick.   What sort of argument could one provide to Mr. Price? Mr. Price might offer his own moral argument: “Forcing me to give up some of my legally earned income to help others get along is a Robinhood scenario, and it is wrong to forcefully take from the rich simply because they are rich; allow me to decide when and to whom I provide charity.” We might counter with a utilitarian argument, to which he might counter with a rights-based argument: “I have a right to opt-out of maximizing 
total good when it directly harms me.” We’ve reached an impasse here.  Mr. Price insists that he is not a moral villain; if he could have it his way, the poorest and most vulnerable would be cared for, but not on the premise that he must be forced to participate through regulations and taxation. Why would he make such a claim? Perhaps, autonomy takes moral priority over equitable wealth distribution. In any case, he would be arguing that providing affordable services to the most vulnerable is a worthy goal. However, that does not mean that it should 
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be directly his problem, and that he should not have ultimate say in how and when he chooses to participate in that endeavor. The problem then becomes this. I. Prudential, egocentric considerations are eminently rational (within a framework of accepted legal and social sanctions). II. There are normatively-binding altruistic reasons and greater-good reasons that it sometimes makes sense to pursue. III. But there is no arbitrating principle that allows us to definitively settle a principled conflict between reasonable, egocentric considerations and altruistic and greater-good considerations.  I know that I would do better for myself not to contribute to the coffer, and I appreciate that doing otherwise would be good under some description, but there is no self-certified principle that says I should sacrifice my egocentric pursuit for the greater good in this case. Moreover, no one doubts the obvious fact that self-care is both justified and consists of a dynamic set of personal concerns that we must balance in nearly all situations. To better reflect this, I need to add the following claims.  IV. Unless we have knowledge of an arbitrating principle, it would make more sense for us to pursue what benefits us personally (when in doubt, and all things being equal, self-care is the obvious choice.).  V. We do not have knowledge of such a principle.  VI. Conclusion: when in a conflict of principles, self-care is the obvious choice, which leads to the damning conclusion that: 
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VII. The altruist and do-gooder acts irrationally when confronting a conflict of principles between self-interest and altruistic and greater-good considerations.   We want to reject (VII). Why? Say a man hurls himself in front of a car to protect a stranger from being hit. This seems to be a clear case of potential conflict, and we want to say that his heroic deed is morally good. However, based on the points above, this forces us to accept the conclusion that the act is both morally good and irrational (or extra-rational). This implies that, to this extent, morality is irrational. But even if we reject (VII), we still do not know how or when we are justified in acting on those considerations when they conflict with egocentric considerations. This might motivate endorsing some form of ethical egoism (the view that we are morally sanctioned to always pursue an egocentric principle). However, aside from it being a flawed theory, it does not make immediate sense of our intuition that altruism and greater-good considerations are not always irrational (and certainly not morally bad). It rejects the moral worth of sincere altruism altogether. Another option is rational egoism (the view that other-regarding considerations are justified by improving our own situation in the long run). This is more promising, because we can certainly show how greater-good considerations can benefit us in the long run, but we would need some complicated principles to show how it accommodates altruism. However, an attenuated form of rational egoism might work. This would take the form of a so-
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called harmonizing strategy.1 If we can show that advancing our own practical interests can advance a maximally better state of the world, then both self and other are served. We would still need to show how altruism fits into this picture. But harmony seems to be the best bet.      Some of the thinkers I will assess pursue versions of this strategy. For example, Samuel Scheffler2 argues that it is partly constitutive of value-driven creatures like us to include relationships and the good of others in the scope of our goals. My account of the so-called normative self (particularly in chapter 4) similarly argues that how we constitute our values, projects, and our own practical identity includes a primary acknowledgement and appreciation for the independent value of others; the self remains an underdeveloped notion without an appreciation for how it constitutes its own worth by coordinating with others, and by taking their needs seriously. Psychological egoism—the view that we are always and only driven by self-interest—is simply unconvincing when we consider how much our own self-interest is bound up with the good of our neighbors, our social peers, and our nearest and dearest. The ruthless or brazen egoist is simply an aberration, and more of a philosophical bogeyman than a standard (though he can materialize as a real President of an apparently real country!). Hobbes was wrong (see Leviathan, Part                                                       1 Caspar Hare, On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2009), 2. Hare describes this as the “peacemaker’s” strategy. Harmony consists of a situation in which: whenever a mild egocentric hedonist favors a situation in which she suffers less, she thereby favors a simply better maximal state of affairs.   2 Samuel Scheffler, “Potential Congruence,” Morality and Self-Interest, ed. Paul Bloomfield (New York: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2008). Also see, Samuel Scheffler, 
“Morality and Reasonable Partiality,” in Equality and Tradition: Questions of Value in 
Moral and Political Theory (New York: Oxford, 2010): 41-76. 
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VII.1), and, bracketing the cogency of his argument, Plato’s conclusion was mostly right.   On the other hand, the South Asian philosophical traditions provide an 
important distinction that considerably nuances the problem. For the early Pāli Buddhist texts, the ego-self—the historical, culturally situated, and practical self—is 
bound to cycles of suffering, because it “craves” existence, and attaches itself to the fruits of the world, while desperately trying to avert what it finds to be unpleasant. This is one sense in which the ego-self is always a “duḥkha-self” (a suffering-self). This pan-Buddhist belief is encountered in some key Mahāyāna texts as well. In fact, barring the intricacies of Indian and Indo-Tibetan Tantrism, we could say that this is simply a pan-Indian, religio-philosophical belief. In some sense, psychological egoism is a basic state of the constructed ego (ahaṅkāra). However, I think this goes too far. Oftentimes, our deep appreciation for the needs and well-being of others is also an attachment that keeps us tethered to cycles of suffering. It’s not that we are all psychological egoists. Instead, we are desperately attached to the agonies and ecstasies that come out of our actions, which, in turn, constitute us and our loved ones in this world. For those South Asian philosophers that endorse the belief in an underlying self, the key to freedom and well-being lies in seeing through the veil of the ego. The metaphysical self is more than just substance or Aristotelian 
hypokeimenon (subject), but also an experiential ground that transcends the narrow needs and values of the ego (ahaṅkāra). On the other hand, for Buddhists, who reject the authority of the Vedas and Upaniṣads, the key to freedom lies in experiencing and understanding the illusion of the self without attaching to some 
 xii 
reified entity like the metaphysical self (ātman). How a thinker makes sense of the 
“essencelessness” or “emptiness” of self (nihsvabhāvatā or śūnyatā), will, among other epistemological and ontological considerations, determine what sort of Buddhist philosophy she endorses. In chapter 2, I cover, from a logical point of view, a variety of No-Self views to help situate how one might reject belief in a real self.3   However, and to the point at hand, the distinction between an ego-reifier (ahaṅkāra), and, either metaphysical selflessness or a transcendent subject, impact how we think about self-interest. One South Asian thinker, Śāntideva (c. 8th Century C.E.) seems to argue that seeing through the illusory persistence of the ego defuses obsession with narrowly prudential reasons, thereby providing rational grounds for 
altruism. However, as a Mādhyamika Buddhist (whose view is either deflationary or                                                       3 Consider this a prolegomenon of sorts to an inter-cultural assessment of selfhood. I note this, because the No-Self, or, “without-Self” claim (anātman), and its practical and rhetorical uses, can take on decidedly distinct implications throughout the 
many “Buddhisms” that span the texts of the Pāli-Theravāda tradition, to first millennium Sanskrit texts, to the Indo-Tibetan and Chan and Zen texts. Much of what I have here is a rational reconstruction grounded more firmly in the robustly metaphysical debates of Indian-Sanskrit texts from roughly 6th century to 11th century CE. Dr. Peter Hershock, in a personal conversation, has pointed out that the 
early adoption of “without-self” for the Pāli tradition appears to have been more of a practical concept with minimal metaphysical commitment—especially because the Buddha was known to avoid deep metaphysical claims—and that an early adopter of Buddhist practice was enjoined to see the self as no-self; that is, to recognize that the self is not fixed or bound to Brahmanical caste (varṇa). Hershock suggests that given the large number of working class and agricultural (vaiśya) adopters of Buddhism, an existential crisis may have loomed for these early devotees, and 
anātman may have been a device for re-orienting the interpretive possibilities of selfhood, a call to author a self from outside the constraints of caste and Brahmanical society. While I do not have the space to explore this intriguing point through textual and historical analysis, one would do well in revisiting 
Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga, a canonical Theravāda compendium that construes No-self in practical terms, and does seem to eschew a deeply metaphysical gloss of the concept. Much of how I treat what I call the Normative Self in chapter 4 is 
consistent with Hershock’s point that the “No-self” of Pāli texts is a practical self who must learn to author itself through its commitments and intentions.  
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radically dismissive of any metaphysical assumptions), Śāntideva does not endorse the view that there is a transcendent self that supports universalizable and impartial 
principles of justice and morality. Śāntideva believes that metaphysical selflessness is tantamount to an admission that, all things considered, prioritizing our future (non)-selves is really a matter of pragmatism and degree. Any reasons guiding us to focus on our (non)-futures are reasons we can extend to all other present and future (non)-selves. Like Derek Parfit after him, Śāntideva believes that recognizing metaphysical selflessness, to some extent, deflates the rationale for obsession with narrow self-interest. There is simply no persisting self in which to place too much stock. On the other hand, Śāntideva offers a controversial positive claim: it is precisely metaphysical selflessness that justifies impartial care and universalizable reasons. When we can view all suffering as suffering as such—something unowned and generalized—we can respond to it impartially and without concern for the ego’s self-interest. In short, we can become altruists.   In chapter 2 (and more broadly in chapter 1), I examine this claim. I argue that metaphysical selflessness is consistent with acts of omission and negligence, and thereby consistent with some forms of practical selfishness. However, in chapter 3, I develop my own version of what I’m calling, Emptiness Ethics, which is 
inspired by Śāntideva's account. I ultimately argue that this account is deficient, primarily because I believe that a more robust notion of self explains how altruism is even possible. When we limit the conversation to the interests of the ego-self, we ignore the fact that selves are emotionally porous (to be explained in the body of this work), and they are porous as selves, not as bundles of psychophysical property 
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tropes. The metaphysical-ontological reasons that may support belief in the reality of a substantive, metaphysical self goes beyond the scope of the present work. However, as ethicists who believe that impartial standards describe an important part of what we mean by morality, we must to some extent invest in a view of reality that is not completely immersed in situation, historical context, and narrative self-identity. Still, thinkers like Michael Sandel,4 to name a few, resist such a view, and this is precisely why they take liberal thinkers like John Rawls5 to task. Whether Rawls has invested in a metaphysical self, or, instead, has operated from an “as-if” political model that makes better sense of the phenomenon of justice as fairness (as I understand him to argue in Political Liberalism), he envisions the possibility of a self both recognizing itself as self, and yet viewing itself as possibly anyone (hence, 
Rawls’s “veil of ignorance”). Christine M. Korsgaard6 attempts to navigate the divide between a radically situated, practical identity, and universalizable principles that emerge from an impartial view of the self as sharing in a kingdom of rational, universal ends. For Korsgaard, at the periphery of more local practical identities, we each have the capacity to identify with the role of humanity (and this is an exclusively practical rather than metaphysical consideration). As I point out in chapter 1, she believes that the metaphysics of self and personal identity do not 
                                                      4 In addition to Sandel’s numerous articles critiquing contemporary liberalism, a classic text that lays out his communitarian thesis is: Michael Sandel, Liberalism and 
the Limits of Justice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982) 5 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 6 Christine M. Korsgaard, “Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian 
Response to Parfit,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 18, no. 2 (1989): 101-132. Also see, Christine M. Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity (Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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directly bear on practical, ethical questions. I also explain in chapter 1 why I disagree, which brings me to the outline of my argument.  The problem centers on the conflict in authority between self-interest and altruistic and greater-good considerations. My view is that thinking in terms of a strictly personal set of ego-interests versus consideration for strictly distinct others produces the problem; however, we do not need to limit our view of self to such a distinction, and this is the key to solving the problem. Interests are not ultimately a narrow band of outcomes that apply solely to an ego-self. But, as we’ve seen, not seeking the best possible, first-order outcomes for oneself does not always mean that one gives up self-interest and prudence; rather, it can also mean that at a higher-order of analysis, one can also include the good of others as part of what constitutes one’s self-interest in terms of personal rewards and achievements. I am going to show how that is possible.  However, my solution should not be conflated with a similar, but importantly distinct solution. The distinct solution I refer to might look something like this: I can 
include the good of others as part of my personal value set. By “personal value set” I mean that in serving these others, I am, by extension, serving my radically situated self. Others come into the picture, but the rationale for caring about them is that I advance my higher-order interests. This is bound up with my narrative identity, my history, and my personal projects and goals. This does not mean that I do not care about others; on the contrary, I learn to identify closely with their good, and their good becomes part of my personal good. This is an oblique form of rational egoism, 
 xvi 
because if I cannot personally identify with their good, I have no reason to promote it. I believe my solution is not a disguised form of rational egoism.   
HOW I CAN BE AN ALTRUIST IN A NORMATIVE SENSE I can include the feelings, motivations, and concerns of others as intrinsically valuable to the self as such; not the ordinary, ego-self, but the self that identifies with selfhood and subjectivity as such. When I do so, I advance 
the good of a “we-self” and not just a “me-self.” This is less an experience of 
personal reward, and more an experience of acting “because it must be 
done.”   To make sense of this, I must provide a view of subjectivity that distinguishes between an ego-self (ahaṅkāra) and an experience of subjectivity as such. Thus, a few preliminary points are in order. First, I believe our capacity to envision selfhood as such is bound up with intersubjectivity. Contrary to Korsgaard (as I read her), this is not a purely practical matter. In fortunate moments, we can radically share our emotional lives with one another, and this is not just a matter of inference, nor is it because the ascription of mental properties is strictly functional talk for physical behavior (either in the subjunctive, as the logical behaviorist might have it, or solely in the use of language, as one might read latter Wittgenstein). Rather, and secondly, I believe we can be open to sharing subjective worlds, because self-awareness is basic to consciousness, which is not to exclude the abundant unconscious thoughts and feelings we harbor; to the contrary, the kind of self-awareness I’m talking about is mostly an implicit sense of presence, and such background awareness is by its very nature not represented as being delimited by context, situation, or body. I am not 
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making the ontological claim that background self-awareness is in fact free of 
limitations, or unencumbered by a body. Rather, I’m pointing out how background self-awareness remains attuned to a broader expanse of possibilities that are not directly tethered to narrative identity and ego-hood; it relates to self as such, and 
not only to self as “this body” or “this history.” Unencumbered by such representations, it remains open to the experience of subjectivity in general, and thus open to the expression and experience of other subjectivities. I also do not believe that we experience things like suffering and joy as radically ownerless (or something purely emergent from a selfless bundle of psychophysical property tropes). In some sense, when shared and co-owned, suffering can show up as simply 
suffering (and in this sense, there is a quality of ownerlessness), but that is only in contrast with the mundane view of the radically private ego-self, who can only 
indirectly experience another’s feelings.  This underlying sense of self supports our capacity to share our world with others, and, at times, recognize that the individual ego supervenes over this larger 
sense of “we-ness.” This is not so distinct from Buddhists like Śāntideva speaking (I suppose, metaphorically?) of a collective, interdependent field of selfhood. However, the point is not that we lose all traces of self, but rather, that the self does not always delimit its sense of presence (and responsibility) to a single, embodied, and historically situated entity. The self can identify with selfhood writ large, and when it encounters other agents who suffer or act toward their valued ends, it can identify with those purposive actions. 
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 Whatever reason there is for a self to avoid needless suffering; whatever reason there is to respect the dignity that comes with autonomy, and the power that comes with agency and purposive action; such reasons apply to selfhood as such; to the sense of delighting in pure presence. In this state of identification, we do not 
recognize these reasons as being “only my” reasons; we can simply recognize them as motivating forces, which are sometimes represented as explicit principles, that extend to all those who share in selfhood. And this must mean that we recognize—not infer—other selves who share in that general presence. We can sometimes act purely for the sake of another as both other and as one’s self. The principle that might arbitrate between strictly egocentric considerations and altruistic and greater-good considerations emerges from an experience of suffering as such, which, given the peculiar nature of suffering, simply demands action. That experience shows up as “we who suffer, and must alleviate suffering.”   My argument is based on an analysis of selfhood within a normative and a metaphysical framework. First, I argue that the everyday self is constituted by a sense of relationality and social-embeddedness, which is articulated through the capacity and urge to communicate and be understood. I expect you to honor my wish not to suffer at the hands of cruelty, and I successfully communicate and understand that need to the extent that I recognize the applicability of that wish to you. It is therefore only natural that I recognize a reason to honor that wish, irrespective of its advantage to my personal projects and immediate desires. The normative framework this presupposes requires a self that recognizes reasons that transcend self-regarding desires (and, perhaps, desires altogether). If this is true, 
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then the concept of a robust divide between self and other—the sort of divide that sets the egoism and altruism debate into motion—emerges out of an initial experience of primordial relationality and porousness. The concept of self develops in tandem with the concept of other, and ties many of the reasons one has for caring about oneself to reasons applicable to caring about another. There are goods that guide and motivate the action of a self that can only be understood as shared goods, things like the value of avoiding needless suffering and cruelty, of caring and being cared for, of enjoying respect and companionship, and having the space to pursue projects free of arbitrary constraints. Such motivating reasons appear only to the extent that they apply universally. Anytime one recognizes such reasons, and thereby promotes the good of another—irrespective of personal desires—one acts in a mundanely altruistic way, that is, one acts without immediate concern for one’s own advantage. I say “mundanely,” because it is possible to help a stranger simply because the stranger needs help, and this can be as simple as listening to and allowing a person who needs companionship to engage you when it is taxing and inconvenient. In other words, the other’s needs may become the sole target and motivator of action.   Still, the talk of “reasons” remains somewhat empty without assessing the nature of motivations; what theoretical ethics has referred to as the Problem of Motivation. A theory of self also impacts how we make sense of empathic identification and the experience of responsiveness to the demands others make upon us. I believe that emotions like compassion, for example, serve important epistemological functions. I come to know something about you and your needs 
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through the contagion of how you feel and how that makes me feel. I come to know your frustrations and the urgency of your needs (not only my private response to your emotive behavior), because the self is also emotionally porous. The manifest fact that we commit ourselves to various actions by way of a guiding good, enacts a self that is mostly unthinkable outside of embodied normative constraints and sharable, emotively-charged and motivating states. An entirely selfish self—or one emboldened by the belief that its primary concern is with its own needs—does not only challenge our ethical intuitions, but also fails to recognize the very elements that constitute selfhood. Consequently, it fails to recognize the very elements that support and constitute self-interest.    To help explain this shared emotional and normative framework, I likewise contend that the self is sometimes recognized as expressing a real and larger whole. I will directly address the term of art, “recognition” (pratyabhijñā) in my assessment of the Kashmiri Monist-Śaivite philosophical tradition of c. 9th-11th century C.E. India. For now, I basically mean that in clear and honest moments the other who suffers does so as part of myself (or simply, as self), which is just to say that an experiential space of co-owned suffering (something that transcends the limitations of my immediate history and constellation of personal concerns) discloses itself and calls for a response that I can only learn to ignore. Just as I can learn to ignore my 
own suffering, I can learn to ignore the other’s suffering. However, the ordinary self  rarely remains completely blind to the presence of another’s suffering; we can only learn to ignore what shows up to be dismissed, and I want to say that it shows up as 
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inherently motivational. So, let us not confuse ignorance with blindness, or the irresponsive and irresponsible person with the blind, moral monster.   I am also proposing that our ethical experience shapes the metaphysics that help organize our experiences, in the sense that the ethical attractiveness of a framework provides a reason to endorse it. We construct the world through an ethically salient and shared lens. When suffering occurs, in some sense, the whole suffers (to be developed in my final chapter), which may provide me with the shared motivation to thwart such suffering. Through shared feelings, we can sometimes experience reality without solipsistically fixed partitions, or, an entirely singular point of view. Ethical responsiveness and ethical responsibility—in the form of a gripping call to action—disclose and shape the space of our experiences.   This is not Mill’s argument for utility. I do not assume that because each person values their own happiness, that each necessarily values the happiness of all. I find myself most pressingly concerned with a particular person’s suffering, and not just an abstract principle or an abstract whole. On one level of description, I must bridge a metaphysical gap between my immediate first-person experience and a suffering that indirectly shows up as another’s. And from this level of description, philosophy must contend with the epistemological and ontological problem of other minds. How is it that I come to know what you need, and know what motivates you or how to help you? How exactly do I come to recognize your needs as independently valid? But on another level of description, the gap was never there to begin with, which is just to say that the composite is not a fiction or conceptual imputation, but rather a background presupposition that allows me to share a world 
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with you. The part and the whole are real. I call this Mereological Holism, and I will describe this in detail in my final chapter. The upshot of this metaphysics is that it is possible to act from something far deeper than a principle or duty or rational constraint. This does justice to the manifest fact that we are motivated and affectively charged to shape our concerns into something like a principle, and that our concerns are often highlighted to a far richer degree in the face of our loved ones and our neighbors, with whom we more closely share a world. In this way, metaphysics finds its worth in its service to our basic ethical intuitions.   So, this is an essay about the nature of the self and the metaphysics of shared disclosure at the service of our ethical experience. The possibility I wish to explore is one that not only critiques what may seem attractive in ethical and rational egoism; I wish to examine the possibility of altruism being grounded in how we naturally constitute and share ourselves. The juggling act consists of developing a model of selfhood that supports the possibility of being rationally compelled to act solely for another’s sake, while making sense of how we can know the other, and directly share an emotional life that grips us in the form of a motivating obligation.   The first possibility is grounded in what I call the Normative Self, which is 
constituted by embodied participation in the authoring of one’s selfhood through commitments and avowals and disavowals. These commitments run more broadly than normatively rich social roles, or, what Korsgaard calls, “practical identity.”7  These commitments presuppose a complex and dynamic process of deliberation and tacit appropriation, which forges a dynamic but unified and integrated self through                                                       7 Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity. 
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speech-acts that partly constitute the introspective experience of having a point of 
view. I develop this point more fully in my final chapter. I contend that the normative self provides us with desire-independent reasons8 to take others seriously, but it falls short of explaining how we directly experience and are motivated by the affective life of another. In short, the normative self provides reasons and obligations, while what I’m calling the Metaphysical View provides the emotive channel that compels us to action. I do not believe these are ultimately separate domains—the cognitive versus the conative—but, instead, argue that the normative framework co-emerges with the metaphysical framework.     This last point speaks to the second feature of the juggling act; what I have referred to as the metaphysical view. This self is not empirically observed, nor is it entirely personal. Instead, it refers to a unity that supports an otherwise fragmented and dislocated flow of psychophysical events. The unity and integrating synthesis lies in something much broader than a historically located constellation of personal experiences. This is an experience of direct connectedness, which at the level of everyday empirical and embodied historicity looks like an ownerless event. This may be reflected in the experience of losing a part of one’s self when another perishes, or experiencing the collective guilt that comes with a terrible collective deed, or the pride that comes with collective integrity.    
                                                      8 John R. Searle, Rationality in Action (Hong Kong: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001). 
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 The task here is to bridge the metaphysical gap between self and other, a gap that European ethicists like Henry Sidgwick9 viewed as an insurmountable obstacle to deciding which sorts of reasons—self-regarding or other-regarding—hold ultimate authority. For Sidgwick, both sorts of reasons hold equal authority, and therefore ethics will always reach an impasse when it comes to principled conflicts between egocentric versus altruistic and greater-good reasons.    In chapter 1, I lay out the landscape of this problem, and I develop a broad overview of a strategy developed in 1st millennium, Indian Buddhism. I am referring to various iterations of No-Self and Bundle-theory views of selfhood; basically, error-theories about the self. The idea is that, first, showing how the self does not exist can surmount the gap that fuels the problem, and, second, personal identity is not what matters most when it comes to examining the reasons we have for doing things. The usual critique of this strategy is that metaphysical non-commitments (and metaphysical views in general) do not deliver robust ethical upshots. The practical domain is as sharply divided from the ontological-metaphysical domain as the self is from the other. In chapter 1, I argue against this view to motivate the relevance of the No-Self and Bundle-theory options. I do so by arguing that speech-acts—even theoretical assertions and beliefs—commit us to various sorts of actions, particularly the adoption of further beliefs. In this sense, normativity is built into our discourse, and theoretical assertions importantly contribute to shaping and 
                                                      9 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1981, republication of 7th edition, 1907). 
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guiding action.10 I also argue that the No-Self option—at least at its broadest level—does not necessarily motivate unselfish and altruistic action; but this is not because 
it attempts to derive an “ought” from an “is.” Instead, I argue that non-egocentricity—that is, a self that no longer recognizes selfhood in the world—may provide just as much reason to selfishly neglect required actions as it does to sacrifice one’s own advantage for the sake of another. In short, we need a more developed notion of selfhood to make sense of altruistic action.  In chapter 2, I situate varieties of the No-Self theory. I then examine a unique No-Self option provided by the Mādhyamika-Mahāyāna thinker, Śāntideva. 
Śāntideva is a target for study, because his work arguably comes the closest in the Buddhist philosophical corpus to a worked-out, systematic ethical system. But more 
importantly, Śāntideva coins an argument from ownerlessness that I wish to appropriate in my final argument in chapter 4. I also engage some of the abundant 
literature assessing Śāntideva's ownerlessness argument. I conclude that only more robust metaphysical assumptions (in addition to a key normative claim) may allow the No-Self and Ownerlessness views to entail an ethics of altruism. The problem for 
Śāntideva is that he endorses the Madhyamaka (“middling”) view of Buddhism, which eschews metaphysics altogether (or at least presents a deflationary view that can hardly help itself to robust metaphysical claims). However, the value of his work for my purposes lies in its emphasis on the ownerlessness of suffering. For 
Śāntideva, suffering is inherently bad and ultimately ownerless. So, if there is any reason under any circumstances to thwart suffering, then it applies to all equally. I                                                       10 Or, as Searle argues, all discourse is fundamentally practical. See Rationality in 
Action, especially chapter 2.  
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examine this line of argument thoroughly in chapter 2. The key fault I find with it (and develop in chapter 4) is that ownerlessness does not have strong ethical upshots without the support of a more developed notion of self. This sounds paradoxical, but my argument is that we can share motivations and feelings with 
others, and in this sense, they are “ownerless.” We could equally claim that motivating feelings are co-owned when they are shared. However, I stress them being ownerless, because these exalted experiences exist at a level of generality in which we are motivated by suffering as such (for reasons I have already provided). By recognizing integrated unity—both at the level of individual, sentient life-streams, and at the level of the whole—recognition of “ownerlessness” in terms of 
shared fields of consciousness provide motivating and emotively-charged reasons for action. My argument falls under a harmonizing strategy, with the caveat that both the individual and the whole are real. When we recognize this, we recognize ourselves acting as and for another: we achieve identity amidst difference.   In chapter 3, I attempt to provide a more worked-out and palatable version of Emptiness Ethics. I do so by appropriating the post-modern concept of “the 
Other” that we find in Levinas.11 Basically, I try my best to develop a No-Self ethics by drawing from a deflationary-minimalist reading of Madhyamaka Buddhism in tandem with a general reading of Levinas. I examine the argument that self-regarding considerations are only attenuated forms of other-regarding considerations, which collapses the metaphysical distinction altogether. I try to show how in the practical domain, this amounts to a kind of harmony between self-                                                      11 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, transl. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 1969).  
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regarding and other-regarding considerations, a harmony that would justify and motivate altruism. However, in chapter 4, I point out where I think this version of the view goes wrong.   Altruism operates in more mundane ways, and it plays a foundational role in ethical maturity. Moreover, emotional states, like compassion, are bound up with the reasons we have for doing things. Without the sort of empathy that moves me to take up your cause as my own, I would not be attuned to the experience of ethical 
responsibility. It’s not enough to say that when I’m egoistic and selfish I am primarily or only bound to myself, as though that were the experience of principled responsibility for myself. Such blind egoism is mostly not experienced as responsibility, but rather as impulse and natural inclination; it’s purely motivational without a developed sense of the experiential modality of justification, which always requires a public world and an experience of otherness. The selfish person may know better, but nevertheless make morally bad and self-serving choices. But I believe that consistent and pathological selfishness betrays a muddled view of what is generally operative as a background presupposition for consciousness, namely, an integrating sense of general selfhood. Thus, recognizing justified motivations for altruism is a kind of gnosis. Extreme and pathological selfishness is both the amoral inability to experience ethical phenomena, and a distracted or delusional state (moha) that covers over what is operative in the reflexivity of consciousness.  
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 In chapter 4, I’ll develop an aspectual metaphysics that views the universe as multivalent,12 which means its individuals are, under one aspect, distinct and singular, but under another aspect, simply an expression of the whole; and this means that we can describe the universe in distinct but equally true ways. As one aspect, the person I witness on the news leaving pipe-bombs in New York City is other, and the whole does not bear his sins. Under another aspect, the whole is that very act of aggression. This sort of metaphysics supports a phenomenology in which an individual identifies with the suffering of others, and experiences their needs as overwhelmingly motivational. According to this metaphysical model, the experience of overcoming egoistic considerations may reach an exalted pitch. Out of the experience of exalted fullness, we can overwrite egocentricity. The outcome amounts to what I call, Exalted Altruism. This refers to a state in which our deliberations take on an exceedingly other-centric tone, one that may be viewed as supererogatory from the everyday state of transactional reality.  
                                                      12 The classic paper in aspectual metaphysics is Donald Baxter, “Identity in the 
Loose and Popular Sense,” Mind 97 (1988): 575-582. See also, D. Baxter, “Many-One 
Identity,” Philosophical Papers 17 (1988): 193-216. For a recent publication that provides thorough analysis and clarification of what is at stake in such a metaphysic, 
see Jason Turner, “Donald Baxter’s Composition as Identity” in Composition as 
Identity, eds. D. Baxter and A.J. Cotnoir (New York, Oxford University Press, 2014): 225-243. Turner captures the key thesis of Baxter’s position as follows: “Baxterian CAI [composition as identity] …holds that each part is identical to an aspect of the whole—which aspect is identical to the whole itself” (225-26). Thus, existence 
would be “count-relative” (226). This amounts to the claim that Leibniz’s Law under certain counts can fail. So, Kevin-as-a-father may spend too much time traveling away from home, but Kevin-as-an-itinerate philosopher may not spend enough time away from home (on work related trips), or might spend an adequate and expected amount away from home. In some sense, then, a thing can be different from itself under aspects (not properties) which, taken as properties, would be contradictory.  
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 To bolster this view, I assess the problem of other minds, and critique the view that we come to know the other through indirect inference rather than shared psychophysical states. As this problem was richly developed in the work of the 
Buddhist logician, Dharmakīrti (c. 6th century C.E.), who provided a unique account of the inference strategy, I will assess and critique his argument through the lens of 
the Pratyabhijñā (“Recognition”) School of Kashmiri-Monism in the likes of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta (c. 10th and 11th century C.E., respectively). While, for me, the metaphysics are mostly exploratory, I believe they are attractive from an ethical standpoint, insofar as they provide an attractive account of how one’s sense of self-identity may sublate narrative and normative identity (in the Hegelian sense of an appropriative negation, or, aufhebung).   My key thesis is that altruism is not only a fundamental aspect of ethical maturity, but also a fundamental aspect of how we come to robustly know each other. By knowing each other, we simultaneously come to know ourselves. We neither entirely transcend our individuality, nor completely lose sight of the whole that is our individuality. We are identical as difference, and our difference expresses our identity. Politically, in so far as we act collectively while respecting this differential identity, we can make a difference.       
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CHAPTER	1.	SELFHOOD	AND	ETHICAL	AGENCY:	OWNING	MORAL	
SELFLESSNESS	
1.1	Introduction		 We	make	plans,	pursue	goals,	and	fret	over	the	outcomes	of	our	actions.	Even	if	choice	is	a	grand	illusion,	we	hold	others	to	their	promises	and	obligations,	and	sometimes	let	ourselves	down,	believing	that	we	could	have	and	should	have	done	better.	We	also	struggle	to	act	on	what	we	believe	it	makes	better	sense	to	do,	and	in	this	way,	we	are	sensitive	to	the	action-guiding	force	of	reasons.	This	presupposes	that	in	our	everyday	conception	of	what	it	means	to	be	a	person,	we	assume	that	we	are	the	owners	of	our	actions	and	our	bodies.	We	at	very	least	naturally	believe	that	we	must	take	responsibility	for	some	of	the	feelings	we	experience	and	some	of	the	motivations	that	impel	us	to	act.	We	articulate	this	in	our	expectations	and	our	relationships.	Being	responsible	and	forward-looking	persons	driven	to	make	specific	choices	that	are	material	to	our	aims	requires	conceiving	of	the	agentive	self	as	something	that	persists	beyond	the	ephemeral	moment.			 These	everyday	presuppositions	are	enacted	through	social	relationships,	which	require	adept	sensitivity	to	the	requirements	of	reciprocity,	mutuality,	and	cooperation.	“Reciprocity”	means	that	we	are	motivated	to	cooperate	with	those	who	cooperate	with	us,	and	we	are	likewise	motivated	to	act	nasty	to	those	who	act	nasty	to	us.	Overall,	cooperation	requires	that	we	care	about	and	take	the	plans	of	others	seriously.	We	even	sometimes	take	steps	to	promote	those	plans	at	our	own	individual	expense.	In	fact,	experiments	have	shown	that	when	given	an	option	to	punish	free-riders	who	take	advantage	of	asymmetrical	power	relations,	that	is,	
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those	who	behave	in	ways	that	are	perceived	to	be	unjust	or	non-egalitarian,	we	frequently	opt	for	punishment	at	considerable	expense	to	our	own	advantage.1	We	also	sometimes	voluntarily	act	against	our	own	perceived	self-interest	to	reward	or	provide	care	for	others.	So	on	the	surface,	it	seems	that	rational	self-interest	is	not	always	a	primary	motivating	force,	and	sincere	concern	for	justice	and	the	well-being	of	others	may	motivate	action	even	at	the	price	of	the	agent’s	own	disadvantage	or	undoing.			 Making	sense	of	this	sort	of	agency	requires	a	compelling	account	of	selfhood.	There	seems	to	be	little	mystery	when	it	comes	to	explaining	self-interested	actions:	survival	and	genetic	replication	account	for	the	adaptive	success	of	self-interested	motivations.	But	knowingly	acting	against	one’s	own	perceived	self-interest	remains	puzzling.	How	do	we	make	sense	of	such	altruistic	action?	While	biology	and	the	social	sciences	have	grappled	with	this	question,	I’m	interested	in	developing	a	philosophical	interpretation	of	selfhood	that	makes	sense																																																									1	Francesco	Guala,	“Reciprocity:	Weak	or	strong?	What	Punishment	Experiments	Do	(and	Do	Not)	Demonstrate,”	Behavioral	and	Brain	Sciences,	35	(2012):	1-59.	In	this	article,	Guala	assesses	some	of	the	upshots	of	experiments	designed	around	the	“Ultimatum	Game,”	which	is	a	game	theoretical	construct.	A	is	given	a	large	sum	of	money,	but	told	that	she	has	to	share	some	of	it	with	B.	If	B	declines	the	offer,	then	neither	A	nor	B	gets	to	keep	the	money.	In	a	majority	of	cases,	when	A	gives	what’s	perceived	by	B	to	be	an	unfair	amount,	B	declines	the	offer	even	though	she	would	have	earned	something	rather	than	nothing.	In	all	fairness,	Guala	cautions	us	not	to	conflate	the	results	of	artefactual—or	highly	contrived	experiments—with	natural	field	experiments.	The	point	of	the	article	is	to	assess	the	methodological	constraints	and	merits	of	two	competing	theories	that	social	scientists	have	developed	to	make	sense	of	actions	that	are	not	on	the	surface	driven	by	rational	self-interest.	“Weak	reciprocity”	theory	claims	that	this	is	done	in	a	forward-looking	way,	and	is	ultimately	derivative	of	prudent	and	self-interested	considerations.	“Strong	reciprocity”	theory	claims	that	we	have	evolved	certain	social	preferences	toward	equitable	and	just	relationships,	and	will	often	forfeit	self-interest	in	order	to	secure	such	relationships.				
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of	this	dynamic	range	of	motivations.	In	doing	so,	I	will	draw	from	classical	(1st	millennium)	Indian	philosophy,	which	has	provided	a	trove	of	novel	analyses	of	selfhood,	some	of	which	radically	revise	our	everyday	conceptions.	For	some,	like	the	Indian	Buddhists,	such	revisions	are	thought	to	make	sense	of	how	an	agent	can	be	motivated	to	act	unselfishly.	In	fact,	throughout	the	corpus	of	both	Buddhist	and	Brahmanical	Sanskrit	texts,	emphasis	is	placed	on	cultivating	a	greater	range	of	motivations	that	transcend	the	narrow	limits	of	the	ego.	For	the	Mahāyāna	Buddhist,	successfully	transcending	perpetual	cycles	of	anguish	and	suffering	requires	curbing	self-interested	actions,	and	cultivating	compassion	and	altruistic	motivations.				 I	want	to	assess	conceptions	of	selfhood	that	compellingly	makes	sense	of	unselfish	agency.	While	radically	reductive	or	revisionary	views	of	selfhood,	the	sort	we	find	in	Indian	Buddhist	philosophy	and	Derek	Parfit’s	work,	may	lead	one	to	view	agency	and	ownership	as	a	useful,	conventional	fiction,	we	still	need	a	view	of	selfhood	that	makes	sense	of	responsibility,	desert,	commitment,	and	the	shared	practices	presupposed	in	carrying	out	the	intentions	involved	in	linguistic	communication.2	Afterall,	Buddhist	philosophy	is	developed	in	tandem	with	a	practical	curriculum	designed	to	achieve	enlightened,	compassionate,	and	ethically	attuned	agency.	The	Buddha	wanted	to	change	both	what	you	think	and	what	you	do.	Likewise,	Parfit	believes	that	his	revisionary	metaphysics	has	a	transformative,																																																									2	See	Paul	Grice,	“Meaning,”	Philosophical	Review	66	(1957):	377-388.	Cited	in	Richard	Sorabji,	Self:	Ancient	and	Modern	Insights	About	Individuality,	Life,	and	Death	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2006),	28.	Sorabji	writes:	“If	I	am	right	that	‘I’-thoughts	enter	into	intentions,	they	will	enter	also	into	much	else	that	is	essential	to	human	life.	Much	of	our	agency	involves	intention.	So	too,	I	believe,	does	our	linguistic	communication.	For	I	accept	Paul	Grice’s	further	view	that	for	a	speaker	to	mean	something,	except	in	the	special	case	of	soliloquy,	is	to	intend	to	produce	an	effect	in	the	hearer.”	
	 4	
ethical	upshot.3	In	this	regard,	both	the	Buddhists	and	Parfit	seem	to	argue	that	we	not	only	can	revise	our	view	of	selves	as	owners	of	experiences,	but	we	ethically	
ought	to	do	so.	Revising	this	everyday	conception,	and	endorsing	the	view	that	we	are	complex	streams	of	connected	and	continuous	psychophysical	events	is	meant	to	curb	the	obsessive	focus	on	rational	self-interest,	and	produce	a	more	utilitarian-leaning	concern	for	the	overall	quantity	of	suffering	and	good	in	the	world.			 But	even	if	we	revise	(or	eliminate)	first-person	“I-thoughts”	with	an	impersonal	description	of	streams	of	consciousness,	we	need	a	clearer	sense	of	how	non-egocentric	considerations	for	the	greater	good—arguably,	a	basic	ingredient	in	moral	considerations—are	better	cultivated	by	embracing	an	impersonal	description	of	the	self	as	a	complex	stream	of	psychophysical	events.	I’m	interested	in	examining	how	such	a	view	motivates	the	ethically	attuned	agent.	What	conception	of	selfhood	compellingly	makes	sense	of	a	self	feeling	rationally	motivated	or	impelled	toward	unselfish,	non-egocentric,	other-regarding,	and	altruistic	agency?			 To	be	sure,	these	four	notions	are	not	synonymous,	but	they	are	all	relevant	to	making	sense	of	sociability,	mutuality,	and	moral	considerations.	So,	in	1.3,	I	will	analyze	these	notions,	and	lay	the	groundwork	for	a	conception	of	selfhood	that	makes	sense	of	their	employment.	In	doing	so,	I	hope	to	better	clarify	what	we	might	mean	by	morally	“selfless”	action.	In	1.2,	I	lay	out	the	problem—famously	identified																																																									3	Derek	Parfit,	Reasons	and	Persons	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1984,	corrected	edition,	1987),	281.	Parfit	writes,	“When	I	believed	that	my	existence	was	such	a	further	fact,	I	seemed	imprisoned	in	myself.	My	life	seemed	like	a	glass	tunnel,	through	which	I	was	moving	faster	every	year…When	I	changed	my	view,	the	walls	of	my	glass	tunnel	disappeared…There	is	still	a	difference	between	my	life	and	the	lives	of	other	people.	But	the	difference	is	less.	Other	people	are	closer.”			
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in	Sidgwick4—of	the	conflict	in	authority	between	self-regarding,	prudential	concerns,	and	other-regarding,	altruistic	concerns.	The	goal	here	is	to	show	how	the	Buddhist	and	Parfitian	revision	of	self-talk	is	meant	to	address	this	problem	by	collapsing	the	metaphysically	deep	distinction	between	self	and	other.	I	go	on	to	consider—and	critique—counter-arguments	to	the	view	that	an	impersonal	revision	of	selfhood	has	important	ethical	upshots.	My	main	argument	is	that	structural	beliefs,	particularly	metaphysical	beliefs,	can	have	important	normative	upshots	when	we	consider	how	descriptive	facts	in	general	commit	language-users	to	basic	sorts	of	actions.	Descriptive	statements	can	structure	what	it	makes	sense	to	want,	prefer,	or	do.	However,	I	do	not	ultimately	believe	that	the	Buddhist	revision	does	the	ethically	relevant	work	it	aims	to	do.	Nevertheless,	in	1.2,	I	am	mainly	countering	the	argument	that	our	practical	identity—the	“who”	of	agency	rather	than	the	“what”	of	selfhood—is	the	only	level	of	description	that	carries	normative	weight.	This	chapter	lays	out	the	general	problem	in	broad	strokes.	I	then	go	on	to	examine	in	more	detail	throughout	the	whole	of	this	work	how,	and	if	at	all,	a	Buddhist	or	Parfitian	theory	of	self	has	any	especially	practical	or	ethical	upshot	that	might	motivate	endorsement	of	the	revisionary	view.	In	this	sense,	I	am	asking	whether	the	ethical	outcomes	of	such	a	view	are	attractive	enough	to	motivate	our	metaphysical	position.	My	considered	view	is	that	they	do	not,	and	I	will	offer	a	different	position	in	chapter	4	that	I	believe	carries	enough	ethical	weight	to	motivate	the	endorsement	of	the	metaphysical	position	that	I	call,	“mereological	
																																																								4	See	Henry	Sidgwick,	The	Methods	of	Ethics,	(Indianapolis:	Hackett	Publishing,	1981,	republication	of	7th	edition,	1907).	
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holism”	(see	chapter	4).	I	build	this	view	by	fusing	it	with	a	normative	account	of	selfhood.				 However,	I	am	only	asking	in	broad	strokes	here	what	it	means	to	act	selflessly,	and	what	it	means	to	act	selfishly.	How	are	these	concepts	related	to	views	about	the	nature	of	the	self?	Various	philosophical-spiritual	practices	enjoin	us	to	pursue	“selfless”	behavior.	However,	in	Buddhist	thought—as	I’ve	said,	construed	broadly—an	ambiguity	exists	between	acting	“selflessly”	in	a	moral	sense,	and	acting	from	the	belief	that	no	real	self	exists.	For	the	1st	millennium	Indian	Buddhist,	nothing	metaphysically	unifies	the	psychophysical	events	that	constitute	the	flow	of	an	individual	stream	of	consciousness.	According	to	the	Buddhist	philosopher,	these	two	senses	of	“selflessness”	are	intimately	related.5	However,	the	debate	about	metaphysical	selflessness	seems,	at	least	on	the	surface,	not	only	morally	neutral,	but	also	irrelevant	to	practical	deliberation.	What	impact,	if	any,	does	metaphysical	selflessness	have	on	our	practical	deliberations?	What	does	it	matter	if	we’re	not,	as	the	Buddhist	and	Parfit	argue,	persisting	selves?	I	will	set	the	stage	in	this	chapter	for	answering	that	question,	while	clarifying	some	ambiguities	surrounding	moral	and	metaphysical	selflessness.	I	hope	to	provide	some	preliminary	conceptual	resources	for	making	sense	of	the	relationship	between	these	two	senses	of	selflessness.	I	will	argue	in	the	next	two	chapters,	and,	in	more	detail	in	chapter	3,	that	metaphysical	selflessness	is	not	the	most	important	concept																																																									5	Particularly	emphasized	in	Śāntideva’s	Bodhicaryāvatāra,	trans.	Kate	Cosby	and	Andrew	Skilton	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1995,	reissued	version,	2008),	8.134:	100	(henceforth,	BCA):	“The	calamities	which	happen	in	the	world,	the	sufferings	and	fears,	many	as	they	are,	they	all	result	from	clinging	onto	the	notion	of	self,	so	what	good	is	this	clinging	of	mine?”	I	use	Crosby	and	Skilton’s	English	translation	unless	otherwise	noted	or	translated	by	me.		
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a	No-Self	view	brings	to	the	table	with	respect	to	ethics.	Instead,	this	view	has	important	ethical	and	practical	ramifications	when	it	seeks	to	clarify	the	“sense	of	self”	that	we	experience.	Madhyamaka	Buddhist	thinkers	like	Candrakīrti	(c.	600	CE)	wanted	to	clarify	the	sense	of	self,	that	is,	the	phenomenological	“mineness”	and	“what-it’s-likeness”	of	first-person	experience—that	is,	ownership	and	
appropriation.	This	focus	provides	a	view	of	self	and	identity	that	forges	a	practical	link	(not	necessarily	a	deductive	entailment)	between	the	two	sorts	of	selflessness.	However,	I’ll	argue	that	while	this	is	the	strongest	reading	we	can	provide	for	the	link	between	the	two	sorts	of	selflessness	in	classical	Indian	Buddhism,	it	does	not	compellingly	make	sense	of	some	of	our	most	ineluctable	ethical	intuitions,	nor	does	it	provide	a	robust	enough	account	of	agency—the	very	sort	of	agency	that	would	allow	us	to	make	sense	of	being	unselfish	ethical	agents.	So,	I	will	examine	what	I	think	we	mean	when	we	call	someone	“selfish”	and	when	we	call	someone	“selfless”	in	an	ethically	relevant	way.	In	doing	so,	I’ll	make	an	important	distinction	between	egocentric,	non-egocentric,	and	selfish	considerations.	But	first,	and	as	a	preliminary	measure,	I	want	to	clarify	in	a	very	general	way	(to	be	assessed	further	in	the	next	chapter)	what	the	Buddhist	might	be	up	to	when	she	critiques	self-talk,	and	tries	to	make	it	relevant	to	practical	deliberation.	This	will	help	motivate	the	Buddhist	and	Parfitian	claim	that	radically	revising	our	commonsense	notion	of	selfhood	will	have	an	ethically	relevant	upshot.	
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1.2	Self-talk	and	Practical	Deliberations:	The	Gap	Between	Self	and	Other		 The	Buddhist,	like	Henry	Sidgwick,6	might	believe	that	the	distinction	between	oneself	and	another	produces	a	metaphysically	deep	rift	in	normative	perspectives.7	On	the	one	hand,	as	distinct	and	separate	selves,	we	are	faced	with	the	personal	task	of	securing	our	own	well-being	by	advancing	our	individual	self-interests.	“Self-interest”	might	be	understood	broadly,	and	from	the	first-person	perspective,	as	whatever	one	believes	will	make	her	life	go	as	well	as	possible.	While																																																									6	Sidgwick	and	the	reductionist-minded	Buddhist	(the	sort	of	Buddhist	philosopher	whose	view	pre-dates	and	parallels	Hume’s	fictionalist	account	of	self)	have	diametrically	opposed	views	about	the	self.	The	latter	takes	the	self	to	be	a	pernicious	fiction,	while	the	former	takes	it	to	be	inescapably	and	ontologically	basic.	Yet	they	share	this	conditional	assumption	that	if	one	retains	a	strict	boundary	between	self	and	other,	then	certain	momentous	moral	and	motivational	consequences	follow.	Sidgwick	entertains	and	then	quickly	dismisses	the	Humean-empiricist	view	as	failing	to	make	sense	of	egocentric	prudence.	See	Methods,	419:	“Grant	that	the	Ego	is	merely	a	system	of	coherent	phenomena,	that	the	permanent	identical	‘I’	is	not	a	fact	but	a	fiction,	as	Hume	and	his	followers	maintain;	why,	then	should	one	part	of	the	series	of	feelings	into	which	the	Ego	is	resolved	be	concerned	with	another	part	of	the	same	series,	any	more	than	with	any	other	series?”			 We	can	compare	this	to	Madhyamaka-Mahāyāna	Buddhists	like	Śāntideva,	for	whom	Sidgwick’s	reductio	becomes	a	premise	for	an	argument	promoting	universal	compassion	and	altruism	(BCA,	8.97-98:	96):	“If	I	give	[others]	no	protection	because	their	suffering	does	not	afflict	me,	why	do	I	protect	my	body	against	future	suffering	when	it	does	not	afflict	me?	The	notion	‘it	is	the	same	me	even	then’	is	a	false	construction,	since	it	is	one	person	who	dies,	quite	another	who	is	born.”	While	we	can	read	this	in	terms	of	a	future,	reincarnated	self,	we	can	also	read	this	in	terms	of	a	future	“surrogate-self”	that	replaces	its	predecessor	in	a	single	life-time.	Śāntideva	points	out	that	we	care	about	our	future-selves,	even	though,	strictly	speaking,	we	are	not	the	same	(or	identical	to)	these	future	iterations.	Why	not	extend	such	cares	to	strangers	in	our	current	field	of	interactions?	In	some	implicit	sense,	we	are	always	caring	for	what	is	other.	So	instead	of	dismissing	this	as	incoherent,	we	might	incorporate	this	deliberately	into	our	motivations.	I	will	develop	this	line	of	thought	in	chapter	3.		7	Methods,	498.	Also,	see	Samuel	Scheffler,	“Potential	Congruence,”	Morality	and	Self-
Interest,	ed.	Paul	Bloomfield	(New	York:	Oxford	Univeristy	Press,	2008):	117-136.	Scheffler	aims	to	revise	the	terms	under	which	we	speak	of	conflicts	between	morality	and	self-interest,	and	takes	issue	with	construing	these	concepts	as	metaphysically	distinct	domains,	or,	“distinct	normative	perspectives.”	
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there	may	or	may	not	be	an	objective	list	of	what	those	things	are,	this	is	immaterial	to	the	discussion	at	hand;8	my	broad	construal	is	adequate	for	my	purposes	here.		 Now,	concern	for	advancing	one’s	self-interest	over	time	has	been	called	“prudence.”	This	already	highlights	an	important	feature	of	agency,	namely,	it’s	forward-looking	nature.	We	each	anticipate	our	individual	future	welfare	and	suffering	in	a	way	that	we	simply	cannot	with	respect	to	another’s	future.	Even	if	I	am	highly	empathic,	a	simple	burn	I	incur	from	accidently	touching	a	hot	kettle	will	present	itself	much	more	vividly	and	viscerally	than	watching	or	hearing	about	thousands	of	others	burning	themselves.	9	My	own	pain	is	directly	present	in	a	way	that	your	pain	can	never	be.	I	can	say	that	my	pain	is	directly	experienced	by	me,	while	your	pain	is	vividly	imagined—or,	only	indirectly	experienced—by	me.	To	be																																																									8	For	thorough	analysis	of	plausible	theories	about	self-interest,	see	Parfit’s	Reasons	
and	Persons,	Appendix	1.		9	See	Caspar	Hare,	On	Myself,	and	Other,	Less	Important	Subjects	(New	Jersey,	Princeton	University	Press,	2009),	35.	Hare	inspired	this	example.	Hare’s	notion	of	insulated	and	private	“presence,”	or	the	manifestly	immediate	and	un-shareable	first-person	experience	informs	much	of	my	work	in	chapter	4.	Hare	argues	that	perceptions	being	“directly	present”	(versus	indirectly	imagined	in	the	case	of	other,	“less	important	subjects”),	are	relevant	to	the	task	of	harmonizing	egocentric-hedonistic	considerations	with	considerations	of	the	greater	good.	He	calls	his	view	“Egocentric	Presentism.”	Basically,	he	argues	that	his	considerations,	whether	self-regarding	or	other-regarding,	can	naturally	“harmonize,”	because	his	considerations	are	the	only	directly	present	goods	he	is	privy	to.	For	Hare,	the	problem	of	other	minds	is	empirically	intractable.	However,	we	can	imagine,	and	in	that	sense,	expand	our	constellation	of	considerations	and	motivations	through	a	fictionalist-semantics	of	other	minds:	the	other	is	always	only	indirectly	present.	The	point	is	that	egocentric	considerations	are	not	always	inconsistent	with	concern	for	(fictional)	others,	and	this	can	collapse	the	distinction	between	rational	egoism	and	altruistic	considerations.	In	chapter	4,	I	pursue	a	similar	strategy,	but	ultimately	part	with	Hare	in	arguing	that	at	a	conceptual	(and	metaphysical)	level,	we	do	sometimes	directly	share	feelings.	Like	Hume	and	the	Buddha,	Hare	is	tethered	to	the	conceptual	limitations	of	empiricism.	But	consciousness	can	be	witnessed	in	the	conceptual	requirements	of	perceiving	agency,	or	better,	in	distinguishing	between	an	agent-subject	and	an	ordinary	object.	This	will	be	a	major	feature	of	the	view	of	self	I	develop	in	chapter	4:	the	normative	and	metaphysical	view.			
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sure,	emotional	contagion	and	empathy	can	trigger	a	deep	connection	between	another	and	me.	However,	my	actions	are	more	directly	causally	relevant	to	securing	my	own	well-being	over	time.	The	intuition	is	that	I	can	more	directly	control	the	variables	involved	in	securing	my	own	goods,	which	includes	psychological	goods,	than	I	can	in	securing	yours.	Finally,	I	am	naturally	motivated	to	secure	my	own	well-being,	and,	more	importantly,	I	believe	that	I	ought	to	secure	my	own	well-being.	While	I	may	also	be	motivated	to	tend	to	and	care	about	others,	I	cannot	so	easily	determine	which	motivations	and	reasons	have	authority	in	a	case	of	conflict.	Something	like	this	seems	to	be	part	of	the	intuition	driving	Sidgwick’s	famous	claim:	It	would	be	contrary	to	Common	Sense	to	deny	that	the	distinction	between	any	one	individual	and	any	other	is	real	and	fundamental,	and	that	consequently	“I”	am	concerned	with	the	quality	of	my	existence	as	an	individual	in	a	sense,	fundamentally	important,	in	which	I	am	not	concerned	with	the	quality	of	the	existence	of	other	individuals:	and	this	being	so,	I	do	not	see	how	it	can	be	proved	that	this	distinction	is	not	to	be	taken	as	fundamental	in	determining	the	ultimate	end	of	rational	action	for	an	individual.10			 In	most	cases,	we	are	naturally	motivated	to	prioritize	the	things	we	are	directly	capable	of	doing	to	direct	the	successful	unfolding	of	our	own	lives,	and	this	is	bound	up	with	a	real	and	irreducible	distinction	between	persons.	Presumably,	then,	my	being	distinct	from	you	and	from	your	suffering	has	normative	relevance	with	respect	to	rational	action.	Something	about	my	pain	(and	well-being),	and	its	being	mine,	privileges	it	in	a	normatively	relevant	way.	This,	in	turn,	determines	reasons	that	I	have	for	action.	So,	my	headache	gives	me	normatively	relevant																																																									10	Methods,	498.	
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reasons	to	act	that	are	not	necessarily	present	for	me	when	your	head	hurts.	This	passage,	and	a	host	of	other	arguments	presented	in	Sidgwick’s	Methods,	aims	to	point	out	how	rational	egoism—the	view	that	the	most	primary	rational	constraint	on	action	is	that	we	each	secure	our	own	self-interest—cannot	be	so	easily	snubbed.	Rational	egoism	accommodates	the	commonsense	distinction	between	self	and	other,	and	it	accommodates	the	vivid	distinctness	of	the	first-person	experience,	which	underlies	the	ordinary	privilege	we	give	to	our	own	individual	suffering.11	If	Sidgwick’s	claim	is	compelling,	then	what	the	token-reflexive	“I”	denotes	when	used	by	me,	and	what	it	denotes	when	used	by	you,	gives	us	both	grounds	to	be	concerned	with	our	own	welfare	in	a	very	personal,	and	therefore,	partial	way.			 On	the	other	hand,	we	can	also	view	ourselves	more	objectively	as	selves	situated	in,	and	dependent	upon,	a	world	of	other	selves,	who	likewise	pursue	their	individual	interests.	We	recognize	that	nothing	objective	privileges	our	own	valid	needs	above	others.	Sidgwick	calls	this	the	commonsense	“axiom	of	personal	irrelevance.”	He	argues,	“The	good	of	any	one	individual	is	of	no	more	importance,	from	the	point	of	view	(if	I	may	say	so)	of	the	Universe,	than	the	good	of	any	other.”12	At	least	in	this	very	abstract	sense,	we	take	the	needs,	values,	and	desires																																																									11	Sidgwick	goes	so	far	as	to	say	that	recognizing	a	rational	ground	for	benevolence	does	not	effectively	supplant	this	very	basic	and	egoistic	rational	constraint:	“…even	if	a	man	admits	the	self-evidence	of	the	principle	of	Rational	Benevolence,	he	may	still	hold	that	his	own	happiness	is	an	end	which	it	is	irrational	for	him	to	sacrifice	to	any	other;	and	that	therefore	a	harmony	between	the	maxim	of	Prudence	and	the	maxim	of	Rational	Benevolence	must	be	somehow	demonstrated,	if	morality	is	to	be	made	completely	rational.	This	latter	view…appears	to	me,	on	the	whole,	the	view	of	Commonsense”	(Methods,	498).	Thus,	Sidgwick	leaves	ethicists	with	the	task	of	securing	a	harmony	between	prudence	and	other-regarding	and	benevolent,	or,	altruistic	considerations.			12	Methods,	382.	
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of	others	seriously;	we	appreciate	the	independent	validity	of	other’s	interests.	We	can	impersonally	recognize	that	if	anyone’s	welfare	matters,	then	everyone’s	welfare	matters.	Nothing	makes	my	pain	so	unique	and	important	that	in	a	utilitarian	calculation	it	should,	in	principle,	supersede	the	pain	of	others.	But	when	this	impartial	view	comes	into	conflict	with	rational	self-interest,	we	sometimes	find	ourselves	in	aporia,	because	both	perspectives	appear	to	have	equal	authority	over	action.	And	this	is	where	the	Buddhist	and	Parfit	might	claim	that	we’ve	mistakenly	invested	too	much	in	the	notion	of	distinctness.	If	there	is	no	metaphysically	deep	distinction	between	self	and	other,	then	the	very	premise	that	drives	Sidgwick’s	worry	is	false.	The	assumption	that	some	sort	of	persisting	self	underlies	the	flow	of	psychophysical	events—like	pleasure	and	pain—drives	us	to	carve	out	privileges	between	self	and	other.	When	we	come	to	revise	this	view	of	the	self	as	an	owner	of	mental	and	physical	states,	we	obsess	less	on	who	endures	these	states.	Instead,	we	focus	on	the	overall	quantity	of	such	states.	As	the	c.	8th	century	Indian	Buddhist	philosopher,	Śāntideva	argues,	“Without	exception,	no	sufferings	belong	to	anyone.	They	must	be	warded	off	simply	because	they	are	suffering.	Why	is	any	limitation	put	on	this?”13		 But	in	response,	one	can	easily	claim,	metaphysics	notwithstanding,	that	conventional,	transactional	reality	still	produces	conflicts	between	self-interest	and	morality.	I’ll	use	the	catch-all	phrase,	“morality”	to	broadly	include	any	normative	strictures	and	recommendations	placed	on	action,	which	presuppose	both	other-regarding	considerations	for	the	independently	valid	interests	of	others,	and																																																									13	BCA:	8.102:	97.	
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sensitivity	toward	rules	of	conduct	that	enjoy	more	far-reaching	generality	than	the	normative	constraints	arising	out	of	contingent	social	roles	and	occupations.	Again,	I	do	not	use	“self-interest”	here	in	any	sort	of	narrow	economic	sense.	Nor	do	I	downplay	the	complexity	involved	in	cashing	out	just	what	sorts	of	things	count	as	“self-interest.”	In	my	broad	construal,	“self-interest”	will	include	eudaimonistic	consideration	for	one’s	meaningful	projects	and	aims—that	is,	concern	with	leading	a	fulfilling	and	good	life.	The	response	here	is	that	we	do	not	need	metaphysically	robust	distinctions	to	find	ourselves	in	philosophically,	not	just	psychologically,	significant	moments	of	conflict	and	contention.	So,	contra	the	Buddhist	and	Parfit,	metaphysical	revision	of	what	constitutes	selfhood	will	not	play	a	significant	role	in	defusing	conflict	when	that	revision	is	based	on	the	contention	that	metaphysical	selves	do	not	exist.	As	I’ve	interpreted	Christine	M.	Korsgaard,	the	question	of	who	we	are—our	practical	identities	that	both	shape	what	it	makes	sense	to	do	in	the	practical	domain,	and	unify	our	agency—supersedes	the	impersonal	question	of	
what	we	are.14	Metaphysical	insights	notwithstanding,	one’s	conception	of	the	good	life	might	be	seriously	jeopardized	by	the	requirements	of	morality	(whatever	those	turn	out	to	be).15	So,	as	Samuel	Scheffler	has	effectively	argued,	it	is	worth	assessing																																																									14	Christine	M.	Korsgaard,	“Personal	Identity	and	the	Unity	of	Agency:	A	Kantian	Response	to	Parfit,”	Philosophy	and	Public	Affairs	18,	no.	2	(1989):	101-132.	“I	argue	that	from	a	moral	point	of	view	it	is	important	not	to	reduce	agency	to	a	mere	form	of	experience.	It	is	important	because	our	conception	of	what	a	person	is	depends	on	our	conception	of	ourselves	as	agents	in	a	deep	way”	(103).	She	further	claims,	“Your	conception	of	yourself	as	a	unified	agent	is	not	based	on	a	metaphysical	theory,	nor	on	a	unity	of	which	you	are	conscious.	Its	grounds	are	practical…”	(109).			15	See	Scheffler,	“Potential	Congruence.”	Scheffler	argues	here	that	the	distinction	between	two	presumably	distinct	and	conflicting	normative	domains,	“morality”	and	“self-interest”	are	not	metaphysically	deep	distinctions,	and	do	not,	when	viewed	in	Sidgwick’s	manner,	account	for	value	pluralism	and	a	host	of	other	
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how	those	conflicts	are	mitigated,	and	what	aspects	of	morality,	mutuality,	and	human	psychology,	allow	such	conflicts	to	remain	exceptions	rather	than	rules.16		 However,	the	Buddhist	(and	Parfitian)	may	have	stronger	reasons	for	believing	that	metaphysical	selflessness	both	takes	the	wind	out	of	Sidgwick’s	sails,	and	also	remains	relevant	to	tensions	between	morality	and	the	good	life.				 The	Buddhist	maintains	that,	under	analysis,	the	persisting	persons	and	agents	we	believe	ourselves	to	be	are	fictions	reducible	to	an	impersonal	description.	Thus,	normative	and	moral	considerations	ought	to	better	reflect	that	fact.	Contra	Korsgaard,	who	we	are	should	be	tempered	by	what	we	in	fact	are.	In	spite	of	our	psychological	proclivities	and	practical	identities,	a	rational	assessment	of	our	individual	moral	worth	supports	an	impersonal	and	egalitarian,	rather	than	partialistic	account	of	ethical	considerations.17	If	my	own	welfare	and	suffering	ought	to	be	considered	in	deliberation,	but	under	analysis,	I	recognize	these	states																																																																																																																																																																						operative	motivations	driving	rational	action.	However,	he	argues	that	when	we	sufficiently	account	for	the	complexity	of	motivating	values	and	moral	motivations,	and	the	various	ways	in	which	moral	constraints	interact	and	intersect	with	psychological	proclivities,	the	question	of	morality	coming	into	conflict	with	one’s	meaningful	projects	and	values	remains	a	philosophically	significant	one.	He	describes	this	as	potential	conflict	between	“morality	and	the	good	life,	or	between	morality	and	the	standpoint	of	eudaimonistic	reflection,	rather	than	as	a	conflict	between	morality	and	self-interest”	(133).				16	Scheffler,	“Potential	Congruence.”	Also,	see	Samuel	Scheffler,	Human	Morality	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1992).	17	Peter	Singer,	“Famine,	Affluence,	and	Morality,”	Philosophy	and	Public	Affairs,	Vol.	1	(3),	April	(1972):	229-243.	Singer,	as	I’ve	interpreted	him,	draws	a	similar	conclusion,	without	committing	himself	to	any	sort	of	view	about	the	nature	of	the	self.	Singer	points	out	that	partialism	highlights	the	way	in	which	certain	psychological	facts	influence	our	moral	considerations.	However,	these	do	not	necessarily	override	the	rational,	moral	constraints	that	we	would	presumably	endorse	in	his	famous	thought	experiment.	Someone’s	suffering	being	more	or	less	distant	from	our	own	(physically	and	psychologically)	does	not	override	the	intuition	that	when	someone	is	suffering,	and	we	are	in	a	material	position	to	help,	that	we	ought	to	help.				
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of	pleasure	and	pain	do	not	really	belong	to	anyone—that	is,	they	are	not	really	owned	by	any	sort	of	persisting	entity—then,	pragmatic	considerations	aside,	anyone’s	welfare	and	suffering	ought	to	be	considered	equally.	Anything	that	counts	as	ultimately	good	or	bad	cannot	be	limited	in	scope	to	what’s	good	or	bad	for	me,	since	there	ultimately	is	no	“me.”	On	this	reading,	the	No-Self	view	of	selflessness	is	meant	to	motivate	an	egalitarian	thesis	about	impartial	considerations	concerning	what	is	morally	good	or	bad.	We	might	all	agree	that	injustice	and	undeserved	and	pointless	suffering	are	inherently	bad	things.	However,	persons,	or,	owners	of	mental	and	physical	states,	are	only	useful	and	ultimately	dispensable	fictions.	So,	if	my	suffering	provides	me	with	a	reason	for	action,	then	anyone’s	suffering	ought	to	provide	me	with	a	reason	for	action.18		 Just	to	recap:	Sidgwick	argued	that	two	motivating	forces—rational	prudence	and	impartial	consideration	of	other’s	interests—produce	a	practical	dilemma.	The	Buddhist	and	Parfitian	argue	that	revising	the	everyday	view	of	self,	a	view	that	entrenches	difference	and	partiality,	can	defuse	the	dilemma.	However,	if	metaphysical	difference	between	self	and	other	is	immaterial	to	practical	deliberation,	then	revising	our	metaphysics	should	not	defuse	Sidgwick’s	problem.	Nor	should	it	defuse	the	conflicts	and	tensions	that	may	arise	between	morality	and	our	practical	identities.																																																										18	See	Mark	Siderits,	Personal	Identity	and	Buddhist	Philosophy:	Empty	Persons	(Burlington:	Ashgate	Publishing	Company,	2003),	102-103.	This	is	my	interpretation	of	Siderits’s	gloss	on	Śāntideva’s	famous	passages,	101-103,	in	chapter	8	of	the	Bodhicaryāvatāra.	The	upshot	of	Śāntideva’s	argument	here	is	that	pain	and	suffering	exist;	these	are	inherently	bad	things;	but	owners	of	such	suffering	do	not	exist.	Therefore,	if	ownership	is	what	justifies	privileging	one	quantity	of	suffering	over	another,	then	no	real	limit	justifies	partiality	(other	than	pragmatic	considerations).	
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	 However,	as	a	counter-argument,	the	Buddhist	might	claim	that	metaphysical	revision	can	defuse	the	problem,	because	we	can	derive	normative	conclusions	from	descriptive	and	factual	statements.	I’ll	develop	this	contentious	point	below.	But	for	now,	consider	the	point	that	a	statement	deduced	from	accepted	premises	commits	one	to	accept	the	derived	statement.	This	means	that	what	is	the	case	is	pertinent	to	what	one	ought	to	do	(namely,	accept	a	new	belief,	and	therefore	act	from	this	new	belief).19	Likewise,	when	one	revises	the	belief	that	a	metaphysically	deep	distinction	exists	between	self	and	other,	this	commits	one	to	recognize	that	from	an	impersonal	point	of	view,	nothing	distinguishes	one	instance	of	suffering	from	another.	Of	course,	convention	and	our	practical	identities	can	still	produce	conflict	and	partial	evaluations.	But	if	we	accept	that	an	impersonal	point	of	view	is	something	we	can	hold,	then	we	are	committed	to	accepting	beliefs	derived	from	such	a	view.	Moreover,	if	we	believe	that	certain	normative	constraints	are	not	purely	derivative	of	psychological	facts,	but,	instead,	play	a	role	in	structuring	such	facts,	then	the	normative	conclusions	we	derive	from	an	impersonal	point	of	view	may	be	justified	despite	our	psychological	proclivities.	These	would	operate	as	very	general	background	constraints	on	what	sorts	of	desires	and	preferences	we	ought																																																									19	See	John	R.	Searle,	Rationality	in	Action	(Hong	Kong:	Massachusetts	Institute	of	Technology,	2001),	136-137.	As	I	understand	him,	Searle	argues	that	theoretical	rationality	presupposes	various	speech-acts,	and	this	defuses	the	presumed	rift	between	descriptive	and	normative	claims.	When	we	deduce	a	conclusion	from	a	set	of	accepted	premises,	we	are	committed	to	accepting	the	derived	conclusion.	So	an	act	of	theoretical	rationality	presupposes	commitments	that	are	normatively	binding:	“I	have	been	emphasizing	the	sense	in	which	theoretical	reason	is	a	special	case	of	practical	reason:	deciding	what	beliefs	to	accept	and	reject	is	a	special	case	of	deciding	what	to	do”	(136).	Searle	adds,	“To	say	that	something	is	true	implies	that	you	ought	to	believe	it.	Suppose	I	have	conclusive	proof	that	p	is	true.	Since	belief	involves	a	commitment	to	truth…I	ought	to	believe	(accept,	recognize,	acknowledge)	that	p”	(137).	
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to	endorse.	Granted,	these	two	points	are	controversial	to	say	the	least.	However,	I	am	simply	trying	to	motivate	how	the	Buddhist	view	might	withstand	the	objection	that	metaphysical	conclusions	have	no	bearing	on	our	conventional	and	practical	lives.	A	bit	more	formally,	the	argument	would	look	like	this.	1. Descriptive	statements	commit	us	to	other	normatively	binding	statements.	For	example,	when	we	derive	a	conclusion	from	accepted	premises,	we	
ought	to	accept	the	derived	conclusion.	That’s	part	of	what	it	means	to	be	rational.	2. From	an	impersonal	point	of	view—that	is,	revising	our	belief	that	persisting	subjects	are	the	owners	of	psychophysical	events—we	recognize	that	suffering	and	pleasure	do	not	strictly	speaking	belong	to	anyone.		3. However,	suffering	and	pleasure	are	not	just	conventional	constructs—as	talk	of	persons	and	“I-thoughts”	are.		4. Pointless	suffering	is	inherently	bad,	and	therefore	ought	to	be	alleviated.	5. Therefore,	(by	2-4),	if	a	reason	exists	to	alleviate	suffering,	then	no	person’s	suffering	and	pleasure	has	any	ultimate	privilege	over	any	other	person’s.	In	other	words,	the	reason	holds	for	all	suffering,	and	we	ought	to	alleviate	suffering.		6. Normative	conclusions	from	an	impersonal	point	of	view	are	not	just	derivative	of	psychological	facts;	instead,	they	can	structure	what	it	makes	sense	to	desire,	want,	or	prefer.		7. Thus,	(by	5-6),	if	we	can	achieve	an	impersonal	point	of	view,	it	makes	sense	to	desire	or	prefer	that	suffering	should	be	alleviated	impartially.	In	short,	
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we	have	good	reason	not	to	privilege	anyone’s	suffering	and	pleasure	over	anyone	else’s	(pragmatic	considerations	aside).		 One	might	take	issue	with	any	of	these	premises,	but	the	more	controversial	premises	are	(1)	and	(6).	However,	with	independent	and	cogent	arguments	for	(1)	and	(6),	we	can	deny	the	claim	that	metaphysical	conclusions	(and,	by	extension,	metaphysical	revisions)	are	always	normatively	and	morally	neutral.	If	we	can	achieve	the	impersonal	point	of	view,	and	the	normative	conclusions	we	derive	from	such	a	point	of	view	can	structure	what	it	makes	sense	to	desire,	want,	or	prefer,	then	despite	certain	psychological	proclivities,	metaphysics	can	have	a	bearing	on	what	it	makes	sense	to	do.					 Finally,	metaphysical	selflessness	aside,	the	Buddhist	might	contend	that	we	each	have	a	sense	of	self	that	cannot	be	explained	away	as	pure	fiction.	Even	the	Buddhist	must	provide	an	account	of	how	we	develop	a	conception	of	selfhood.	The	Buddhist	may	go	on	to	argue	that	a	radically	revised	way	of	viewing	the	self	in	terms	of	the	sense	of	self	(without	recourse	to	a	real	metaphysical	entity)	cures	us	of	existential	suffering.	This	transformative	view	is	meant	to	play	an	important	role	in	practical	deliberation,	since	it	impacts	the	motivational	resources	that	drive	action.	Initially,	the	voluntary	pursuit	of	this	sort	of	existential	transformation	may	start	out	from	an	entirely	egoistic	concern	for	one’s	own	welfare.20	The	practitioner-philosopher	aims	to	put	an	end	to	her	own	anguish	once	and	for	all,	and	this	is	the	most	important	concern	that	drives	her	actions.	As	she	progresses	in	the	pursuit,																																																									20	BCA,	8.108:	97.	“Those	who	become	oceans	of	sympathetic	joy	when	living	beings	are	released,	surely	it	is	they	who	achieve	fulfillment.	What	would	be	the	point	in	a	liberation	without	sweetness?”	
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she	recognizes	that	radically	appropriating	the	needs	and	values	of	others	into	her	own	sense	of	self	is	constitutive	of	this	transformation.	This	requires	effacement	of	the	limited	ego	through	an	expansion	of	what	it	includes	in	its	sense	of	self.21	The	self	is	“selfless”	by	expanding	its	self-identity	to	include	the	concerns	of	all	suffering	creatures.	Expanding	its	concerns	and	self-identity	broadly	enough,	it	comes	to	recognize	that	there	is	a	broader	and	unified	field	of	pleasures	and	pains,	which	it	learns	to	care	about	in	a	motivated	way.	Admittedly,	this	is	a	process,	and	not	a	one-off	gestalt-switch	in	perspective.	So	it	requires	practice,	and	a	host	of	other	cultivated	virtues	that	support	that	practice.	I	will	develop	this	further	in	the	next	chapter,	and	assess	what	may	or	may	not	be	compelling	in	such	a	view.				 But	for	now,	it’s	fair	to	ask	what	exactly	motivates	this	practice.	It	may	not	be	something	“selfish,”	since	the	practice	ultimately	frees	one	up	for	more	compassionate	other-regarding	considerations.	However,	I	contend	that	it	is	ultimately	egocentric,	and	in	the	next	chapter,	I’ll	explain	why.	To	set	this	discussion	up,	I	will	conclude	the	chapter	by	clarifying	what	I	think	we	can	mean	by	calling	someone	“selfish,”	“unselfish,”	“egocentric,”	and	“non-egocentric.”	I’ll	also	assess	how	this	informs	what	is	involved	in	altruistic	motivations,	and	how	it	informs	the	distinction	between	self-regarding	and	other-regarding	considerations.	These	concepts	are	crucial	both	for	making	sense	of	what	is	involved	in	unselfish	agency,	and	for	developing	a	conception	of	selfhood	that	would	support	such	an	account.																																																									21	BCA,	8.115:	98.	“In	the	same	way	that,	with	practice,	the	idea	of	a	self	arose	towards	this,	one’s	own	body,	though	it	is	without	a	self,	with	practice	will	not	the	same	idea	of	a	self	develop	towards	others	too?”	Also,	see	8.112:	“Why	can	I	not	also	accept	another’s	body	as	my	self…since	the	otherness	of	my	own	body	has	been	settled	and	is	not	hard	to	accept?”		
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Moreover,	disambiguating	these	concepts	will	help	support	my	further	contention	that	revising	our	belief	in	the	unity	and	persistence	of	self—the	view	we	find	in	Buddhism	and	Parfit—does	not	provide	the	unselfish	and	altruistic	payoff	thinkers	who	endorse	the	view	believe	it	does.		
1.3.1	Conceiving	Moral	Selflessness:	Unselfish	Egocentricity		 I	want	to	provide	an	account	of	selfishness	that	can	help	make	sense	of	what	morally	relevant	“selflessness”	looks	like.	By	doing	so,	I	want	to	provide	a	better	sense	of	what	the	Buddhist	might	be	up	to	when	claiming	that	the	No-Self	view	(whatever	that	amounts	to)	supports	“selfless”	action.			 Now,	I’ve	been	called	selfish	many	times.	Is	that	because	I’m	often	concerned	with	outcomes	that	benefit	me?	At	first	glance,	I	may	be	considered	“selfish”	when	I	am	solely	motivated	by	the	good	that	an	action	affords	me	alone:	if	the	action	did	not	afford	me	that	good,	then	I	wouldn’t	have	pursued	the	action.	But	this	could	be	called,	more	neutrally,	an	“egocentric”	action	rather	than	a	selfish	action.	I	cook	myself	lunch	solely	because	the	action	affords	me	a	good,	and	if	cooking	lunch	for	myself	didn’t	afford	me	that	good,	I	wouldn’t	do	it.	But	this	hardly	warrants	calling	me	selfish.	Nor	does	it	warrant	calling	the	action	selfish.	In	the	very	bland	way	I’ve	described	things,	cooking	myself	lunch	is	not	selfish,	but	it’s	certainly	egocentric,	because	I’m	entirely	concerned	with	satisfying	myself	in	pursuing	that	action.			 But	let	me	get	a	bit	more	specific	about	my	wholesome	lunch.	Let’s	say	I	prepare	myself	some	chicken.	I	buy	a	major	corporate	brand	of	chicken	breasts,	say,	Tyson®	chicken.	I	do	so	because	this	sort	of	flesh	is	most	affordable	for	my	budget,	and	Tyson®	has	perfected	the	art	of	producing	unnaturally	plump	and	white	meat.	I	
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know	that	an	animal	suffers	for	me	to	enjoy	its	cooked	corpse.	But	let’s	say	I’ve	come	to	terms	with	that	(or	devised	a	principle	that	justifies	my	eating	the	flesh	of	a	sentient	creature).	Still,	I	do	not	relish	unnecessary	suffering,	and	I’m	even	squeamish	when	it	comes	to	the	idea	of	killing	and	procuring	meat	by	hunting	it	myself.	However,	the	corporate	meat	I’ve	bought	requires	that	the	animal	suffer	more	than	it	would	have	to	if	bottom	line	profits	did	not	solely	dictate	their	chicken	farming	practices.	Moreover,	I	know	that	policies	of	the	corporate	meat	industry,	which	outsources	its	chicken	farming	to	local	farmers,	causes	harm	to	those	farmers.	The	farmers	often	remain	poor,	because	the	payment	schedules	are	drafted	to	maximize	shareholder	profits,	which	requires	paying	the	farmers	substandard	wages.	Also,	the	farmers	often	suffer	from	terrible	health	conditions	because	of	corporately	mandated	farming	practices	that	could	be	adjusted	at	the	expense	of	shareholder	profits.	When	farmers	complain,	the	corporate	entities	threaten	to	pull	support	and	supply	from	them,	thus	despoiling	their	livelihoods.	When	the	farmers	decide	to	change	farming	practices	without	corporate	sanction,	they	are	fired,	and	left	saddled	with	debt	for	the	machinery	they’ve	been	mandated	to	purchase	on	credit.	Corporate	policies	are	drafted	and	enforced	at	the	expense	of	both	the	farmers	and	the	chickens.	I	know	this,	but	I	cook	the	meat	anyway,	because	it	tastes	good,	and	it	makes	me	feel	good.	I	know	that	I	have	other	options,	and	I	know	that	I’m	contributing	to	forms	of	unnecessary	suffering	and	injustice,	but	I	decide	that	my	hedonistic	desires	and	my	budget	outweigh	these	concerns.	I	cannot	afford	cage-free	and	organic	chicken,	and	I	like	the	taste	and	feeling	of	meat	too	much	to	give	it	up	altogether.	This	highlights	a	more	specific	feature	embedded	in	what	I	call,	
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“selfishness.”	I	am	selfish	when	I	not	only	pursue	an	egocentric	consideration,	but	I	do	
so	knowingly	at	the	expense	of	others,	and	I	do	so	without	motivating	consideration	for	
their	valid	needs,	desires,	and	values.	I	can	act	egocentrically	without	being	selfish,	but	I	cannot	act	selfishly	and	non-egocentrically.	If	this	is	true,	then	non-egocentric	action	entails	that	I	am	not	acting	selfishly,	since	egocentricity	is	a	necessary	condition	for	selfishness.22	There	may	be	other	requirements	for	calling	an	action	selfish,	but	egocentricity	is	a	fundamental,	although	not	sufficient,	ingredient.			 A	general	belief	in	Buddhist	philosophy,	basic	to	Theravāda	and	Mahāyāna	texts,	is	that	the	sense	of	“I”	(ahaṅkara:	the	“ego-making”	component	of	consciousness)	perpetuates	craving	desire,	which	in	turn,	leads	to	cycles	of	suffering	and	“thirst”	(triṣṇā).	Breaking	free	from	the	hedonic	treadmill	requires	cultivated	detachment.	But,	according	to	the	Buddhist,	detachment	is	not	possible	so	long	as	one	believes	in	the	persistence	of	the	“I.”	Even	at	the	conventional	level	of	practical	identity,	if	we	remain	fixated	with	the	roles	we’ve	carved	out	for	ourselves,	we																																																									22	This	raises	the	question	of	omissions.	Suppose	that	I	apathetically	refrain	from	activities	that	will	clearly	benefit	me.	Go	further,	and	say	that	I	engage	in	self-destructive	behavior.	In	some	sense,	I	am	not	acting	egocentrically	(certainly	not	with	prudence,	anyway).	Now,	I	may	very	well	ignore	doing	much	for	anyone—it’s	all	the	same	gray	palette	as	far	as	I	am	concerned.	But	if	someone	were	in	need	of	help,	and	I	know	that	I	am	in	a	position	to	help,	but	in	my	apathetic	state,	I	simply	ignore	them,	then	it	seems	my	omission	and	neglect	is	selfish.	However,	knowing	that	someone	is	in	need,	and	not	raising	a	finger	to	help	when	I	am	in	a	good	position	to	do	so,	means	that	I	knowingly	ignore	another’s	need	without	any	motivating	consideration	for	those	needs.	Moreover,	the	fact	that	I	“cannot	be	bothered”	means	that	my	apathetic	equilibrium	(or	“oblivious	equanimity”)	is	more	valuable	for	me	than	another’s	needs.	So	in	this	problem	case,	what	seems	like	a	non-egocentric	state	is	dictated	by	something	other	than	an	obviously	positive	concern	with	my	own	perceived	self-interest:	I	am	selfish	to	the	extent	that	an	important	omission	highlights	a	self-regarding	value	that,	through	neglect,	I	obliquely	prioritize	over	the	other’s	needs.	My	apathy	shows	up	as	selfishness	to	the	extent	that	I	am	in	a	position	to	help	another	who	requires	help.				
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remain	tethered	to	the	whims	of	needs	and	preferences	that	perpetuate	suffering.	Being	more	flexible	and	less	dogmatic	with	one’s	practical	identity,	which	may	be	supported	by	revising	the	everyday	belief	in	a	persisting	subject,	produces	a	sort	of	agency	that	is	less	blinded	and	burdened	by	egocentric	and	hedonistic	considerations.	Consider	two	distinct	pairs:	“ego-centric/other-centric”	and	“hedonistic/ascetic.”	Is	there	a	problem	with	being	hedonistic	and	other-centric	in	one’s	motivations	while	being	committed	to	the	Buddhist	mission	to	achieve	impersonal	and	altruistic	motivations?	Now,	I	may	be	other-centric	in	my	motivation	to	deliver	hot	meals	to	shut-ins	on	Thanksgiving:	I	gain	no	material	advantage	from	this	volunteer	work,	and	I	lose	time	that	I	could	have	spent	acquiring	goods	that	provide	me	with	pleasure.	But	it’s	not	as	though	I	view	my	volunteer	work	as	only	good	for	others.	I	derive	pleasure	from	my	volunteer	work.	Is	there	a	problem	with	me	deriving	pleasure	from	volunteer	work?	My	instinctive	response	is,	“No,”	because	otherwise	my	volunteer	work	would	be	a	very	grim	and	colorless	endeavor.	However,	the	danger	is	that	pleasure	is	always	self-regarding.	From	the	Buddhist	perspective,	it	may	further	entrench	the	view	that	I	am	a	persisting	subject	who	pursues	actions	with	the	hope	of	achieving	some	emotional	and	material	benefit	from	the	consequences.	That’s	not	to	say	that	deriving	pleasure	from	the	action	makes	me	selfish,	but	without	some	emotional	and	material	benefit,	I	may	be	hard-pressed	to	pursue	the	action	(it	at	least	requires	more	convincing	than	recognizing	that	pursuing	some	action	will	lead	to	a	“win-win”	outcome).	Moreover,	my	hope	to	achieve	congruence	between	self-regarding	rewards	and	other-regarding	requirements	or	values,	may	lead	to	further	fixation	on	the	self	by	
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clouding	the	other-directed	motivation	with	my	emotional	and	material	gains.	After	all,	these	gains	are	immediately	present	to	me	in	a	way	that	the	relief	or	happiness	I	produce	in	another	is	not.	We	may	both	share	in	pleasure,	but	we	cannot	share	each	other’s	pleasure,	and	this	seems	to	further	punctuate	the	gap	between	self	and	other.	Therefore,	the	advanced	Buddhist	practitioner	stresses	effacing	the	ego	and	vanquishing	the	thought	of	a	giver	and	a	receiver.	By	doing	so,	the	gap	is	no	longer	highlighted,	and	no	longer	material.			 However,	does	self-abnegation	and	asceticism	necessarily	produce	a	more	other-centric	set	of	motivations	and	concerns?	If	what	I’ve	sketched	above	is	at	all	correct,	then	an	egocentric	action	does	not	directly	entail	selfish	behavior.	Whether	it	perpetuates	suffering	is	a	different	issue,	but	acting	unselfishly	does	not	seem	to	require	abandoning	egocentric	considerations	en	masse;	nor	does	it	seem	to	require	deprivation	of	pleasure	in	the	act	of	giving.	So,	if	Buddhist	philosophy	is	relevant	at	the	level	of	applied	ethics—not	only	soteriology—it	needs	to	show	us	why	the	principle	of	anātman	(No-Self)	is	especially	relevant	to	unselfish,	altruistic,	and	other-regarding	considerations.			 Moreover,	selfishness	and	egocentricity	are	rather	crude	concepts	that	do	not	adequately	encapsulate	nuanced	conflicts	of	loyalty	and	reciprocity.	Two	people	may	be	deserving	of	a	job.	One	is	a	friend,	and	the	other	is	a	stranger	who	might	be	a	better	fit	for	the	organization.	I	feel	bound	to	offer	the	job	to	a	slightly	less-qualified	and	dear	friend.	I’m	partial	to	friends	and	family,	and	if	I	was	not,	you	might	think	I’m	“cold,”	and	do	not	understand	the	loyalty	and	reciprocity	that	comes	with	sincere	friendship.	Partialism	is	a	thorny	issue	in	ethics,	and	building	and	nurturing	
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partialistic	obligations	seems	basic	to	the	human	condition.	Bolder	arguments	contend	that	sensitivity	to—and	appreciation	for—normative	and	ethical	considerations	are	derivative	of	the	sort	of	partialism	cultivated	in	intimate	relationships;	it	is	through	partialistic	relationships	that	we	learn	to	cultivate	and	embrace	more	general	ethical	considerations.	Thus,	the	moral	life	may	fundamentally	require	partialism.23	Part	of	what	it	means	to	be	a	loving	father,	say,	is	that	I	favor	my	child.	I	might	lament	the	loss	of	another’s	child	in	a	horrible	fire,	but	if	it’s	between	my	child	and	her	child,	and	I	have	the	capacity	to	rescue	only	one	person,	I’ll	have	to	rescue	my	own	child.	The	care	I	show,	and	the	commitment	that	I	act	upon,	might	be	basic	to	my	capacity	to	develop	more	far-reaching	and	less	partialistic	commitments.	This	is	a	large	leap,	and	it	requires	independent	argument	and	support.	However,	the	virtue	of	my	gloss	on	selfishness	is	that	it	does	not	require	taking	a	definite	position	on	partialism	and	the	moral	life.	I	may	enter	a	burning	house,	and	rescue	my	child	while	knowing	that	other	children	will	inevitably	and	tragically	perish,	and	in	this	very	broad	sense,	I	knowingly	act	at	the	expense	of	others.	Saving	my	child	means	allowing	another’s	child	to	perish.	But	when	I	do	this,	I	do	not	necessarily	do	so	without	regard	for	the	independently	valid	needs,	desires,	and	values	of	those	other	children	and	their	parents.	I	am																																																									23	Samuel	Scheffler,	“Morality	and	Reasonable	Partiality,”	in	Equality	and	Tradition:	
Questions	of	Value	in	Moral	and	Political	Theory	(New	York:	Oxford,	2010):	41-76.	Scheffler	entertains	this	possibility,	and	while	it	may	be	a	stretch	to	say	that	morality	presupposes	partiality,	Scheffler	aims	to	defend	the	rational	necessity	of	partiality:	“The	general	aim	of	this	line	of	thought	is	to	establish	that	what	I	will	call	
reasons	of	partiality	are	inevitable	concomitants	of	certain	of	the	most	basic	forms	of	human	valuing.	This	means	that,	for	human	beings	as	creatures	with	values,	the	normative	force	of	certain	forms	of	partiality	is	nearly	unavoidable.	If	that	is	right,	then	for	morality	to	reject	partiality	in	a	general	or	systematic	way	would	be	for	it	to	set	itself	against	our	nature	as	valuing	creatures”	(43).		
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egocentrically	bound	to	“me	and	my	own,”	but	I’m	not	necessarily	selfish:	partialism	is	not	equivalent	to	selfishness.	Partialistic	and	egocentric	action	is	motivated	by	reasons	that	make	essential	reference	to	the	agent’s	own	needs,	desires,	and	values,	and	this	runs	more	broadly	than	selfish	action.	If	I	did	not	feel	the	weight	of	the	house-burning	tragedy,	that	is,	if	I	did	not	even	view	it	as	a	tragedy,	then	calling	me	selfish	would	be	warranted.	I	would	show	no	regard	for	the	independently	valid	needs	and	desires	of	others.	And	when	we’re	dealing	with	children	and	burning	houses,	this	disregard	would	reveal	a	lot	more	than	selfishness—it	would	be	borderline	sociopathic.	This	sort	of	twisted	partialism	allows	a	gangster	to	sob	over	his	dead	son	while	unrepentantly	committing	atrocities	against	someone	else’s.			 But	in	other	cases,	say,	in	a	war	campaign,	a	soldier	or	country	may	remain	partial	to	their	own,	without	necessarily	being	selfish	in	the	narrower	sense.	Still,	selfishness	does	not	linger	too	far	behind	partialism.	For	example,	during	the	early	phases	of	George	W.	Bush’s	war	against	Iraq,	all	the	American	news	stations	highlighted	the	U.S.	death	toll	without	much	mention	of	the	hundreds	of	thousands	of	Iraqi	civilian	deaths.	I	had	to	make	considerable	effort	to	determine	the	devastation	and	destruction	exacted	upon	the	Iraqi	civilian.	For	some,	it	was	not	so	difficult	to	view	Iraqi	deaths	as	a	necessary	evil,	and	perhaps,	in	that	sense,	they	were	not	entirely	selfish—after	all,	they	sincerely	considered	Iraqi	deaths	a	necessary	evil.	But	when	military	commanders	prefer	the	use	of	drones,	which	minimize	American	deaths,	but	lead	to	greater	numbers	of	civilian	casualties,	they	believe	an	American	soldier’s	life	is	worth	more	than	an	innocent	Iraqi	civilian’s	life.	Again,	this	may	be	a	case	of	tragedy	and	partialism,	and	not	a	case	of	pure	
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selfishness.	And	perhaps,	by	appealing	to	a	nuanced	“Just	War”	theory,	biased	supporters	can	sleep	easier	at	night.	But	if	securing	more	oil	fields	to	sustain	our	petroleum-rich	infrastructure	is	premised	upon	something	like	hundreds	of	thousands	of	Iraqi	causalities,	then	it’s	hard	to	chalk	this	up	to	“necessary”	evils.	When	we	lose	sincere	interest	in	the	valid	needs	and	desires	of	others,	and	knowingly	pursue	actions	at	their	expense,	we	exhibit	both	partialism	and	selfishness.	There’s	a	lot	of	work	to	do	to	clarify	and	distinguish	the	various	shades	of	personal	and	collective	selfishness	from	justified	forms	of	partialism,	but	the	basic	point,	I	hope,	is	clear:	selfishness	is	not	only	a	form	of	partialism,	but	it’s	
partialism	without	sincere	regret,	and	without	sincere	consideration	for	the	
independently	valid	needs	and	desires	of	others.			 With	that	said,	I	will	clarify	what’s	meant	by	morally-relevant	“selflessness.”	In	the	case	of	eating	unnecessarily	harmful	chicken,	I	can	adjust	my	habits.	After	some	practice,	when	I	no	longer	desire	chicken,	that	is,	when	there’s	no	strong	desire	to	eat	chicken,	I	may	be	leading	a	less	selfish	life.	But	am	I	acting	“selflessly”	in	a	moral	sense?	After	all,	I	no	longer	fret	over	eating	chicken,	because	I	simply	don’t	desire	eating	chicken.	This	seems	different	from	a	case	in	which	I	never	desired	to	eat	chicken	in	the	first	place.	Does	a	morally	selfless	action	require	that	while	I	do	A,	I	have	a	more	than	trivial	inclination	not	do	A,	or	at	some	point	took	this	inclination	to	be	a	motivationally	live	option	for	me?	I	might	be	inclined	not	to	eat	chicken,	which	seems	structurally	no	different	than	my	inclination	to	eat	lunch.	Certainly,	there’s	nothing	selfless	about	my	satisfying	the	desire	to	eat	lunch.	For	an	action	to	count	as	“selfless,”	must	I	perform	a	Herculean	feat	of	the	will	to	override	
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an	opposing	and	gnawing	background	preference?	Does	moral	selflessness	require	internal	strife	or	tension?	If	so,	then	moral	selflessness	seems	much	too	demanding,	because	it	requires	something	most	of	us	would	consider	inherently	bad:	persistent	internal	conflict.			 Surely,	a	more	promising	set	of	moral	requirements	allows	one	to	lead	a	life	that	is	better	overall,	and	not	marred	by	internal	strife.24	We	want	to	avoid	moral	strictures	that	are	overly	demanding.	If	I	agree	that	eating	factory	farmed	chicken	perpetrates	injustice,	then	my	having	the	character	traits	to	resist	eating	factory	chicken	without	having	to	persistently	grapple	with	internal	conflict	is	both	morally	laudable	and	desirable.	Moral	requirements	ought	to	sufficiently	align	with	our	motivational	resources.25	So	perhaps	moral	selflessness	is	simply	a	way	of	characterizing	morally-relevant	unselfish	action,	and	by	“unselfish”	action	I	mean	any	action	that	is	at	least	partly	motivated	by—and	takes	into	strong	and	more	than	trivial	consideration—the	valid	needs	and	desires	of	others.	When	one	acts	in	a	morally	praiseworthy	and	unselfish	way,	one	acts	“selflessly.”	One	may	be	partly	motivated	by	egocentric	considerations	and	cultivated	inclinations,	but	that	does	not	mean	one	acts	selfishly.	To	be	selfless,	one	is	not	required	to	always	feel	the	pressure	of	opposing	inclinations	coming	up	against	normative	constraints.	And																																																									24	Scheffler,	Human	Morality,	6:	“…although	moral	considerations	and	considerations	of	self-interest	can	diverge,	and	although	morality	sometimes	requires	significant	sacrifices	of	us,	nevertheless	the	most	demanding	moral	theories	are	mistaken.”	Scheffler	adds	that	“Taken	together,	these	accounts	of	morality’s	content,	scope,	authority,	and	deliberative	role…will	provide	support	for	the	[claim]	that	the	relation	between	the	moral	and	individual	perspectives	is	one	of	potential	congruence”	(7).		25	Scheffler,	Human	Morality,	7:	“…it	is	in	part	a	social	and	political	task	to	achieve	a	measure	of	fit	between	what	morality	demands	and	what	people’s	motivational	resources	can	supply.”		
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selflessness	does	not	have	to	presuppose	internal	strife	between	opposing	normative	perspectives;	it	does	not	require	overcoming	a	dilemma	between	self-interest	(in	the	broad	way	I’ve	construed	it)	and	moral	demands.				 However,	when	viewing	selflessness	so	benignly,	we	risk	losing	sight	of	its	subtler	and	more	exalted	features.	The	problem	might	lie	in	fixating	on	the	motivations	behind	single	actions.	I	may	not	eat	the	chicken	because	I	don’t	eat	chicken—that	is,	I’m	the	type	of	person	who	doesn’t	flinch	at	abstaining	from	meat.	I	seamlessly	avoid	eating	meat	without	any	sort	of	struggle	or	second	thought.	I	don’t	have	to	consciously	endorse	vegetarianism	every	time	I	cook	a	meal.	In	that	sense,	my	values	become	transparent:	my	inclinations	and	my	values	reinforce	each	other.	However,	by	being	able	to	justify	this	way	of	living	when	asked	why	I	endorse	it,	I	recognize	that	I	am	importantly	motivated	by	the	valid	needs	and	desires	of	others.	My	choice	is	not	just	a	matter	of	inclination,	alone,	nor	is	it	a	matter	of	rigid	adherence	to	a	moral	duty.	I	could	easily	learn	to	like	chicken,	but	I	strive	not	to	for	reasons	of,	say,	promoting	justice	and	respecting	the	value	of	sentient	life.	The	fact	that	I	could	easily	learn	to	like	chicken	shows	that	selfless	action	is	in	some	way	connected	to	the	material	possibility	of	strife	between	what	I	desire	and	what	I	believe	I	ought	to	do.	At	some	point	in	my	career	of	decision-making,	I’ll	have	to	deliberate	and	justify	this	practice	to	myself.	At	some	point,	I’ll	have	to	decisively	determine	that	I	must	do	A	rather	than	not	do	A,	regardless	of	any	opposing	inclinations.	But	the	“selfless”	component	comes	with	weighing	the	valid	needs	of	others	and	caring	about	the	greater	good.	Viewing	selflessness	in	this	way	highlights	the	fact	that	I	have	been	directly	motivated	by	consideration	for	the	valid	needs	and	
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desires	of	others.	Moreover,	deliberation,	and	a	more	than	abstract	potential	for	strife	is	material	to	the	action	that	I	commit.	What’s	key	is	that	consideration	for	others	plays	an	important	role	in	shaping	my	current	motivations,	however	transparent	and	fluid	they	become,	and	this	is	what	distinguishes	morally	relevant	selflessness	from	garden	variety	inclinations	that	I	may	acquire	by	happenstance.			 Just	to	summarize	things	here,	I’ve	illustrated	how	egocentric	considerations	are	not	necessarily	selfish.	I’ve	also	argued	that	selfishness	is	necessarily	egocentric.	“Selflessness”	refers	to	actions	motivated	by	the	normative	weight	of	other-regarding	considerations,	which,	in	a	non-trivial	way,	come	up	against	potentially	opposing	inclinations.	With	time,	I	integrate	these	considerations	into	my	basic	practices,	and	so	I	do	not	need	to	experience	strife	between	what	I	want	and	what	I	think	is	required	of	me.	At	some	point	in	the	history	of	my	deliberations,	the	primary	source	of	a	selfless	action	has	to	be	the	recognition	that	I	ought	to	do	A,	because	A	is	the	right	thing	to	do	when	I	take	another’s	valid	needs	into	consideration,	despite	potentially	opposing	inclinations.	I	recognize	the	independent	normative	force	of	A,	and	this	is	premised	on	consideration	for	others.			 Buddhism	adopts	the	view	that	we	must	view	suffering	and	pleasure	impersonally,	and	this	is	presumably	supported	by	the	view	that	such	states	do	not,	strictly	speaking,	belong	to	anyone.	For	the	Buddhist,	when	there	is	some	lingering	sense	of	ownership	involved	in	one’s	self-conception,	there	will	be	“clinging”	motivations	that	disrupt	our	capacity	to	exhibit	moral	selflessness.	Thus,	viewing	the	self	as	an	ownerless	stream	produces	non-egocentric	motivations,	thereby	supporting	unselfish	action.	However,	if	what	I’ve	sketched	above	is	at	all	
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convincing,	then	we	can	be	selfless	actors	without	having	to	purge	ourselves	of	all	traces	of	the	ego.	While	the	soteriological	ambitions	of	Buddhism	might	require	achieving	a	deeper	revisionary	view	of	the	self	as	an	ownerless	stream,	from	the	standpoint	of	applied	ethics,	such	a	view	is	supererogatory,	and	even	overshoots	its	mark.	Achieving	an	impersonal	viewpoint	does	not	require	jettisoning	the	view	that	we	are	owners	of	our	mental	and	physical	states.	And	given	the	importance	ownership	plays	in	our	conception	of	agency,	it	may	not	only	be	supererogatory,	but	also	counterproductive.	Here’s	why.		 Viewing	your	needs—and	pleasures	and	pains—as	ownerless	states	may	erode	my	appreciation	for	the	unique	person	that	you	are	(conventionally	speaking).	By	focusing	too	much	on	the	overall	quantity	of	states,	rather	than	the	owner	of	such	states,	I	miss	the	nuances	that	come	with	pain	and	pleasure	being	
your	pain	and	pleasure.	I	may	become	less	interested	in	the	specific	plight	of,	say,	you	and	your	family,	and	more	interested	in	plight	as	it	pertains	to	an	abstract	whole.	When	I	empathize	with	you,	and	I	view	your	plight	with	compassion,	I	take	an	interest	in	what	it	means	to	be	the	sort	of	creature	and	person	that	you	are,	which	will	partly	determine	the	sort	of	actions	I	should	promote	for	your	benefit.	While	the	more	abstract,	impersonal	and	non-egocentric	approach	may	not	amount	to	selfishness,	it	becomes	harder	to	understand	what	the	target	of	my	compassion	and	concern	is:	it	becomes	harder	to	be	truly	selfless	in	the	way	I’ve	sketched	things	above.	Since	to	some	extent	your	pain	is	occluded,	that	is,	I	cannot	completely	know	what	it’s	like	to	be	you	suffering	right	now,	I	must	take	into	consideration	whether	my	actions	are	suitable	to	treating	you.	I	cannot	view	things	so	abstractly	as	mere	
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“pain-instances”	that	must	be	vanquished.	I	must	focus	on	your	unique	relationship	to	the	pain	right	now.	In	short,	I	must	focus	on	your	personhood	as	well	as	your	selfhood.	And	this	means	that	I	must	view	you	as	a	unique	owner	of	your	suffering—a	unique	bearer	of	personality	traits	strung	together	by	a	personal	history.	Granted,	Buddhists	like	Śāntideva	admit	that	for	the	sake	of	ethical	agency	I	must	embrace	the	conventional	understanding	of	persons	as	persisting	owners	of	their	mental	and	physical	states.26	But	if	that’s	the	case,	it’s	hard	to	know	what	the	payoff	of	the	No-Self	view	is.	In	fact,	it	seems	that	the	more	I	treat	you	as	a	real	person	who	owns	her	mental	and	physical	states,	the	more	I	can	help	alleviate	your	very	specific	and	contextually-grounded	suffering.			 The	Buddhist	might	respond	that	a	lasting	way	I	can	treat	your	suffering	is	by	helping	you	revise	the	view	that	you	own	mental	and	physical	states.	Anātman	is	supposed	to	be	a	liberating	view,	and	it	is	supposed	to	specifically	liberate	you	from	suffering.	By	establishing	the	reasonableness	of	this	view,	I	help	you	become	less	fixated	on	your	anguish	and	pain.	But	then	the	problem	is	that	motivation	becomes	less	intelligible.	If	you,	that	is,	this	very	specific	person	who	is	suffering,	will	not	actually	benefit	from	this	revised	view,	then	what’s	the	point	in	you	endorsing	it?	If	fixation	on	anguish	and	suffering	is	the	problem,	then	surely	you	can	become	less	fixated	without	abandoning	the	belief	that	you	are	a	person	who	owns	mental	and	physical	states.	In	fact,	the	payoff	in	believing	that	you	do	own	such	states	is	that	you																																																									26	BCA,	9.75-76:	122-23:	“If	you	argue:	for	whom	is	there	compassion	if	no	being	exists?,	[sic]	[our	response	is]	for	anyone	projected	through	the	delusion	which	is	embraced	for	the	sake	of	what	has	to	be	done.	[Objection]	Whose	is	the	task	to	be	done,	if	there	is	no	being?	[Mādhyamika]	True.	Moreover,	the	effort	is	made	in	delusion,	but,	in	order	to	bring	about	an	end	to	suffering	the	delusion	of	what	has	to	be	done	is	not	prevented.”	
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can	experience	the	benefits	of	becoming	less	fixated	on	anguish	and	suffering.	This	can	motivate	you	to	take	proper	action.	Granted,	if	one	were	to	dispense	with	belief	in	a	real,	persisting	person,	one	may	be	less	motivated	to	fixate	on	self-interest,	which	in	turn	might	deflate	selfish	ambitions.	However,	this	may	not	have	the	payoff	a	Buddhist	might	hope	for.	One	might	not	see	any	reason	whatsoever	to	pursue	either	self-interested	considerations	or	other-regarding	considerations.	“Non-egocentricity,”	understood	as	acting	on	the	view	that	the	self	is	a	dispensable	fiction,	does	not	necessarily	motivate	unselfish	action,	even	if	it	helps	deflate	the	motivation	to	pursue	selfish	actions.27	The	way	that	I’ve	sketched	“selfless”	action	does	not	require	this	sort	of	non-egocentricity.	There	may	be	other	reasons	to	endorse	the	No-Self	view,	but	it’s	hard	to	see	why	ethical	considerations	should	motivate	that	endorsement.			 So	now	that	I’ve	sketched	my	view	of	what	is	involved	in	non-egocentricity	and	unselfish	or	“selfless”	behavior,	I’d	like	to	finish	the	chapter	by	providing	a	basic	schematic	of	these	important	concepts.	I	do	so,	because	they	will	be	amply	employed	throughout	the	whole	of	this	work.	In	chapters	2	and	4,	I	will	develop	a	more	thorough-going	critique	of	the	view	that	reducing	the	person	to	an	ownerless	stream	of	consciousness	has	important	ethical	upshots.	I	will	more	thoroughly	examine	distinct	versions	of	the	Buddhist	No-Self	argument,	the	“reductionist”	vs.	the	“emptiness”	(deflationary	and	minimalist)	schools	of	thought,	and	expose	various	problems	I	believe	these	have	in	accounting	for	ethical	agency	and	unselfish,	altruistic	action.																																																										27	In	fact,	it	may	even	promote	a	deeper,	disguised	selfishness	that	comes	with	neglect	and	acts	of	omission.	See	fn.	22.	
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1.3.2	Non-egocentricity,	Unselfishness,	and	Other-regarding	Considerations	
	 Non-egocentricity	can	be	viewed	in	a	purely	negative	manner.	In	the	context	of	Buddhist	thought,	it	may	refer	to	the	view	that	the	machinations	of	the	ego,	and	the	influence	of	one’s	practical	identity	are	tempered	by	the	view	that	the	self	is	either	“empty”	(wholly	non-existent)	or	reducible	to	a	complex	and	impersonal	psychophysical	stream,	unified	by	various	causal	connections	and	relationships	of	contiguity.	The	Buddhist	who	no	longer	recognizes	himself	as	a	“self,”	may	infer	that	there	is	no	reason	to	be	either	obsessed	with	rational	self-interest	or	to	fear	death.	For	example,	Madhyamaka	Buddhism	(the	“emptiness”	school	I	will	further	discuss	in	the	following	chapters)	rejects	the	view	that	any	sort	of	real	reduction	base—like	the	body,	or	the	substratum	of	unanalyzable	psychophysical	events—underlies	the	conception	of	selfhood.	This	is	what	I’m	calling	the	“emptiness	school.”	Adopting	this	view	may	reduce	one’s	fixation	on	the	notion	of	selfhood.	But	this	means	that	one	comes	to	view	all	ownership,	and,	as	I’ll	argue,	agency	as	“empty.”	This	may	or	may	not	amount	to	nihilism.	But	we	can	infer	that	such	a	person	is	less	inclined	to	horde	or	think	only	of	himself—there’s	very	little	reason	to	fret	over	the	interest	of	something	that	simply	does	not	exist!	So,	in	this	sense,	the	view	supports	non-egocentricity.	But	this	does	not	offer	any	positive	reason	to	emphasize	other-regarding	considerations.	There’s	no	direct	reason	to	link	other-centrism	with	metaphysical	self-abnegation	or	practical	asceticism,	especially	when	self-abnegation	can	lead	to	acts	of	omission	that	disguise	oblique	forms	of	selfishness.	The	loss	of	self	may	come	at	the	price	of	a	loss	of	concern	for	others.	I’m	reminded	of	the	Troglodytes	in	Borges’s,	The	Immortal.	The	questing	Roman	soldier,	Rufus	finds	
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himself	horribly	wounded	in	the	city	of	the	immortals.	The	immortals,	having	achieved	transcendence	beyond	the	mortal	pining	of	the	ego,	and	remaining	in	meditative	equipoise	while	contemplating	the	infinite,	are	not	motivated	to	help	Rufus.	Nor	are	they	particularly	concerned	with	self-care.	From	such	a	transcendent	and	impersonal	vantage-point,	why	bother	nursing	the	wounded	soldier?	Neither	self	nor	other-regarding	motivations	play	a	role	in	this	infinitely	stretched-out	state	of	transcendence.	The	upshot	here	is	that	non-egocentrism	does	not	directly	entail	compassion	or	altruistic-minded,	other-regarding	considerations.	What’s	worse	is	that	a	seemingly	non-egocentric	pattern	might	simply	disguise	a	pernicious	form	of	apathetic	egocentrism,	which	prizes	the	personal	state	of	apathy	over	morally	relevant,	other-centric	actions	that	one	may	pursue	or	promote.	While	unselfish	actions	do	not	place	undo	importance	on	self-interest,	and	in	this	way,	they	are	“non-egocentric,”	non-egocentric	agency	is	not	a	sufficient	condition	for	altruism.	This	becomes	abundantly	clear	when	considering	how	“non-egocentricity”	can	cut	across	the	integrity	of	self	and	other	in	the	belief	that	no	one,	strictly	speaking,	owns	mental	or	physical	states.		
	 However,	unselfishness,	as	I’ve	construed	it,	is	a	more	positive	notion:	it	is	commissive.	We	do	not	call	someone	“unselfish,”	because	she	neither	obstructs	nor	contributes	to	someone	else’s	well-being.	Nothing	about	Borges’s	Troglodytes	is	unselfish.	By	withdrawing	and	remaining	detached,	one	may	not	be	very	egocentric	in	her	concerns.	She	attains	a	sort	of	non-egocentricity	by	not	being	overly	obsessed	with	herself	or	others.	But	our	ethical	intuitions,	at	least	by	my	lights,	view	“unselfishness”	as	something	positive,	and	characterized	by	exemplary	deeds.	When	
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one	appreciates	and	cares	for	the	valid	interests	of	another,	and	when	one	actively	puts	another’s	concerns	above	her	own,	or	does	not	make	her	own	interests	the	primary	motivating	factor,	then	one	is	acting	in	an	unselfish	way.	Far	from	being	a	detached	state,	this	requires	that	one	recognizes	and	places	some	value	on	another’s	interests,	and	allows	concern	for	those	interests	to	motivate	her	action	while	downplaying	the	importance	of	her	own.	This	may	not	be	synonymous	with	altruistic	action,	but	it	is	a	necessary	condition	for	altruism.			 Finally,	I’d	like	to	clarify	what	I	mean	when	I	speak	of	“other-regarding	
considerations.”	This	is	a	term	of	art,	and,	as	employed	by	Sturgeon,	it	simply	means	recognizing	that	“someone,	namely	X,	has	a	reason	to	do	or	want	or	strive	to	promote	A.”28	When	I	recognize	that	someone,	namely	X,	has	a	reason	to	do	or	want	to	promote	A,	then	I	am	exhibiting	an	“other-regarding	consideration.”	Likewise,	when	I	recognize	that	I,	myself,	have	a	reason	to	do,	want,	or	strive	to	promote	A,	I	exhibit	a	“self-regarding	consideration.”	This	distinction	helps	us	articulate	at	a	very	general	level	reasons	we	have	for	doing	things.	Some	things	pertain	solely	to	the	self,	and	some	things	pertain	to	others.	Considering	the	intricate	minutiae	of	motivating	reasons	for	action,	these	considerations	often	overlap.	However,	the	distinction	helps	highlight	an	important	logical	structure	that	renders	Buddhist	non-egocentricity	(as	I’ve	glossed	it	here	without	too	much	attention	to	the	variety	of	Buddhist	schools)	problematic	to	say	the	least.	When	I	value	another’s	interests,	say,	in	an	unselfish	action,	or	when	I	sacrifice	my	own	good	for	the	good	of	another	in	an	altruistic	action,	I	can	more	formally	be	said	to	recognize	that	“someone,	namely	X,																																																									28	Nicholas	L.	Sturgeon,	“Altruism,	Solipsism,	and	the	Objectivity	of	Reasons,”	The	
Philosophical	Review,	Vol.	83,	No.	3	(1974):	374-402,	cf.	376.	
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has	a	reason	to	do	A.”	I	come	to	see	that	since	this	is	an	accepted	and	general	rational	structure,	it	applies	to	anyone.	Thus,	I	have	a	reason	to	promote	this	person’s	aim,	and	promoting	or	fulfilling	the	aim	does	not	need	to	necessarily	benefit	me.	But	if	Buddhist	non-egocentricity	has	the	potential	to	amount	to	a	transcendent,	and	for	that	reason,	potentially	nihilistic	outlook,	then	achieving	such	a	state	may	lead	me	to	lose	grip	on	why	anyone	has	any	reasons	to	do	anything.	I	can	no	longer	formulate	my	motivations	in	terms	of	either	self-regarding	or	other-regarding	considerations;	nor	does	any	sort	of	overlap	come	into	play.	Rather	than	resonance,	I	seem	to	encounter	a	cancellation	pattern:	I	am	no	longer	driven	by	ego-thoughts	and	self-interest,	but	neither	do	the	values	and	interests	of	others	drive	me.	The	threat	is	that	Buddhism	collapses	the	distinction	between	self	and	other,	and	thereby	collapses	the	distinction	between	self-regarding	and	other-regarding	considerations	(and	their	overlap).	This	threatens	to	render	compassionate	and	altruistic	action,	as	well	as	positive	forms	of	unselfishness,	formally	unintelligible.	Moreover,	it	has	the	danger	of	disguising—and	in	this	sense,	perpetuating—a	more	pernicious,	because	transparent,	form	of	selfishness,	namely,	apathetic	acts	of	omission.			 	
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CHAPTER	2:	SELFLESSNESS	AND	NORMATIVITY:	ŚĀNTIDEVA	AND	EMPTINESS	
ETHICS	
2.1	Introduction		 My	central	thesis	here	is	that	the	No-Self	view	fails	to	provide	us	with	a	clear	account	of	agency,	particularly,	ethical	agency.	In	chapter	1,	I	argued	in	a	very	general	way	that	our	intuitions	regarding	what	it	means	to	be	an	ethical	agent	are	better	accommodated	by	a	conception	of	the	self	as	the	owner	of	its	mental	and	physical	states.	Furthermore,	I	pointed	out	that	influential	early	and	late	20th	Century	thinkers	like	Henry	Sidgwick	and	Derek	Parfit	argued—albeit	from	two	different	standpoints—that	normative,	rational,	and	ethical	considerations	are	importantly	shaped	by	our	conception	of	selfhood,	particularly	with	respect	to	how	we	conceive	of	the	distinction	between	self	and	other.	I	also,	in	a	very	broad	way,	reconstructed	a	version	of	the	Buddhist	No-Self	view	(anātman	or	nairātmyavāda),	which	likewise	places	considerable	ethical	weight	on	how	we	conceive	of	the	self.	I	then	argued	that	entertaining	such	a	view	in	the	practical	domain	might	not	only	prove	to	be	unnecessary	for	making	sense	of	other–regarding	considerations	and	altruistic	motivations,	but	may	even	collapse	or	greatly	destabilize	a	vital	distinction	that	underlies	such	considerations:	the	distinction	between	self-regarding	and	other-regarding	motivations.	The	metaphysical	self-effacer	may	end	up	failing	to	distinguish	between	being	selfish	and	being	altruistic,	and	thus	prove	incapable	of	being	altruistic.	Practical	unselfishness	may	turn	out	to	be	incompatible	with	No-Self	
		 39	
metaphysics.	While	this,	on	its	own,	might	not	be	a	highly	original	claim,1	I	wanted	to	better	clarify	what	morally	relevant	“selflessness”	might	mean.	In	doing	so,	I	showed	how	egocentric	considerations	might	in	fact	be	consistent	with	unselfishness	(just	as	abolition	of	the	ego	can	be	practically	consistent	with	selfishness	of	the	sort	that,	in	popular	imagination,	Yashodhara	must	have	charged	Prince	Siddhartha,	who	with	the	aim	of	achieving	enlightenment,	abandoned	her	and	their	baby).			 The	crucial	issue	to	examine	here	is	the	relationship	between	the	Ownership	view	of	self,	which	compellingly	accommodates	many	of	our	firm	intuitions	with	respect	to	agency	and	ethics,	and	the	various	theoretical	programs	that	revise	our	belief	in	an	owner	of	mental	occurrences.	In	section	2.2,	I	address	some	of	the	glaring	challenges	No-Self	views	face	in	terms	of	providing	both	a	compelling,	general	account	of	agency,	and	a	specifically	convincing	account	of	ethical	agency.	I	argue	that	No-Self	views	require	re-description	of	some	fundamental	features	of	forward-looking	agency	and	language-use,	and	I	show	how	such	re-descriptions	face	formidable	problems	that	are	better	met	by	an	Ownership	view.			 I	only	broadly	covered	this	problem	in	chapter	1.	The	problem	is	that	agency	and	ethics	crucially	appeal	to	notions	like	volition,	voluntary	action,	freedom,																																																									1	Paul	Williams,	Studies	in	the	Philosophy	of	the	Bodhicaryāvatāra:	Altruism	and	
Reality	(Dehli,	India:	Motilal	Banarsidass,	1998).	While	Williams	does	not	describe	the	problem	in	this	way,	I	am	capitalizing	on	a	key	insight	in	his	critique	of	Śāntideva's	argument	for	impartialism	and	altruism.	Williams	has	claimed,	more	or	less,	that	emphasis	on	anātman	is	consistent	with	moral	nihilism.	On	the	other	hand,	adopting	the	conventional	belief	in	a	self	might	motivate	altruism	and	make	sense	of	normative	considerations,	but	conventional	considerations	can	also	support	the	ethical	intuition	that	prioritizing	one’s	own	future	welfare	is	not	immoral.					
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intention,	and	persistence	and	duration.	The	view	that	we	are	owners	of	our	mental	lives	nicely	accommodates	the	deeply	held	intuition	that	we	can	be	rational	or	irrational	agents	who	are	responsible	for	our	lives,	and	that	some	sense	of	endurance	justifies	prudence	and	concern	for	the	welfare	of	our	nearest	and	dearest.	These	are	basic	aspects	of	the	lived,	human	experience,	and	these	notions	are	ineluctably	stubborn	organizing	principles	that	have	been	emphasized	to	greater	or	lesser	degrees	throughout	the	history	of	civilized	life.	Moreover,	these	principles	make	social	living	conceptually	intelligible.	Theoretical	advancements,	ontologically	revisionary	insights,	and	compelling	reductionist	programs	either	force	us	to	abandon	some	of	these	basic	notions,	or	proceed	along	an	insulated	domain	of	discourse	that	simply	remains	neutral	to	the	reality	of	agency	and	ethical	phenomena.	The	radical	implications	of	some	these	revisionary	models	for	our	ethical	intuitions	and	for	models	of	agency	and	practical	rationality	can	be	crudely	compared	to	the	difficulties	quantum	mechanics	presents	for	Newtonian	physics	and	Relativity	Theory.	These	physical	models,	certain	aspects	of	which	are	mutually	inconsistent,	are	all	indispensable	to	the	advancement	of	physics—none	have	so	far	been	abandoned	for	the	other.	Similarly,	the	social	aspect	of	the	human	condition	that	produces	ethics	cannot	be	“transcended”	or	dispensed	with	merely	in	order	to	accommodate	ontological	models	that	dispense	with	person-involving	and	ethical	terms.	And	this	is	precisely	why	Buddhist	views,	and	the	work	of	Parfit,	are	so	attractive:	they	provide	possibilities	of	a	sort	of	“grand”	or	“unifying	theory”	in	which	the	theoretically	compelling	project	of	reductionism	may	be	able	to	provide	
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us	with	normative-ethical	insights.	Thus,	it	is	crucial	for	ethicists	to	take	these	projects	seriously.			 While	various	No-Ownership	and/or	No-Self	views	might	distance	themselves	from	normative	discourse,	those	views	that	do	attempt	to	develop	an	ethical	orientation—or	to	derive	normative	principles	from	their	ontological	commitments—would	be	attractive	to	those	who	want	to	retain	the	normative	gravity	of	“I	should	do	the	right	thing”	while	also	adhering	to	eliminativism	or	reductionism	that	construes	“I”	as	an	empty	term.	The	ethical	orientation	of	the	Buddhist	and	Parfitian	projects	are	just	the	sorts	of	views	that	want	to	derive	moral	conclusions	from	ontological	commitments	(or,	ontological	revisions	in	the	form	of	metaphysical	non-commitments).	I	sketched	one	way	in	which	metaphysical	views	about	the	self—especially	revisionary	metaphysical	views—can	importantly	impact	what	it	makes	sense	to	do	in	the	practical	domain.	This	was	in	response	to	the	claim	that	metaphysically	deep	categories	do	not	matter	so	much	in	ethical	questions	as	do	considerations	of	practical	identity.	The	counter-argument	I	offered	in	chapter	1	claimed	that	if	we	can	achieve	a	certain	impersonal	view	about	selfhood,	then	such	descriptive	views	might	in	fact	have	normative	implications.	Moreover,	we	might	achieve	an	impersonal	view	through	theoretical	dialogue	with	metaphysics.	For	example,	one	version	of	the	No–Self	view	in	Buddhism,	the	“reductionist	view”	that	we	find	in	Vasubandhu	(c.	4th-5th	C.	CE),	which	is	arguably	rehearsed	in	Śāntideva’s	argument	for	rational	altruism	in	chapter	8	of	the	Bodhicaryāvatāra	(passages	101-103),	claims	that	under	analysis	we	can	view	the	psychophysical	stream	in	totally	impersonal	terms.	We	can	do	this	without	appealing	to	any	sort	of	further	
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underlying	and	unifying	thread.	The	idea	here	is	that	psychological	continuity,	and	various	forms	of	causal	relationships	between	psychophysical	events,	underlies	the	erroneous	view	that	there	is	a	persisting	self	that	owns	its	mental	and	physical	states.	When	we	unburden	ourselves	of	the	belief	that	we	are	persisting	owners	of	our	experiences,	we	not	only	free	ourselves	up	for	other-regarding	considerations	in	the	conventional,	practical	domain,	but	also	recognize	that	altruistic	motivations	are	rationally	justified.			 I	also	briefly	discussed	a	variant	of	this	view.	Acknowledging	that	we	need	a	more	robust	view	of	how	we	develop	a	conception	of	ownership	and	“mineness,”	Buddhists	like	Candrakīrti	(c.	6th	C.	CE)—on	Jonardon	Ganeri’s	reading2—argued	that	the	sense	of	self	is	forged	through	an	appropriative	activity	in	the	practical	domain.	I	gloss	“appropriative	activity,”	as	involving	the	capacity	for	the	stream	to	“grasp”	or	“take	ownership”	of	(or	fuel	and	feed	itself)	various	sensations,	volitions,	and	physical	objects.	Appropriation	is	a	gloss	on	the	term,	“upādāna,”	which	is	a	word	for	fuel.3	The	psychophysical	stream	is	“fueled”	by	what	it	wants	and	does	not	want,	which	is	reflected	in	its	positive	pursuits	and	its	various	aversions.	The	stream	operates	relationally	and	fluidly	like	a	fuel	appropriating	oxygen.	Without	hypostasizing	the	stream,	we	can	say	that	psychophysical	elements	show	up	as	intimately	related	by	the	sorts	of	intentional	objects	at	which	such	states	aim,	and	by	which	the	stream	feeds	itself.	The	fuel	of	desire	determines	the	directionality	of	those	aims.	Desire	produces	a	kind	of	closure	wherein	states	of	consciousness	knit	a																																																									2	Jonardon	Ganeri,	The	Concealed	Art	of	the	Soul:	Theories	of	Self	and	Practices	in	
Indian	Ethics	and	Epistemology	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2007),	at	Part	III,	155-185.		3	Ganeri,	The	Concealed	Art,	200.	
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seemingly	unified	tapestry	out	of	the	sentiment,	“I	want,	therefore	I	am.”	The	“I”	appears	to	be	singular	and	self-same	as	it	is	a	term	that	arises	out	of	desire	for	existence	and	for	sensual	objects.	To	want	is	to	make	the	object	of	want	one’s	own,	and	this	process	holistically	produces	the	sense	that	“this	is	mine,”	and	“I	am.”	There	is	lust	for	the	lover’s	body,	or	desire	to	smell	and	taste	something	sweet.	There	is	pride	in	the	supple	movements	of	the	body,	and	a	certain	experience	of	power	in	exerting	physical	force	and	maintaining	social	equilibrium.	Contiguity	and	continuity	between	desires	and	volitions	produce	a	first-person	sense	of	unity,	which	is	neither	a	mere	sum	of	parts	nor	a	real	whole.	We	might	think	of	this	in	terms	of	a	sort	of	“vortex”	of	desires	and	perceptions	that	forge	a	sense	of	unity	amid	the	“grasping”	action	that	Buddhism	believes	fuels	sentient	existence.			 While	this	produces	an	egocentric	closure,	I	independently	suggested	that	a	more	other-centric	manifestation	of	the	appropriative	activity	could	be	one	way	of	creatively	glossing	“selflessness.”	When	we	learn	to	more	consciously	view	the	self	as	a	dynamic	activity	with	porous	borders	(not	a	substantive	thing),	and	dispense	with	the	belief	that	the	sense	of	self	is	the	result	of	a	real,	persisting	entity,	we	may	better	learn	to	identify	with	the	needs	and	sufferings	of	other	people.	We	understand	that	no	real	metaphysical	limits	sustain	a	hard	and	fast	individuation	between	the	more	intimate	needs	we	experience,	and	the	needs	that	others	attest	to	having.	The	very	boundary	between	the	intimate	and	the	objectified	“other”	grows	blurry,	and	the	result	is	a	sense	of	“exchange”	and	dynamic	unity	between	self	and	other.	On	the	practical	level,	the	so-called	appropriative	self	is	one	built	out	of	the	various	mental	and	physical	occurrences	that	are	either	appropriated	and	identified	
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with,	or	disavowed	or	transcended.	This	sort	of	“self-activity”	or	“self-ing”	is	more	or	less	coherent,	but	always	porous	and	dynamically	in	flux,	and	it	is	fueled	by	the	mental	occurrences	and	values	that	it	endorses.	The	idea	here	is	that	with	the	right	practice	we	can	expand	the	view	of	self	to	radically	incorporate	others	(and	by	“others,”	I	mean	other	constellations	of	mental	and	physical	occurrences	available	for	appropriation).	When	this	is	supported	by	the	Buddhist	soteriological	goal	of	liberation	from	cycles	of	suffering—which	the	Buddhist	argues	are	chiefly	produced	by	attachment,	egoism,	and	narrow	obsession	with	one’s	own	desires	and	projects—we	can	cultivate	a	deeply	other-centric	orientation.	This	is	presumed	to	be	a	liberating	and	salvific	orientation—an	“enactment,”	if	you	will,	of	non-egocentric	being.	I	will	develop	a	slightly	different,	but	I	think,	more	attractive	version	of	this	argument	in	chapter	3.	However,	in	chapter	4,	I	will	point	out	some	of	its	shortcomings,	and	argue	that	a	more	normative	gloss	on	the	“appropriative	self”	offers	a	contemporary	and	respectably	embodied,	naturalistic	view.	The	important	difference	between	the	two	versions	is	that	the	latter	supports	the	belief	that	authorship	of	one’s	life	through	practical	identity	and	embodied	avowals	and	disavowals	is	not	an	illusion	to	be	seen	through.			 In	section	2.3	of	the	present	chapter,	I	will	lay	out	the	conceptual	territory	of	contemporary	views	on	selfhood.	My	goal	is	to	better	situate	No-Self	views.	I	specifically	set	up	the	conversation	in	light	of	the	Madhyamaka-Buddhist	“emptiness”	thesis—the	view	that	nothing	in	reality	has	intrinsic	existence	or	inherent	essence	(svabhāva).	I	focus	on	Madhyamaka,	because	its	ethical	champion,	Śāntideva	provides	one	of	the	more	systematic	ethical	treatises	in	the	Mahāyāna	
		 45	
corpus.	Moreover,	I	need	to	situate	Madhyamaka	and	Śāntideva’s	altruistic	project	in	terms	of	competing	Buddhist	No-Self	views.			 In	2.4,	I	cover	with	greater	detail	the	utilitarian-leaning	ethics	we	may	extract	from	Śāntideva's	Bodhicaryāvatāra	and	his	Śikṣāsamuccaya.	Śāntideva	provides	us	with	a	version	of	the	No-Self	view	that	presumably	aims	to	derive	moral	conclusions	from	ontological	insights.	Furthermore,	as	theorists	like	Charles	Goodman	have	contended,	Śāntideva's	work	aims	to	justify	a	version	of	act-consequentialism,	which	promotes	altruism	and	agent-neutral	ethics.4	This	should	be	taken	seriously,	because	there	are	independently	compelling	reasons	to	disavow	the	belief	in	a	real	self	or	a	real	owner	of	experiences.	So	if	we	can	develop	a	workable	ethics	out	of	such	insight,	then	we	may	have	an	ethically	compelling	reason	to	dispense	with	our	belief	in	real	selves.			 Goodman	provides	a	nice	overview	of	some	of	the	independent	reasons	Buddhists	have	for	rejecting	belief	in	the	self.	For	example,	Buddhists	are	fond	of	appealing	to	vagueness	arguments.	Mereological	vagueness,	which	drives	various	Sorites	problems,	destabilizes	a	realist	account	of	composite	objects,	thereby	problematizing	our	capacity	to	individuate	objects	and	identify	parts	that	belong	to	a	whole.	Moreover,	it	implies	that	identifying	P	as	a	part	of	W	is	a	function	of	conceptual	construction,	and	not	an	isomorphic	depiction	of	fixed	structures	in	nature.	Thus,	all	composite	items—like	the	complex	stream	that	Buddhists	believe	account	for	the	self—are	conceptual	imputations	that	disappear	under	analysis.	As	Goodman	writes,	“Plants	and	animals,	artifacts	and	natural	objects,	all	have	vague																																																									4	Charles	Goodman,	The	Consequences	of	Compassion:	An	Interpretation	and	Defense	
of	Buddhist	Ethics	(New	York,	Oxford	University	Press,	2006).	
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spatial	boundaries;	once	we	look	at	them	on	the	atomic	level,	they	are	clouds	of	tiny	particles,	which	constantly	exchange	matter	with	the	environment	in	such	a	way	that	there	is	often	no	fact	of	the	matter	about	whether	a	particular	particle	is	part	of	them	or	not.”5	And	of	course,	at	the	normative	level,	vagueness	drives	many	of	the	controversies	involved	in	the	abortion	and	assisted-suicide	and	euthanasia	questions.	Parfit	famously	capitalizes	on	vagueness	to	argue	that	there	is	not	always	a	fact	about	the	matter	as	to	whether	or	not	someone	has	survived	a	process	of	change.	This,	of	course,	has	important	implications	for	theories	about	personal	identity,	and	for	the	ethics	of	punishment	and	responsibility.	So,	if	Śāntideva's	revisionary	work	can	provide	us	with	normative	conclusions,	then	it’s	a	theory	worth	taking	very	seriously.	However,	to	better	situate	Śāntideva's	work—and	show	how	it	may	differ	in	important	ways	from	Parfit’s	project—we	need	a	more	thorough	taxonomy	of	views	about	the	self,	particularly	No-Self	views,	since	not	all	Buddhists	mean	the	same	thing	by	denying	the	existence	of	a	self.			 I	will	tackle	this,	as	I	said,	in	2.3.	In	doing	so,	I	will	utilize	Ganeri’s	helpful	taxonomy.6	Accordingly,	I	will	assess	Śāntideva's	work	in	light	of	this	taxonomy.	Finally,	in	2.5,	I	will	also	assess	some	of	the	leading	reconstructions	of	the	crucial	passages,	101-103,	in	chapter	8	of	Śāntideva's	Bodhicaryāvatāra.	In	these	passages,	Śāntideva	argues	that	we	must	endorse	robust	altruism.	I	will	ultimately	conclude,	like	Harris,7	that	denying	the	existence	of	the	self	fails	in	any	straightforward	way	to																																																									5	Goodman,	The	Consequences	of	Compassion,	101-102.	6	Jonardon	Ganeri,	The	Self:	Naturalism,	Consciousness,	and	the	First-Person	
Experience	(New	York:	Oxford,	2012),	chapter	1.	7	Stephen	Harris,	“Does	Anātman	Rationally	Entail	Altruism?	On	Bodhicaryāvatāra	8:103,”	Journal	of	Buddhist	Ethics	18,	2011:	93-123.	
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justify	an	altruistic	moral	imperative.	There	may	be	better	ways	to	reconstruct	Śāntideva's	work.	However,	I	cannot	currently	devise	a	strategy	for	rescuing	Śāntideva's	argument	(although	I	provide	some	original	takes	on	the	leading	critiques	of	his	argument,	while	providing	a	metaphysical	option	that	might	bolster	Śāntideva’s	thesis).	It	seems	to	me	that	the	most	compelling	reason	I	might	have	for	helping	someone—or	for	being	committed	to	altruism—is	through	some	form	of	identification	with	that	person.	At	some	general	level	of	empathic	identity,	your	pain	might	as	well	be	my	pain:	this	is	something	we	can	share.	At	some	level	of	metaphysical	description	“we	are	all	one,”	and	so	any	suffering	is	suffering	for	all.	At	some	level	of	social	generality,	I	would	want	to	be	free	of	pain,	and	I	believe	that	this	is	a	right	that	anyone	who	is	sufficiently	unbiased	would	have	to	extend	to	everyone	in	a	Rawlsian-contractualist	sort	of	way.	However,	in	all	these	scenarios—pace	the	Buddhist	emphasis	on	“emptiness”—the	important	distinction	between	self	and	other	is	always	maintained.	The	key	to	altruism,	I	believe,	rests	somewhere	in	the	paradoxical	notion	of	forging	real	identity	amidst	accepted	difference.		
2.2	Ownership	and	No-Self	Views		 South	Asian	thought,	from	its	rich	philosophical	inquiry	into	the	nature	of	the	self	in	the	Upaniṣads,	to	early	Buddhist	practical	philosophy,	and	medieval	Buddhist	epistemological-metaphysical	speculation,	has	viewed	the	question	of	the	self	as	one	of	the	most	central	philosophical	and	spiritual-religious	questions	to	pursue.	A	general	belief	pervading	the	constellation	of	diverse	texts	we	monolithically	call,	“Indian	philosophy”	(darṡana)	is	the	belief	that	understanding	the	nature	of	the	self	is	necessary	for	commanding	a	clearer	sense	of	what	one	should	do,	in	both	the	
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social-normative	sphere,	and	in	one’s	private	life.	Moreover,	and	particularly	in	the	case	of	Buddhism,	understanding	the	nature	of	the	self	is	thought	to	be	necessary	for	achieving	maximum	well-being,	for	understanding	one’s	duties	and	social	roles	(dharma),	and	for	freeing	oneself	from	the	existential	suffering	that	presumably	arises	from	holding	mistaken	views	about	the	self.8	In	fact,	one	way	of	viewing	the	Buddha’s	mission,	and	the	philosophical	thought	that	has	grown	out	of	that	mission,	is	to	see	it	as	a	deeply	pragmatic	labor	aimed	at	healing	various	“psychological	sicknesses”	that	arise—not	out	of	aberrant	mental	disorders	and	neuroses,	but	rather,	out	of	the	ordinary	experience	of	living	under	erroneous,	but	dominant	practical	and	philosophical	paradigms.	So	the	Buddha	may	be	viewed	as	a	kind	of	“psychological	doctor,”9	or	“philosophical	healer.”	Especially	with	such	foundational	Madhyamaka	thinkers	as	Nāgārjuna	and	Candrakīrti,	Buddhism	becomes	a	philosophical	therapeutic	and	corrective	in	its	critique	of	the	reifying	habits	and	practices	of	language-users,	a	move	we’ve	taken	very	seriously	in	the	Euro-American	tradition	following	Wittgenstein’s	lead.	Also,	in	a	move	paralleled	by	Hume	in	British	philosophy,	the	Buddha’s	project	might	be	viewed	as	a	kind	of																																																									8	See	Ganeri,	The	Concealed	Art	of	the	Soul,	157.	Ganeri	points	out	in	citing	Richard	Gombrich:	“We	ought	not	to	conclude,	however,	that	the	Buddha’s	interest	in	persons	is	merely	statistical,	and	this	is	because	of	another	claim	he	makes,	namely,	that	the	path	to	the	removal	of	suffering	rests	in	freedom	from	mistaken	conceptions	of	the	self,	or	mistaken	ideas	about	what	having	this	concept	consists	in.”	Ganeri	draws	on	Gombrich’s	claim	that	“‘the	most	fundamental	doctrine	of	Buddhism	[is	that]	Enlightenment	consists	in	realizing	that	there	is	no	soul	or	enduring	essence	in	living	beings.”	See	Richard	Gombrich,	“Review	of	J.	T.	Ergardt,”	
Numen	26	(1979):	270.	Ganeri	adds	in	his	note	(157:	n.	2):	“It	is	perhaps	worth	stressing	that	the	claim	is	not	that	we	labor	under	a	self-deception.	Self-deception	has	to	do	with	willful	errors	in	my	de	se	judgments	about	my	own	motivations	and	desires;	the	error	to	which	the	Buddha	refers	has	to	do	with	mistakes	about	the	possession	of	a	concept	of	self	as	such.”	9	Ibid.,	157.		
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empirical	philosophical-psychology,	or,	proto-psychology.	This	is	especially	visible	in	the	Abhidharma	tradition,	which	aimed	to	provide	metaphysical	support	for	the	leading	conceptual	tenets	of	Buddhism:	the	teachings	of	nonself	(anātman),	impermanence	(anitya),	and	suffering	and	its	healing	(duḥkha	and	nirodha).10	Abhidharma	articulated	what	it	believed	were	the	fundamental	building	blocks	(dharmas),	or,	matrices	of	basic	experiential	data	that	underlie	our	mental	lives	and	express	the	structures	of	our	consciousness.	Thus,	Buddhist	philosophy,	with	its	pragmatic-empirical	and	therapeutic	orientation,	and	the	equally	therapeutic	but	deeply	metaphysical	Yoga	tradition,	emerging	out	of	Patañjali’s	c.	4th	century	CE,	
Yoga-Sūtras,	along	with	the	analytic	and	logic-driven	discourse	of	the	Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika	realists	all	set	the	stage	for	what	Ganeri	calls,	“substantive	truth-directed	debate	about	the	self”	in	the	Indian	tradition.11	The	Buddhists	were	particularly	concerned	with	locating	the	source	of	error	that	perpetuates	erroneous	thinking	about	the	self.12	One	does	not	exaggerate	in	saying	that	all	the	major	schools	of	Indian	philosophy	believed	that	getting	it	right	about	the	self	is	essential	for	achieving	a	fully	realized	life	(construed	in	both	transcendent	terms,	and	with	respect	to	social	harmony	and	the	proper	view	of	one’s	social	roles	and	duties).					 Mahāyāna-Madhyamaka	Buddhism,	in	the	likes	of	Nāgārjuna,	Candrakīrti,	and	Śāntideva’s	9th	chapter	of	the	Bodhicaryāvatāra,	“Perfection	of	Wisdom”																																																									10	Nāgārjuna’s	Middle	Way:	Mūlamadhyamakakārikā,	translation	and	commentary	by	Mark	Siderits	and	Shōryū	Katsura	(Somerville,	Massachusetts:	Wisdom	Publications,	2010),	4.	Siderits	and	Katsura	do	not	mention	any	relation	to	Hume	here,	but	they	give	a	succinct	outline	of	the	metaphysical	aspects	of	the	Abhidharma	project	that	Mahāyāna-Madhyamaka	thinkers	would	later	deconstruct.	See	the	introduction.				11	Ganeri,	The	Concealed	Art,	159.	12	Ibid.,	159.	
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(prajñā-pāramitā),	adopts	a	radical	global-irrealism	by	attacking	epistemological	foundationalism,	and	deconstructing	substance	ontology	altogether.	If	the	Sautrāntika-Abhidharma	philosophy	of	Vasubandhu	(c.	4th-5th	C.	CE)	sought	to	locate	and	analyze	the	basic	experiential	stuff	out	of	which	our	mental	lives	are	constructed,	the	Madhyamaka	School,	growing	out	of	Nāgārjuna’s	
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā	(“Root	Verses	of	the	Middling	Path”),	sought	to	problematize	the	epistemological	assumptions	that	grounded	such	a	pursuit.	This	inspired	the	Mādhyamika	philosopher	to	develop	a	radically	relational	philosophy,	eschewing	any	references	to	either	real	natural	kinds,	or	foundational	knowledge	obtained	through	allegedly	certified	and	truth-producing	instruments	(pramāṇa).13	Thus,	it	is	necessary	to	clarify	the	nuanced	iterations	of	the	No-Self	view	that	arise	out	of	the	trove	of	diverging	texts	called,	“Buddhism.”	It	is	also	necessary	to	provide	a	broader	scope	of	the	different	concerns	that	drove	the	evolving	critique	of	belief	in	a	persisting,	substantial	self.	Helpfully,	Ganeri	has	distilled	two	basic	research	targets	running	throughout	the	variegated	strands	of	the	Buddhist	project:	1. Identify	false	constitutive	accounts	of	the	concept	of	self,	and	provide	instead	a	true	account	of	what	our	concept	of	self	consists	in.	2. Consider	whether	the	concept	of	self,	correctly	described,	has	any	place	in	a	properly	constituted	mental	life.14																																																									13	For	an	updated	interpretation	of	Nāgārjuna’s	Vigrahavyāvartanī	(“The	Dispeller	of	Disputes”),	a	text	devoted	to	critiquing	epistemological	foundationalism,	particularly,	the	realism	endorsed	by	the	Nyāya	philosophers	with	respect	to	the	existence	of	justified	knowledge	obtained	through	use	of	the	pramāṇas,	see	
Nāgārjuna’s	Vigrahavyāvartanī,	translation	and	commentary	by	Jan	Westerhoff	(New	York:	Oxford,	2010).		14	Ganeri,	The	Concealed	Art,	159.	
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	 No-Self	views	may	be	oriented	against	the	background	of	these	two	trajectories.	First,	one	must	provide	a	convincing	account	of	what	is	conceptually	constitutive	of	selfhood.	Second,	one	must	determine	the	practical	and	ethical	upshot	of	employing	this	correct,	or,	corrected	account	of	self.	With	that	in	mind,	I’d	like	to	articulate	several	philosophically	relevant	iterations	of	the	No-Self	view	in	order	to	more	closely	assess,	in	light	of	chapter	1,	whether	a	more	compelling	account	of	ethical	agency	and	justified	altruism	can	be	developed	by	departing	from	the	view	of	the	self	as	an	embodied	owner	of	its	mental	and	physical	states.	I	will	begin	by	adopting	a	useful	taxonomy	from	Ganeri’s	work.			 But	before	turning	to	that	taxonomy,	I’d	like	to	emphasize	that	in	order	for	a	No-Self	view	to	be	convincing,	especially	those	views	claiming	that	even	a	correctly	described	concept	of	self	is	a	moral	ill	that	somehow	impedes	one	from	achieving	optimal	ethical	clarity	and	maturity,	it	has	to	overcome	some	formidable	ontological	and	ethical	obstacles	surrounding	the	concept	of	agency.	As	I’ve	claimed	above,	chapter	1	was	a	broad	and	very	generic	rehearsal	of	what	is	ethically	at	stake	when	we	consider	the	metaphysics	of	selves.	But	the	epistemology	of	selves	is	equally	important	when	considering	agency.	How	I	come	to	know	that	certain	plans	and	preferences	are	in	your	interest,	and	how	I	come	to	relate	to	the	various	beliefs,	desires,	and	intentions	that	fashion	my	plans	and	interests,	as	being	mine,	require	that	I	employ	some	conception	of	selfhood.	Ownership	and	an	attendant	conception	of	self	are	key	components	that	make	agency	and	self-regarding	and	other-regarding	considerations	intelligible.	As	Ganeri	argues,	the	concept	of	self	“is	important	because	it	enables	me	to	think	of	my	ideas	and	emotions,	my	plans	and	aspirations,	
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my	hopes	and	fears,	as	mine—as	belonging	to	me,	and	the	proper	focus	of	my	self-interest.”15	The	discussion	of	conflicts	between	self-interest	and	considerations	of	the	greater	good	does	not	get	off	the	ground	with	out	some	working	conception	of	selfhood.	In	chapter	1,	I	showed	how	the	strategy	of	collapsing	the	distinction	between	self	and	other	does	not	necessarily	defuse	the	conflict	between	self	and	other.	It	may	either:	(1)	leave	us	with	no	motivations,	or,	(2)	disguise	a	deeper	selfishness	that	comes	with	apathetic	acts	of	omission.	Moreover,	lacking	a	concept	of	a	self	is	tantamount	to	lacking	a	robust	sense	of	agency:	one	would	lack	the	capacity	to	consider	how	intentions	and	interests	coincide	or	conflict.	Altruism	would	not	make	sense	unless	one	had	a	clear	sense	of	whose	interests	are	at	stake,	and	whose	interests	are	either	advanced	or	impeded.			 		 Also,	as	Marya	Schechtman	has	pointed	out,	some	sense	of	duration	and	persistence	is	conceptually	essential	in	a	convincing	notion	of	selfhood,	and	this	is	straightforwardly	supported	by	an	Ownership	view	of	the	self.	Duration	and	connectedness	is	required	for	making	sense	of	talking,	listening,	working,	acting,	having	beliefs,	desires,	goals,	intentions,	and	for	thinking,	and	vacillating,	and	being	inconsistent.16	Indeed,	as	Arindam	Chakrabarti	has	pointed	out,	the	self	has	been	used	to	conceptually	make	sense	of	the	forward-looking	nature	of	desire,	and	to	make	sense	of	our	capacity	to	recognize	persons	and	things,	and	to	communicate																																																									15Ganeri,	The	Concealed	Art,	191.	16	Cited	from	Sorabji,	The	Self,	270.	See	Marya	Schechtman,	The	Constitution	of	Selves	(Ithaca:	Cornell	University,	1996),	137.	Sorabji	writes:	“There	is	yet	another	difficulty	[for	No-Self	views	and	Parfitian	style	reductionism]:	a	person’s	activities	are	linked	together	in	a	far	greater	variety	of	contexts	than	the	few	that	Parfit	considers,	and	normally	the	linkage	involves	the	idea	of	the	same	owner,	so	that,	if	we	drop	that	idea,	all	these	cases	would	need	to	be	re-described.	
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and	use	language.17	So,	in	summary,	a	No-Self	and/or	No-Ownership	view	must	address	three	general	problems.	1. In	terms	of	ethical	agency,	the	No-Self	view,	at	least	on	the	surface,	threatens	to	destabilize	the	distinction	between	self-regarding	and	other-regarding	considerations,	and	this	is	a	basic	distinction	that	makes	altruism	intelligible.	2. Again,	in	terms	of	ethical	agency,	the	equanimity	that	the	Buddhist	believes	is	achieved	in	fully	realizing	the	No-Self	view,	seems,	at	least	on	one	interpretation,18	to	produce	a	dilemma.	On	the	one	hand,	when	the	importance	of	conventional	selfhood	is	stressed,	the	close	and	personal	conventional	relationship	to	one’s	own	future-self	seems	to	justify	at	least	moderate	egoism	(or	a	privileging	of	one’s	own	future	welfare).	On	the	other	hand,	by	de-emphasizing	conventional	selfhood,	equanimity	may	be	achieved,	but	equanimity	is	not	logically	inconsistent	with	apathy	and	neglect;	so	de-emphasizing	conventional	selfhood	is	consistent	with	moral	nihilism.	Clearly,	moderate	egoism	and	nihilism	undermine	the	demanding	commitment	to	altruism	that	texts	like	Bodhicaryāvatāra	endorse.	3.	There	are	all	sorts	of	problems	for	the	No-Self	view	that	concern	broader	notions	of	agency.	For	example,	everything	from	developing	a	full-fledged	intention,	to	entertaining	self-doubt,	anticipation,	repentance,	or	engaging	in																																																									17	Also	cited	in	Sorabji,	The	Self,	295.	Sorabji	cites	Chakrabarti’s	translation	of	the	10th	century	CE	Nyāya	philosopher,	Jayanta	Bhaṭṭa,	who	argued	that	linguistic	communication,	from	the	successive	apprehension	of	ordered	phonemes,	to	the	holistic	apprehension	of	a	whole	sentence,	bolsters	the	view	that	an	enduring	self	is	operative	in	synthesizing	fields	of	data.	See	Arindam	Chakrabarti,	“The	Nyāya	Proofs	for	the	Existence	of	the	Soul,”	Journal	of	Indian	Philosophy	10,	1982,	211-38,	at	225.		18	Harris,	“Does	Anātman,”	102:	Harris	refers	to	this	problem	as	“Śāntideva's	dilemma,”	and	develops	his	assessment	out	of	Paul	Williams’s	critique	in	Studies.		
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inconsistent	or	illogical	thinking	requires	some	sense	of	persistence	and	duration.	We	require	some	sense	of	persistence	and	duration	to	even	connect	the	phonemes	that	make	up	words,	which	then	produce	intelligible	sentences.	In	short,	the	future-directed,	or	forward-looking	nature	of	agency	requires	a	sense	of	duration	and	persistence	that	the	Ownership	view	more	easily	accommodates.		 So	I’ve	basically	boiled	down	the	problem	with	No-Self	and/or	No-Ownership	views	to	two	general	problems	concerning	ethical	agency,	and	one	general	problem	concerning	the	forward-looking	nature	of	agency	and	linguistic	communication.	However,	in	fairness	to	the	No-Self	view,	which	has	several	nuanced	versions,	we	cannot	simply	assume	that	No-Selfers	deny	the	importance	of	conventional	selfhood	and	ownership,	especially	when	doing	so	produces	a	glaringly	incoherent	account	of	everyday,	transactional	reality.	And	yet,	as	stated	in	(2)	above,	it	remains	to	be	shown	how	a	No-Self	view	that	emphasizes	an	impersonal	perspective	escapes	the	egoism/nihilism	dilemma.	Moreover,	it	remains	to	be	shown	just	how	normativity	can	be	derived	from	the	revisionary	metaphysical	assertions	various	Buddhist	No-Selfers	endorse.	As	Harris	has	shown,19	this	is	a	formidable	problem,	and	we’ve	yet	to	produce	a	satisfactory	account	of	how	the	ontological	claim	of	No-Self	and	No-	Ownership	entails	the	moral	imperative	that	we	should	be	committed	to	altruism.	Accordingly,	I	will	develop	a	broad	sketch	of	Ownership	and	No-Self	views,	and	examine	where	we	might	place	the	arguments	for	altruism	that	Buddhist	philosophers	like	Śāntideva	employed.	I	want	to	specifically	examine	how																																																									19	See	the	conclusion	in	Harris,	“Does	Anātman	Rationally	Entail	Altruism?”		
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Śāntideva’s	argument	holds	up	against	some	of	the	conceptual	requirements	that	an	Ownership	view	of	self	more	easily	accommodates.		
2.3	Ownership	and	Individuation:	Varieties	of	Selflessness		 Ganeri	has	provided	one	of	the	most	succinct	contemporary	taxonomies	that	organize	the	intersection	and	conversation	between	contemporary	views	of	self	and	classical	Indian	No-Self	views.	He	employs	a	crucial	organizing	principle	extracted	from	the	Indian	tradition:	the	distinction	between	“place”	(ādhāra)	and	“base,”	or,	“resting	place”	(āśraya).	These	are	terms	of	art	that	address	both	the	issue	of	ownership,	that	is,	the	question	of	who	owns	a	set	of	mental	occurrences,	and	addresses	the	issue	of	metaphysical	dependence,	that	is,	the	issue	of	accounting	for	that	upon	which	a	mental	life	is	metaphysically	dependent.20	“Place,”	answers	the	ownership	question,	and	“base”	answers	the	question	of	what	individuating	ground	supports	an	individual’s	experiences.21	Put	still	another	way,	we	can	ask	where	we	should	place	mental	occurrences,	like	glee	or	anxiety,	and	how	we	should	establish	
the	basis	of	individuation.	Ganeri	organizes	views	about	self	into	four	types,	and	eleven	basic	views.		
Figure	1.22					
	
																																																									20	Ganeri,	The	Self,	38.	21	Ibid.,	48.	22	Ganeri,	The	Self,	36-49.	This	schema	is	pulled	almost	verbatim	from	40-47.	I	include	it,	because	I	will	draw	from	it	throughout	the	rest	of	this	essay.	Moreover,	I	provide	independent	analysis.			
Type-I:	One-dimensional	Views	
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1.	Cartesian	View	
	
§ The	self	is	both	the	place	and	the	base.	
§ The	self	is	both	the	owner	of	the	experience,	and	that	upon	which	it	adjectivally	depends;	just	like	a	knot	depends	adjectivally	upon	the	existence	of	the	rope	out	of	which	it	is	a	knot,	so	mental	experiences	are	not	possible	without	a	basic	substratum,	or	bare	particular,	which	is	the	self.		
	
	
2.	Materialist	View		
§ The	body	is	both	the	place	and	the	base.	
§ This	ontology	is	monistic	with	respect	to	the	underlying	entities	that	account	for	mental	and	physical	properties.	However,	materialism	also	accommodates	type-identity	theory	and	property	dualism	(for	example,	Strawson’s	M	and	P	predicates,	and	other	forms	of	non-reductive	materialism).			
	
3.	Reductionist	View	
	
§ The	stream	of	psycho-physical	occurrences	is	both	the	place	and	the	base.	
§ Hume	and	Parfit	provide	examples	of	this	view:	a	stream	of	experience	collectively	provides	mental	states	with	both	an	individuating	identity	and	an	owner.			 		
	
	
	
4.	Ownership	View		
§ The	self	is	place,	and	the	body	is	base.	
§ Constitution	View:	the	relation	between	body	and	self	is	a	constitution	relation,	like	that	between	gold	and	a	ring;	that	is,	the	body	constitutes	the	self.	However,	the	self	is	not	identical	with	or	reducible	to	the	body.		
§ Natural	Self	View:	the	self	is	the	basis	upon	which	there	can	be	a	mental	life.	It	is	not	a	Cartesian	res	cogitans,	that	is,	it	is	not	something	whose	essence	is	thinking	and	consciousness.	Our	mental	lives,	however,	are	metaphysically	dependent	upon	a	body.	
§ Minimal	Ownership	View:	the	self	is	more	aptly	characterized	as	an	embodied	and	invariant	sense	of	reflexively	attuned	presence.	
o What	unites	all	these	threads	is	that	the	self	is	metaphysically	dependent	upon	the	body,	but	the	self	is	not	reduced	to	the	body.		
Type-II:	Real	Self	Views	
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5.	Phenomenal	View		
§ The	self	is	place,	and	the	stream	is	base.	
§ The	self	may	be	emergent	from,	or	constituted	by,	a	stream	of	mental	occurrences,	but	it	is	neither	identical	with	nor	reducible	to	the	stream,	which	is	its	individuating	base.		
	
6.	Pure	Consciousness	View		
§ The	self	is	place,	but	there	is	no	base.	
§ Self	is	pure	consciousness,	self-owning,	and	metaphysically	dependent	on	
nothing!	For	example,	the	“witness	consciousness”	(śakṣin)	of	Advaita	Vedānta.				 		
	
	
	
7.	NP-1:	The	body	is	base,	but	there	is	no	place	(Abhidharma).		
8.	NP-2:	The	stream	is	base,	but	there	is	no	place	(Yogācāra	and	Sautrāntika).	
	
9.	NP-3:	There	is	no	base,	and	there	is	no	place	(Madhyamaka).		 	 				
10.	Tornado	View	
§ The	body	is	base,	and	the	stream	is	place.	
§ The	self	is	an	emergent	phenomenon	that	arises	from	dynamic	and	sufficiently	complex	systems.	Supervening	over	the	body,	it	displays	autonomy.	In	the	Tornado	view,	“We	would	then	think	of	the	mind	as	a	tornado-like	occurrence	within	a	dynamic	flow	of	experience.	What	characterizes	the	Tornado	View,	above	all,	is	the	thought	that	mind	is	an	emergent	macrostate	of	the	non-linear	dynamical	behavior	of	aggregated	particles,	here	mental	events.”23	
																																																									23	Ganeri,	The	Self,	47.	
Type	III:	No	Place	(i.e.,	No	Ownership)	Views:	Buddhist	Schools	
Type	IV:	Stream	is	Place	
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11.	Flame	View	
§ The	stream	is	place,	and	there	is	no	base.		
§ The	Flame	View	dispenses	with	the	idea	that	the	self	is	emergent	from	an	underlying	microstate	of	shifting	patterns	of	aggregates.	Instead,	on	the	model	of	a	flame,	the	self	emerges	out	of	a	constant	fusion	and	mutation	of	non-persisting	particulars.		
Figure	1.	
	 	
	 The	advantage	of	using	“place”	and	“base”	terminology	is	that	it	nuances	and	complicates	the	conversation	about	selves.	The	notion	of	an	enduring	self	disappears	in	the	Materialist	and	Reductionist	views.	However,	these	views	embrace	the	idea	that	some	sort	of	ownership,	or	“place,”	is	operative	in	the	processes	that	produce	the	sense	of	self.	In	other	words,	“it	is	open	to	stipulate	that	what	the	term	‘self’	really	means,	in	any	of	these	views,	is	whatever	it	is	that	the	view	takes	to	be	the	place:	the	body	or	the	stream.”24	So	Ganeri’s	point	clarifies	the	radical	nature	of	the	Buddhist	No-Self	views.	It	is	not	just	a	reductionist	project	that	revises	and	stipulates	a	distinct	place	of	ownership.	These	views,	articulated	as	they	are	here	in	terms	of	“place,”	deny	that	it	ultimately	makes	sense	to	speak	of	any	ownership	at	all.25	However,	not	all	Buddhists	maintained	such	a	view.	The	Vātsiputrīya	Buddhists	argued	that	some	sort	of	“person”	(pudgala)	supervenes	over	micro-elements,	and	is	emergent	from,	but	non-reducible	to	such	micro-states.	They	would	not	embrace	NP1-NP3.	When	Vasubandhu	summarily	discounts	this	view,	of	which	we	have	a	paucity	of	texts	to	draw	from,	he	does	not	envision	the	more	complex	emergentist,	systems-dynamical	views	that	would	gain	such	popularity	today.	Like																																																									24	Ibid.,	47.	25	Ibid.,	47.	
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the	reductionists,	the	Vātsiputrīya	Buddhists	wanted	to	minimize	ontology	by	eschewing	the	view	that	an	immaterial	soul	exists	distinct	from	the	body.	However,	they	were	not	willing	to	reduce	mental	life	to	just	a	functionalist-causal	model	of	impersonal	psychophysical	occurrences.	For	the	Abhidharma	Buddhists,	particularly	the	Vasubandhu	of	Abhidharmakośabhāṣya,	sequences	of	tropes	supervene	on	the	physical	body,26	and	this	accounts	for	the	erroneous	belief	in	an	enduring,	Cartesian	self.	The	“mind-only”	(Citamātra/Vijñānavāda)	schools,	also	known	as	“Yogācāra,”	are	interpreted	to	be	idealists	of	one	sort	or	another.	They	are	represented	by	NP2,	in	that	they	believe	a	sense	of	self	arises	out	of	relations	internal	to	a	mental	stream,	and	does	not	supervene	on	a	physical	body.	Finally,	Madhyamaka	Buddhism,	which	denies	that	anything	has	independent	and	intrinsic	existence	(svabhāva),	rejects	any	sort	of	real	supervenience	or	real	determining	relations.27			 This	latter	view	may	be	read	in	an	eliminativist	sort	of	way.	For	the	Mādhyamika,	in	order	for	X	to	be	metaphysically	independent,	it	needs	to	be	free	of	any	sort	of	causal	or	ontological	dependence	on	anything	else.	Showing	that	nothing	conceptually	fits	the	bill	of	having	an	essence,	or,	having	metaphysical	independence	reveals	that	all	things	are	essentially	“coreless”	(asāra),	and	appear	as	co-relational	terms	in	an	interdependent	field	of		“emptiness”	(śūnyatā).	However,	in	a	contemporary	context,	we	can	say	that	the	Churchland	eliminativist	believes	that	we	can	abandon	talk	of	the	theoretical	entity	“eliminated”	by	a	compelling	reduction	discourse.	Once	we	find	an	impersonal	and	purely	physical-functional	way	of																																																									26	Ganeri,	The	Self,	47.	27	Ibid.,	48.	
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describing	the	mind,	for	example,	we	need	not	speak	of	minds	at	all.	That	is,	we	can	replace	talk	of	minds	with	talk	of	neurons	and/or	functional	systems.	I	doubt	that	we	can	read	the	Madhyamaka	project	in	this	way.	In	fact,	some	theorists	have	suggested	that	we	can	read	Madhyamaka	philosophy	as	a	form	of	deflationary-minimalism.28	What’s	nice	about	this	reading	is	that	the	radical,	and	often	inscrutable,	nature	of	Madhyamaka	is	reconstructed	as	a	philosophy	that	prizes	epistemic	humility,	while	eschewing	the	need	for	deep	metaphysics	to	provide	justification	for	our	practices.29	For	the	Mādhyamika,	all	metaphysical	views,	particularly	the	belief	in	an	enduring	self,	ensnare	us	in	dichotomous	and	angst-inducing	thought;	thus,	divesting	ourselves	of	such	metaphysical	commitments	is	the	key	to	liberation.	Indeed,	even	the	claim	that	all	is	“empty,”	or,	interdependent	and	without	essence,	should	not	be	entertained	as	a	positive	metaphysical	claim.30	This	clearly	supports	the	deflationary	reading.	We	can	embrace	the	conventional	understanding	of	phenomena	without	believing	that	the	entities	we	have	commerce																																																									28	Roy	W.	Perrett,	“Personal	Identity,	Minimalism,	and	Madhyamaka,”	Philosophy	
East	and	West,	Vol.	52,	No.	3	(July,	2002):	373-385.	29	Perrett,	“Personal	Identity,	Minimalism,	Madhyamaka,”	375:	“According	to	Minimalism,	metaphysical	pictures	of	the	justificatory	undergirdings	of	our	practices	do	not	represent	real	conditions	of	justification	of	those	practices.	Any	metaphysical	view	that	we	may	have	of	persons	is	not	indispensable	to	the	practice	of	making	judgments	about	personal	identity	and	organizing	our	practical	concerns	around	these	judgments.”		30	See	Nāgārjuna’s	Mūlamadhyamakakārikā,	(Saṃskāra-parīkṣā),	13.8.		
	
śūnyatā	sarvadṛṣṭīnām	proktā	niḥsaraṇaṃ	jinaiḥ|	
	 yeṣāṃ	tu	śūnyatādṛṣṭis	tān	asādhyān	babhāṣire||		 Emptiness	is	declared	by	the	Victorious	ones	to	be	the	expedient	for	all	[metaphysical]	views.		For	those	for	whom	emptiness	is	a	view,	they	have	been	said	to	be	incomplete	and	incurable.			
		 61	
with	arise	unmediated	by	conceptual	imputation.	Of	course,	revealing	that	we	impute	concepts	on	our	experiences	does	not	mean	that	we	have	to	embrace	radical	skepticism.	It’s	one	thing	to	say	that	something	is	mediated	by	concepts,	and	quite	another	thing	to	say	that,	as	a	result,	we’ve	falsified	our	experience.31	The	deflationary	and	minimalist	reading	tempers	Madhyamaka	by	viewing	it	as	a	rejection	of	the	traditional	realist	project	of	describing	things	from	a	purportedly	God’s-eye	view,	or,	a	“view	from	nowhere.”	So	it	views	justification	as	solely	a	product	of	convention	and	conceptual	construction.32	All	entities	arise	out	of	a	web	of	interdependent	conceptual	schemes,	and	seeing	the	scheme	qua	scheme	is	presumed	to	be	a	liberating	achievement	that	frees	us	from	the	pangs	of	“views”	(dṛṣṭi).	Thus,	we	can	read	Madhyamaka	as	a	therapeutic	and	self-corrective	philosophy	along	the	lines	of	Wittgenstein.33	However,	all	this	notwithstanding,	it	seems	uncontroversial—or	problematically	ambiguous—that	Madhyamaka	philosophy	eschews	the	belief	in	any	sort	of	metaphysical	ownership	or	firmly-fixed																																																									31	This	point	has	been	brought	home	by	Bernard	Williams	with	respect	to	Nietzsche’s	claim	that	all	conceptual	mediation	is	falsification	of	one	sort	or	another.	Cited	in	Ganeri,	The	Concealed	Art,	168.	See	also,	Bernard	Williams,	Truth	and	
Truthfulness	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2002),	17.	32	Perrett,	“Personal	Identity,	Minimalism,	and	Madhyamaka,”	379:	“I	want	to	claim	that	the…Madhyamaka	position	on	personal	identity	as	a	Buddhist	analogue	of	the	Western	Minimalist	position	on	personal	identity.	Both	believe	that	any	metaphysical	view	that	we	may	have	of	persons	is	not	indispensable	to	the	practice	of	making	judgments	about	personal	identity	and	organizing	our	practical	concerns	around	these	judgments.	Both	believe	that	the	presence	or	absence	of	“deep	facts”	about	personal	identity	is	largely	irrelevant	to	justifying	our	ordinary	normative	practices	because	these	are	founded	not	on	metaphysics	of	person	but	on	our	circumstances	and	needs.”		33	Yuktiṣaṣṭikā,	“Nāgārjuna’s	Reason	Sixty	with	Candrakīrti’s	Commentary,”	translation	by	Joseph	Loizzo	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2007).	See	Part	III	of	Loizzo’s	introduction,	“Dereification	and	Self-Correction	in	Chandrakīrti	and	Wittgenstein.”	
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individuating	base,	and	this	becomes	a	problem	when	we’re	trying	to	make	sense	of	agency	and	the	altruistic	program	endorsed	by	Mahāyāna	Buddhism.	Accordingly,	I	will	now	turn	to	Bodhicaryāvatāra—a	text	glossed	as	an	example	of	Madhyamaka	philosophy—and	assess	with	more	detail	whether	or	not	Śāntideva’s	project	can	withstand	the	conceptual	obstacles	I	addressed	above.	
2.4	Bodhicaryāvatāra:	Altruism,	Egoism,	and	Utility		 The	8th	century	CE	Buddhist	philosopher,	Śāntideva	composed	one	of	the	most	lyrical	and	sincere	expressions	of	the	Mahāyāna-Buddhist	ethos	in	the	Sanskrit	language.	In	doing	so,	he	also	provided	a	more	systematic	and	ethics-driven	treatise	that	more	closely	parallels	the	generality,	strategies,	and	aims	of	contemporary	ethics	than	do	other	texts	in	classical	Buddhism	and	Indian	philosophy.34	In	fact,	Charles	Goodman	argues	that	the	shift	in	the	ethical	orientation	between	early	Theravāda	Buddhism	and	later	Mahāyāna	Buddhism	lies	in	the	latter’s	more	systematic	articulation	of	values	that	parallel	universalist-consequentialism	and	classical	act-utilitarianism.	In	support	of	this	claim,	it’s	worth	citing	in	whole	the	
																																																								34	Goodman,	The	Consequences	of	Compassion,	96:	“It	has	become	a	commonplace	among	scholars	that	the	Buddhist	tradition	did	not	produce	any	systematic	ethical	theory.	There	is	some	truth	to	this	assertion;	the	Theravāda	tradition	and	such	Mahāyāna	texts	as	the	“Chapter	on	Ethics”	do	not	present	reasoning	about	the	nature	of	morality	or	the	rationale	for	particular	ethical	norms	that	rises	to	the	level	of	generality	found	in	numerous	ancient	and	modern	Western	treatments	of	the	subject.	Of	all	the	productions	of	the	Indian	Buddhist	tradition,	the	texts	that	come	closest	to	a	worked-out	ethical	theory	are	the	two	works	of	Śāntideva:	the	
Bodhicaryāvatāra,	or	Introduction	to	the	Bodhisattva’s	Way	of	Life,	and	Śīkṣā-
samuccaya,	or	Compendium	of	the	Trainings…The	sophistication,	generality,	and	power	of	Śāntideva’s	arguments	give	him	a	legitimate	claim	to	be	the	greatest	of	all	Buddhist	ethicists.”	
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passage	from	Śāntideva's	Śikṣāsamuccaya	that	Goodman	believes	epitomizes	the	Mahāyāna	project.35	Through	actions	of	body,	speech,	and	mind,	the	Bodhisattva	sincerely	makes	a	continuous	effort	to	stop	all	present	and	future	suffering	and	depression,	and	to	produce	present	and	future	happiness	and	gladness,	for	all	beings.	But	if	he	does	not	seek	the	collection	of	the	conditions	for	this,	and	does	not	strive	for	what	will	prevent	the	obstacles	to	this,	or	he	does	not	cause	small	
suffering	and	depression	to	arise	as	a	way	of	preventing	great	suffering	and	depression,	or	does	not	abandon	a	small	benefit	in	order	to	achieve	a	greater	benefit,	if	he	neglects	to	do	these	things	even	for	a	moment,	he	is	at	fault	(italics	mine;	translation,	Goodman).36				 Bracketing	the	intricate	distinctions	and	philosophical	differences	that	characterize	the	various	Mahāyāna	schools	since	c.	100	BCE	to	the	present	day,	we	can	be	sure	that	all	Mahāyāna	Buddhism	converges	on	the	general	belief	that	cultivating	“great	compassion”	(mahākaruṇā)	is	partly	constitutive	of	the	goal	of	achieving	Buddhist	enlightenment	and	Buddha	status.	For	the	Mahāyāna	Buddhist,	achieving	Buddhahood	is	the	supreme	goal.	While	the	Buddha	could	have	remained	a	lonely	forest-dweller,	saved	by	his	own	transcendent	accomplishments,	he	instead	chose	to	teach	out	of	compassion	for	the	existential	suffering	of	other	seekers.	Not	only	motivated	to	seek	personal	liberation,	the	Mahāyāna	Buddhist-heroes,	or,	Bodhisattvas	delay	their	own	release	in	order	to	liberate	all	sentient	beings	from	the	throes	of	saṁsāra	(cyclic	existence),	and	the	various	“hell	realms”	believed	to	exist	in	classical	Buddhist	cosmology.	Bodhisattvas	strive	to	cultivate	the	“awakened																																																									35	Goodman,	97	36	Goodman,	The	Consequences	of	Compassion,	97:	“Not	one	of	the	major	characteristics	of	classical	act-utilitarianism	is	missing	from	this	passage.	The	focus	on	actions;	the	central	moral	importance	of	happy	and	unhappy	states	of	mind;	the	extension	of	scope	to	all	beings;	the	extreme	demands;	the	absence	of	any	room	for	personal	moral	space;	the	balancing	of	costs	and	benefits;	the	pursuit	of	maximization:	every	one	of	these	crucial	features	of	utilitarianism	is	present.”	
		 64	
mind”	(bodhicitta),	which	amounts	to	the	cultivation	of	noble	attainments,	or,	“perfections”	(pāramitā).	By	attaining	unshakeable	dhyāna	(meditative	one-pointedness	of	mind	and	yogic	detachment),	which	is	the	key	pāramitā	developed	in	chapter	8	of	Bodhicaryāvatāra,	Bodhisattvas	recognize	the	interdependence	of	self	and	other,	and	they	practice	an	exalted	“exchange”	or	identification	with	all	suffering	beings.	This	is	in	fact	so	exalted	a	state	of	achievement	that	it	is	regarded	as	a	sort	of	“secret”	(guhya)	drawn	out	of	a	cavernously	inward,	obscured,	and	not	fully	articulated	sense	of	fellow-feeling.	Śāntideva	notably	captures	this	in	the	BCA	at	8:120:		Whoever	longs	to	rescue	quickly	both	himself	and	others	should	practice	the	supreme	mystery	(paramam-guyam):	exchange	of	self	and	other	(parātma-
parivartanam).				 The	merits	that	Bodhisattvas	accrue	through	these	practices	are	devoted	to	the	salvific	release	of	those	who	are	still	corrupted	by	the	pangs	of	mortal	existence.	The	revisionary/reformative	Mahāyāna	schools	viewed	the	so-called	lesser	vehicle	Buddhists	(hīnayāna)	of	the	early	Theravāda	tradition	(a	designation	fashioned	by	Mahāyāna)	as	insufficiently	concerned	with	the	altruistic	spirit	of	the	Buddha.	While	Theravāda	presumably	emphasizes	individual	liberation	in	the	image	of	the	Arhat,	Mahāyāna	emphasizes	the	altruistic	compassion	of	the	self-sacrificing	Bodhisattva.	Mahāyāna	schools	further	distinguish	themselves	by	viewing	achievement	of	Buddhahood	as	the	greatest	goal.	Part	of	what	it	means	to	be	a	Buddha,	they	believe,	is	to	devote	oneself	to	universal	salvation.	This	dedication	is	expressed	through	altruistic	and	consequentialist-oriented	acts	of	self-sacrifice.		
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For	one	who	fails	to	exchange	his	own	happiness	for	the	suffering	of	others,	Buddhahood	is	certainly	impossible—how	could	there	even	be	happiness	in	cyclic	existence?	(BCA,	8:131)		Hey	Mind,	make	the	resolve,	‘I	am	bound	to	others’!	From	now	on	you	must	have	no	other	concern	than	the	welfare	of	all	beings	(BCA,	8:137).		If	the	suffering	of	one	ends	the	suffering	of	many,	then	one	who	has	compassion	for	others	and	himself	must	cause	that	suffering	to	arise	(BCA,		8:105).			Through	my	merit	may	all	those	in	any	of	the	directions	suffering	distress	in	body	and	mind	find	oceans	of	happiness	and	delight.	As	long	as	the	round	of	rebirth	remains,	may	their	happiness	never	fade.	Let	the	world	receive	uninterrupted	happiness	from	the	Bodhisattvas	(BCA,	10:2-3).				 This	exalted	sense	of	concern	for	all	beings	resonates	with	the	agent-neutral	ethics	and	impartialism	found	in	utilitarian	and	consequentialist	discourses.	Rather	than	placing	emphasis	on	the	owner	of	suffering,	the	utilitarian-minded	philosopher	places	ultimate	import	on	the	total	quantity	of	suffering.	In	chapter	1,	I	briefly	discussed	Śāntideva’s	argument	for	viewing	suffering	in	an	egalitarian,	impersonal,	and	therefore	impartial	light.	The	rational	and	motivational	economy	required	to	practice	such	an	ethic	is	what	early	20th	century	utilitarians	like	Sidgwick	called,	“rational	benevolence.”	In	achieving	an	impersonal	view,	one	recognizes	that	“from	the	point	of	view	of	the	Universe,”	her	own	suffering	is	not	privileged	over	anyone	else’s.	Given	that	more	good	is	better	than	less,	one	recognizes	a	reason	to	take	particular	interest	in	the	total	sum	of	good	and	bad	in	the	world.	And	in	order	to	actually	act	upon	that	insight,	one	must	cultivate	the	capacity	to	sacrifice	one’s	own	egocentric	considerations	for	considerations	of	the	greater	good.	Likewise,	Bodhisattvas	are	called	on	to	delay	their	own	release	until	all	sentient	beings	achieve	enlightenment.	They	selflessly	devote	themselves	to	the	good	of	all.		
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	 The	philosophical	question	that	arises	for	me	is	this:	How,	and	under	what	conditions,	would	it	make	sense	to	set	aside	my	optimal	advantage	for	another’s	advantage?	In	an	applied-ethical	context,	this	would	have	to	be	assessed	on	a	case	by	case	basis.	But	I’m	asking	how	we	can	make	sense	of	this	structurally,	that	is,	with	respect	to	a	general	framework	of	reasons	for	doing	things.	As	far	as	clichés	go,	we	can	always	say,	“To	help	others,	you	must	first	help	yourself.”	But	we	can	always	ask	why,	as	a	general	rule,	or	in	a	normative	sense,	we	must	be	motivated	to	help	others.	Being	motivated	to	help	my	nearest	and	dearest	is	not	such	a	mystery	to	me,	but	how	far-out	does	rationality	demand	I	extend	this	concern?	Now,	if	we	reverse	the	cliché,	we	might	say,	“To	help	yourself,	you	must	help	others.”	We	may	even	interpret	the	logic	of	Śāntideva	along	this	line.		Those	who	become	oceans	of	sympathetic	joy	when	living	beings	are	released,	surely	it	is	they	who	achieve	fulfillment.	What	would	be	the	point	in	a	liberation	without	sweetness?	(BCA,	8:	108).			Some	sort	of	carrot	must	motivate	the	reasonable	person	to	delay	her	valid	needs	and	aspirations	for	the	sake	of	someone	else’s	well-being.	When	I	act	prudently,	I	delay	gratification	for	myself	right	now	for	the	sake	of	a	greater	balance	of	happiness	on	the	whole.	I	do	this	because,	ultimately,	I	will	benefit	from	this	in	the	long	run.	Would	it	make	sense	to	delay	my	valid	needs	now	for	the	sake	of	someone	else,	without	pursuing	a	state	of	affairs	in	which	I	am	also	well	off	in	the	long	run?	What	am	I	supposed	to	ultimately	aim	for	when	I	engage	in	acts	of	charity	and	altruism?	One	consequentialist-minded	response	is	that	I	should	aim	for	a	larger	total	quantity	of	happiness	or	good.	But	when	I	consider	the	manifest	fact	that	I	am	one	individual	among	many	individuals	striving	for	a	more	pleasing	and	fulfilling	
		 67	
life,	I	cannot	help	but	wonder	why	that	quantity	of	overall	good	should	not	necessarily	include	my	own	welfare.	Let	me	begin	to	develop	an	answer	to	these	questions	by	examining	some	of	the	leading	reconstructions	of	passages	101-103	in	
Bodhicaryāvatāra.		
2.5	Bodhicaryāvatāra:	Altruism	and	the	Anātman	Dilemma		 Chapter	8	of	Bodhicaryāvatāra	may	be	reconstructed	to	endorse	the	following	views:	(1)	impartial	concern	for	the	welfare	of	all	is	rationally	justified;	(2)	all	suffering,	regardless	of	whose	suffering,	ought	to	be	eradicated.	Taken	together,	these	provide	a	working	definition	of	“altruism,”	glossed	in	normative-ethical	terms,	rather	than	purely	socio-biological	or	game-theoretical	terms.37	The	more	recent	cottage	industry	emerging	out	of	chapter	8	of	Bodhicaryāvatāra	centers	on	passages	101-103.	This	is	largely	due	to	Paul	Williams’s	seminal	study	of	the	text,	and	his	controversial	claim	that	Śāntideva’s	position	not	only	fails,	but	also	unwittingly	undermines	the	Bodhisattva	path	it	aims	to	endorse.38	A	key	controversy	that	philosophers	like	Williams,	Siderits,	Pettit,	Clayton,	and	Harris39	have	engaged	is																																																									37	Harris,	“Does	Anātman	Rationally	Entail	Altruism?	On	Bodhicaryāvatāra	8:103,”	93-123:	“Throughout	this	essay,	I	will	use	‘altruism’	to	refer	to	the	position	that	one	should	have	an	impartial	concern	for	one’s	own	and	others	welfare,	and	should	strive	to	remove	all	suffering,	regardless	to	whom	it	belongs”	(95).	He	also	notes	(n.	2,	95)	Jon	Wetlesen’s	gloss	on	altruism.	Wetlesen	calls	the	altruistic	person	one	who	“has	an	impartial	concern	for	the	welfare	of	all	parties	concerned,	without	discriminating	between	the	welfare	of	himself	or	herself	and	others.”	See	Jon	Wetlesen,	“Did	Śāntideva	Destroy	the	Bodhisattva	Path?”	Journal	of	Buddhist	Ethics	9,	2002:	34-88,	at	42.				38	Paul	Williams,	Studies,	174-176.	39	Barbra	Clayton,	“Compassion	as	a	Matter	of	Fact:	The	Argument	from	No-self	to	Selflessness	in	Śāntideva's	Śikṣāsamuccaya,”	Contemporary	Buddhism,	2:1,	83-97.	See	also,	John	Pettit,	“Paul	Williams:	Altruism	and	Reality:	Studies	in	the	Philosophy	of	the	Bodhicaryāvatāra,”	Journal	of	Buddhist	Ethics,	6,	120-137.	See	also,	Mark	Siderits,	“The	Reality	of	Altruism:	Reconstructing	Śāntideva,”	Philosophy	East	and	
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whether	or	not	the	No-Self	view	provides	rational	justification	for	altruism.	While	this	has	spawned	an	extensive	conversation	in	the	literature,	I’d	like	to	provide	only	a	brief	account	of	some	key	philosophical	reconstructions	of	the	said	passages,	which	have	been	succinctly	tackled	in	Harris’s	essay.40	I’ll	examine	whether	or	not	the	text	can	stand	up	to	some	of	the	conceptual	problems	I’ve	addressed	above.	So	let	me	begin	with	the	passages	themselves:	The	continuum	of	consciousness,	like	a	queue,	and	the	combination	of	constituents,	like	an	army,	are	not	real.	The	person	who	experiences	suffering	does	not	exist.	To	whom	will	that	suffering	belong?	(BCA,	8:101)		Without	exception,	no	sufferings	belong	to	anyone.	They	must	be	warded	off	simply	because	are	suffering.	Why	is	any	limitation	put	on	this?	(BCA,	8:102)		If	one	asks	why	suffering	should	be	prevented,	no	one	disputes	that!	If	it	must	be	prevented,	then	all	of	it	must	be.	If	not,	then	this	goes	for	oneself	as	for	everyone	(BCA,	8:103).				 Verse	101	addresses	the	orthodox	Buddhist	view	that	person-involving	concepts	ultimately	refer	in	one	way	or	another	to	an	impersonal	continuum	or	“stream”	(saṅtāna)	of	psychophysical	aggregates	(skandhas).41	But	the	verse	also	warns	us	not	to	hypostasize	this	dynamic	complex	or	view	the	stream	as	an	enduring	and	real	composite	entity	(samudāya).	Śāntideva	is	enumerating	a	premise	here	accepted	by	nearly	all	of	his	Buddhist	interlocutors,	that	is,	that	a	person	is	nothing	over	and	above	the	individuating,	stream-like	psychophysical	constituents,																																																																																																																																																																						
West,	50(3),	412-424.	Mark	Siderits,	Personal	Identity	and	Buddhist	Philosophy:	
Empty	Persons	(Burlington,	VT:	Ashgate	Publications,	2003).	40	Harris,	“Does	Anātman	Rationally	Entail	Altruism?”	41	The	aggregates	(skandhas)	are:	rūpa	(physical	form/structure),	vedanā	(emotional	coloring/feeling),	samjñā	(conception/recognition),	samskāra	(volition/habit/impulse),	vijñāna	(discernment/synthesizing	consciousness).	Abhidharma	philosophy	derives	various	species	of	dharmas	from	these	larger	categories.		
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and	the	“stream”	is	not	a	real	composite	entity.	Just	like	a	string	of	beads	or	an	army,	a	whole	is	merely	a	conceptual	imputation	(prajñapti),	derived	from	ultimately	independent	elements	conceived	to	appear	as	parts	of	a	whole.	In	fact,	the	Ābhidharmika	Buddhist	who	adopts	the	“momentariness”	thesis	(kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda)	believes	that	every	dharma,	or,	metaphysically	atomic	entity	arises	as	an	independently	ephemeral	point-instance.	The	arising	of	a	new	dharma,	which	in	some	way	or	another	appropriates	certain	aspects	of	its	predecessor,	follows	from	the	perishing	of	a	preceding	dharma.	These	dharmas,	which	are	species	of	the	five	basic	psychophysical	aggregates,	serve	as	the	reduction-base	for	all	entities.	Given	their	radically	ephemeral	nature,	we	can	attribute	the	appearance	of	persistence	of	these	seemingly	real	composite	entities	to	conceptual	construction.	These	dharmas	are	not	parts	of	a	real	whole,	nor	are	they	the	properties	of	an	underlying	subject;	thus,	mental	occurrences	are	not	ultimately	properties,	because	no	enduring	subject	exists	to	bear	them.	What	we	have	here	are	ephemeral	property-tropes.	So,	if	the	self	is	a	composite	entity	constituted	by,	or	emergent	from	the	five	skandhas,	and	composite	entities	are	only	conceptually	constructed	fictions	(mṛṣā),	then	the	self	must	in	turn	prove	to	be	a	sort	of	fiction	or	error.42			 So,	as	Śāntideva	claims	in	102,	without	a	real	self,	there	is	no	owner	(svāmika)	or	ultimately	enduring	locus	of	suffering,	and	if	suffering	ought	to	be	removed,	then	it	ought	to	be	removed	simply	because	it	is	suffering.	Śāntideva	is	addressing	the	egoist	who	believes	that	a	quantity	of	suffering	being	“mine”																																																									42	Harris,	“Does	Anātman,”	95:	“Verse	101	points	out	that	since	a	person	is	a	partite	entity,	accepting	that	partite	entities	do	not	exist	entails	accepting	that	persons	are	fictions.”		
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relevantly	restricts	practical	considerations,	and	justifies	privileging	one’s	own	future	welfare.	The	fact	that	my	burnt	hand	provides	me	with	compelling	practical	reasons	to	tend	to	myself	in	a	way	that	hearing	about	a	stranger	burning	her	hand	in	New	Mexico	does	not	might	compel	me	to	believe	that,	in	general,	my	own	interests	are	especially	privileged.	Śāntideva	counters	that	without	the	restriction	of	real	ownership	that	comes	with	the	existence	of	enduring	subjects,	there	are	no	ultimate	limitations	(niyama)	that	justify	partial	concern	for	one’s	own	or	another’s	suffering.	If	suffering	ought	to	be	prevented,	then	it	must	be	prevented	because	it	is	inherently	bad.	If	one	were	to	object	to	that	point,	as	Śāntideva	points	out	in	verse	103,	then	he	or	she	would	be	committed	to	the	view	that	no	suffering	ought	to	be	prevented.	However,	this	latter	option	is	a	reductio	that	allows	Śāntideva	to	derive	his	conclusion	that	one	must	remain	committed	to	preventing	all	suffering.	As	in	all	sūtra	literature,	these	pithy	passages	require	detailed	unpacking.	I	will	therefore	provide	a	brief	sketch	of	leading	reconstructions	of	the	argument	in	order	to	better	situate	my	own	gloss	on	Śāntideva’s	project.			 For	Paul	Williams,	Śāntideva	commits	a	basic	fallacy.	He	makes	the	ontological,	descriptive	claim	that	real	selves	are	nonexistent,	and	then	tries	to	derive	the	normative	conclusion	that	we	must	be	committed	to	altruism.43	On	the	surface,	then,	Śāntideva	wants	to	appeal	to	our	rationality,	but	cannot	successfully	bridge	the	is/ought	gap.	As	Harris	has	pointed	out,	“Drawing	upon	the	Tibetan	commentarial	tradition,	Williams	interprets	Śāntideva’s	argument	as	an	appeal	to	our	rationality.	Once	we	understand	reality	correctly,	and	accept	the	self	is																																																									43	Williams,	Altruism	and	Reality,	104.		
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nonexistent,	it	will	no	longer	be	rational	to	remove	one’s	pain	before	removing	the	pain	of	others.”44				 A	general	problem	I	have	with	Williams	point	is	that	I	think	he	exaggerates	and	oversimplifies	the	ontological	weight	of	the	argument.	The	idea	that	selves	do	not	exist	at	the	“ultimate”	level	of	analysis	is	not	necessarily	a	purely	descriptive	claim	that	carries	no	normative	force.	The	Buddhist-hermeneutical	device	of	distinguishing	between	conventional	truth	(saṃvṛti-sat)	and	ultimate	truth	(paramārtha-sat)	should	not	be	so	straightforwardly	glossed	as	the	Platonic	distinction	between	appearance	and	reality.	It’s	not	so	clear	that	in	these	passages	Śāntideva	simply	wants	to	make	the	truth-functional	claim	that	persons	in	fact	do	not	exist,	and	that	a	presumably	more	accurate	description	of	reality	will	not	include	person-involving	concepts.	It’s	not	just	that	when	we	talk	in	person-involving	ways	we’re	not	“getting	it	right”	in	an	absolute	sense.	A	more	literal	interpretation	of	the	concept,	“saṃvṛti,”	would	be	that	of	a	“concealing”	or	a	“cloaking”	truth,45	thus	admitting	some	degree	of	concept-mediated	universality.	Ganeri	has	provided	an	excellent	alternative	to	the	typical	subjective/objective	cum	appearance/reality	dichotomy	often	foisted	on	to	these	Buddhist	concepts.46	The	cloaking	truth,	and	its	cousin,	the	conceptually	fashioned	truth	(prajñapti-sat)	are	not	necessarily	“subjective”	or	purely	falsifying	truths,	so	much	as	they	are	indicative	of	observer-dependent,	conceptually-mediated	positionality.	Viewing	an	impressionist	painting																																																									44	Harris,	“Does	Anātman,”	96.	Also	see	n.4,	96.	Harris	cites	Williams,	Altruism	and	
Reality,	105.	45	Ganeri,	The	Concealed	Art,	Part	III:	A	Selfless	Person’s	Sense	of	Self,	“The	Imperfect	Reality	of	Persons,”	155-185.	46	Ibid.,	155-185.	
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from	a	distance,	I	see	a	grassy	field	fashioned	out	of	vivid	colors	and	delicate	forms.	I	see	couples	strolling	along	under	parasols.	However,	as	I	close	the	distance,	what	seemed	like	solid	forms	become	tiny	points	of	color.	I	lose	the	image	of	couples	enjoying	the	bright	and	cloudless	day.	The	images	from	the	painting	can	be	said	to	lose	“stability	under	analysis.”47	But	that	does	not	mean	that	the	images	emerging	at	a	distance	are	purely	personal	and	subjective	images	that	falsify	reality.	If	any	fiction	(mṛṣā)	is	involved,	it’s	the	belief	that	the	person-involving	level	of	description	is	a	solid,	unanalyzable	fact	that	stands	on	its	own.	Once	we	achieve	a	non-person-involving	level	of	analysis,	we	come	to	appreciate	an	impersonal	perspective	that	levels	off	viewing	things	in	terms	of	owners	and	bearers	of	properties.	We	come	to	recognize	an	impersonal	field	of	relations.	The	self,	which	is	an	experienced	aspect	of	reality	when	one	“zooms	out”	at	a	certain	cognitive	distance,	is	not	as	much	a	perniciously	falsifying	concept	as	the	rigid	view	(dṛṣṭi)	that	the	self	is	an	enduring	substance	that	exists	with	an	essence	(svabhāva),	independently	of	its	causes	and	conditions.			 Some	of	the	leading	interpreters	of	the	text,	while	diverging	on	important	details	of	the	argument,	agree	that	Śāntideva,	the	Mādhyamika,	is	provisionally	adopting	the	Ābhidharmika	position	here.48	Remember,	the	reductionist-minded	Ābhidharmika,	like	Vasubandhu,	believes	that	there	is	no	self	over	and	above	the	stream	of	psycho-physical	constituents.	However,	for	these	philosophers,	the																																																									47	Ibid.,	171.	Ganeri	writes:	“These	definitions	[between	cloaking	and	ultimate	truths]	suggest	that	what	is	really	at	issue	is	not	so	much	the	existence	of	social	practices	or	conventional	fabrications,	but	what	we	might	call	‘stability	under	analysis’.	An	impressionist	painting	ceases	to	represent	anything	when	investigated	too	closely:	the	perceptual	image	is	unstable	under	analysis.”		48	See	n.	35,	p.27.		
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constituents	like	form	(rūpa)	and	affective-coloring	(vedanā),	for	example,	remain	stable	under	analysis.	When	we	shift	our	cognitive	frame,	these	constituents	remain	unanalyzable	and	basic.	Śāntideva,	the	Mādhyamika,	adopts	the	Ābhidharmika’s	position	as	a	dialectical	tactic.	Showing	that	from	both	the	Madhyamaka	and	Abhidharma	perspective	one	must	be	committed	to	altruism	allows	Śāntideva's	interlocutor	to	embrace	altruism	without	necessarily	rejecting	his	prior	doctrinal	commitments.	If	we	accept	this	reading	of	Śāntideva,	then	things	like	suffering—at	least	in	the	context	of	the	argument	in	chapter	8—are	fixed	aspects	of	unanalyzable	
dharmas	such	as	affective-coloring	(vedanā).	Thus,	from	the	cloaking	level	of	reality,	selves	exist,	while	from	the	stable	or	unanalyzable	level	of	description	they	disappear.	Suffering,	however,	remains	a	stable	aspect	of	the	unanalyzable	dharmas.				 It’s	important	not	to	confuse	Ganeri’s	concept	of	stability	and	non-stability	under	analysis	with	Madhyamaka	anti-foundationalism	and	irrealism.	If,	through	a	purely	deconstructive	analysis,	Madhyamaka	claims	that	the	ultimate	truth	is	that	there	is	no	ultimate	truth,	Vasubandhu’s	distinction	between	the	two	truths	is	not	irrealist	and	anti-foundationalist,	nor	is	it	eliminativist	in	nature.	Rather,	his	view	is	reductionist,	with	the	caveat	that	person-involving	concepts,	and	therefore,	concepts	concerning	bearers	of	suffering,	provide	a	useful	enough	glimpse	of	reality	that	universally	shows	up	at	a	particular	level	of	cognitive-framing.	However,	from	the	analytically	stable	perspective,	owners	of	suffering	completely	disappear.	This	means	that	instead	of	solely	examining	whether	or	not	one	view	is	“more	objective”	in	nature,	which	is	of	course	appropriate	in	certain	contexts,	we	should	also	be	asking	ourselves	what	the	pragmatic	upshot	of	viewing	the	world	in	one	way	rather	
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than	the	other	amounts	to,	and	we	can	do	this	without	succumbing	to	full-blown	relativism	or	Madhyamaka	anti-foundationalism.	In	other	words,	one	perspective	is	not	simply	“better”	than	another	just	because	it	captures	more	basic	and	unanalyzable	aspects	of	reality—it’s	not	as	though	we	should	claim	that	the	physicist	is	“more	important”	than	the	biologist,	because	she	deals	with	more	basic	items.	The	biologist	deals	with	complex,	organic	systems	that	are	not	amenable	to	talk	of	quarks,	neutrinos,	and	black	holes.	Pragmatically,	we	can	ask	ourselves	what	we	get	when	we	operate	from	the	unanalyzable	conceptual	perspective	as	opposed	to	the	conceptually	unstable	perspective.	Now,	it’s	part	of	the	basic	message	of	Buddhism	that	the	person-involving	level	generates	attachment	and	grasping	that	produces	suffering.	Buddhist	interlocutors	already	accept	the	normative	claim	that	suffering	is	something	bad	and	ought	to	be	overcome.	So	any	Buddhist	will	agree	that	we	should	strive	to	avoid	seeing	the	world	from	a	perspective	that	contributes	to	suffering—that’s	just	part	of	the	commitment	that	comes	with	asserting	that	all	suffering	is	bad.	To	be	sure,	under	the	Abhidharma	banner,	there	are	things	that	really	exist,	and	things	that	really	do	not	exist.	However,	the	point	of	emphasis	is	not	solely	on	the	ontology.	Buddhism	always	remains	pragmatic	to	one	degree	or	another.			 So	where	does	this	leave	Williams’s	claim	that	Śāntideva	fallaciously	tries	to	derive	an	ought	from	an	is?	If	we	can	achieve	an	impersonal	view,	then	the	egoist’s	claim	that	a	distinction	between	self	and	other	justifies	egoism	does	not	apply	at	this	level	of	analysis.	When	Śāntideva	ontologizes	here,	he	does	so	to	undercut	the	egoist’s	sticking	point	that	the	distinction	between	self	and	other—particularly	the	
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first-person	experience	of	pain	versus	a	third-person	description	of	another’s	pain—justifies	privileging	one’s	own	future	welfare.	From	the	metaphysical	level,	no	such	distinction	applies,	and	given	the	commitment	to	end	suffering,	we	ought	to	maintain	this	perspective	to	the	best	of	our	abilities.	The	normative	force	of	the	Buddhist	view	on	suffering	allows	Śāntideva	to	derive	his	desired	conclusion.	The	speech-act	of	sincerely	asserting	X	comes	with	a	commitment,	namely,	a	commitment	to	act	in	light	of	that	truth,	and	accept	any	truths	derivable	from	it.	So,	if	we	find	that	the	most	stable	analysis	does	not	include	person-involving	concepts,	then	we	are	committed	to	accepting	any	truths	derivable	from	that	assertion.	Likewise,	if	we	accept	that	suffering	is	intrinsically	bad,	and	ultimately	real	(that	is,	stable	under	analysis),	then	we’re	committed	to	accepting	any	derivable	claims	from	that	assertion.	Part	of	what	it	means	for	something	to	be	bad	is	that	it	should	be	eradicated	if	possible,	and	it’s	part	of	the	Buddhist	worldview	that	we	should	avoid	perspectives	that	produce	suffering.	Thus,	we	can	adopt	an	impersonal	view,	and	given	the	Buddhist	thesis	on	suffering,	we	ought	to	maintain	that	perspective	since	it	arguably	defuses	suffering.	The	egoist’s	primary	justification	for	egoism	disappears	from	the	analytically	stable	perspective.	Śāntideva	is	not	deriving	a	normative	from	a	descriptive	claim.	Rather,	he’s	addressing	an	interlocutor	who	argues	that	the	only	sensible	limiting	condition	that	justifies	partialism	with	respect	to	suffering	is	ownership.	But	from	the	conceptually	stable	perspective,	ownership	disappears.	However,	from	this	same,	stable	perspective,	suffering	presumably	remains	intact,	and	the	concept	of	suffering	already	has	normative	force,	and	carries	with	it	a	host	of	commitments.			
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	 Nevertheless,	Williams	has	pointed	out	a	much	deeper	problem	with	Śāntideva’s	argument,	and	Siderits	has	in	turn	come	to	Śāntideva's	defense	in	a	strategy	similar	to	what	I’ve	sketched	above.	I	will	briefly	develop	these	points,	and	then	assess	Harris’s	analysis	of	the	debate,	because	I	think	ultimately	Harris	cum	Williams	have	outlined	a	dilemma	in	Śāntideva's	argument	that	is	not	so	easily	defused.	What	I	would	add	is	that,	specifically	with	respect	to	other-centric	and	altruistic	considerations,	bridging	the	gap	between	self	and	other	in	a	normative	context	is	best	served	by	concepts	of	identity	and	real	relationality,	and	not	by	concepts	like	“emptiness”	and	non-ownership.	In	other	words,	the	integrity	between	self	and	other	must	be	maintained—and	not	just	as	a	matter	of	“conventional	reality”—in	order	to	impel	one	to	find	a	motivating	and	ethically-relevant	bridge	between	self	and	other.			
	 Now,	Williams	and	Siderits	argue	that	Śāntideva	is	employing	the	Ābhidharmika	perspective	as	an	example	of	skillful,	or,	pragmatic	means	(upāya).	Ābhidharmikas	are	mereological	irrealists,	that	is,	they	do	not	believe	that	a	whole	exists	over	and	above	the	parts	that	are	thought	to	make	it	up.	However,	they	do	believe	that	there	are	ultimate	physical	and	mental	events,	or,	dharmas	that	are	the	really	existing	building	blocks	over	which	conceptual	imputation	operates.	As	Ganeri	has	more	recently	shown,	Ābhidharmika	philosophers	like	Vasubandhu	may	very	well	believe	in	the	conventional	validity	of	medium-sized	objects	along	with	the	validity	of	the	conventional	self.49	Vasubandhu	would	instead	argue	that	our																																																									49	Ganeri,	The	Concealed	Art,	172:	“Vasubandhu’s	statement	that	persons	are	‘real	with	reference	to	conception’	is	to	be	taken	as	saying	that	one	can	think	in	a	person-involving	way	only	as	long	as	one	does	not	analyze	or	‘mentally	divide’	the	person	
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belief	in	the	self	as	an	enduring	entity,	which	exists	independently	of	its	causes	and	conditions,	is	a	pernicious	fabrication	that	produces	suffering.			 With	this	in	mind,	Williams	argues	that	Śāntideva	must,	nevertheless,	deny	the	validity	of	the	conventional	self.	He	argues	this	on	the	basis	that	all	we	need	to	potentially	prioritize	the	interests	of	person	A	over	person	B	is	the	ability	to	distinguish	between	A	and	B.	In	the	conventional	context,	we	can	make	this	distinction.	Thus,	accepting	the	validity	of	the	conventional	self	is	enough	to	justify	at	least	moderate	egoism,	where	one	believes	that	it	is	sometimes	perfectly	justified	to	prioritize	one’s	own	welfare.	Put	still	another	way,	moderate	egoism	claims	that	it	is	not	immoral	to	prioritize	one’s	own	future	welfare.	This	is	enough	to	undercut	a	demanding	ethics	of	universal	altruism.	If	Williams	is	right,	then	Śāntideva	must	reject	the	validity	of	the	conventional	self	in	order	to	maintain	the	view	that	we	ought	to	be	unwaveringly	committed	to	altruism.	This	means	that	Śāntideva	cannot	just	attack	the	belief	in	an	enduring	metaphysical	self,	but	must	also	deny	the	validity	of	the	conventional	and	transactional	self.	But	this	is	a	glaring	problem	for	Śāntideva's	argument.	The	conventional,	transactional	world	is	where	things	like	altruism	and	egoism	make	sense.	Agency	in	general—and	ethical	agency	in	particular—draws	on	the	sorts	of	conventions	that	only	make	sense	at	the	transactional	level	of	reality.	This	is	the	level	of	reality	in	which	I	do	not	just	see	suffering,	but	I	see	that	you	are	suffering,	and	that	I	am	in	a	position	to	help	you,	or	sacrifice	my	interests,	or	simply	ignore	your	pain.	Moreover,	I	am	in	a	position	to	identify	the	fact	that	not	all	pain	is	my	pain,	and	that	you	have	a	stake	in	your	life																																																																																																																																																																						into	a	flow	of	experience…So	Vasubandhu’s	view	is	not	that	there	are	no	persons,	but	that	person-involving	conceptual	schemes	are	unstable.”	
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that	is	worthy	of	my	attention	and	respect.	Thus,	by	denying	the	validity	of	such	a	world,	Śāntideva	renders	altruism	unintelligible.			 Harris	tentatively	objects	that	we	need	not	foist	this	view	onto	Śāntideva.50	He	offers	a	quick	gloss	on	Barbra	Clayton’s	interpretation	of	passages	101-103	to	illustrate	the	point.	Clayton	sees	a	parallel	between	Śāntideva's	argument	and	anti-discrimination	arguments.51	If	all	beings	equally	desire	happiness	and	freedom	from	suffering,	and	it	is	ethical	for	me	to	ultimately	prioritize	my	own	welfare,	then	I	need	to	provide	an	ethically	relevant	distinction	that	justifies	my	bias.	If	my	future	self	that	I	am	concerned	with	turns	out	to	be	identical	to	my	current	self,	then	that	would	provide	the	distinction	that	justifies	my	temporal	neutrality	with	respect	to	my	own	happiness,	and	my	bias	with	respect	to	the	happiness	of	others.	But	in	the	light	of	Śāntideva’s	argument,	my	current	and	future	selves	are	not	really	identical,	but	only	conventionally	so.	Thus,	I	cannot	provide	the	ethically	relevant	distinction	that	would	justify	my	partiality	with	respect	to	the	common	good	of	happiness.	If	I	regard	suffering	as	an	ill	to	be	removed	in	my	own	case,	then	I	ought	to	apply	that	view	to	all	cases	of	suffering.	As	Harris	writes,	“Śāntideva	can	be	seen	as	claiming	that	although	conventional	selves	exist,	when	we	realize	they	are	only	convenient	fictions	we	will	accept	that	we	should	not	prioritize	our	own	conventional	self’s	welfare	above	that	of	other	persons.”52	But,	as	Harris	points	out	in	the	context	of	Williams’s	argument,	when	we	emphasize	the	conventional	nature	of	the	self,	we	might	not	only	learn	to	become	less	fixated	on	our	own	suffering,	but	also	learn	to																																																									50	Harris,	“Does	Anātman,”	99.	51	Clayton,	“Compassion,”	91.		52	Harris,	“Does	Anātman,”	100.	
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become	less	fixated	on	anyone’s	suffering.	In	other	words,	altruism	is	not	the	logical	outcome	of	such	a	belief.	One	may	lose	all	concern	for	suffering	in	general.			 Verse	103	may	be	interpreted	as	a	response	to	this	sort	of	problem.	Suffering	is	not	something	that	can	be	viewed	as	morally	neutral:	it	is	not	something	we	can	ever	really	feel	justified	in	ignoring.	As	Bodhicaryāvatāra	puts	it:	“No	one	disputes	that!”	So	Śāntideva	appeals	to	commonsense.	But,	as	Harris	points	out,	the	opponent	“can	respond	that	most	people	agree	to	this	because	they	believe	their	self,	and	the	selves	of	the	ones	they	care	about,	endure.”53	While	it	might	be	the	case	that	
anātman	provides	altruistic	motivations	for	some,	it	may	very	well	provide	no	such	motivations,	or	even	apathy,	for	others.	If	Śāntideva	were	to	respond	that	psychological	connectedness	and	physical	continuity	motivate	us	to	care	about	our	conventionally	established	future	suffering,	then	he	would	play	into	the	hand	of	the	egoist,	who	claims	that	close	ties	to	our	future-self	warrant	special	concern	for	our	future	welfare.	Thus,	Śāntideva’s	argument	faces	a	dilemma.			 However,	the	dilemma	developed	in	Williams’s	argument	relies	on	a	crucial	assumption:	our	obligation	to	remove	pain	requires	that	there	be	selves	to	experience	this	pain.54	In	particular,	the	apathy/moral	nihilism	horn	of	the	dilemma	assumes	that	without	the	belief	in	an	enduring	self,	and	without	emphasizing	the	importance	of	psychological	connectedness	and	physical	continuity,	we	lose	motivation	to	care	about	any	suffering.	But	why	do	we	need	these	views	to	motivate	the	cultivation	of	compassion	and	other-centric	action?	According	to	Siderits,	
																																																								53	Ibid.,	101.		54	Harris,	“Does	Anātman,”	103.	
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Śāntideva	rejects	this	key	assumption.	Here’s	a	reconstructed	version	of	Siderits’s	interpretation:55	1. The	person,	being	an	aggregate,	is	ultimately	unreal.		2. Hence	if	pain	is	ultimately	real,	it	must	be	ownerless	or	impersonal.	3. We	are	in	agreement	across	the	board	that	pain	is	bad	(even	though	concern	over	pain	is	often	restricted	to	one’s	own	case).	4. Either	pain	is	ultimately	and	impersonally	bad,	or	no	pain	is	ultimately	bad.	5. But	it’s	not	the	case	that	no	pain	is	ultimately	bad;	therefore,	it	is	impersonally	and	ultimately	bad.	So	given	(5),	we	can	say	that	pain	is	impersonally	bad,	which	just	means	we	have	no	reason,	other	than	pragmatic	considerations,	to	restrict	our	concern	to	ourselves	or	our	nearest	and	dearest.	As	Harris	glosses	Siderits,	“It	is	our	commitment	to	removing	this	pain,	which	ultimately	exists	impersonally,	that	leads	to	us	adopting	personhood	conventions	in	which	we	identify	our	current	and	future	collection	of	causal	constituents	as	being	the	same	persons.”56	Siderits	makes	the	original	and	controversial	point	that	personhood	conventions	are	useful	for	removing	suffering,	
since,	often	times,	we	are	in	a	unique	position	to	successfully	alleviate	the	suffering	
that	appears	closest	to	us.	Thus,	personhood	conventions	become	a	stratagem	for	removing	pain,	which	is	ultimately	impersonal.	We	can	gauge	the	extent	to	which	we	must	pay	attention	to	ourselves	and	our	nearest	and	dearest	by	employing	a	consequentialist	calculation	of	one	sort	or	another.																																																											55	Siderits,	Personal,	103.		56	Harris,	“Does	Anātman,”	104.	
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	 Harris	points	out	two	problems	with	this	interpretation.57	First,	as	Williams	has	claimed,	it	is	questionable	that	most	Buddhist	philosophers	would	buy	that	personhood	conventions	are	useful	devices	employed	to	remove	suffering.	The	orthodox	view	is	that	belief	in	an	innate	conception	of	self,	that	is,	identification	with	the	ego	and	its	ambitions,	produces	self-attachment	and	grasping,	and	this	contributes	to	existential	suffering.	This	sort	of	self-attachment	motivates,	and/or,	works	in	tandem	with	the	belief	in	a	“further	fact”	or	metaphysical	presence	underlying	the	flow	of	mental	occurrences.	Personhood	conventions	do	more	to	entrench	self-attachment	and	ego-identification	than	they	do	to	facilitate	the	removal	of	pain.	However,	a	Buddhist	following	Siderits’s	strategy	might	object	that	the	misidentification	of	the	stream	as	an	enduring	person,	which	contributes	to	fixation	on	the	ego	and	its	projects,	causes	suffering.	But	the	practice	of	Buddhist	detachment	and	“right	views”	prevents	one	from	clinging	to	selfhood.	Without	such	clinging,	suffering	does	not	arise.	This	is	perfectly	consistent	with	Siderits’s	claim	that	personhood	conventions	are	stratagems	for	removing	pain	and	suffering.			 The	second	and	more	controversial	problem	that	Harris	points	out	is	that	it	is	questionable	whether	or	not	pain	is	inherently	bad.58	One	might	distinguish	pain	from	suffering,	and	claim	that	impersonal	pain	is	not	really	bad.	Only	the	grasping	that	comes	with	believing	in	a	really	enduring	self—rather	than	recognizing	that	the	self	is	a	conceptual	imputation—transforms	pain	into	suffering.	This	line	of	thought	relies	on	accepting	the	distinction	between	pain	and	suffering.	On	the	one	hand,	pain	is	not	ultimately	negative—only	the	interpretation	of	pain	as	belonging	to	a	really																																																									57	Ibid.,	105-106.	58	Harris,	“Does	Anātman,”	108.	
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existing	and	enduring	person	is	negative,	and	this	sort	of	belief	transforms	pain	into	suffering.	On	the	other	hand,	suffering	is	illusory,	since	it	disappears	upon	realizing	the	right	view.	So	there	is	no	real	need	to	eliminate	pain,	and	if	we	can	achieve	this	remarkable	realization,	then	suffering,	as	it	were,	simply	falls	away.	This	line	of	thought	would	be	damning	to	Śāntideva's	argument,	since	it	relies	on	the	normative	claim	that	all	pain/suffering	is	inherently	bad.			 However,	even	if	this	quasi-Stoic	line	of	thought	is	somewhat	convincing,	it’s	hard	to	argue	that	no	pain	is	intrinsically	negative.	Mental	pain	like	depression,	for	example,	is	not	so	clearly	analyzable	as	a	relationship	between	some	initial	quantity	of	physical	pain,	and	a	personal	interpretation	that	then	generates	angst	and	full-blown	suffering.	Depression	is	just	depression,	even	if	it	is	the	result	of	cognitive	framing	of	one	sort	or	another.	In	other	words,	the	pain	and	suffering	of	depression	are	co-temporal.	Unlike	the	case	of	physical	pain,	it	is	conceptually	difficult	to	distinguish	between	the	suffering	that	comes	with	seeing	the	world	through	melancholy	eyes,	and	the	raw	data	of	a	more	cognitively	neutral	sensation.	Until	that	more	neutral	data	is	drawn	into	a	melancholy	portrait,	it	is	inappropriate	to	call	it	“pain”	at	all.	So	we	can	at	least	assume	with	Śāntideva	and	Siderits	that	some	mental	states	are	intrinsically	negative,	regardless	of	whether	or	not	they	belong	to	persons.59			 But	nevertheless,	as	Harris	points	out,	bridging	the	is/ought	gap	still	remains	a	problem	for	Śāntideva's	argument.	Certain	mental	states	being	inherently	negative	
																																																								59	Harris,	“Does	Anātman,”	107.	
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do	not	necessarily	entail	the	moral	conclusion	that	we	ought	to	remove	them.60	Harris	believes	that	Śāntideva	anticipates	this	point,	and	thus	appeals	in	103	to	ethical	intuition.	“Everyone	agrees”	that	suffering	needs	to	be	removed.	In	other	words,	this	basic	belief	is	not	up	for	debate.	In	response,	Harris	levels	a	cherry-	picking	argument.	While	endorsing	anātman	purportedly	undermines	the	ethical	intuition	that	supports	egoism,	it	also	threatens	to	undermine	the	ethical	intuition	that	all	suffering	is	inherently	bad,	and	we	cannot	just	cherry-pick	which	ethical	intuition	to	take	seriously.			 I	believe	this	point	needs	to	be	assessed	a	bit	further.	First,	when	appealing	to	commonsense,	we	can	only	dispense	with	ineluctable	intuitions	on	a	case	by	case	basis.	Harris	claims	that	ethical	intuition	supports	two	principles:	the	Principle	of	Moderate	Benevolence	(PMB),	and	the	Principle	of	Moderate	Egoism	(PME).61	PMB	agrees	that	we	ought	to	remove	anyone’s	suffering	provided	that	it	is	not	overly	demanding,	while	PME	claims	that	it	is	not	immoral	to	prioritize	one’s	own	future	welfare.	One	can	consistently	maintain	both	principles.	PME	just	says	that	it	is	not	necessarily	immoral	to	prioritize	our	own	welfare,	not	that	we	must	always	
prioritize	our	own	welfare.	Harris’s	argument	is	that	if	the	truth	of	anātman	is	meant	to	undercut	the	intuitions	supporting	PME,	then	it	can	likewise	do	the	same	to	PMB.	At	the	analytically	stable	level	that	frames	the	anātman	view,	PME	may	fall	away,	but	the	fact	that	suffering	is	bad	no	longer	seems	intuitive	at	this	level	of	analysis.																																																									60	Harris,	108:	“The	opponent	may	object	that	simply	pointing	out	the	fact	that	a	mental	state	is	negative	does	not	obviously	entail	the	normative	conclusion	that	we	ought	to	prevent	or	remove	it.”	61	Harris,	“Does	Anātman,”	109.		
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It’s	not	that	Śāntideva	is	just	cherry-picking	between	ethical	intuitions.	Rather,	Śāntideva	is	cherry-picking	between	the	levels	of	analysis	he	draws	from.	PMB	is	most	intuitive	from	the	conventional	or	“unstable”	level	of	analysis.	When	Śāntideva	undercuts	PME	by	moving	to	the	more	analytically	basic	level	of	analysis,	there’s	nothing	that	seems	to	prevent	both	PME	and	PMB	from	falling	away	as	intuitive	claims.				 However,	Harris	does	not	seem	to	have	adequately	entertained	the	possibility	that	the	intuition	that	impersonal	suffering	ought	to	be	removed	is	more	resilient	than	either	PMB	or	PME	at	the	analytically	basic	level	of	analysis.	Remember,	PMB	and	PME	are	“moderate”	and	mutually	consistent	principles.	However,	the	impersonal	suffering	thesis	is	a	demanding	principle	that	claims	that	all	suffering,	no	matter	whose,	ought	to	be	removed.	Could	this	make	any	sense	at	the	impersonal	or	analytically	basic	level	of	analysis?	Harris	claims	that	he	is	not	clear	“that	we	have	any	intuitions	about	impersonal	suffering.”62	But	if	we	accept	that	Śāntideva	employs	“skillful	means”	through	embracing	Abhidharma	metaphysics,	there	is	nothing	to	stop	us	from	interpreting	him	to	embrace	other	Buddhist	metaphysical	principles	that	would	strengthen	his	argument	and	bolster	its	rhetorical	force.	The	metaphysical	view	that	comes	to	mind	for	me	is	the	view	that	all	mental	dharmas	are	inherently	self-reflexive	(sva-prakāśa),	and	in	this	sense,	
self-aware.	What	this	means	is	that	any	mental	occurrence	is	both	aware	of	an	object,	and	aware	of	its	own	awareness	of	the	object.	So,	if	there	really	were	quantities	of	suffering	“just	hanging	there,”	without	a	real	subject	who	bears	them	as																																																									62	Ibid.,	109.		
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properties,	then	we	can	see	how	each	suffering	moment	would	to	some	extent	be	aware	of	its	own	suffering.	The	self-reflexivity	view	is,	among	other	things,	a	metaphysical	device	that	helps	make	sense	of	the	phenomenal	feel	of	“mineness,”	which	then,	along	with	other	theoretical	principles	not	pertinent	to	the	discussion	here,	better	explains	the	psychological	connectedness	of	various	mental	occurrences.	In	short,	there	is	a	sense	or	trace	of	ownership,	but	that	does	not	mean	that	we	have	to	believe	in	a	really	existing	and	enduring	subject	who	owns	that	suffering.	More	importantly,	we	can	imagine	point-instances	of	suffering	that	take	on	a	first-person	feel.	In	other	words,	there	is	some	form	of	self-awareness	that	accompanies	instances	of	suffering.	Perhaps,	contrary	to	how	Williams	and	Harris	have	stated	things,	endurance	and	psychological	connectedness	are	not	the	most	important	factors	that	motivate	compassion	and	concern	for	instances	of	suffering.	Self-awareness	seems	to	be	the	most	basic	fact	about	suffering	that	makes	it	a	moral	ill.	In	fact,	suffering	(as	opposed	to	damage	or	corruption)	seems	unintelligible	when	we	do	not	include	self-awareness	as	a	basic	component	of	the	phenomenon.	The	self-reflexivity	principle	makes	sense	of	self-awareness	without	appealing	to	any	real	or	conventional	ownership.	While	PMB	and	PME	may	fall	away	as	intuitive	concepts	at	the	impersonal	level	of	analysis,	the	nastiness	of	instances	of	self-aware	suffering	seems	resilient	to	whatever	level	of	analysis	we	operate	from.	Harris	is	correct	that	there’s	a	sort	of	cherry-picking	going	on	here,	but	I	do	not	think	that	we	lose	all	intuition	about	our	view	of	suffering	when	we	operate	from	the	impersonal	level,	so	long	as	we	are	committed	to	other	metaphysical	principles	that	would	allow	us	to	believe	that	self-aware	suffering	can	arise	as	a	point-instance	in	a	flow	of	
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ephemeral	tropes.	Now,	this	may	seem	to	play	into	the	hands	of	the	dilemma,	because	Harris	or	Williams	might	argue	that	by	stressing	ownership,	continuity,	psychological	connectedness,	and	other	such	conventional	notions,	we	may	embrace,	at	very	least,	PME	if	not	full-fledged	egoism.	But	the	only	“ownership”	and	connectedness	employed	here	is	one	where	we	can	make	sense	of	the	reflexive	awareness	of	each	momentary	flash	of	suffering,	and	that	means	that	as	long	as	there	is	the	experience/awareness	of	suffering,	we	have	room	to	compassionately	care	about	any	point-instance	of	suffering.	While	this	might	not	be	intuitive,	it	provides	a	theoretical	and	sophisticated	bit	of	machinery	that	can	support	our	already	entrenched	intuition	that	suffering	is	a	nasty	thing	no	matter	who	endures	it.	However,	the	same	cannot	be	said	for	the	egoistic	intuition.	If	there	is	no	enduring	entity	that	ultimately	reaps	the	benefits	and	endures	the	pain	of	a	set	of	current	actions,	then	it	seems	less	important	to	be	fixated	on	who	exactly	endures	the	suffering.	That	does	not	mean	that	we	do	not	care	about	suffering	whatsoever,	we	simply	care	more	about	the	overall	quantity	of	suffering	and	good	in	the	world,	which	is	a	view	that	aligns	nicely	with	consequentialism	and	utilitarianism.	Bear	in	mind	that	this	assumes,	as	Harris	allows,	that	it	makes	sense	to	say	that	suffering	is	inherently	bad.	To	say	that	it	is	impersonally	bad	is	just	to	say	that	we	do	not	need	person-involving	concepts	to	justify	our	concern	for	suffering.	We	can	simply	think	in	terms	of	quantities	of	a	type	of	mental	occurrence	that,	being	inherently	self-aware,	perpetuates	a	larger	quantity	of	inherently	negative	experiences.	Harris’s	problem	is	that	“Śāntideva	has	shifted	the	burden	of	proof	to	his	opponent	by	pointing	out	that	there	is	a	common	acceptance	that	suffering	ought	to	be	removed.	
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The	opponent,	however,	may	respond	that	once	anātman	has	been	accepted,	it	is	irrational	to	accept	any	intuitions	that	arise	in	dependence	on	the	belief	in	enduring	persons”	(110).	Presumably,	then,	the	belief	that	suffering	is	inherently	negative	is	one	such	intuition	that	depends	on	some	investment,	however	attenuated,	in	the	endurance	of	persons.	I’m	taking	exception	with	that	claim.	Instead,	I’m	focusing	on	the	awareness	and	self-awareness	of	suffering,	no	matter	how	attenuated,	as	a	motivating	reason	to	prevent	suffering.			 While	I	think	that	Śāntideva's	argument	may	be	able	to	withstand	the	cherry-	picking	critique,	I	think	that	read	as	a	Madhyamaka	text,	it	does	not	supply	the	sort	of	systematic	ethical	clarity	that	Goodman	imagines	it	does.	By	chapter	9	of	
Bodhicaryāvatāra,	Śāntideva	endorses	the	radical	teaching	of	Madhyamaka	irrealism.	Remember,	this	view	eschews	any	notion	of	“place”	or	“base”	(see	figure	
1).	And	yet,	he	claims	that	we	need	to	embrace	a	conventional	view	of	self	to	make	sense	of	altruism	and	Mahāyāna	compassion	(see	chapter	1).	This	seems	to	indicate	that	when	we	graduate	past	the	conventional	view	of	things	into	the	impersonal	view,	things	like	altruism	and	ethics	disappear.	So,	in	some	sense,	Williams	and	Harris	are	correct	that	the	ultimate	level	of	ontological	analysis,	at	least	from	the	Madhyamaka	perspective,	does	not	come	embedded	with	any	normative	implications.	Śāntideva,	himself,	seems	to	agree	by	emphasizing	that	the	altruistic	motivations	of	the	Bodhisattva	require	a	conventional	view	of	things	to	make	sense	of	agent-driven	concepts	like	karma,	retribution,	and	kindness	and	compassion.	If	my	response	to	Harris	above	is	at	all	satisfying,	then	it	relies	on	a	great	deal	of	metaphysical	machinery,	including	a	“base”	of	individuation	(see	figure	1)	that	the	
		 88	
Mādhyamika	would	not	ultimately	endorse.	Without	ownership	(“place”)	and	without	any	metaphysical	individuation	(“base”),	it’s	not	clear	what	guiding	principles	we	should	appeal	to	when	considering	the	treatment	of	others,	and	the	value	of	their	suffering.	This	may	not	be	as	much	a	problem	for	figures	like	Hume	and	Parfit,	since	some	notion	of	“base”	is	still	in	play.	However,	the	same	cannot	be	said	for	Śāntideva.	Śāntideva	needs	a	conventional	set	of	transactional	notions	to	make	sense	of	ethical	requirements,	and	that	is	precisely	why	he	recommends	that	we	embrace	the	“delusion”	of	conventional	reality	for	the	sake	of	being	guided	by	altruistic	principles	(see	chapter	1).	But	this	does	not	clarify	what	sort	of	principle	would	motivate	him	to	take	the	fabrications	of	conventional	reality	seriously	to	promote	universal	salvation.	Any	principle	that	would	do	that	sort	of	work	would	only	make	sense	in	conventional	reality.	As	a	purely	transcendent	and	amoral	philosophy,	this	would	not	be	a	problem;	but	the	same	cannot	be	said	for	an	ethically-oriented	philosophy	that	has	any	normative	teeth.			 Finally,	although	I	appealed	to	self-awareness	rather	than	endurance	to	make	sense	of	the	normative	force	of	suffering,	and	to	make	sense	of	why	we	might	be	motivated	to	care	that	anyone	is	suffering,	endurance	and	persistence	are	still	key	concepts	that	make	sense	of	agency	construed	more	broadly.	From	reasoning,	to	language	acquisition	and	linguistic	communication,	to	anticipation	and	responsibility,	we	need	some	account	of	ownership	and	persistence.	The	Mādhyamika	might	be	able	to	appeal	to	convention	to	make	sense	of	how	we	come	to	operate	in	a	domain	of	transactional	reality,	but	the	state	of	“perfect	wisdom”	he	
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ultimately	recommends	does	little	to	make	sense	of	why	we	ought	to	care	one	way	or	the	other	about	the	suffering	that	we	find	in	that	domain.	
2.6	Toward	Ownership	and	Other-centricity	
	 I	have	devoted	considerable	attention	in	this	chapter	to	the	Mahāyāna	philosopher,	Śāntideva,	because	his	Madhyamaka	text	provides	a	novel	approach	to	an	ethical	theory	of	altruism.	We	can	call	this,	“emptiness	ethics.”	While	we	can	certainly	find	consequentialist-utilitarian	streaks	in	Śāntideva’s	text,	aspects	of	his	approach	are	unique	and	not	so	readily	accommodated	by	modern	and	contemporary	Euro-American	ethics.	The	analytic	and	decision-procedural	schools	require	a	rather	robust	notion	of	agency	and	practical	identity	to	justify	their	emphasis	on	universal	principles,	practical	rationality,	freedom,	responsibility,	and	punishment.	While	Śāntideva’s	concerns	may	be	read	in	a	way	that	is	consonant	with	some	of	those	aims,	he	does	not	provide	enough	resources	(or	the	usual	sorts	of	resources	we	find	in	Euro-American	ethics)	that	would	support	such	an	endeavor.	His	uniqueness	lies	in	trying	to	make	“emptiness”	(of	ownership	and	individuation)	do	the	work	that	contemporary	principles-based	ethics	does	through	theories	of	real	agency	and	practical	identity.	On	the	other	hand,	while	the	non-principles	based	schools—like	the	situational	and	care-ethical	schools—emphasize	relationality	and	interdependence,	the	self	is	not	so	effaced	in	these	schools,	because	that	would	undercut	the	very	partial	concerns	that	prioritize	intimacy,	family,	and	friendship.	Nor	can	it	be	so	effaced	that	it	threatens	to	undercut	one’s	capacity	to	respect	and	take	the	other	on	his	or	her	terms.	And	yet,	Śāntideva	tries	to	build	other-regarding	concern	and	ethical	responsibility	out	of	a	radical	effacement	of	the	self	and	its	
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practical	identity,	effacement	so	radical	that	partialism	toward	lovers,	family,	friends	or	neighbors	is	rejected63—thus,	preventing	Śāntideva's	ethics	from	conversing	productively	with	care-ethics.	Śāntideva	explicitly	aims	for	an	impersonal,	impartial,	and	agent-neutral	ethics.	So,	on	the	principles-based	side,	he	neglects	a	robust	enough	account	of	agency	to	credibly	make	sense	of	responsibility	and	ethical	action,	and	on	the	non-principles	side,	he	effaces	the	self	so	radically	that	it’s	not	clear	what	(or	who)	can	be	self-possessed	enough	to	invest	in	its	immediate	relationships	of	care	and	its	situatedness	in	a	nexus	of	caring	relationships.			 Śāntideva,	and	more	recent	No-Selfers	like	Parfit,	deny	the	belief	in	a	Cartesian	soul	or	substance,	in	order	to	better	accommodate	and	respond	to	the	needs	of	the	other.	Cartesian	dualism	threatens	to	produce	an	egoistic	self-enclosure—both	a	metaphysical	and	an	ethical	solipsism—that	is	only	bridged	by	reducing	other-regarding	considerations	to	an	extension	of	egocentric,	self-regarding	considerations.	This	sort	of	metaphysics	generates	the	problem	of	making	sense	of	altruism	and	other-centric	considerations	from	an	inescapably	egocentric	vantage-point.	The	selflessness	thesis	in	Śāntideva	aims	to	undercut	the	sort	of	metaphysics	that	generate	inescapable	egoism.	Mādhyamika	Buddhism	does	this	by	denying	the	reality	of	either	ownership	of	cognition	and	volition,	or	a	base	of	individuation.	While	Derek	Parfit	orients	his	ethics	in	a	similarly	non-Cartesian																																																									63	See	8:1-90	in	Crosby	and	Skilton.	These	sections	lay	out	the	emotional	preparatory	work	for	transcending	commonly	reactive	states	tied	to	our	investments	in	public	opinion,	family	and	friendship,	and	the	craving	that	comes	with	lusting	and	the	objectifying	the	lover’s	body.	As	Śāntideva	writes,	“Distraction	does	not	occur	if	body	and	mind	are	kept	sequestered”	(8:2),	and	“Free	from	acquaintance,	free	from	conflict,	he	is	quite	alone	in	his	body”	(8:36),	and	finally,	“…One	should	recoil	from	sensual	desires	and	cultivate	delight	in	solitude,	in	tranquil	woodlands	empty	of	contention	and	strife”	(8:85).	
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direction,	his	reductionist	project	still	remains	grounded	in	an	individuating	base—namely,	the	body—which	helps	orient	the	ethical	act	by	providing	us	with	enough	of	a	distinction	between	self	and	other	to	make	sense	of	the	terms	involved	in	an	ethical	relationship.	In	the	next	chapter,	I	will	further	explore	the	sort	of	“emptiness	ethics”	we	find	in	Madhyamaka	philosophy,	and	examine	whether	or	not	this	sort	of	research	project	has	some	more	promising	insights	and	moves	available	to	it	for	addressing	the	critique	I’ve	provided	so	far.			 I	have	argued	that	ethically	altruistic	action	requires	the	concept	of	a	self,	which	owns	its	cognitive,	affective,	and	volitional	states.	I	make	this	claim	on	two	accounts.	First,	I	have	argued	that	we	need	a	clear	self/other	distinction	in	order	to	both	generate	other-orientedness,	and	intelligibly	place	our	acts	of	compassion	and	generosity	in	a	space	not	fully	describable	in	egocentric	terms.	Without	the	Ownership	view	of	the	self,	the	self/other	distinction	is	compromised,	and	the	other	for	whom	we	become	responsible	loses	his	or	her	independence.	Instead,	the	other	becomes	a	complicated	extension	of	the	ego.	Second,	I’ve	tried	to	show	that	the	No-Self	strategy	destabilizes	our	sense	of	genuine	agency,	including	the	agentive	will	to	act	against	the	basic	egoistic	inclination	of	the	natural,	self-possessed	person.	We	need	a	self	that	owns	its	mental	states	to	make	sense	of	both	agency,	and	the	capacity	to	recognize	the	validity	of	another’s	needs	independently	of	immediate	self-interest	and	desire.	In	short,	the	No-Self	view,	while	sounding	friendly	to	unselfish	action,	fails	to	provide	us	with	genuine	other-orientation	and	genuine	agency.	Therefore,	other-orientation,	which	is	the	ground	of	altruistic	action,	requires	an	Ownership	view	of	the	self.		
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	 Are	there	other	Non-Ownership	views	that	not	only	make	sense	of	altruistic	action,	but	also	show	how	the	Ownership	view	comes	up	short?	I	will	tackle	this	question	in	the	next	chapter,	by	providing	a	hybrid	No-Self	view.	This	will	be	my	attempt	at	preserving	ethical	obligation,	and	the	lived	experience	of	caring	for	another,	without	appealing	to	a	real	self	or	an	Ownership	view.			 		 		
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CHAPTER	3.	BEING	OTHER	THAN	MYSELF:	DEFENDING	AN	ETHICS	OF	
SELFLESSNESS	
3.1	Introduction	
	 In	this	chapter,	I	develop	“emptiness	ethics”	in	greater	detail.	I	examine	whether	or	not	Madhyamaka	Buddhism,	fused	with	contemporary	No-Self	views,	can	provide	a	transformative	and	ethically	compelling	orientation	that	is	more	practically	attractive	than	the	Self	view.	In	this	sense,	the	nature	of	the	project	is	metaethical.	However,	in	another	sense,	the	project	is	phenomenological,	because	I	focus	here	on	a	kind	of	lived	experience,	where	unsettling	alterity	and	otherness	show	up	as	ethical	responsibility	(to	be	explained	in	detail	below).	I	examine	ways	in	which	this	experience	of	responsibility	can	be	importantly	supported	by	No-Self	views.						 Section	3.2	provides	the	technical	nuts	and	bolts	for	my	argument.	The	key	lies	in	treating	egocentric,	first-person	concerns	as	special	cases	of	other-centric,	third	person	concerns.	For	example,	when	I	care	about	the	character,	values,	and	well-being	of	the	good	old	man	I	hope	to	become,	I’m	actually	concerned	with	another	person.	When	I	recognize	this,	I	see	that	other-centric	responsibility	resonates	at	the	most	basic	level	of	my	self-centered	experience.	I	am	suggesting	that	this	sort	of	paradoxical	realization	can	be	ethically	transformative.	The	No-Self	view,	as	I	develop	it	throughout	the	chapter,	may	allow	us	to	make	such	a	claim.	To	help	make	sense	of	this,	I	examine	Parfit’s	distinction	in	Reasons	and	Persons	between	the	“moderate	claim”	and	the	“extreme	claim.”	The	moderate	claim	states	that	upon	adopting	the	No-Self	view,	we	may	have	moral	reasons	for	caring	about	
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our	future	surrogate-selves.	The	old	man	I	hope	to	become	is	not	a	stage	in	my	life—he’s	a	surrogate.	But	this	does	undermine	my	obligation	to	make	sacrifices	for	his	future.	The	idea	here	is	that	we	can	forge	practically	relevant	connections	with	our	surrogate-selves	without	establishing	metaphysical	criteria	for	personal	identity.	The	extreme	claim	states	that	without	such	criteria,	we	have	no	reason	to	anticipate,	project,	or	care	about	the	future.	This	is	a	reductio	on	the	No-Self	view.	While	I	believe	the	No-Self	view	has	resources	to	defuse	this	worry,	I	argue	that	the	moderate	claim	breaks	down	in	light	of	the	anticipatory	first-person	structure	of	our	lived	experience:	knowing	that	the	old	man	who	replaces	me	(in	that	gradual	and	continuous	way	which	we	call	“myself	growing	older”)	will	suffer	painful	prostate	cancer	is	different	than	knowing	that	my	dear	friend	will	suffer	third-degree	burns.	In	this	sense,	I	suppose,	I	tentatively	defend	the	extreme	claim.	Parfit	judiciously	entertained	the	anticipation	problem,	but	I	think	it	is	a	strong	objection.	Again,	the	extreme	claim	states	that	without	metaphysically	substantive	perdurance	of	the	self,1	an	individual	does	not	have	good	reasons	to	care	about	the	future	of	a	surrogate-self	(or,	at	least	not	prudential	reasons,	which	involve	projecting	into	one’s	own	future).	In	other	words,	forward-looking	agency	requires	that	we	project	into	a	future	in	which	we	exist	(or	we	exist	with	specific	temporal	parts),	and	that	existing	in	this	future	is	the	primary	reason	we	have	for	caring	about	it	when	considering	actions	to	take	now.	The	moderate	claim	states	that	we	can	care	about																																																									1	The	same	point	might	be	made	with	an	endurantist	view,	but	this	latter	view—that	the	self	is	wholly	present	in	each	moment	of	its	existence	(as	opposed	to	being	“spread”	temporally	with	distinct	“temporal	parts”	over	something	like	a	four-dimensional	space-time)—might	add	further	complexities	to	the	argument.	For	my	purposes,	I	needn’t	get	into	the	fine	distinctions	between	endurance	and	perdurance.		
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our	surrogate,	but	non-metaphysically	identical	future-selves	without	believing	in	substantive	criteria	for	personal	identity.	The	anticipation	problem	counters	the	moderate	claim	by	stating	that	a	basic	aspect	of	caring	about	the	future	is	not	accounted	for	in	the	moderate	claim,	which	eschews	belief	in	real	persistence	over	time:	the	fact	is,	I	anticipate	future	pain	and	pleasure	in	a	first-person	way	that	I	simply	do	not	and	cannot	do	with	respect	to	someone	else’s	pleasures	and	pains.	With	these	problems	in	mind,	I	believe	that	there	may	be	ways	of	reframing	things	that	do	justice	to	both	claims,	and	I	show	how	this	may	support	the	No-Self	view’s	practical	and	ethical	worth.		 In	section	3.3,	I	develop	this	defense	further	by	providing	a	practical	gloss	on	Thomas	Metzinger’s	work.2	Metzinger,	who	started	off	by	writing	a	major	work	titled,	On	Being	No	One—a	work	arguing	that	nobody	ever	had	a	self—concedes	in	his	later	works	that	the	so-called	self	is	an	“ego-tunnel”	or	“personal	self-model”	(PSM).	According	to	Metzinger,	the	self	is	a	simulation	built	out	of	the	brain’s	higher-order	capacity	to	represent	and	orient	its	representational	activities.	For	Metzinger,	consciousness	is	an	evolved	capacity	to	represent	reality,	and	the	first-person	experience	is	a	higher-order	representation	of	those	representational	capacities.	With	Metzinger’s	version	of	the	No-Self	view,	we	might	be	able	to	split	the	difference	between	the	moderate	and	the	extreme	claims.	In	short,	Metzinger’s	work	might	support	the	view	that,	although	we	may	not	have	the	usual	reasons	to	care	about	our	futures,	this	can	be	liberating	when	it	comes	to	anxiety	and	the	dread	or																																																									2	Thomas	Metzinger,	Being	No	One:	The	Self-Model	Theory	of	Subjectivity	(Massachusetts:	MIT	Press,	2003).	Also	see,	Thomas	Metzinger,	The	Ego	Tunnel:	The	
Science	of	the	Mind	and	the	Myth	of	the	Self	(New	York:	Basic	Books,	2009).	
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anticipation	of	death.	Moreover,	we	can	appeal	to	evolutionarily-adaptive	conventions	to	secure	many	of	our	intuitions	about	agency	and	self-regarding	considerations—something	Selfists	believe	No-Self	models	cannot	do.	That	I	am	free,	and	have	a	will	that	causes	things	to	happen	in	the	world	may	be	a	simulated	illusion—but	it’s	one	that	works.	Therefore,	the	extreme	claim	is	over-reactive,	and	the	moderate	claim,	on	its	surface,	is	flippantly	optimistic.				 However,	I	go	on	to	argue	that	glossing	the	ego-tunnel	in	this	practical	(enactive?)	way	produces	a	new	problem.	Developing	a	theory	of	action	in	terms	of	simulation	and	transparent	third-person	processes	faces	a	dilemma.	Either	the	concept	of	an	ego-tunnel	keeps	many	of	our	commonsense	views	about	agency	intact,	or	it	does	not.	If	it	does,	then	the	Self/No-Self	issue	is	practically	speaking	irrelevant.	If	it	does	not,	then	the	Selfist	can	more	credibly	argue	that	No-Selfers	carry	the	onus	of	proof,	because	their	view	up-ends	manifest	facts	about	our	practical	lives.	But	here’s	where	I	think	fusing	Madhyamaka	and	contemporary	No-Self	views	can	be	morally	and	practically	instructive.	Metzinger’s	fictionalism	concerning	the	self	can	then,	perhaps,	lean	on	the	device	of	“two	truths”	(ultimate	and	conventional)	with	which	the	Mādhyamika	does	the	tight-rope	walking	between	realism	and	eliminativism	about	the	agent-self.		 To	show	this,	I	appropriate	aspects	of	Levinas’s	metaphysical	ethics,	specifically,	his	view	of	otherness.3	My	appropriation	can	nuance	an	ethically	rich	fusion	of	Madhyamaka	and	contemporary	No-Self	views.	I	argue	that	sincerely																																																									3	Although	Levinas’s	work	on	the	subject	is	extensive,	I	appropriate	claims	made	in	his	seminal	piece:	Emmanuel	Levinas,	Totality	and	Infinity,	transl.	Alphonso	Lingis	(Pittsburgh,	Duquesne	University	Press,	1969).		
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embodying	this	version	of	the	No-Self	view	can	reorient	our	egocentric	instincts.	This	reorientation	nurtures	an	expansive	concern	for	the	general	field	of	suffering.	And	rather	than	caring	less	about	my	future,	as	some	Selfists	believe	the	No-Self	view	forces	us	to	do,	I	can	see	my	future-directed	concern	as	a	special	case	of	altruistic	care	and	responsibility	for	the	other.		 In	section	3.4,	I	examine	in	further	detail	whether	or	not	the	Self/No-Self	view	makes	any	practical	difference.	Even	if	the	extreme	claim	is	correct,	nothing	about	my	persisting	into	the	future	necessitates	that	I	should	care	about	my	future,	especially	if	the	person	I	will	become	has	an	entirely	different	set	of	memories,	and	a	different	practical	identity.	Selfers	might	claim	that	I	should	care	about	my	future,	because	it	is	a	future	stage	of	my	life.	This	is	what	Raymond	Martin	has	called	the	“me-consideration.”4	He	has	argued	that	it	is	not	justified,	and	therefore	the	Self	and	No-Self	views	may	equally	fail	to	ground	forward-looking	concerns.	I	disagree.	I	think	the	“me-consideration”	is	stronger	than	Martin	thinks,	with	the	caveat	that	we	need	to	appreciate	the	body	as	an	individuating	base	for	selfhood.	In	order	to	prove	this,	I	offer	my	own	tentative	estimation	of	what	I	think	a	Self	might	be,	and	what	I	think	a	Self	can	do.	However,	I	end	the	chapter	with	a	tension	(if	not	a	dilemma).	I	show	how	both	the	Self	and	No-Self	views	provide	us	with	good	reasons	to	care	about	our	futures.	The	latter	provides	us	with	a	revisionary	account	of	self-regard	that	can	blossom	into	full-blown	altruism.	The	former,	for	reasons	I	will	detail	below,	can	successfully	ground	its	egocentric,	forward-looking	concerns.	But	then																																																									4	Raymond	Martin,	“Would	it	Matter	All	That	Much	if	There	Were	No	Selves?”	in	
Pointing	at	the	Moon:	Buddhism,	Logic,	Analytic	Philosophy	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009):	115-134.	
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the	question	becomes	whether	or	not	the	Self	view	can	not	only	provide	an	equally	compelling	account	of	altruism,	but	one	that	has	advantages	over	the	No-Self	view.	I	reserve	a	response	to	this—a	response	that	lies	at	the	heart	of	this	entire	work—for	the	final	chapter.	
3.2.1	Anticipating	My	Future:	How	to	Treat	Myself	as	Other		 What	would	it	be	like	to	reverse	the	golden	rule?	Instead	of	“Treat	others	as	you	would	yourself,”	what	if	we	teach	our	children:	“Treat	yourself	as	you	treat	others.”5	Obviously,	we	would	need	to	clarify	what	“other”	means.	Emmanuel	Levinas’s	“other”6	is	someone	who,	unlike	an	ordinary	object—like	a	statue,	for																																																									5	I’m	grateful	to	Dr.	Arindam	Chakrabarti	who	in	a	personal	conversation	offered	this	playfully	important	gloss	on	Parfit	and	Śāntideva.	6	Lingis	translates	the	“personal	Other,	the	you”	as	“Other”	with	a	capital	“O.”	This	translates	the	French,	“autrui”	(24).	He	translates	“other”	(without	the	capital)	for	the	French,	“autre.”	This	is	important,	because	Levinas	problematizes	the	usual	sense	of	otherness	(without	the	capital)	as	a	delimiting	concept.	Since	it	is	invoked	in	making	sense	of	myself—the	self-same	“I”—it	is	defined	in	relation	to	the	“I,”	and	thus	not	so	“strange”	and	“other”	that	it	would	disrupt	my	capacity	to	reduce	it	to	a	system	of	intelligible	concepts.	But	for	Levinas,	the	metaphysical	“Other”	is	wholly	transcendent,	and	eludes	reduction—it	is	an	“Other	with	an	alterity	that	does	not	limit	the	same,	for	in	limiting	the	same	the	other	would	not	be	rigorously	other:	by	virtue	of	the	common	frontier	the	other,	within	the	system,	would	yet	be	the	same”	(39).	I	am	capitalizing	on	the	metaphysical	weight	and	transcendence—or	
strangeness—of	this	Other	who	shows	up	as	a	real	stranger.	However,	I’m	not	necessarily	committed	to	Levinas’s	development	of	this	concept—I’m	interested	in	the	lived	experience	of	the	inscrutable	that	can	be	a	stranger,	but	can	then	be	familiarized	or	in	some	sense	identified	with,	that	is,	the	past	and	future	me	(or	continuant	or	surrogate)	who	I	am	not	identical	with,	and	who,	in	that	sense,	is	a	stranger	to	me,	but	who	I	learn	to	recognize	a	continuity	with.	Thus,	I	will	not	make	a	fuss	about	capitalizing	or	not	capitalizing	“other”	in	what	will	follow.	However,	for	a	deep	reading	of	Levinas	on	his	own	terms,	this	would	be	a	travesty,	because	for	Levinas,	“The	absolutely	other	is	the	Other.	He	and	I	do	not	form	a	number.	The	collectivity	in	which	I	say	‘you’	or	‘we’	is	not	a	plural	of	the	‘I.’	I,	you—these	are	not	individuals	of	a	common	concept.	Neither	possession	nor	the	unity	of	number	nor	the	unity	of	concepts	link	me	to	the	Stranger	[l’Etranger],	the	Stranger	who	disturbs	the	being	at	home	with	oneself	[le	chez	soi]”	(39).	This	speaks	to	the	idea	of	building	a	relationship	with	the	Other	in	a	non-totalizing	way—that	is,	in	a	way	that	does	not	
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example—generates	a	call	to	which	we	must	respond.	The	other	has	a	face,	which	brings	the	“I”	face	to	face	with	it.	This	“must”	of	response	to	the	other	is	not	a	logical	or	principled	demand,	but	presumably	a	lived	experience	of	primordial	responsibility—the	experience	of	our	subjectivity	coming	face	to	face	with	someone	who	resists	reducibility	to	our	familiar	concepts.	The	other	and	I	cannot	even	form	a	generic	“we”	together.	In	the	other’s	radical	singularity,	I	am	forced	to	respond.	Others	are	not	just	some	collectivity	of	individuals	of	a	specific	race,	gender,	height,	or	other	objectifying	property:	their	faces	are	singular	and	elevated	and	beaming	with	inscrutable	life.	As	William	Large	writes,	“The	other	is	not	just	another	self,	either	a	friend	or	an	enemy,	whom	I	can	label	and	describe	and	thus	domesticate…but	that	which	unsettles	the	very	core	of	my	being…the	other	is	not	just	everything	I	am	not,	but	more	than	me.”7	I	will	not	pursue	a	detailed	exegesis	of	Levinas’s	work	here.	I’m	simply	appropriating	the	idea	that	at	the	core	of	our	being,	we	experience	unsettling	difference	and	alterity,	and	we	feel	both	related	to	and	yet	separated	from	this	unsettling	other.	The	other,	as	I’m	thinking	of	it,	is	the	first-person	experience	that	I	can	sense	but	never	possess,	an	addressed	first	person	to	whom	my	self	comes	second:	the	uniqueness	of	your	life-force	coming	face	to	face	with	mine,	and	the	responsibility	that	comes	with	recognizing	that	you	are	a	unique	opening	on	to	the	world.		
																																																																																																																																																																					reduce	the	Other	to	one’s	own	terms,	but	instead,	allows	otherness	to	be	its	own	unique	singularity.	This	post-modern	account	of	otherness,	especially	its	political	and	social	ramifications,	goes	well	beyond	my	present	purposes.		7	William	Large,	Levinas’	Totality	and	Infinity	(New	York:	Bloomsbury	Academic	Publishing),	27.	
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	 With	respect	to	No-Self	views,	particularly	Madhyamaka	Buddhism	and	the	more	recent	work	of	the	philosopher	of	mind,	Thomas	Metzinger,	I’d	like	to	propose	that	a	basic	experience	of	becoming	other	to	our	own	selves	might	lend	an	ethical	nuance	to	the	No-Self	view	not	yet	explored	in	this	essay.	Becoming	other	to	oneself	might	reveal	a	responsibility	that	exists	at	the	most	basic	level	of	subjective	experience.	According	to	Levinas,	we	become	other	to	ourselves,	and	through	an	act	of	appropriation,	solidify	our	sense	of	selfhood—of	“mine-ness”—in	the	midst	of	constant	alterity	and	heterogeneity:	The	I	is	not	a	being	that	always	remains	the	same,	but	is	the	being	whose	existing	consists	in	identifying	itself,	in	recovering	its	identity	throughout	all	that	happens	to	it.	It	is	the	primal	identity,	the	primordial	work	of	identification	[my	italics].8			I	want	to	examine	an	experience	of	our	own	alterity	and	difference	with	respect	to	our	past	selves	and	our	future	selves,	and	show	how	it	produces	a	basic	sense	of	ethical	responsibility,	which	is	supported	rather	than	undermined	by	the	No-Self	view.	Accordingly,	my	exploration	of	otherness	in	the	context	of	analytic	and	Buddhist	texts	will	only	cursorily	resemble	Levinas’s	idea	of	otherness.	I’m	chiefly	interested	in	developing	an	idea	of	otherness	that	plays	an	important	ethical	role	in	Buddhist	and	contemporary	No-Self	views.			 So	let’s	begin	by	reversing	the	golden	rule.	We	do	so	because	we	come	to	realize	that	the	self	is	more	or	less	always	other	to	itself—an	other	for	whom	we	care,	on	whose	past	we	draw,	and	of	whose	future	we	are	circumspect.	When	the	self	is	not	a	persisting	and	substantial	metaphysical	entity	to	which	the	dynamic	continuum	of	mental	life	is	tethered,	the	person	projecting	forward	into	her	so-																																																								8	Levinas,	Totality	and	Infinity,	36.	
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called	future	learns	to	see	her	circumspection	as	concern	for	an	intimate	other	somehow	bound	to	her.	For	contemporary	analytic	philosophers	like	Derek	Parfit,	this	boundedness	is	a	function	of	causal	and	psychological	continuities,	and	not	some	sort	of	really	persisting	entity	or	phenomenologically	lived	experience	to	describe.	But	I	want	to	say	that	a	deeply	experienced	sense	of	otherness	in	the	projected	face	of	the	person	who	we	were,	and	the	person	who	we	will	become,	might	reveal	our	typically	self-regarding	concern	as	a	special	case	of	other-regarding	concern.	I	will	show	one	way	in	which	this	reversal	might	be	morally	instructive,	and	also	how	it	grows	out	of	a	basic	experience	that	No-Self	reductionists	like	Parfit,	and	No-Self	irrealists	like	the	Mādhyamika	Buddhist,	capitalize	upon.	The	point	here	is	to	show	how	No-Self	camps	may	not	only	debunk	realism	about	the	self,	but	also	provide	morally	instructive	reasons	to	do	so.	This	stands	in	complete	contrast	to	what	I’ve	developed	so	far,	namely,	the	view	that	we	need	to	think	in	terms	of	persisting	selves	in	order	to	live	coherent	social	and	ethical	lives.	But	as	I’ve	already	stated	in	the	previous	chapters,	Indian	Buddhism	begins	with	practice,	not	theoretical	metaphysics.	The	practical	underpinnings	of	the	No-Self	view	requires	lengthy	examination	since	it	is	believed	to	liberate	the	ego-centered	person,	and	motivate	a	deeply	other-centric	orientation,	and	without	eradicating	ego-centricity	there	is	no	hope	of	eradicating	even	one’s	own	suffering	let	alone	others’.	For	the	over-arching	practical	goal	of	“eradication	of	suffering—no	matter	whose,”	No-Self	metaphysics,	as	it	were,	has	to	be	commissioned.	In	order	to	
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explore	this	possibility	I	will,	for	the	sake	of	argument,	grant	reductionism	about	the	self.9		
3.2.2	The	Continuant	Other:	Good	Reasons	to	Care	About	My	Surrogate	(Non)-	
Self	 		 I	embody	the	belief	that	me,	the	man	writing	this	chapter,	will	not	strictly	speaking	persist	into	the	future	in	some	deep	metaphysical	sense.	Granted,	I	may	relate	more	intimately	with	the	idea	of	me	in	20	years	than	I	do	with	my	neighbor	Sam	in	20	years.	Analytic	philosophers	might	argue	that	I	do	so,	because	there	exists	individuating	psychological	and	physical	relationships	between	me-now	and	my	future-continuant.	Still,	when	we	accept	that	“I”	does	not	pick	out	anything	that	strictly	persists	into	the	future,	then	we	may	view	KPM	in	20	years	as	another	person—a	little	less	other	than	my	neighbor	Sam,	but	still	other	than	me.	KPM-20	is	not	a	future	stage	of	me—he’s	my	surrogate,	my	replacement,	or,	my	heir.	I	may	feel	a	deep	bond	with	the	concept	of	him,	because	I	imagine	he	will	resemble	me	in	important	ways.	Perhaps,	he	will	look	a	lot	like	me,	but	then	again,	if	I	am	unhappy	with	my	current	visage,	and	am	trying	to	get	a	face-lift,	I	imagine	that	he	will	not	look	a	lot	like	me.	Still,	he	will	share	a	lot	of	my	memories,	ticks,	and	beliefs	and	habits:	the	stuff	that	picks	me	out	in	more	or	less	unique	ways.	If	I	do	not	believe	that	any	distinct,	further	fact	relates	me	to	this	surrogate,	then	I	do	not	in	any	literal																																																									9	“Reductionism”	here	refers	to	the	claim	that	the	concept	of	the	self	might	be	construed	in	non-personal	terms.	While	this	aligns	with	Parfit’s	Reasons	and	Persons,	we	must	remember	that	Parfit	retracts	that	claim.	However,	he	does	not	believe	that	it	makes	much	practical	difference.	He	compares	it	to	replacing	the	concept	of	a	river,	for	example,	with	the	concept	of	a	continuous	flowing	of	water	in	a	certain	pattern.	See	Derek	Parfit,	“Experiences,	Subjects,	and	Conceptual	Schemes,”	
Philosophical	Topics	26,	1999:	217-270,	at	228.	Cf.	Richard	Sorabji,	The	Self,	chapter	15.	
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sense	get	to	have	that	future	toward	which	I	project:	KPM-20	may	be	the	result	of	a	continuity	that	depends	upon	certain	aspects	of	me-now,	but	he	is	not	a	stage	over	which	I	can	claim	ownership.	When	I	take	measures	to	secure	his	interests,	say,	by	devoting	myself	to	Pilates	in	order	to	allow	him	to	have	a	back	that	doesn’t	ache,	and	a	hip	that	doesn’t	so	easily	give	out,	I’m	in	essence	working	for	the	future	of	another	person.	Accepting	this	requires	in	a	nuanced	way	that	I	develop	below,	that	I	treat	a	first-person	sense	of	self-regarding	and	egocentric	concern	as	a	third-person	account	of	other-regarding	concern—the	sort	of	concern	we	might	express	for	our	neighbors,	children,	or	family	and	friends.	This	is	one	way	I	might	experience	myself	as	other.		 As	I	read	Parfit,	he	entertains	this	possibility	when	defending	what	he	calls	the	“moderate	claim”	over	the	“extreme	claim.”10	According	to	the	extreme	claim,	when	we	accept	reductionism	about	the	self,	we	lose	any	special	reasons	to	have	future-oriented	and	egocentric	concerns.	In	Early-Modern	European	philosophy,	Bishop	Butler	advanced	this	line	of	argument.	He	believed	that	without	a	persisting	self	that	owns	its	mental	states,	nobody	would	have	any	reason	to	care	about	his	or	her	own	future	for	the	simple	reason	that	they	would	not	actually	have	a	future	to	care	about.	This	is	supposed	to	be	a	reductio	on	the	No-Self	view,	because	the	view	cannot	make	sense	of	a	basic	feature	of	forward-looking	agency.	When	I’m	making	a	sandwich,	I’m	driven	by	a	goal	that	is	forward-looking.	In	a	very	mundane	way,	I’m	projecting	toward	a	future	good	in	which	KPM	in	10	minutes	gets	to	enjoy	a	full	belly.	However,	the	No-Self	view	might	spins	things	differently.	In	this	picture,	my																																																									10	Derek	Parfit,	Reasons	and	Persons,	307-320.			
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deep	concern	for	KPM-10	or	KPM-20’s	future	may	be	more	or	less	on	par	with	caring	about	neighbor	Sam’s	future.	But	the	problem	Bishop	Butler	and	others	have	pointed	out	is	that	I	might	not	care	so	much	about	neighbor	Sam’s	future,	since	so	much	of	it	does	not	directly	concern	me.	And	likewise,	I	don’t	have	any	special	reason	to	care	about	KPM-20’s	future	if	it’s	just	as	psychologically	and	temporally	distant	as	neighbor	Sam’s	future.	If	I	do	happen	to	care,	that	may	be	commendable,	and	a	function	of	various	psychological	proclivities.	But	rational	prudence	does	not	demand	this	of	me.	Parfit	denies	this	extreme	claim	and	instead	defends	the	moderate	claim.	His	“Relation	R,”	which	replaces	the	notion	of	personal	identity	over	time	with	stream-like	psychophysical	connectedness	and	continuity,	may	be	good	enough	for	future-oriented	self-regard:	 	Extremists	are	wrong	to	assume	that	only	the	deep	further	fact	gives	us	a	reason	for	special	concern.	Think	of	our	special	concern	for	our	own	children,	or	for	anyone	we	love.	Given	the	nature	of	our	relation	to	our	children…we	can	plausibly	claim	that	we	have	reasons	to	be	specially	concerned	about	what	will	happen	to	these	people.	And	the	relations	that	justify	this	special	concern	are	not	the	deep	separate	fact	of	personal	identity.	If	these	relations	give	us	reason	for	special	concern,	we	can	claim	the	same	about	Relation	R.	We	can	claim	that	this	relation	gives	each	of	us	a	
reason	to	be	specially	concerned	about	his	own	future	(italics	mine).11			 As	I	read	him,	Parfit’s	point	is	that	reason	does	chime	in	with	respect	to	future-oriented	concern.	Whatever	reasons	we	have	for	caring	about	those	who	are	close	to	us	may	apply	to	reasons	we	have	for	caring	about	our	future	surrogates.	Personal	identity	and	deep	further	facts	are	not	necessary	for	having	a	reason	to	care	about	someone.	KPM-20	is	not	like	the	neighbor	I’ve	never	spoken	to	across	the	street;	he’s	more	like	a	close	friend,	or	the	neighbor	I’ve	had	a	beer	with.	As	a																																																									11	Parfit,	Reasons	and	Persons,	311.		
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reductionist	about	the	self,	I	recognize	that	whatever	“I”	picks	out	now,	it	importantly	contributes	to	whatever	“KPM-20”	will	pick	out,	and	it	usually	does	so	in	a	way	that	it	can’t	when	considering	Donald	Trump	in	20	years.	Somehow,	this	very	personal	psychological	connection	to	KPM-20	draws	me	closer	to	his	plight.	Being	temporally	distant,	I	am	not	necessarily	as	close	to	KPM-20	as	I	am	to	the	partner	I	share	my	bed	with	right	now.	But	just	as	my	spouse	being	my	spouse	draws	me	closer	to	her	plight	than,	say,	Donald	Trump	being	Donald	Trump	does	to	his,	KPM-20	stands	in	a	special	relation	to	me-now.	If	all	goes	well,	KPM-20	will	not	be	Donald	Trump,	and	he	will	not	be	my	neighbor	Sam.	In	fact,	he	won’t	be	anyone	who	is	so	remotely	related	to	me.	He	might	not	even	be	a	“he”	at	all.	Instead,	he	might	feel	like	a	distant	relative,	or	my	own	offspring,	whose	future	deeply	concerns	me.		 Let	me	reflect	a	bit	further	on	what	would	have	to	be	true	if	this	seems	convincing.	The	reason	I	care	about	the	future	welfare	of	my	son	is	that	I	am	related	to	him	in	important	ways.	I’ve	been	there	to	watch	his	victories	and	defeats.	I’ve	supported	him	through	the	growing	pains	of	his	trying	early	teen	years.	I	share	laughs	and	tears	and	stories	and	meals	with	him.	The	list	goes	on.	In	short,	I’m	pretty	darned	close	to	him,	because	so	much	of	our	practical	and	emotional	lives	overlap	and	impact	each	other.	But	one	might	argue	that	I	do	not	need	rigorously	grounded	criteria	for	personal	identity	to	justify	caring	for	him.	We	care	about	our	loved-one’s	future	and	we	care	about	ourselves	without	any	appeal	to	metaphysics.	Even	if	my	loved-one	is	just	a	stream	of	continuants,	or,	strung-together	surrogates,	there’s	no	reason	the	continuant	process	that	describes	my	history	cannot	care	
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about	the	continuant	process	that	describes	his.	We	can	remain	intimately	connected	without	establishing	metaphysical	criteria	for	personal	identity.	Grant	that	there	is	no	real	self	or	deeper	owner	of	my	experiences.	Grant	that	the	concept	of	personal	identity	is	really	just	a	confused	way	of	describing	various	psychological	and	physical	connections	and	continuities	over	time.	Still,	there’s	nothing	especially	important	about	relating	to	myself	in	a	persisting	and	first-person	way	to	ensure	that	I	care	about	KPM-20.	In	other	words,	I	can	learn	to	treat	myself	the	way	I	treat	
others,	just	as	our	reversal	of	the	old	maxim	claims.	If	this	has	any	practical	purchase,	then	I	must	be	able	to	see	myself	as	my	own	other,	and	revise	the	reasons	I	have	for	caring	about	this	future-me.	I	do	not	just	care	about	KPM-20	because,	“He’s	me!”	I	care	about	him,	because	he	is	deserving	of	my	care.				 Now,	in	his	typically	judicious	manner,	Parfit	does	not	insist	that	the	moderate	claim	is	necessarily	correct.	There	are	reasons	to	endorse	the	extreme	claim,	but	there	are	equally	reasons	not	to	endorse	it.	Here’s	a	reason	why	we	might	endorse	the	extreme	claim.	When	I’m	told	that	I	will	experience	a	crippling	back	injury	in	20	days,	the	anticipation	of	that	pain	seems	qualitatively	different	than	being	told	that	my	wife,	my	neighbor,	or	my	dear	friend	will	experience	crippling	pain	in	20	days.	It	seems	to	me	that	the	first-person	feel	of	pain	in	20	days	distinguishes	my	concern	for	KPM	over	my	concern	for	my	wife.	My	own	future	pain	is	anticipated	“from	the	inside,”	while	my	loved	one’s	future	pain	is	viewed	“from	the	outside.”	But	how	can	we	make	sense	of	this	distinction	if	people	do	not	persist	into	their	own	future?	Anticipating	our	own	future	pain	does	not	seem	to	be	on	par	with	concern	for	our	loved	one’s	future—it’s	a	different	sort	of	phenomenon	
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altogether.	But	being	a	steadfast	reductionist,	I	may	argue	that	anticipation	of	one’s	own	future	pain	is	not	really	justified.	Maybe	anticipation	is	simply	a	residual	prejudice	or	confused	state	we	can	learn	to	revise.	Just	as	motivations	based	on	psychological	and	geographical	distance	are	not	necessarily	arguments	against	moral	reasons	to,	say,	donate	money	to	UNICEF,	similarly,	my	psychological	proclivity	to	anticipate	future	events	and	feelings	might	be	a	simple	prejudice	that	sober	reflection	cures.	I	might	have	psychological	hang-ups	about	my	surrogate,	that	is,	I	may	have	a	lingering	sense	that	it	will	be	me	who	experiences	future	pain,	but	that	does	not	mean	I	should	let	such	appearances	guide	my	actions	now.	Put	another	way,	the	reductionist	might	claim	that	if	and	when	there	is	a	reason	to	care	for	his	future	surrogate,	it	doesn’t	require	an	identity	relation.	Moreover,	anticipation	might	just	be	a	residual,	less	philosophically	mature	way	of	caring	about	this	future	person’s	plight.	So	it	all	comes	down	to	how	we	analyze	the	phenomenon	and	ontology	of	anticipation.	As	judicious	as	this	may	sound,	I	believe	that	the	anticipation	objection	is	precisely	the	sort	of	objection	that	makes	all	the	difference.	But	perhaps	there	are	more	sophisticated	ways	of	making	sense	of	forward-looking	egocentric	concern	from	a	No-Self	perspective.	What	I’ll	explore	next	is	a	view	I’ve	constructed	out	of	contemporary	philosophy	of	mind	and	Madhyamaka	Buddhism.	This	view	splits	the	difference	between	the	moderate	and	extreme	claims,	and	justifies	conventional	concern	for	our	own	future	without	investing	in	some	further	fact.	It	may	be	a	compelling	view,	but	I	think	it	has	some	serious	shortcomings	that	I	will	discuss	below.	
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3.3.1	Ego-Tunnels	and	Madhyamaka:	The	Ethics	and	Consolation	of	Simulated	
(Non)-Selves			 		 Thomas	Metzinger’s	“personal	self-model”	(PSM)	may	be	just	the	sort	of	No-Self	view	that	revises	the	simple	distinction	between	a	so-called	moderate	versus	extreme	claim.	The	PSM,	or	what	Metzinger	also	calls,	“the	ego-tunnel”	is	an	organizing	component	in	a	functional	neural	network.	Consciousness,	according	to	Metzinger,	is	“a	very	special	phenomenon,	because	it	is	part	of	the	world	and	contains	it	at	the	same	time.”12	Nature,	as	it	were,	carves	inwardness	and	representation	into	its	own	fabric.	Now,	Metzinger	operates	at	the	interdisciplinary	cutting	edge	of	empirical	hard	sciences	and	the	humanities,	where	the	logical	structure	of	consciousness,	particularly	the	phenomenological	feel	of	“mine-ness,”	or,	the	first-person	experience	(rationally	reconstructed	by	analytic	philosophy,	and	described	through	lived	experience	in	phenomenology)	must	answer	to	neuroscience,	biology,	and	empirical	data.	For	Metzinger,	consciousness	is	an	evolved	component	of	advanced	nervous	systems	that	represent	the	basic	stuff	of	reality	(basically,	various	wavelengths	of	energy)	in	adaptively	advantageous	ways.	Thus,	nature	carves	out	an	internal	space,	or,	representational	tunnel	within	itself.	The	ego	emerges	at	a	much	more	advanced	evolutionary	stage	in	which	representational	activity	can,	in	a	nested	and	looping	way,	represent	that	very	activity.	This	appears	as	a	self—or	single	point	of	origin—for	which	such	activity	represents	a	unique	and	recursively	self-aware	vantage	point	onto	reality.	However,	this	feel	of	“mine-ness”	is	purely	simulation,	or,	the	PSM:	“The	process	of	attending																																																									12	Metzinger,	The	Ego	Tunnel,	15.	
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to	our	thoughts	and	emotions,	to	our	perceptions	and	bodily	sensations,	is	itself	integrated	into	the	self-model.”13	This	means	that	an	evolved	form	of	third-person	processes—coordinated	neuronal	firings,	etc.—represent	those	very	processes	transparently.	In	other	words,	the	representations,	rather	than	the	neuronal	correlates	of	consciousness	(NCC)	underlying	such	representations,	are	the	only	things	visible	at	this	higher-order	level	of	representation.	The	ego-tunnel	does	not	represent	the	organic	and	physical	processes	involved	in	representation.	The	ego-tunnel	appears	as	an	agent	for	whom	various	decisions	about	its	coordinated	activities	must	be	made.	Strictly	speaking,	there	is	no	one	there	who	makes	decisions	or	witnesses	the	unfolding	of	reality.	Conscious	reality	carves	out	an	inner-domain	of	nested	and	transparent	representational	phenomena.	If	“I”	refers	to	anything,	it	refers	to	this	organizational	component	in	the	dynamic	network	of	neuronal	activity.			 Adopting	this	theory,	we	might	believe	that	egocentric	and	future-directed	concern	is	not	justified	in	the	usual	sense,	because	there	is	strictly	speaking	no	one	
there	whose	needs,	hopes,	and	fears	we	should	worry	too	much	about.	This	is	how	the	PSM	model	might	appropriate	the	extreme	claim.	Perhaps,	practically	speaking,	this	would	be	liberating.	When	it	comes	to	the	fear	of	death,	or	the	anxiety	of	a	mind	obsessively	concerned	with	its	own	future,	knowing	there’s	no	one	there	to	really	have	or	lose	control	over	the	future	might	be	psychologically	palliative.	The	PSM	approach,	supported	as	it	is	by	empirical	data	and	interdisciplinary	research,	might	also	help	illuminate	in	contemporary	terms	what	seems	obscure	or	incoherent	in	a																																																									13	Metzinger,	The	Ego	Tunnel,	16.	
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surface	reading	of	Madhyamaka	philosophy.	For	example,	PSM	might	clarify	Nāgārjuna’s	opening	dedication	to	the	Buddha	in	his	Mūlamadhyamakakārikā:	I	salute	the	Fully	Enlightened	One	[the	Buddha]…who	taught	the	doctrine	of	dependent	origination,	according	to	which	there	is	neither	cessation	nor	origination,	neither	annihilation	nor	the	eternal,	neither	singularity	nor	plurality,	neither	the	coming	or	the	going	[of	any	dharma,	for	the	purpose	of	nirvāṇa	characterized	by]	the	auspicious	cessation	of	hypostatization.14			 We	can	read	Madhyamaka	philosophy	as	deflationary	and	epistemically	humble	(see	chapter	2).	The	Mādhyamika	highlights	our	evolved	tendency	to	reify	and	posit	theoretical	entities—entities	used	to	navigate	our	natural	and	social	reality.	In	the	contemporary	scene,	we	would	say	that	Madhyamaka	deconstructs	the	unstable	reifications	that	imbue	our	folk-psychological	belief	in	substantial	entities	such	as	souls,	persons,	universals,	permanent	substrata	of	change,	etc.	The	hard	sciences	have	produced	coherent	and	empirically	supported	models	that	destabilize	naïve	realism.	Advances	in	statistics,	neuroscience,	biology,	and	physics	have	shown	us	that	substantialist-discourse	is	a	product	of	our	collective	tendency	to	hypostasize	and	simplify	dynamic,	non-linear,	and	metaphysically	open-ended	processes.	Basically,	when	we	learn	to	think	in	terms	of	nested	systems	and	probabilities—like	global	weather	patterns—rather	than	linear	algorithms	and	causally	determined	closed	systems,	we	come	to	realize	that	the	language	of	“coming	or	going”	or	“cessation	or	non-cessation”	does	not	have	the	same	deeply	entrenched	purchase	it	once	had.	Madhyamaka	philosophy	is	unique	in	that	it	weds																																																									14	Translation	in	Siderits	and	Katsura,	Nāgārjuna’s	Middle	Way,	2013:		
	 anirodham	anutpādam	anuchhedam	aśāśvatam|		 anekārtham	anānārtham	anāgamam	anirgamam|		 yaḥ	pratītyasamutpādam	prapañcopaśamaṃ	śivam|		 deśayāmāsa	saṃbuddhas	taṃ	vande	vadatāṃ	varam||	
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various	Buddhist	assumptions	and	practical	commitments	to	its	irrealist	and	conventionalist	discourse.	Granted,	it	casts	its	net	wider	than	some	would	like	when	it	claims	that	nothing	whatsoever	has	any	intrinsic	nature	(svabhāva),	but	it	also	coheres	more	succinctly	with	some	of	the	more	cogent	but	radical	claims	drawn	out	of	evolutionary	biology,	and	quantum	and	chaos	theories.	It	appears	that	our	nervous	systems	are	always	busy	inventing	independent-seeming	realities	outside	and	inside	ourselves.		As	social	creatures	with	responsive	nervous	systems,	we	may	be	described	as	creatures	that	coordinate	consensual	patterns	of	activity	around	the	way	things	show	up	relative	to	our	nervous	systems.	Moreover,	with	advances	in	the	study	of	mirror-neurons,	we	are	beginning	to	develop	a	physical	picture	of	how	intersubjectivity	can	arise	within	a	nexus	of	self-interpreting	nervous	systems—nervous	systems	that	couple	with	(rather	than	perfectly	mirror)	an	external	environment	in	selectively	advantageous	ways.	Looking	at	things	this	way,	we	become	less	committed	to	the	naïve	belief	that	we	can	describe	an	observer-independent	reality.	Instead,	we	view	ourselves	as	participants	in	the	unfolding	of	appearances.	Likewise,	I	suggest	that	the	model	of	a	self	who	suffers,	or	disappears	or	survives	after	its	death	holds	less	importance	over	our	deliberations	when	we	think	in	terms	of	processes,	systems,	and	simulations	rather	than	substances,	billiard-ball	causality,	and	real	metaphysical	selves.	So,	in	a	way,	PSM	and	Nāgārjuna	take	seriously	the	Selfist’s	belief	that	without	substantialist	metaphysics,	we	do	not	have	(the	usual)	reasons	to	care	about	our	futures.	In	this	sense,	they	take	Selfism	and	the	extreme	claim	seriously,	but	then	go	on	to	show	how	revising	future-directed	concerns	can	actually	be	liberating	and	morally	instructive	rather	than	a	
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nihilistic	reductio	on	the	No-Self	view.	Now,	when	it	comes	to	everyday	practical	considerations,	they	can	defuse	the	Selfist’s	extreme	claim	by	winning	back	ethics	and	self-regarding	and	other-regarding	concerns	through	convention	(the	“two	truths”	gambit).15	In	one	sense,	we	do	not	have	a	“special”	reason	to	care	for	a	self																																																									15	I	need	to	be	careful	about	my	very	general	gloss	of	Nāgārjuna	here.	In	the	MMK,	specifically	the	Aryasatya-Parīkṣā	(“Analysis	of	the	Noble	Truths”),	Nāgārjuna	is	addressing	a	Buddhist	audience	worried	that	the	Madhyamaka	emptiness	doctrine	(śūnyatā)	undermines	the	ethical	orientation	and	purpose	of	the	Buddhist	path.	The	worry	is	that	emptiness	of	all	intrinsic	natures	and	natural	kinds	undermines	the	four	noble	truths,	of	which	the	prescribed	eight-fold	path	plays	a	vital	ethical	role	for	Buddhists.	Nāgārjuna	argues	that,	first,	one	must	bear	in	mind	the	Buddha’s	doctrine	of	the	two	truths	(dvau	satyau):	the	conventional	or	“concealing”	truth	(saṃvṛti-satya)	versus	the	ultimate	truth	(paramārtha-satya).	In	his	Prasannapadā,	the	Mādhyamika,	Candrakīrti	gives	three	glosses	on	“conventional.”	His	third	gloss	steers	away	from	the	idea	that	the	conventional	truth	conceals	an	ultimate	state	of	observer-independent	facts.	Instead,	Candrakīrti	points	out	that	conventional	truth	is	socially	constructed	and	is	built	out	of	the	semantic	and	cognitive	habits	of	ordinary	people	(loka).	Recognizing	this	fact	just	is	the	“ultimate	truth.”	Oftentimes,	Indian	commentators	favor	the	last	etymological	gloss	they	provide	for	a	contested	term—so	this	seems	to	be	his	preferred	gloss.	For	more	on	this,	see	Siderits	and	Katsura,	Nāgārjuna’s	Middle	Way,	272.	Now,	we	may	interpret	Madhyamaka	as	claiming	that	the	ultimate	truth	is	that	no	ultimate	foundations	can	be	found	by	analysis.	Thus,	recognizing	that	we	are	inherently	social	and	interpretive	beings	can	liberate	us	from	stubbornly	dogmatic	views.	Yet	it	is	only	through	these	self-same	conventions	that	we	can	develop	something	like	“the	noble	path”	in	the	first	place.	So,	recognizing	our	participant	role	in	the	construction	of	reality	does	not	necessarily	undermine	all	our	cherished	ethical	intuitions.		 		 Second,	Nāgārjuna	argues	that	for	X	to	have	an	intrinsic	nature	is	for	X	to	be	changeless	and	bound	to	the	permanent	expression	of	its	essential	nature.	Thus,	X	is	not	amenable	to	bearing	dynamic	dependency	relations	with	other	entities.	Nāgārjuna’s	point	is	that	the	path	to	nirvāṇa	is	dynamic	and	processual.	However,	in	the	Gatāgata-Parīkṣā	(“Analysis	of	the	Moved	and	Not-Moved”)	chapter	of	the	MMK,	Nāgārjuna	famously	argues	that	motion	(or	process	and	change)	does	not	make	sense	when	we	think	in	terms	of	real	substances	with	permanent	natures.	Thus,	the	successful	practice	of	the	Buddhist	path,	which	is	a	dynamic	process,	is	supported	by	the	emptiness	doctrine,	because	the	doctrine	claims	that	things	hang	together	in	constructed	dependency	relations	that	would	arguably	not	make	sense	if	we	believed	in	permanent	and	intrinsic	natures.	My	point	here	is	that	Nāgārjuna	can	eschew	the	belief	in	real	selves	and	persisting	and	substantial	entities	without	undermining	Buddhist	practice	and	Buddhist	ethics.	Dependent	origination	(pratītyasamutpāda)	is	the	cornerstone	of	Madhyamaka	philosophy,	and	thought	by	
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that	was	never	really	there	in	the	first	place.	On	the	other	hand,	the	simulated	self	serves	evolutionary	and	pragmatic	purposes,	and	a	circumspective	attitude	toward	future	surrogates	is	somewhat	inevitable	given	the	nature	of	the	simulation.	As	social	creatures	that	must	plan	for	a	future,	or	determine	who	is	responsible	for	an	action	by	holding	someone	accountable	to	her	commitments	and	promises,	we	still	need	a	more	detailed	practical	picture	of	how	the	PSM	and	No-Self	models	can	make	sense	of	normative	phenomena,	or	offer	us	any	consolations	about	our	futures	(if	there	are	any	to	be	had).	Perhaps	with	a	more	detailed	sketch,	and	with	on-going	conversation	between	the	hard	sciences	and	humanities,	a	shift	in	theoretical	paradigms	can	more	directly	impact	a	shift	in	our	practical	outlooks.		 For	example,	say	that	“I”	picks	out	a	process	called	“Kevin.”	This	process	either	arises	in	a	real	base	of	individuation—say,	a	body	that	allows	us	to	distinctly	locate	it	through	space	and	time—or,	as	Madhyamaka	philosophy	seems	to	argue,	arises	as	a	conventional	construct.	Madhyamaka	uses	the	very	logic	of	substantialism	and	naïve-realism	to	deconstruct	the	essentialist	paradigm.	Through	a	deconstructive,	purely	critical	endeavor,	the	Mādhyamika	Buddhist	learns	to	stop																																																																																																																																																																						the	Mādhyamika	to	be	the	Buddha’s	essential	teaching.	According	to	Nāgārjuna,	dependent	origination—or	the	efficacy	of	constructed	dependency	relations—only	makes	sense	if	we	believe	that	all	things	are	empty	of	intrinsic	natures.	So	the	ethically-charged	nature	of	the	Buddhist	path,	which	consists	in	recognizing	the	truths	of	suffering,	arising,	cessation,	and	the	eight-fold	path,	is	supported	rather	than	undermined	by	eschewing	real	natural	kinds	and	persisting	metaphysical	entities:		 		 yaḥ	pratītyasamutpāda	paśyatīdaṃ	sa	paśyati|		 duḥkhaṃ	samudayaṃ	caiva	nirodhaṃ	mārgam	eva	ca|			 He	who	sees	dependent	origination	[understood	as	śūnyatā]	sees	this:		 Suffering,	arising,	cessation	of	suffering,	and	the	very	path	itself.		
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thinking	in	terms	of	real	natural	kinds,	real	metaphysically	distinct	bases	of	individuation,	and	substances	with	real	intrinsic	natures.	Instead,	the	Mādhyamika	learns	to	embrace	ontological	commitments	with	a	degree	of	irony—that	is,	he	learns	to	see	the	boundedness	and	individuation	of	various	medium-sized	objects	as	a	product	of	interpretive	possibilities	arising	out	of	the	conceptual	frameworks	that	organize	our	mental	lives.	There	is	no	observer-independent,	ontological	reality	to	uncover.	And	we	do	not	embody	such	a	view	only	in	mystical,	hallucinatory,	or	LSD-inspired	experiences.	Our	everyday	experience—the	so-called	manifest	image—can	still	see	things	in	a	relatively	ordinary	way	even	accepting	the	fact	that	our	metaphysical	conclusions	are	open-ended	functions	of	changing	interpretative	possibilities.	For	example,	embodying	Madhyamaka	philosophy	comes	with	a	deflationary	or	minimalist	commitment	to	thinking	in	terms	of	dependency	relations	rather	than	strict	causal	relationships.	This	is	part	of	why	the	Buddha	chose	to	speak	in	terms	of	interdependent	relationality,	or,	“dependent	origination”	(pratītyasamutpāda)	rather	than	billiard-ball,	cement-of-the-universe	causal	forces.	For	example,	I	refuse	to	leave	the	rally,	a	police	officer	sprays	a	fine	mist	in	my	eyes,	and	now	I	experience	tear-jerking	pain.	The	complexity	of	overlapping	relationships	and	interpretive	schemas	involved	in	that	simple	causal	story	would	undermine	any	final,	billiard-ball	account	of	the	incident.	But	for	my	purposes,	the	story	is	fine	as	a	series	of	events	depending	on	other	events.	This	sort	of	account	gets	me	what	I	need	out	of	the	story:	if	not	for	this	happening,	then	that	wouldn’t	have	happened,	etc.	Or	say	I	lead	a	life	of	crime	robbing	drug	stores	for	their	narcotics.	I’m	arrested,	and	at	my	trial	there	is	no	one	else	I	can	convincingly	offer	up	for	punishment.	Claiming	
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that	I’m	a	Buddhist	who	does	not	believe	in	persisting	selves	or	natural	kinds	does	not	get	me	off	the	hook.	I	neither	claim	deep	metaphysical	identity	with	the	man	who	robbed	the	drug	stores,	nor	do	I	believe	it	was	anyone	else.	But	if	anyone	needs	to	be	deterred,	reformed,	or	punished,	it’s	not	going	to	be	my	neighbor	Sam—it’s	going	to	be	me,	the	guy	who	got	caught	red-handed.	Ultimately,	if	I	accept	the	PSM	theory,	then	no	one	thing	really	did	any	of	this.	A	process,	organized	by	years	of	evolution	and	random	adaptive	fit,	organized	itself	along	an	asymptotic	point	of	selfhood,	a	simulated	point	never	really	reached,	and	never	really	identified	for	the	simple	reason	that	the	self	does	not	strictly	speaking	exist.	The	process	names	various	intimately	related	events	that	lead	to	KPM—a	hypostatization—becoming	a	self-aware	drugstore	cowboy.	“I”	refers	to	a	process	with	representational	thought	that	can,	in	a	nested	and	recursive	way,	represent	the	fact	that	it	represents	things.	This	is	a	process	that	can	reflect,	think,	feel,	anticipate,	and	hope	for	things,	but	a	process	not	really	tethered	to	any	one	persisting	point.			 With	respect	to	practical	considerations,	we	might	ask	how	endorsing	this	view	impacts	our	thoughts	on	death,	in	both	egocentric	and	other-centric	terms.	We	might	explain	the	ego-tunnel’s	fear	of	death	as	more	than	a	fear	of	the	unknown,	or	the	yearning	for	things	to	always	“be	like	something”	in	a	first-person	sort	of	way.	When	I	dread	or	fear	my	death,	the	ego-tunnel	or	PSM	that	constitutes	my	sense	of	self	reaches	a	zero-point	that	makes	no	sense:	it	is	overwhelmed	by	the	existential	anxiety	of	meaninglessness—understood	as	the	inability	to	represent	the	face	of	oblivion.	If	we	take	the	PSM	theory	seriously,	then	third-person	processes	remain	transparent	to	a	simulated	“I,”	which	is	the	reason	that	this	“I”	experiences	itself	as	a	
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single	entity	and	not	just	a	dynamic,	physical	process.	This	process	does	not	incorporate	the	idea	of	its	complete	annihilation	in	any	sort	of	coherent	way.	Granted,	elements	of	existence	are	experienced	as	(properties’	or	states’)	coming	and	going,	but	the	absolute	ceasing	of	any	coming	and	going	are	not	computable	to	a	process	that	is	living	and	constantly	regenerating	and	representing	itself—to	a	process	that	is	always	processing	and	not	simply	ceasing.	(Incidentally,	even	under	Eternalism,	the	Self	cannot	just	cease	to	exist).	If	I	can	embody	this	theory	in	practice,	then	perhaps	I	can	learn	to	neither	fear	nor	not-fear	what	eludes	experiential	processing	and	representation:	I’m	neither	flippant	nor	am	I	overwhelmed	by	the	prospect	of	a	death	that	I	usually	(and	paradoxically)	take	ownership	of	when	I’m	a	naïve	realist	about	the	self.	There	is	simply	no	static	or	persisting	entity	that	can	own	its	death.	There	is	no	self	who	will	suffer	annihilation,	but	only	an	intense	change	in	an	always-dynamic	process.	Perhaps	achieving	this	sort	of	equanimity	is	precisely	the	sort	of	liberating	nirvāṇa	Nāgārjuna	refers	to	in	his	dedicatory	verse	above.	Remnants	of	the	extreme	claim	remain	here,	because	there	is	no	special	reason	I	have	for	worrying	too	much	about	the	future,	simply	because	there	is	no	one	thing	picked	out	by	“I.”	However,	there	may	be	other	reasons	for	concern	that	are	simply	generated	by	the	biologically	and	culturally	situated	nature	of	the	simulated	“I”	experience,	and	this	is	how	the	PSM	view	appropriates	the	moderate	claim:	we	can	have	concern	for	a	simulated	future,	because	it	is	often	advantageous	to	do	so.	Thus,	we	can	stave	off	nihilism	even	in	the	face	of	a	growing	theoretical	framework	that	views	the	self	as	a	kind	of	fiction	or	simulation.		
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	 While	this	may	console	us	in	the	face	of	our	own	deaths,	I’m	not	convinced	that	it	offers	much	when	it	comes	to	dreading	the	death	of	others.	Even	if	I	will	not	be	there	to	fret	over	my	death,	and	even	if	there’s	no	one	entity	deprived	of	the	value	of	future	goods,	this	does	not	console	me	when	I	experience	the	passing	away	of	a	loved	one.	In	the	Pāli	sutras,	Buddha’s	pupils,	and	even	his	closest	and	most	advanced	disciple,	Kaśyapa	pour	tears	over	the	imminent	death	of	their	great	teacher.	Like	Socrates,	Buddha	scolds	them	for	such	unenlightened	behavior.16		
																																																								16	Zhuangzi	(476-221	BCE)—a	classical	Daoist,	process-philosopher	from	the	Warring	States	period	in	China—seems	to	have	gone	to	the	other	extreme,	drumming	happily	when	his	wife	died.	Perhaps	the	Buddha	recommended	a	middle	way	between	inconsolable	and	interminable	grieving,	and	nonchalant	celebrating	of	the	death	of	a	dear	one.	See	Burton	Watson,	Chuang	Tzu:	Basic	Writings	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	1964),	113.		 	 Chaung	Tzu’s	[Zhuangzi’s]	wife	died.	When	Hui	Tzu	went	to	convey	his	condolences,	he	found	Chuang	Tzu	sitting	with	his	legs	sprawled	out,	pounding	on	a	tub	and	singing.	“You	lived	with	her,	she	brought	up	your	children	and	few	old,”	said	Hui	Tzu.	“It	should	be	enough	simply	not	to	weep	at	her	death.	But	pounding	on	a	tub	and	singing—this	is	going	too	far,	isn’t	it?”		 Chaung	Tzu	said,	“You’re	wrong.	When	she	first	died,	do	you	think	I	didn’t	grieve	like	anyone	else?	But	I	looked	back	to	her	beginning	and	the	time	before	she	was	born.	Not	only	the	time	before	she	was	born,	but	the	time	before	she	had	a	body.	Not	only	the	time	before	she	had	a	body,	but	the	time	before	she	had	a	spirit.	In	the	midst	of	the	jumble	of	wonder	and	mystery	a	change	took	place	and	she	had	a	spirit.	Another	change	and	she	had	a	body.	Another	change	and	she	was	born.	Now	there’s	been	another	change	and	she’s	dead.	It’s	just	like	the	progression	of	the	four	seasons,	spring,	summer,	fall,	and	winter.	[Sic]		 “Now	she’s	going	to	lie	down	peacefully	in	a	vast	room.	If	I	were	to	follow	after	her	bawling	and	sobbing,	it	would	show	that	I	don’t	understand	anything	about	fate.	So	I	stopped.”				
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After	all,	really	embodying	the	Buddha’s	teachings	should	give	the	pupils	reasons	to	celebrate	rather	than	lament	his	death.	However,	the	Buddha’s	pupils	recognize	that	they	must	now	endure	a	world	without	the	Buddha’s	direct	influence.	They	must	learn	to	live	without	his	friendship	and	his	compassionate	gaze.	Likewise,	I	must	endure	the	death	of	those	who	matter	most	to	me.	Living	without	those	who	bring	meaning	to	my	life	would	be	painful	and	worthy	of	my	sorrow.	If	endorsing	a	No-Self	view	somehow	assuages	my	concern	for	a	loved	one’s	death,	and	thus	to	some	extent	mitigates	my	reasons	for	dreading	death,	then	it	must	follow	that	a	third-person	theory	about	the	first-person	experience,	say,	a	PSM	theory	or	whatever,	can	revise	my	intimate	relationships	with	others,	and	transform	the	meaning	invested	in	how	they	enrich	my	life.	But	how	does	that	exactly	follow?	Even	if	I	accept	that	my	beloved	mother	is	nothing	but	a	simulation	of	an	individual	self,	nothing	in	my	practical	relationship	with	her	is	changed	other	than,	perhaps,	the	consolation	that	comes	with	believing	her	soul	will	live	on	after	her	body’s	death.	She	provides	me	with	unconditional	love	and	encouragement,	and	her	passing	will	mark	the	devastating	end	of	a	dearly	intimate	relationship,	a	final	severing	from	the	woman	and	friend	who	nurtured	me	in	her	womb	and	in	her	home.			 Moreover,	even	when	it’s	myself	rather	than	my	loved	one	that	I’m	concerned	with,	other	practical	problems	arise	(to	say	nothing	about	the	conceptual	issue	of	whether	my	own	death	is	even	imaginable	by	me;	worrying	about	my	own	death—which	Wittgenstein	teaches	us	will	not	be	an	event	in	MY	life—seems	harder	to	make	sense	of	than	worrying	about	my	ageing	from	which,	at	least,	my	death	will	be	a	total	respite).	Am	I	not	justified	in	caring	about	what	sort	of	old	man	I	will	become,	
	 119	
or	what	sort	of	retirement	I	may	or	may	not	enjoy,	or	what	sort	of	globally	warmed	and	environmentally	degraded	planet	I	must	endure?	Process	or	no-process,	convention	or	no-convention,	even	the	simulated	“I”	still	has	to	contend	with	these	issues	as	part	of	the	content	and	repertoire	of	its	thoughts	and	goal-oriented	behavior.	I	am	suggesting	here	that	thinking	about	practical	deliberation	and	agency	as	process	and	simulation	either	confuses	how	I	should	feel,	or	does	nothing	to	assuage	the	existential	woes	that	come	with	living	a	mortal	life.	However,	thinking	in	terms	of	a	self	who	has	a	real	history,	a	self	who	can	live	up	to	and	take	ownership	over	her	decisions	and	indecisions,	might	better	motivate	me	to	try	to	“get	it	right”	in	the	face	of	my	short	time	on	this	planet.	That	I	suffer	is	a	real	problem	for	me,	and	that	I	must	helplessly	endure	the	pain	on	suffering	faces,	or	cope	with	the	loss	of	a	loved	one	is	likewise	a	dreaded	feature	of	my	existence.	I	am	not	consoled	by	the	cold,	surgical	conclusions	of	a	well-developed	theory.			 Furthermore,	when	I	think	of	myself	as	an	agent	who	must	make	decisions,	I	project	myself	into	a	future	that	I	care	about.	Even	if	I	were	suicidal,	I	would	be	driven	to	produce	a	future	that	matters	to	me—albeit	a	future	that	ends	all	future	possibilities	for	me.	Agents	always	anticipate	possibilities	against	a	background	of	beliefs	and	embodied	capacities.	This	means	that	agents	have	a	history	by	which	they	assess	the	present	moment	while	projecting	into	an	unknown	future.	The	PSM	model	does	not	adequately	clarify	how	I	should	relate	to	myself	as	an	agent.	Perhaps	PSM	does	not	disturb	many	of	our	intuitions	about	agency	and	forward-looking	deliberations,	because	it	postulates	a	simulated	“I”	who	does	the	work	that	a	persisting	“I”	is	supposed	to	do.	But	then,	PSM	has	no	practical	or	ethical	upshot	
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when	it	comes	to	future-oriented	concern,	both	egocentric	and	other-centric.	Ethically	and	practically	speaking,	you	could	flip	a	coin	to	decide	whether	or	not	to	endorse	the	Self	or	the	No-Self	view,	which	means	that	neither	view	makes	any	real	practical	difference.	So	if	we’re	going	to	find	practical	and	ethical	worth	in	these	theories,	then	both	the	Self	and	No-Self	views	must	show	us	with	greater	detail	how	the	metaphysics	(or	metaphysical	revisions)	really	matter.	For	a	philosopher	of	mind	like	Metzinger,	this	might	not	be	such	an	important	issue.	Granted,	certain	transhumanist	ethical	considerations	may	arise	regarding	A.I.	and	the	resurrection	of	egos	in	new	bodies	or	super-computers.	But	some	of	our	more	basic	concerns	about	being	ethical	agents	are	not	really	addressed	by	this	model.	However,	being	able	to	think	of	oneself	as	other	in	the	more	radical	way	I	suggested	might	provide	a	novel	way	of	justifying	altruism	and	other-regarding	considerations.	I’ll	develop	this	further	below	as	I	explore	in	more	detail	whether	or	not	the	Self	or	No-Self	issue	makes	any	practical	difference.	
3.3.2	Madhyamaka,	Ego-Tunnels,	and	Altruism:	Seeing	the	World	as	a	
Spectrum	of	Graded	Concerns	for	the	Other			 		 I	should	remind	you	that	I	am	appropriating,	in	a	very	cursory	way,	Levinas’s	gloss	on	“metaphysics”	and	“otherness,”	because	I	believe	it	may	actually	provide	the	No-Self	model	with	greater	ethical	and	practical	purchase.	For	Levinas,	metaphysics	is	a	conversation	with	what	is	other,	that	is,	with	the	“infinite”	understood	as	that	which	resists	reduction	to	the	concept,	and	is	experienced	as	
	 121	
“more	than”	or	“other	than”	oneself.17	Again,	without	providing	commentary	on	Levinas,	I	would	only	connect	this	kind	of	unsettling	experience	to	the	inability	to	directly	experience	the	inner	life	of	another	person.	Above,	I	discussed	the	role	of	mirror-neurons	in	their	capacity	to	provide	a	physical	basis	for	intersubjectivity.	But	even	mirror-neurons	cannot	close	the	gap	between	what	is	manifestly	present	to	me	in	a	first-person	way,	and	what	may	be	manifestly	present	to	others.	The	science	has	so	far	shown	that	my	neurons	can	mirror	certain	functional	states	in	the	brain	of	another	who	is	suffering.	This	is	postulated	to	be	part	of	the	physical	basis	underlying	empathy.	However,	the	neurons	do	not	mirror	those	firings	in	the	suffering	subject	associated	with	the	first-person	experience	of	pain,	and	this	just	means	that	I	do	not	literally	feel	your	pain.	However,	I	can	empathize	with	your	pain	as	my	brain	mirrors	the	firings	associated	with	the	general	functional	state	of	pain.	My	brain	matches	these	to	relevant	patterns	of	behavior	that	have	pathways	in	my	motor	cortex.	So	in	the	case	of	Levinas’s	understanding	of	the	impenetrable	or	“transcendent”	other,	we	can	think	this	in	terms	of	an	ego-tunnel	or	first-person	experience	that	is	never	directly	graspable	from	our	own	vantage	point.	Again,	this	is	a	simplification	of	both	the	neuroscience	and	Levinas’s	work,	but	the	point	here	is	that	“metaphysics,”	understood	as	a	lived	encounter	with	the	inscrutable	other,	
																																																								17	Levinas,	Totality	and	Infinity:	“The	relation	between	the	same	and	the	other,	metaphysics,	is	primordially	enacted	as	conversation,	where	the	same,	gathered	up	in	its	ipseity	as	an	“I,”	as	a	particular	existent	unique	and	autochthonous,	leaves	itself”	(39).	Also,	“The	metaphysical	desire	has	another	intention	[other	than	ordinary	desire];	it	desires	beyond	everything	that	can	simply	complete	it.	It	is	like	goodness—the	Desired	[other]	does	not	fulfill	it,	but	deepens	it”	(34).	And	further	on,	“Infinity	is	characteristic	of	a	transcendent	being	as	transcendent;	the	infinite	is	the	absolutely	other”	(49).	
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might	show	how	the	No-Self	model	provides	a	powerful	revision	of	practical	agency	and	ethical	other-centricity.	Let	me	explain	this	in	more	detail.			 As	Parfit	argued,	the	moderate	claim	is	justified.	Even	if	there	is	strictly	speaking	no	one	there	to	laugh,	cry,	suffer,	or	die	(as	the	PSM	model	claims)	we	still	care	about	people	around	us,	and	we	care	most	for	those	who	are	closest	to	us.	This	is	a	manifest	aspect	of	our	lived	experience.	Similarly,	we	can	learn	to	care	for	our	surrogates	to	whom	we	bear	Relation	R.	We	can	take	pains	and	sacrifice	certain	pleasures	now	to	help	ensure	a	better	life	for	our	surrogates,	and	we	can	do	so	without	being	overly	concerned	that	our	sense	of	identity	with	the	surrogate	is	simply	a	matter	of	evolved	conventions.	If	we	accept	this,	then	we	can	more	or	less	have	morality,	prudence,	responsibility,	and	many	of	the	morally	rich	categories	that	come	with	having	metaphysically	persisting	selves,	and	we	can	have	this	all	on	the	reductionist’s	terms.	But	unless	Parfit’s	picture	provides	us	with	revised	ethical	concerns	and	commitments—which	he	has	argued	it	does18—then	we’re	caught	in	a	problematic	conundrum:	the	Self	and	No-Self	views	matter	very	little	in	the	practical	and	ethical	domains.	However,	I	argue	that	by	developing	a	notion	of	“otherness,”	and	fusing	it	with	Madhyamaka	Buddhism,	the	No-Self	view	can	have	a	morally	relevant	upshot.	In	fact,	the	No-Self	view	may	offer	a	unique	revision	of	our	usual	distinction	between	self-regarding	and	other-regarding	considerations.	In	chapters	1	and	2,	I	argued	that	such	revision	might	perniciously	destabilize	the	self/other	distinction,	which,	I	argued,	is	necessary	for	empathy	and	other-regarding	motivations	to	hit	their	target.	But	perhaps	I	missed	some	important	nuances	that																																																									18	Parfit,	Reasons	and	Persons,	321-347.	
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allow	a	little	play	in	that	distinction	to	serve	greater	practical	ends.	The	“otherness”	
cum	irrealist	Madhyamaka	view	may	provide	us	with	a	unique	view	of	altruism	as	a	spectrum	of	graded	concerns	that,	upon	embracing	the	No-Self	view,	open	up	subtler	and	yet	more	far-reaching	opportunities	for	altruism,	and	for	the	sort	of	emotional	maturity	required	when	acting	from	altruistic	motivations.	This	is	precisely	the	sort	of	useful	revision	that	I	discounted	in	chapters	1	and	2.	So	let’s	see	how	it	might	work	here.			 When	I	see	the	world	in	terms	of	constant	“othering,”	I	no	longer	remain	so	deeply	entrenched	in	the	solipsism	of	the	self—entrenched	in	that	sense	of	private	mine-ness	that	always	(falsely?)	appears	the	same	in	the	midst	of	my	always	fluctuating	mental	life.	When	I	become	other	to	myself,	in	the	way	I’ve	suggested	we	might	become	by	embracing	the	No-Self	view,	primordial	otherness—not	just	
between	me	and	you	but	between	me	and	me—is	highlighted.	And	it	is	not	just	highlighted	as	a	general	structure.	The	self	is	viewed	as	both	other	(remember	my	story	about	KPM-20)	and	yet	someone	to	whom	I	am	called	on	to	respond.	I	experience	a	psychological	as	well	as	temporal	distance	between	me-now	and	my	future	self,	because	this	future	surrogate	is	in	some	way	inscrutable	and	unknowable.	When	I	was	5,	I	wanted	to	be	a	boxer	and	a	writer	(maybe	I	was	in	touch	with	my	inner	Hemingway),	but	I	couldn’t	have	foreseen	in	any	intellectual	or	visceral	way,	the	man	I	have	become.	And	yet,	when	I	project	20	years	down	the	line	to	still	another	man	I	will	become,	even	in	his	alterity	and	difference,	I	feel	responsible	for	and	to	him.	I	come	face	to	face	with	the	“transcendent”	(in	the	
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Levinasian	sense	I	discussed	above),	but	in	the	face	of	this	otherness,	I	experience	responsibility	as	a	general	feature	of	my	experience.		 Let	me	flesh	this	out.	Consider	projecting	20	years	into	the	future.	I	have	a	vivid	sense	of	connection	to	this	person	I	will	become,	and	I	simultaneously	feel	distant	to	this	future	agent,	as	though	he	were	someone	else	altogether.	I	want	to	claim	that	this	is	not	just	a	matter	of	temporal	distance,	there’s	an	ontology	involved.	So	much	about	him	will	be	different	from	me	now,	that	in	a	substantive	way,	he	will	be	a	different	sort	of	person,	someone	I	cannot	directly	identify	with.	This	can	also	be	captured	more	succinctly	by	considering	the	backward	gaze.	There	is	so	much	difference	in	the	experiences—not	to	mention	the	physicality,	the	peculiar	style	of	embodied	living,	and	the	various	concerns	and	values—of	my	former	life	as	a	young	boy	and	teenager	from	my	life	now,	that	I	can	sometimes	feel	like	it	was	someone	
else’s	life.	In	other	words,	this	past	that	I	call	my	own	is	in	many	ways	transcendent	to	who	I	am	now,	and	to	what	it	is	in	my	capacity	to	feel,	think,	and	do.	It’s	“transcendent”	in	the	sense	that	it	exists	powerfully	outside	of	me,	and	yet	I	feel	more	or	less	connected	to	it.	I’m	often	surprised	to	hear	interpretations	from	others	about	events	in	my	past—interpretations	of	what	I	was	supposedly	doing	or	thinking	or	feeling—and	I’m	amazed	by	the	disparity	in	narrative	lenses,	and	the	extent	to	which	someone	can	convince	me	that	I	ought	to	view	who	I	was	and	what	I	did	in	such	and	such	a	way,	a	way	that	I	was	not	privy	to	before	opening	the	discussion	with	this	other	person.	We	can	provide	such	radically	different	narratives,	because	we’re	all	seeing	these	(identical?)	events	through	unique	vantage-points	that	require	imagination,	creative	synthesis,	and	narrative	filtering.	
	 125	
It	doesn’t	help	me	to	claim	that	I	can	trump	my	mother’s,	my	father’s,	my	teachers’,	and	my	friends’	and	neighbors’	view	about	myself	because	it	was	“my	life,”	and	“I	know	who	I	was	and	what	I	cared	about	and	what	I	went	through”	in	a	way	that	no	one	else	can.	Perhaps	in	a	certain	sense	that	is	true,	but	most	of	the	time,	I	can	be	surprised	by	the	unique	narrative	options	that	I	had	no	idea	were	available	for	viewing	and	making	sense	of	my	past.	What	I’m	suggesting	is	that	this	experience	puts	a	wedge	between	me-now,	and	my	past	as	something	I	can	viscerally	“own”	right	now.	When	sitting	here	in	pain,	because	I’ve	cut	my	hand	slicing	an	apple,	I	have	an	immediate	sense	of	ownership	over	the	physical	and	mental	states	in	play	in	a	way	that	I	do	not	when	I	project	backward	on	sufficiently	distant	experiences.	The	distance,	I’m	suggesting,	is	not	just	temporal	or	a	matter	of	recollection,	but	also	personal:	sometimes	I	have	to	work	hard	to	take	ownership	of	my	past	actions	in	spite	of	being	able	to	remember	those	experiences.	I	believe	that	something	similar	is	in	play	when	I	project	forward	into	the	future.	There	is	a	transcendent	alterity	that	shows	up,	which	provides	the	ontological	basis	for	my	capacity	to	completely	dissociate	from	my	past	and	my	future	despite	my	being	able	to	take	ownership	of	those	experiences	through	a	process	of	narrative	construction.			 Now,	one	can	respond	that	an	obvious	asymmetry	between	“owning”	my	past	and	projecting	toward	my	future	is	in	play	here.	I	can	own	something	I’ve	done,	but	it’s	hard	to	imagine	owning	a	mere	possibility,	a	future	occurrence	not	yet	said	or	done.	This	is	particularly	problematic	when	we	consider	a	Minority	Report	scenario.	In	Philip	K.	Dick’s	story,	people	are	punished	in	advance	for	what	they	will	do.	This,	of	course,	requires	a	deterministic	account	of	things,	but	the	point	is	that	we	are	
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hard-pressed	to	blame	someone	for	his	or	her	possible	and	not	yet	manifested	deeds—that	is	why	the	story	is	dystopian.	So	perhaps	my	appeal	to	the	alterity	of	the	past	does	not	help	clarify	what’s	involved	in	projecting	toward	the	future.	There	seems	to	be	an	openness	or	freedom	with	respect	to	the	future—however	illusory	that	freedom	may	be—that	allows	me	to	have	an	important	say	in	what	I	will	do.	This	option	does	not	exist	with	respect	to	the	past.	So	let	me	instead	spin	this	in	a	slightly	different	direction.	The	point	on	the	table	is	that	I	experience	alterity	with	respect	to	myself	in	the	face	of	my	past	and	my	future,	and	I	experience	this	as	both	another	person—a	person	I	do	not	directly	control—and	yet	someone	intimately	connected	to	me	(if	not	simply,	myself)	for	whom	I	take	responsibility.	In	both	cases,	narrative	interpretation	and	filtering	are	at	work	in	constructing	my	past	and	projecting	toward	the	possibilities	in	my	future.	My	biases,	prejudices,	and	perspectival	uniqueness	and	shortcomings	construct	the	being	whose	past	I	believe	I	own,	and	the	being	whose	future	I	can	own	(in	the	modal	sense	of	a	possibility	that	I	can	actualize).	What	I’m	saying	is	that	the	palpable	and	commonsense	way	in	which	I	own	the	immediate	rush	of	pain	when	slicing	my	finger	in	the	present	is	not	the	way	in	which	I	come	to	make	sense	of	my	past	and	project	into	my	future.	This	is	why	I	would	call	this	narrative	framing,	“appropriation”	rather	than	mere	ownership.	Although	both	terms	are	intimately	related	in	the	sense	of	laying	claim	to	property,	there	is	a	kind	of	distance	to	the	past	self	and	future	self	that	does	not	allow	me	to	see	that	“property”	as	fully	my	own.			 Once	we	accept	the	existence	of	this	lived	experience	of	alterity,	the	extreme	of	which	shows	up	as	depersonalization,	we	can	distinguish	between	the	lack	of	
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taking	responsibility	(in	depersonalization),	and	the	almost	dissonant	sense	in	which	I	accept	that	“that	was	me,	and	that	is	what	I	intended”	and	“that	will	be	me	carrying	out	my	current	intentions,”	and	yet,	“that	‘me’	is	not	me	in	terms	of	metaphysical	personal	identity.”	The	appropriative	act	is	an	act	of	experiencing	responsibility	and	responsiveness.	And	we	can	take	this	one	step	further	when	we	consider	the	“anticipation	problem”	I	addressed	earlier	in	this	essay.		 When	I’m	told	that	in	a	Minority	Report	sort	of	way	a	Kevin-surrogate,	that	is,	someone	who	will	have	occurrent	quasi-memories	of	having	been	me-now,	will	be	an	active	shooter	that	causes	terrible	suffering	and	death	to	innocent	victims,	and	I’m	told	that	my	wife,	Elizabeth	will	be	a	terrible	active	shooter,	there’s	a	sense	in	which	I	feel	closer	and	more	responsible	for	the	Kevin	surrogate	(or,	what’s	the	same,	a	Kevin	continuant)	than	I	can	for	the	future	Elizabeth.	I	anticipate	things	about	that	event	that	are	simply	not	possible	for	me	to	anticipate	in	considering	Elizabeth’s	future.	However,	the	spin	I’ve	put	on	things	is	this.	From	a	philosophically	matured	perspective,	I	recognize	that	it’s	a	matter	of	degree	and	interpretive	limitations	that	allows	me	to	own	my	past	and	feel	responsible	for	my	future.	I	recognize,	like	Parfit	asked	us	to	do,	that	personal	identity	is	not	really	in	play	at	all.	However,	I	do	not	believe	that	this,	alone,	can	practically	exonerate	me	from	the	deeds	that	I’ve	perpetrated	or	will	perpetrate	(or	that	I	will	“quasi-perpetrate”).	I’m	strung	between	a	sense	of	alterity	and	otherness,	while	at	the	same	time	imbued	by	a	sense	of	responsibility	(in	cases	in	which	I	do	not	disconnect	entirely	or	experience	depersonalization).	Thus,	I	come	to	recognize	that	I	am	responsible	for	and	to	an	other,	and	what	I	need	to	be	able	to	do	is	make	sense	of	
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how	levels	of	intimate	connections	to	otherness	take	hold	in	degrees	of	relatedness	and	appropriative	identification	rather	than	through	metaphysically	substantive	personal	identity	relations.	I	experience	responsibility	for	someone’s	injury	when	I	unintentionally	hit	him	in	the	face	with	a	door	he’s	trying	to	walk	through	(let’s	say	that	unbeknownst	to	me,	a	stranger	is	walking	closely	behind	me,	and	I’m	angry	at	my	spouse,	and	I	slam	the	door	violently	behind	me	as	I	walk	through).	The	most	obvious	reason	I	feel	responsible	is	because	in	some	sense	I	caused	this	to	happen,	and	yet	I	feel	a	certain	lack	of	responsibility	because	it	was	not	my	intention	to	harm	anyone	in	that	instance	(I	did	not	even	know	someone	was	walking	behind	me).	Similarly,	there	are	many	ways	in	which	I	feel	like	I’ve	caused	the	deeds	of	the	past,	and	will	cause	certain	intended	and	unintended	outcomes	in	the	future,	and	yet	there	are	so	many	aspects	of	my	past	experiences	and	experiences	yet	to	be	that	are	outside	of	my	control,	and	to	some	extent,	contribute	to	the	sense	of	alterity	with	which	I	regard	my	past	and	future	selves.	I	feel	responsibility	as	an	agent—a	causal	force	or	process—but	not	necessarily	as	a	subject	personally-identical	to	my	past	self	and	my	future	self.	So	at	the	heart	of	experiencing	myself	as	an	agent	(rather	than	just	a	subject	personally-identical	to	various	manifestations	of	my	existence	over	time)	is	a	sense	of	responsibility	for	my	contribution	to	the	way	the	world	shows	up.	I	can	feel	this	in	relation	to	the	future,	because	I	project	the	force	of	my	agency	effecting	future	outcomes.	When	I	see	the	otherness	of	the	field	of	outcomes	that	surround	me,	and	yet	I	maintain	a	sense	of	agency,	I	feel	responsibility	in	the	face	of	otherness	and	in	the	face	of	the	other	that	is	both	“I”	and	“not-I.”	This	is	fundamentally	different	from	having	a	sense	that	these	are	my	thoughts	and	feelings	
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and	itches.	In	the	latter	case,	I	am	an	“opening”	or	a	“place”	in	which	various	properties	and	occurrences	hang	together.	In	the	former	case,	I	am	a	force	that	effects	outcomes,	and	I	am	responsive,	and	thus	responsible	for	contributing	to	how	something	that	is	much	larger	than	myself	shows	up.			 I	can	maintain	both	the	sense	of	responsibility	I	feel	toward	my	surrogate,	and	the	sense	of	otherness	that	thinking	in	terms	of	surrogates	presents.	And	I’m	suggesting	that	this	is	an	experience	we	have	with	the	idea	of	both	our	future	selves	and	our	past	selves.	When	I	look	back	at	my	childhood	in	Connecticut,	and	try	to	experience	the	concerns	that	little	boy	had,	or	remember	what	it	felt	like	to	hold	on	for	dear	life	to	his	mother’s	hand	in	the	midst	of	a	ravishing	blizzard,	I	encounter	a	paradoxical	identity	and	difference—I’m	not	that	little	boy,	and	yet	I	couldn’t	be	here	writing	this	now	without	him.19	The	identity	I	imagine	I	have	with	him	is	not	based	on	any	palpable	taste	of	what	that	little	boy’s	inner	world	was	like.	At	the	time,	he	might	have	been	petrified	by	the	largeness	and	unpredictability	of	nature.	But	now,	reflecting	on	that	memory,	I	feel	melancholy	and	nostalgia—something	I’m	sure	the	child	had	not	yet	matured	to	even	anticipate	let	alone	experience.	I	honestly	can’t	feel	his	thoughts	or	experience	his	imagination.	I	project	an	identity,	as	the	Buddhist	suggests,	through	convention	and	various	dependency	relations,	but	I	ultimately	experience	him	as	inscrutably	other.	I	cannot	fully	disclose	the	reality	of																																																									19	Arindam	Chakrabarti	develops	the	concept	of	“radical	repentance,”	which	similarly	plays	on	this	paradoxical	experience	of	identity	and	difference	with	respect	to	one’s	past	self.	I	recognize	some	action	done	in	the	past	to	be	so	heinous	that	the	current	I	cannot	imagine	ever	doing	it.	I	am	aghast	thinking,	“Who	is	that	person	who	could	do	that!?”	And	to	that	extent,	the	doer	is	someone	alien	and	yet,	this	radically	other	person,	the	current	repenter,	feels	responsible	for	him,	because	he	feels	some	sort	of	continuity	with	this	“despicable	past-self”	(Chakrabarti,	personal	conversation).	
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his	subjectivity.	And	yet,	I	feel	responsible	to	him,	and	responsible	for	him.	Likewise,	I	feel	responsible	to	and	for	KPM-20.	So	what	I’m	suggesting	is	that	the	No-Self	view,	when	sincerely	and	deeply	embodied,	might	be	morally	instructive,	because	when	I	learn	to	more	clearly	treat	myself	as	other,	and	yet	maintain	my	binding	responsiveness	to	this	other,	I	cultivate	an	other-centric	perspective	that	potentially	reaches	a	high	normative	pitch.	What	I	mean	is	that	I	begin	to	see	how	responsibility	toward	others	is	basic	to	every	aspect	of	my	experience,	even	at	the	most	personal	and	“private”	level	of	the	first-person	perspective,	projecting	forward	into	its	own	future,	and	gazing	backward	into	its	own	past.	I	begin	to	recognize	that	confusions,	contingent	psychological	proclivities,	and	metaphysical	prejudice	often	impede	my	sense	of	responsibility	toward	the	independent	needs	of	others.	I’m	suggesting	that	this	confusion	and	prejudice	is	a	function	of	remaining	tethered	to	naïve	realism	and	the	self/other	distinction,	and	thus	tethered	to	the	sort	of	ethical	dilemmas	that	arise	from	operating	out	of	those	conceptual	schemes.	When	I	see	KPM-20	as	both	other	and	self,	and	really	embody	the	simultaneous	closeness	and	distance	of	this	other,	then	I	learn	to	see	that	it	is	not	the	rigid	self/other	distinction	that	is	paramount	in	having	ethical	reasons	for	action,	but	rather	a	question	of	what	sorts	of	ties	make	me	more	or	less	responsive	to	an	always-pervading	otherness.	As	Śāntideva	and	the	entire	Buddhist	tradition	before	him	claimed,	suffering,	which	is	always	self-aware	and	always	experienced	as	a	negative	valence,	may	provide	reasons	for	promoting	certain	behaviors	and	disavowing	other	behaviors.	The	other’s	suffering—a	suffering	I	cannot	fully	grasp,	but	still	remain	responsive	to—is	
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always	important,	because	even	my	own	suffering	is	another’s	suffering	in	the	nuanced	sense	I’ve	been	trying	to	describe	here.			 Sidgwick,	who	adopted	the	extreme	claim,	worried	that	abandoning	the	rigid	self/other	distinction	would	lead	to	moral	nihilism,	and	render	our	prudential	concerns	unintelligible.20	He	also	believed	that	maintaining	the	rigid	self/other	distinction	left	us	with	a	practical	dilemma:	a	conflict	between	rational	egoism	and	utilitarian	altruism,	two	rational	motives	he	believed	a	philosophically-matured	“commonsense”	justified.	I’m	suggesting	that	the	No-Self	view	may	bolster	rather	than	threaten	Sidgwick’s	utilitarian	vision.	Suffering	and	pleasure	become	key	issues	to	consider,	and	we	come	to	see	that	responsibility	for	another	is	a	basic	ingredient	of	all	experience	viewed	from	the	philosophically-matured	perspective.	Once	we’ve	seen	that	otherness	imbues	all	our	concerns	and	responsibilities,	once	we’ve	seen	this	even	in	our	projected	relationship	to	our	own	past	and	future,	the	fundamental	concern	becomes	how	much	suffering	exists,	rather	than	who	the	suffering	belongs	to.	This	does	not	mean	that	we	can	simply	abandon	our	firm	concern	for	our	nearest	and	dearest,	but	it	does	mean	that	from	the	philosophically-matured	perspective,	we	understand	that	their	suffering	is	ethically	(or	principally)	on	par	with	anyone	else’s	suffering.	We	do	not	confuse	psychological	facts,	and	the	impassioned	concern	we	have	for	our	nearest	and	dearest,	with	normative	facts.	If	we	could	truly	embody	this	version	of	the	No-Self	view,	then	perhaps	the	instinct	to	care	almost	exclusively																																																									20	Sidgwick,	The	Methods	of	Ethics,	419:	“Grant	that	the	Ego	is	merely	a	system	of	coherent	phenomena,	that	the	permanent	identical	‘I’	is	not	a	fact	but	a	fiction,	as	Hume	and	his	followers	maintain;	why,	then,	should	one	part	of	the	series	of	feelings	into	which	the	Ego	is	resolved	be	concerned	with	another	part	of	the	same	series,	any	more	than	with	any	other	series?”	
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for	our	own	welfare	would	mature	into	a	more	far-reaching	concern	for	the	general	field	of	suffering,	which	is	a	product	of	natural	processes	always	othering	themselves.	Rather	than	caring	less	about	my	future,	I	might	instead	see	my	concern	as	a	special	case	of	altruistic	care	and	responsibility	for	the	other.	This	possibility	arises	out	of	our	lived	experience	of	feeling	responsible	to	a	projection	of	ourselves	as	both	the	same	(“me	in	20	years”)	and	other	(“me	who	is	not-me	and	not	knowable	in	20	years”).	With	emotional	maturity,	we	recognize	that	we’re	never	actually	tending	to	some	special	private	point—the	self—but	more	strictly	speaking,	we’re	attending	to	something	that	eludes	identity	and	sameness,	and	yet	encompasses	them	both.	We’re	always	attending	to	the	other,	that	projected	person	who,	in	each	moment,	we	can	never	fully	determine.		
3.4	Does	the	Existence	of	a	Self	Make	Any	Practical	Difference?		 I	will	now	examine	an	oblique	attack	against	the	belief	in	a	real	self.	This	brings	us	back	to	the	issue	of	whether	or	not	there	is	any	practical	stake	in	the	Self/No-Self	question.	Whether	a	self	really	exists	or	just	needs	to	be	rigged	up	conventionally	to	go	on	with	our	social	and	emotional	business	may	turn	out	to	be	a	non-issue,	from	the	practical,	ethical	point	of	view.	Specifically,	this	addresses	a	critique	against	what	Raymond	Martin	calls	the	“me-consideration”	(see	the	introduction	above).	As	I’ve	said,	thinkers	like	Butler	and	Sidgwick	have	argued	that	the	No-Self	view	cannot	make	sense	of	forward-looking	agency	and	egocentric	concerns.	But	if	this	is	a	reason	to	believe	in	a	persisting	self,	then	presumably	the	Self/Ownership	view	adequately	makes	sense	of	our	prudential	and	forward-looking	concerns.	The	“me-consideration”	is	the	claim	that	we	care	about	our	own	
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futures,	because	we	persist	into	those	futures.	However,	as	Martin	points	out,	the	Selfist	owes	us	a	story	of	why	me-now	should	be	egoistically	concerned	with	me-later.	Why	exactly	do	I	care	about	either	a	future	stage	of	myself	(under	the	Ownership	view)	or	a	surrogate	of	myself	(under	the	No-Self	view)?	The	me-consideration	is	an	intuitive	response.	I	should	egoistically	care	about	me-later,	because	any	good	or	ill-fortune	that	befalls	me-later	impacts	me	overall.	It	is	me	who	will	reap	the	outcomes	of	events	spanning	all	the	stages	of	my	life.	Future-me	is	a	stage	of	my	becoming,	and	thus	I	can	anticipate	the	aches	and	exaltations	that	await	me.	In	short,	the	Selfist	who	appeals	to	the	me-consideration	is	temporally	neutral	with	respect	to	prudential	concerns,	that	is,	he	has	an	eye	on	achieving	a	balanced	distribution	of	good	over	the	whole	of	his	life.	He	believes	that	the	further	fact	underlying	his	persistence	is	enough	to	justify	future-oriented	concern.			 Now,	Martin	argues	that	reductionism	about	the	self	is	not	a	big	deal	practically	speaking.	With	the	notion	of	a	continuer-self,	or,	surrogate	there	is	good	reason	to	care	about	our	future	surrogates.21	I	will	explore	this	in	more	detail,	because	if	Martin	is	correct,	then	the	Self	and	No-Self	models	prove	to	be	neutral	with	respect	to	practical	rationality.	I’ve	shown	you	why	I	think	this	is	wrong	from	the	side	of	the	No-Self	model.	There	are	ethical	and	agentive	implications	involved	in	treating	oneself	as	other.	With	respect	to	forward-looking	agency,	my	defense	of																																																									21	Martin	compares	“continuer-consideration”	and	“continuer-interest”	to	Parfit’s	“quasi-memories”	in	Reasons	and	Persons.	See	Martin,	124.	Martin	concludes:	“When,	as	reductionists,	we	give	up	our	belief	in	the	reality	of	the	self,	we	don’t	give	up	our	belief	in	the	existence	of	a	brain,	a	body,	and	a	series	of	interrelated	physical	and	psychological	events.	Nor	do	we	abandon	continuer-interest.	What	we	used	to	think	of	as	our	future	selves	we	still	regard,	albeit	perhaps	less	robustly,	as	our	future	continuers	and	we	may	value	them	as	such”	(128).	
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the	No-Self	view	appealed	to	a	certain	type	of	lived	experience	rather	than	a	rational	reconstruction.	I	appealed	more	to	phenomena	than	analytic	structure.	But	what	about	the	Self	model?	Does	persisting	into	the	future	give	me	special	reasons	to	care	about	that	future?	I	want	to	show	why	thinking	in	terms	of	embodied	selves	who	own	their	physical	and	mental	states	does	make	a	practical	difference.	If	I’m	right	about	that,	then	reductionism	about	the	self,	pace	Martin,	is	a	big	deal,	because	believing	in	a	persisting	self	makes	a	practical	difference.				 To	put	my	cards	on	the	table	before	proceeding,	the	sort	of	self	I	believe	makes	a	difference	is	an	underlying,	synthesizing	aspect	of	embodied	consciousness.	The	self	operates	at	the	sub-personal	and	personal	levels;	it	is	unique	to	the	body	in	which	it	is	realized,	and	is	not	just	a	product	of	memories,	dispositions,	values,	and	practical	identity.	I	will	develop	this	point	in	more	detail	below.	But	before	doing	so,	I’d	like	to	illustrate	some	of	the	practical	and	ethical	considerations	that	are	at	stake	in	believing	either	that	one’s	embodied	self	is	unique—and	not	the	sort	of	thing	that	can	be	simply	transferred	to	another	body—or,	instead,	believing	that	the	self	is	a	(hollow?)	ego-tunnel	that	can	be	uploaded	to	super-computers	or	resurrected	through	transplants.					 In	the	recent	film,	Self/Less,	starring	Ben	Kingsley	and	Ryan	Reynolds,	a	real	estate	tycoon,	Damian	(played	by	Kingsley)	takes	advantage	of	a	new	technology	that	allows	him	to	transplant	his	ego	into	another	body.	The	procedure	is	in	its	Beta	stage,	as	remnants	of	the	host	brain’s	former	ego	linger	in	the	neural	network.	Damian	thinks	these	experiences	are	hallucinations.	In	actuality,	the	“hallucinations”	are	fragments	of	the	memories,	feelings,	dispositions,	and	capacities	of	the	former	
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ego	struggling	to	remain	intact	and	reintegrate	its	identity.	The	plotting	transhumanist	scientist,	who	sold	Damian	on	the	procedure,	gives	him	a	chemical	concoction	to	slowly	erase	these	haunting	remnants.	He	tells	Damian	that	the	“hallucinations”	are	controllable	side	effects	of	the	procedure.	Damian	is	also	told	that	the	body	used	for	the	transplant	has	been	genetically	engineered.	But	actually,	a	poor	soldier	(Ryan	Reynolds)	willing	to	die	for	cash	to	save	his	daughter	from	a	life-threatening	medical	condition	has	sold	his	body	to	the	scientist.	Damian	uncovers	this	dark	secret,	and	saddled	with	guilt,	seeks	out	the	soldier’s	wife,	and	develops	a	fatherly	bond	with	her	now	healthy	daughter.	Damian’s	ethical	dilemma	grows	abundantly	clear	to	him.	He	can	stop	taking	his	medications	in	order	to	bring	back	the	soldier,	or	he	can	rob	the	little	girl	of	her	father,	and	rob	the	woman	of	her	beloved	husband.	If	Damian	were	to	stop	taking	his	meds,	then	within	a	few	weeks,	his	ego	would	dissipate	into	oblivion,	and	the	soldier’s	memories	would	return.		 If	we	accept	this	story	at	face	value,	then	clearly	the	only	thing	that	makes	a	person	a	person,	and	a	self	a	self,	is	an	ego-tunnel	supervening	over	a	working	brain.	When	Damian	is	haunted	by	the	soldier’s	flashbacks,	we	might	be	inclined	to	believe	that	no	clear	criteria	of	personal	identity	can	establish	whether	or	not	it’s	Damian	or	the	soldier	experiencing	the	turmoil.	We’ve	entered	a	Parfitian	gray	area,	because	the	self,	understood	as	an	ego-tunnel,	is	no	longer	individuated	by	a	single	stream	of	consciousness.	Our	metaphysical	interpretation	of	this	film	has	important	ethical	upshots.			 Say	we	believe	the	self	underlies	a	synthesizing	component	in	the	structure	of	consciousness,	a	component	that	operates	at	both	the	sub-personal	and	personal	
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levels.	We	also	believe	the	self	is	embodied,	and	unique	to	the	particular	embodiment	in	which	it	is	realized.	The	existence	of	this	self	would	have	serious	ethical	ramifications.	For	example,	if	John’s	wife,	Luna	suffered	from	Alzheimer’s	to	the	point	where	she	had	no	memory	of	being	John’s	wife,	John	would	be	keeping	his	wedding	vow	by	remaining	devoted	to	Luna	in	her	amnesiac	state.	He	should	see	her	as	the	same	person	he	married.	Only	now,	she	suffers	from	Alzheimer-induced	amnesia.	He	should	not	believe	that	she	has	died	or	been	replaced	by	a	surrogate.	On	the	other	hand,	if	Alzheimer’s-Luna	were	just	a	surrogate,	John	might	decide	that	he	owed	the	surrogate	nothing—she	is	not	the	one	he	vowed	to	care	for	in	sickness	and	health.	Luna	died	when	her	ego-tunnel	faded	away	into	oblivion.	But	if	there	were	a	unique	self	that	underlies	but	is	not	reducible	to	its	ego,	then	the	soldier’s	wife	in	
Self/Less	should	believe	that	her	husband	is	the	victim	of	thought	implantation.	Damian	has	not	actually	stolen	the	soldier’s	body.	During	the	transplant,	Damian	dies,	and	the	soldier	suffers	from	memory	and	belief	implants.	His	stream	of	consciousness	has	been	severely	disrupted,	as	he	suffers	from	a	sort	of	split-personality	in	which	he	mostly	believes	he	is	Damian.	If	there	were	some	further	fact	(and	not	necessarily	an	immaterial	soul)	that	underlies	a	person’s	identity	and	persistence	in	time,	then	the	soldier	has	not	been	replaced,	the	soldier	has	been	
infiltrated,	and	his	ego	is	now	highly	unstable.			 On	the	other	hand,	if	we	believe	there	are	only	open-ended	ego-tunnels,	then	at	some	point	in	the	film,	we’re	not	dealing	with	Damian,	nor	are	we	dealing	with	the	soldier.	When	Damian	takes	the	ethical	high-road	and	stops	taking	his	medications,	then	we’ve	witnessed	a	resurrection	of	the	soldier.	These	distinct	views	of	the	self	
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have	implications	for	the	commitments	we	make,	and	for	the	feelings	we	believe	we	ought	to	have	toward	loved-ones	who	have	been	severely	altered	by	brain	injuries	and	diseases.	If	my	wife	were	entirely	constituted	by	an	ego-tunnel,	then	staying	by	the	side	of	her	amnesiac-Alzheimer’s	surrogate	would	not	fulfill	a	vow.	I	am	no	longer	a	loyal	husband.	Instead,	I	am	involved	in	an	act	of	charity,	giving	selflessly	to	a	needy	stranger.	Loyalty	and	charity	are	both	ethically	commendable,	but	these	are	distinct	ethical	actions	with	distinct	motivations.	So	Self	versus	No-Self	would	make	a	significant	practical	difference,	because	endorsing	one	or	the	other	view	might	impact	the	sorts	of	motivations	and	reasons	we	have	for	doing	things.				 Keeping	this	illustration	in	mind,	I	want	to	directly	assess	Martin’s	thesis	that	the	Self/No-Self	issue	does	not	make	a	practical	and	ethical	difference.	His	main	contention	is	that	the	me-consideration	does	not	really	provide	an	answer	to	why	I	should	care	about	my	future	self.	The	me-consideration	might	pair	with	the	extreme	claim.	The	Selfist	might	argue	that	if	I	don’t	persist	into	my	future,	then	I	have	no	direct	reason	to	care	about	the	future	surrogate	who	will	replace	me.	Again,	I	might	care	about	KPM-20,	but	I	might	just	as	easily	not	care.	Raymond	Martin	believes	that	the	extreme	claim	is	ungrounded,	and	that	if	it	applies	to	the	No-Self	model,	then	it	likewise	applies	to	the	Self	model.	This	is	a	strategy	worth	taking	seriously,	because	it	not	only	obliquely	defends	the	No-Self	view,	but	also	puts	it	on	equal	footing	with	the	Ownership	view	when	it	comes	to	making	sense	of	forward-looking	agency.	So	if	we	have	some	convincing	empirical	and	metaphysical	reasons	to	take	the	No-Self	view	seriously—which	we	do—then	a	failure	to	adequately	make	sense	of	an	essential	component	of	agency	should	not	count	against	it,	since	the	same	problem	
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exists	for	the	Ownership	view.	It	could	be	that	whatever	will	provide	us	with	an	adequate	theory	of	action	is	more	sophisticated	than	either	the	Reductionist	or	Ownership	view.	In	order	to	defend	his	thesis,	Martin	tentatively	grants	that	some	further	fact	establishes	the	sameness	of	the	self	across	time,	and	that	this	self	will	reap	the	future	outcomes	of	its	actions.	Martin	argues	that	the	persistence	of	a	self	does	not	necessarily	justify	egocentric,	future-directed	concern	by	me-now	for	me-later.		 		 Here’s	one	reason	this	might	be	true.	Suppose	one’s	psychology	does	not	persist.	Let	the	felt	narrative	of	being-someone	be	diachronically	interrupted	and	disjoint.	Future	stages	of	a	self	whose	psychology	is	radically	distinct	from	the	present	are	too	foreign,	too	remote,	and	too	psychologically	disconnected	from	the	present	to	provide	the	self	with	reasons	to	have	special	concern	for	her	future	stages.	We	don’t	need	sci-fi	thought-experiments	regarding	teleportation,	or	fission	and	fusion,	to	make	this	point.	We	can	instead	project	into	a	future	in	which	one’s	views,	dispositions,	life-style	choices,	and	memories	and	self-interpretations	are	radically	different	from	one’s	current	ego.			 Martin	asks	us	to	grant,	for	the	sake	of	argument,	the	existence	of	a	persisting	self.	Imagine	that	the	self	persists	as	some	further	fact	behind	all	the	quantitative,	qualitative,	and	psychological	changes	that	make	up	a	conscious	human	life.	These	changes	can	be	more	or	less	continuous,	allowing	for	radical	ruptures	between	current	values	and	personal	history,	and	later	values	and	memories.	In	fact,	we	can	imagine	a	case	in	which	psychological	facts	about	a	particular	self,	say,	its	aims,	its	values,	its	existential	projects,	and	all	of	the	personal	memories	that	shape	its	
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personal	history	change	so	radically	that	some	future	stage	of	it	will	have	no	psychological	relation	to	(that	is,	recognition	of)	its	current	stage.	The	“who”	constituted	by	the	content	of	personal	identity	(the	memories,	aims,	and	projects	of	a	person)	basically	becomes	someone	else.	Would	it	be	so	obvious	that	the	current	self	should	be	egoistically	concerned	for	the	welfare	of	such	a	future	self?		 		 Me-now	would	find	a	lot	less	color	in	a	world	without	the	poetry	of	Bob	Dylan,	and	without	the	comedy	of	Tina	Fey	and	Alec	Baldwin	in	30	Rock.	But	perhaps	future-me	would	not	be	able	to	get	past	Dylan’s	nasal	voice	and	amateurish	harmonica	and	guitar	playing.	Perhaps	future-me	would	resent	a	comedy	that	features	a	hapless	and	overtly	liberal	female	lead	in	a	position	of	power.	I	can’t	even	be	sure	that	this	radically	altered	future-me	wouldn’t	vote	for	Donald	Trump	to	be	President	of	the	United	States,	and	wouldn’t	support	building	a	wall	between	the	United	States	and	Mexico.	Supposing	all	this	were	true	of	future-me,	I	probably	wouldn’t	be	especially	concerned	with	this	very	different	creature	(a	nationalist,	misogynist,	and	racist	me,	in	a	very	important	sense,	wouldn’t	be	me	at	all).	But	the	Selfist	who	believes	in	a	further	fact	is	committed	to	the	view	that	this	person	would	still	be	me,	albeit	a	terrible	version	of	me.	Martin’s	conclusion	is	that	persistence	of	self	is	not	enough	to	justify	egoistic	concern	for	my	own	future.	Therefore,	the	Selfist	who	endorses	the	Ownership	view	is	no	better	off	than	the	No-Selfist	who	does	not	endorse	the	Ownership	view.	Both	camps	need	to	adequately	justify	self-regarding,	future-directed	considerations.			 The	basic	problem	I	have	with	Martin’s	argument	is	that	it	does	not	adequately	explore	the	complex	ways	in	which	temporality,	the	distinction	between	
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synchronic	and	diachronic	unity,	and	the	question	of	the	metaphysical	base	of	individuation	(we	visited	in	chapter	2)	impact	what	it	makes	sense	to	care	about.	Specifically,	he	fails	to	distinguish	between	those	things	we	remain	especially	concerned	with	despite	personal	identity	and	psychological	continuity,	and	those	existential	and	narrative	items	of	the	ego-tunnel	whose	discontinuity	complicates	the	matter	of	who	it	makes	sense	to	care	about.	Let	me	illustrate	the	point.		 Suppose	me-later	will	be	a	jingoistic	racist,	who	opposes	social	security	and	any	sort	of	welfare	entitlements,	and	who	thinks	climate	change	is	a	hoax	and	that	nature’s	only	purpose	is	to	serve	the	needs	of	human	populations.	Me-later	will	not	remember	the	progressive	me	who	has	leanings	toward	deep-ecology	and	who	grew	up	the	son	of	an	Iranian	immigrant.	Me-later	will	remember	nothing	about	me-now	and	the	narrative	I’ve	drawn	out	of	my	past:	my	early	days	as	a	skater	and	surfer	and	angry	punk-rocker,	my	penchant	for	writing	poetry,	my	love	for	composing	songs	and	reading	philosophy,	my	deep	concern	for	the	well-being	of	the	natural	environment	and	the	alarming	rate	of	species	die-offs.	Maybe	I	won’t	care	so	much	about	this	future-me	who	is	utterly	disconnected	from	my	current	history.	We	might	even	wonder	if	former-me—the	anarchistic	punk-rocker—would	want	to	have	anything	to	do	with	the	slightly	bourgeois,	soft,	and	academic-me	writing	this	essay	right	now.	But	suppose	I	find	out	that	me-later	will	be	punished	by	an	experimental	virtual-pain	machine	that	tortures	its	subject	through	neuro-stimulation.	This	might	be	a	Clockwork	Orange-esque	punishment	exacted	on	future-me	by	a	utilitarian	government	for	committing	some	horribly	racist	hate	crime	(remember,	this	is	the	intolerant,	Donald	Trump	version	of	me).	I	also	find	out	that	as	part	of	the	
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punishment	for	the	hate	crime,	once	every	year	for	5	years	after	the	sentencing,	me-later	will	experience	the	most	vivid	and	horrific	nightmares	for	48	hours,	and	live	on	the	verge	of	suicide	until	the	nightmares	suddenly	stop—again,	a	conditioning	technique	created	by	a	very	sadistic	big-brother.	I	think	it’s	quite	obvious	that	I	would	egoistically	care	about	the	plight	of	me-later,	because	these	are	generally	terrible	experiences.	Afterall,	we’re	assuming	it’s	the	same	me,	in	the	sense	that	some	further	fact	makes	me-later	a	future	stage	of	me-now.	I	might	not	practically	care	too	much	for	the	Trump-supporting	future-me.	It	would	be	hard	to	know	how	to	feel	about	someone	who	shares	none	of	my	memories,	hopes,	or	dispositions.	But	I	would	certainly	dread	the	torture	and	mind-curdling	nightmares	that	await	me.	I’m	not	begging	the	question	here,	because	I’m	claiming	that	general	aspects	of	experience,	like	the	amount	of	pleasure,	pain,	fear,	or	love	and	fulfillment	one	experiences	matter	to	us	so	long	as	we	know	that	some	tangible	continuity	between	our	first-person	experiences	will	exist.	In	some	sense,	albeit	not	as	a	progressive	son	of	an	immigrant,	I’ll	be	there	to	feel	the	pain.	But	the	key	is	that	my	“being-there”	is	not	just	a	matter	of	my	existential	projects,	personal	memories,	and	practical	identity.	Something	supports	that	identity,	and	this	is	the	embodied	self,	which	is	the	base	of	individuation	persisting	through	psychological	and	dispositional	changes	that	differentiates	me	from	any	other	individual	existing	in	the	universe.	As	long	as	my	nervous	system	is	in	good	working	order,	pain	will	never	cease	to	be	an	issue	for	me,	no	matter	how	much	of	an	asshole	or	amnesiac	I	become.	I	do	not	need	to	know	that	I	will	remain	a	progressive	liberal	who	adores	Bob	Dylan,	and	that	I	will	organize	my	life	around	the	constraints	of	being	a	good	father	and	a	half-way	decent	
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philosopher	in	order	to	dread	the	prospects	of	an	amnesiac	future	filled	with	horrific	torture	and	fear.	So	in	short,	even	if	my	psychology	does	not	persist	as	it	does	now,	I	have	good	reason	to	care	about	aspects	of	my	future	that	involve	my	general	physical	and	psychological	welfare.	This	of	course	rests	on	the	possibility	of	the	self	persisting	through	radical	change.	Bear	in	mind	that	this	does	not	commit	me	to	belief	in	a	Cartesian,	immaterial	soul.	In	fact,	it	requires	that	the	body	play	an	essential	role	in	the	history	and	prospects	of	the	self.	The	simple	point	here	is	that	in	order	for	an	embodied	self	to	have	a	coherent	experience	it	must	be	unified	both	synchronically	and	diachronically.	However,	certain	disruptions	to	narrative	diachronic	unity	might	confuse	us	at	the	level	of	existential	analysis.	We	may	not	know	how	to	feel	about	ourselves	when	projecting	into	a	future	in	which	our	personal	history	is	forgotten,	and	our	projects	and	aims	are	radically	altered.	We	may	not	know	which	commitments	made	now	remain	intact,	and	which	may	be	overturned	given	radical	ruptures	in	life	projects	and	deep	values.	But	synchronic	unity,	which	allows	for	an	individual	to	identify	this	red	object	as	causing	this	sensation	of	pain,	is	enough	to	justify	fear	and	dread	in	me-now	for	a	future	I	will	viscerally	feel.	While	the	narrative	may	change,	it	will	still	“be	like	something”	for	me	to	be	a	Trump	supporter	who	remembers	nothing	of	his	progressivist	past	or	his	loving	and	multi-cultural	family.	This	rests	on	the	assumption	that	it	will	be	me—the	synchronically	unified	and	embodied	self—who	experiences	the	future	pain,	even	though	aspects	of	diachronic	unity	that	account,	among	other	things,	for	personal	identity	may	have	been	severely	disrupted.	
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	 Another	possibility	is	that	my	psychology	does	not	persist	due	to	a	coma.	Do	I	have	reason	to	care	about	this	future-me?	Simply	put,	yes.	As	long	as	the	disposition	to	have	a	first-person	experience	exists,	then	I	can	care	about	that	shell	of	a	man,	and	whatever	his	ego	may	experience	in	the	state	of	a	coma.	I’m	not	making	an	ethical	claim	here	about	when	it	is	appropriate	to	unplug	a	patient	on	life	support.	I’m	simply	claiming	that	if	we	believe	the	self	persists	into	its	future,	then	it	has	reasons	to	care	about	that	future	based	on	what	sort	of	general	and	visceral	first-person	experiences	that	self	will	have,	and	not	necessarily	what	sort	of	practical	identity	that	self	will	articulate	through	his	commitments.				 Now,	let	me	clarify	this	further	with	respect	to	the	discussion	in	chapter	2	of	the	distinction	between	“place”/locus	(ādhāra—ownership	of	mental	states)	and	“base”	(āśraya—the	foundation	of	individuation	and	metaphysical	dependence).	The	self	might	be	related	to	its	mental	states	in	an	adjectival	sense,	the	way	a	dent	is	related	to	a	surface.22	For	a	self	to	be	adjectival	upon	some	X,	it	must	be	essentially	of	or	in	X,23	and	could	not	exist	without	X.	So,	for	example,	the	mental	states	of	a	subject	might	be	metaphysically	dependent	on	a	body.24	The	body	would	be	its	base	of	individuation	upon	which	it	metaphysically	depends.	Notice	the	distinction	here	between	a	subject	owning	some	set	of	mental	states—meaning	they	are	not	experienced	as	external	assailments,	and	they	are	available	for	endorsement	or																																																									22	Ganeri,	The	Self,	36:	Ganeri	borrows	this	from	Sidney	Shoemaker,	The	First-Person	
Perspective	and	Other	Essays	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1996),	10.	The	idea	here	is	that	a	mental	life	is	adjectival	upon	some	subject	of	experience,	the	way,	say,	“a	bending”	may	be	adjectival	upon	some	branch	that	is	bent.	This	is	contrasted	with	viewing	the	mental	life	as	a	collective	property,	say,	supervening	upon,	or	emergent	from,	a	collection,	no	single	part	of	which	constitutes	the	mind.		23	Ibid,	36.	24	Ibid,	37.	
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disavowal—and	the	ontological	state	of	affairs	making	it	the	case	that	there	is	a	plurality	of	individuals.25	If	the	self	is	metaphysically	dependent	upon	a	body—its	base	of	individuation—and	psychological	continuity	is	more	directly	bound	up	with	a	sense	of	ownership,	then	egoistic	concern	for	me-later	is	justified	even	if	me-now	cannot	imagine	owning	(in	the	sense	of	endorsing	or	anticipating)	most	of	the	beliefs	and	dispositions	of	me-later.	This	is	because	ownership	can	be	a	matter	of	propensities	to	endorsement,	while	individuation	(metaphysical-ontological	dependence)	can	be	the	product	of	an	embodied	“capacity	for	normative	emotional	response.”26	I	may	not	be	able	to	anticipate	what	it’s	like	for	the	future-me	to	be	very	greedy	with	money—something	the	more	successful,	business-entrepreneurial	me	might	be—but	I	can	still	anticipate	the	palpable	pain	of	future-me	hyperventilating	and	panicking	upon	watching	the	stock-market	crash.	As	long	as	there	is	continuity	between	the	stages	of	my	body,	and	my	body	maintains	its	capacity	for	emotionally	charged,	normative	responses,	which	are	felt	in	a	first-person	way,	namely,	my	mind-body	complex	experiences	things	as	desirable	or	undesirable,	or	right	or	wrong,	I	have	some	reason	to	care	about	a	future	me	who	is	psychologically	disconnected	from	me-now.	Let	me	explain	this	further	by	providing	more	of	the	phenomenological	assumptions	driving	my	thought.		 We	may	favor	a	non-cognitivist	and	phenomenological	gloss	on	what	it	means	to	act	in	a	goal-directed	way.	This	sort	of	gloss	would	prioritize	something																																																									25	Ibid,	37.	26	Ibid,	39:	“My	own	view	is	that	ownership	is	‘rooted’	in	the	deep	psyche	of	the	individual	and	in	their	propensities	to	endorsement,	and	individuation	is	determined	by	the	essentially	embodied	character	of	a	capacity	for	normative	emotional	response.”	
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like	a	Heideggerian	approach	to	“being-in”	over	the	cognitivist/beliefs-desires	account	of	intentionality.	According	to	the	non-cognitivist	account,	we	are	first	“being-in-the-world”	in	the	sense	of	being	absorbed	in	a	socialization	process	amidst	transparent	background	practices.27	We	are	not	essentially	minds	with	beliefs	and	desires,	but	rather,	“agents”	(in	Heidegger’s	sense	of	Dasein)	who	are	absorbed	in	coping	strategies.	When	we	skillfully	cope	with	the	meaningful	context	in	which	we	find	ourselves,	and	align	our	patterns	of	behavior	with	what	it	makes	sense	to	do,	we	are	not	necessarily	taking	a	theoretical	attitude,	which	assesses	its	own	belief	and	desire	structures.	Prior	to	theoretical	and	calculative	thought,	we	experience	the	world	more	originally	as	possibilities	for	action	amid	affordances	that	emerge	from	interactions	between	the	embodied	self	and	its	physical	and	social	environment.	The	infant	muddling	through	her	environment	on	all	fours	begins	to	develop	a	sense	of	what	she	can	and	cannot	do,	and	she	begins	to	anticipate	possibilities	for,	say,	grabbing	stuff,	or	supporting	her	body	based	on	affordances	from	her	environment.	For	example,	the	edge	of	an	oak	table	affords	itself	as	a	means	to	stand	up.	Narratives	and	dispositions	toward	endorsements	emerge	out	of	an	embodied	self	that	viscerally	experiences	what	it	can	and	cannot	do	before	it	overtly	calculates	things	through	various	decision	procedures.	I	skillfully	skip	over	a	puddle	with	little	to	no	calculation,	as	I	am	averse	to	getting	my	pant	legs	wet.	It’s	an	immediate,	non-algorithmic,	and	yet	goal-driven	response.	Without	calculation,	I	anticipate	my	reach	and	bodily	momentum	and	force,	and	I	have	a	sense	of	the																																																									27	See	Hubert	Dreyfus,	Being-in-the-World:	A	Commentary	on	Heidegger’s	Being	and	
Time	Division	I	(Massachusetts:	MIT	Press,	1991).	As	Dreyfus	has	argued,	he	does	not	believe	that	minds	do	not	exist.	Rather,	his	non-cognitivist	gloss	on	Heidegger	has	ontological	priority	over	the	cognitivist	beliefs-desires	account	of	agency.	
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boundedness	of	this	puddle	against	the	boundedness	of	my	body.	I	proceed	to	navigate	through	the	crowded	street	to	my	train,	anticipating	my	body’s	movement	along	a	dynamic	grid	of	other	moving	bodies	that	I	can	get	around,	keep	pace	with,	or	press	against.	This	capacity	to	navigate	through	environmental	and	social	signs	is	driven	by	a	sense	of	temporality	imbuing	sensations,	anticipations,	feelings,	and	moods	and	emotions.	Getting	to	the	grocery	store,	which	is	a	block	away,	is	unthinkable	for	me,	because	the	distance	is	“insurmountable”	when	I’m	in	the	mood	of	dark	despair	and	crippling	depression.	But	in	some	other	mood,	say,	of	bittersweet	joy	in	walking	a	dear	old	friend	who	I’m	not	sure	I’ll	see	again	to	the	subway	next	to	the	store,	I	experience	the	store	as	tragically	close.	This	more	primary	relationship	to	my	environment,	colored	as	it	is	by	temporality	and	various	affective	attunements,	informs	how	I	build	self-narratives	without	being	reducible	to	
the	narrative	itself.	In	essence,	the	self	is	not	essentially	a	“thinking	thing.”		 Moreover,	radical	psychological	discontinuity	over	time	does	not	necessarily	amount	to	a	complete	lapse	in	diachronic	unity	for	the	body	that	supports	this	capacity	to	care,	circumspect,	endorse	beliefs,	and	view	itself	as	responsible	to	various	normative	constraints.	So	it	makes	perfect	sense	to	claim	that	I	might	disavow	the	beliefs	and	narrative	of	some	future	incarnation	of	me,	that	is,	I	might	not	be	able	to	comprehend	what	it	would	be	like	to	own	this	future	existence,	but	I	can	still	anticipate	his	aches,	pains,	joys	and	fears	in	a	visceral	and	first-person	way.	Therefore,	Martin’s	conclusion	that	psychological	discontinuity	puts	the	Self/Ownership	view	on	equal	footing	with	the	No-Self/No-Ownership	view	is	not	convincing.	The	Self/Ownership	view	that	I’m	tentatively	putting	forward	can	
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accommodate	lapses	or	complete	ruptures	in	personal	identity,	because	it	also	maintains	the	belief	that	a	body	and	nervous	system	support	the	capacity	to	develop	a	sense	of	ownership.	First-person	experiences	blossom	out	of	the	individuating	base	of	the	body,	and	remain	circumspective	toward	environmental	affordances	regardless	of	consciously	endorsed	patterns	of	behavior,	and	regardless	of	the	personal	history	that	informs	personal	identity.		
3.5	Madhyamaka	as	Borderless	and	Constructed	Care	for	the	(Non)-Self			 I	will	conclude	by	directing	the	analysis	specifically	to	Madhyamaka	No-Selfism.	Let	me	do	this	by	first	contrasting	that	view	with	the	other	No-Self	options	I	have	developed	so	far.	The	No-Self	view,	pace	the	Mādhyamika,	might	appeal	to	some	sort	of	continuity	in	the	base	of	individuation.	Like	the	Selfist,	the	No-Selfer	can	appeal	to	the	continuity	of	a	body	and	a	nervous	system	(or	to	a	stream	of	consciousness).	But	No-Selfers	cannot	connect	the	first-person	sense	of	mine-ness	that	I	am	experiencing	now	with	just	any	person’s	sense	of	mine-ness.	They	must	make	sense	of	me	anticipating	things,	and	they	must	clarify	why	I	overwhelmingly	believe	it	will	“be	like	something”	for	me	to	have	those	experiences.	It’s	not	enough	to	say	there	will	be	someone	who	also	says	“I”	at	T2.	Even	now,	there	are	plenty	of	others	who	refer	to	themselves	as	“I,”	and	who	describe	what	it’s	like	to	be	experiencing	things.	I	do	not	identify	with	or	anticipate	their	experiences	based	on	their	avowal	of	a	first-person	perspective.	I	must	have	some	sense	that	I	can	own	parts	of	that	experience	in	order	to	identify	with	it	and	anticipate	it.	A	lot	needs	to	be	said	about	how	(and	if)	this	can	be	done	without	appealing	to	a	persisting	self,	but	this	will	be	visited	more	thoroughly	in	my	final	chapter.	We	have	the	continuer	
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or	surrogate	option,	in	which	a	continuer	of	me-now	becomes	my	future	surrogate.	And	even	from	the	Selfist	side,	we	might	endorse	punctualism,	which	is	the	view	that	“I’s”	pick	out	something	real,	but	these	“I’s”	only	last	episodically,	and	are	strung	together	like	pearls	on	a	necklace.	Finally,	the	PSM	theory	believes	that	“I”	picks	out	nothing.	So	I’m	not	sure	what	story	about	future-directed	concern	is	available	to	this	theory,	unless	it	appeals	to	various	continuity	relationships	like	Parfit	and	other	No-Selfers	who	believe	that	the	self	is	importantly	tied	to	an	individuating	body.			 However,	I’d	like	to	focus	here	on	the	Madhyamaka	No-Self	view.	From	this	perspective,	nothing,	not	even	the	body,	has	an	intrinsic	nature	that	persists.	The	challenge	here	is	to	determine	how	any	sort	of	concern	for	future-me	is	justified	when	eschewing	belief	in	any	sort	of	place	(ownership)	or	base	(metaphysical	individuation).	There	is	no	base	on	which	to	hang	anticipation	for	a	particularly	nasty	or	pleasant	first-person	experience	in	the	future.	The	Mādhyamika	will	appeal	to	conventional	designation	for	making	sense	of	the	connectedness	between	experiences,	but	if	nothing	other	than	convention	relates	these	experiences,	we	lose	the	very	visceral	and	anticipatory	sense	of	future	first-person	experiences.	Moreover,	under	this	model,	radical	ruptures	in	psychological	continuity	and	personal	history	more	easily	lead	to	the	conclusion	that	one	is	not	justified	in	being	especially	concerned	for	a	future	surrogate.	So	the	Mādhyamika	owes	us	a	theory	about	how	we	justify	the	manifest	experience	of	caring	about	our	own	futures.	Candrakīrti	provides	a	theory	of	how	we	have	a	sense	of	ownership	for	this	experience	through	appropriation	of	various	thoughts	and	feelings,	etc.	(see	chapter	
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2).	Yet,	without	appeal	to	some	sort	of	unity	or	body,	or	some	other	sort	of	individuating	base,	he	does	not	offer	a	very	clear	picture	of	how	we	develop	and	justify	future-oriented	concerns.	But	on	my	tentative	view,	it	is	the	continuity	between	stages	of	the	body	and	its	embedded-ness	in	a	physical	environment,	replete	with	navigable	signs	and	anticipatory	intentionality	toward	social	and	physical	possibilities,	that	allows	my	first-person	sense	of	what	it’s	like	to	have	this	body	concern	itself	with	future	first-person	experiences.	Whether	I	remember	my	past	experiences	and	commitments,	or	remember	my	current	values	and	projects,	that	is,	whether	my	personal	identity	is	radically	disrupted,	I	can	imagine	a	future	in	which	it	will	“be	like	something”	for	me—a	sentient	and	sapient	dynamism	of	flesh,	circumspective	action,	and	thought—to	suffer	as	some	other	type	of	personal	owner	of	experiences.	I	will	be	some	other	type	of	owner,	say,	a	Trump-supporting	type	of	owner,	but	thanks	to	the	continuity	of	synthesizing	first-person	experiences	piggy-backing	on	bodily	continuity,	I	will	be	an	owner	nevertheless.	This	is	because	the	content	of	those	experiences	does	not	necessarily	have	to	involve	continuity	between	narratives	and	deep	commitments.	They	simply	must	“be	like	something,”	say,	pain	or	joy,	or	elation	and	giddiness	for	me	to	care	about	them.	And	they	can	be	like	something	to	me,	because	I	am	a	sentient	body	that	can	own	its	experiences	through	various	narrative	lenses.					 Still,	there	is	a	card	left	for	the	Mādhyamika	to	play.	Grant	that	we	have	independent	reasons	to	adopt	Madhyamaka’s	more	global	metaphysical	irrealism.	And	grant	that	adopting	these	insights	are	impactful	on	relevant	aspects	of	practical	deliberation.	Any	concern	for	that	future-me	(which	would	be	“me”	strictly	out	of	
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conventional	designation)	might	be	viewed	as	other-centric	and	altruistic	(perhaps	initially	in	an	obscured	way)	since	it	is	strictly	speaking	someone	else	that	I’m	concerned	with	and	feel	responsible	toward.	Like	Parfit	suggests28	we	may	have	moral	reasons	for	concerning	ourselves	with	future	surrogates.	I	would	argue	that	this	is	the	most	attractive	and	revisionary	aspect	of	glossing	Madhyamaka-Mahāyāna	arguments	for	radically	self-effacing	altruism.	I	cannot	really	justify	
egocentric	concern	for	this	future	“other”	that	is	my	surrogate,	but	nevertheless,	I	manifestly	care	for	this	other	who	is	in	one	sense	me	and	in	another	sense	not	me.	Thus,	I	can	revise	this	future-directed	consideration	to	be	an	obscured	form	of	other-centricity.	I	can	then	build	upon	this	to	justify	broader	altruistic	concern	for	all	sentient	beings.	Put	more	simply,	if	there	are	any	general	reasons	for	caring	about	others,	then	I	can	find	reasons	to	care	about	this	future	version	of	me.	But	reversing	the	formula	might	also	be	morally	instructive.	Given	my	manifest	concern	for	this	distant	and	future	version	of	me,	I	can	also	cultivate	more	robust	concern	for	distanced	others	who	are	nevertheless	closer	to	me	now	than	this	future	version	of	me.	In	other	words,	if	I	have	reasons	to	care	for	this	future	version	of	me	whose	relationship	to	me	is	thin,	then	I	have	reasons	to	care	for	others	now	that	are	only	thinly	related	to	me.	This	is	arguably	one	way	of	glossing	Śāntideva's	argument	against	the	egoist.	This	person	claims	that	he	is	justified	in	privileging	his	own	suffering,	because	he	does	not	experience	another’s	suffering	in	a	first-person	way.	He	capitalizes	on	the	me-consideration:		If	I	give	them	no	protection	because	their	suffering	does	not	afflict	me,	why	do	I	protect	my	body	against	future	suffering	when	it	does	not	afflict	me?	The																																																									28	Reasons	and	Persons,	311-312.	
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notion	‘it	is	the	same	me	even	then’	is	a	false	construction,	since	it	is	one	person	who	dies,	quite	another	who	is	born.	(BCA,	8:96-97).				 In	its	historical-textual	context,	this	verse	speaks	to	the	Buddhist	(and	in	a	different	respect,	Hindu	Selfist)	belief	in	reincarnation	after	bodily	death.29	The	Buddhist	does	some	things	and	avoids	other	things	for	the	sake	of	this	future	being’s	welfare.	While	the	Mādhyamika’s	view	about	nirvāṇa,	which	is	the	Buddhist	
summum	bonum,	is	complex	to	say	the	least,	Śāntideva	is	clearly	directing	his	point	to	practitioners	who	put	a	lot	of	stock	in	future	merits	and	demerits.	These	practitioners	follow	ethically	relevant	patterns	of	behavior	for	the	sake	of	achieving	
nirvāṇa.	Without	any	sort	of	lasting	immaterial	soul,	and	without	physical	or	psychological	continuity,	this	reincarnated	being	(if	it	can	be	called	that)	is	certainly	“other.”	And	yet,	one	manifestly	cares	about	this	future	person.	We	can	explain	this	phenomenologically	as	an	experiential	given,	as	part	of	our	lived	experience.	Or,	we	might	claim	that	concern	naturally	arises	out	of	recognizing	how	the	future	surrogate	is	dependent	upon	one’s	current	existence	(or,	to	speak	in	non-ownership	terms,	is	dependent	upon	the	currently	dynamic	and	episodic,	and	yet	somehow	conventionally	bounded	flow	of	psychophysical	events).	In	either	event,	Śāntideva	does	not	claim	that	the	concern	is	illogical.	Rather,	he	exploits	the	fact	that	we	normally	have	such	forward-looking	concern,	but	then	argues	that	this	concern	is																																																									29	I	cannot	discuss	the	complex	matter	of	individual	Buddhist	treatments	of	the	mostly	pan-Indian	belief	in	reincarnation.	It	will	suffice	to	say	that	while	the	future	person	is	not	identical	to	the	current	person	by	virtue	of	some	lasting,	immaterial	soul,	there	is	an	important	dependence	relationship	between	one’s	actions	and	a	future	avatar	that	will	somehow	embody	the	results	of	those	actions	after	one	has	perished.	Some	Indo-Tibetan	schools	claim	that	a	temporary	and	dynamic	“soul-like”	energy	does	in	fact	leave	one	body	and	inform	the	development	of	a	future	body,	but	again,	these	complex	issues	go	well	beyond	the	current	discussion.			
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incorrectly	assessed	as	self-regarding	and	egocentric.	Śāntideva	uses	this	against	the	egoist	to	show	that	any	reason	we	have	to	care	about	our	future	surrogate	applies	to	other	persons	now.	In	other	words,	we	have	just	as	much	reason	to	care	for	current	others	as	we	do	to	care	for	distant	surrogates,	since	the	future	entity	is	strictly	speaking	other	than	oneself.	Lapses	in	time,	and	separateness	of	bodies,	arguably,	do	not	make	any	meaningful	difference	in	the	concern	we	ought	to	have	for	future	suffering.	Therefore,	Śāntideva	endorses	temporal	and	agent	neutrality	when	it	comes	to	reasons	for	action	(although	he	certainly	did	not	speak	in	terms	of	“reasons	for	action”).	So	pragmatic	considerations	notwithstanding,	Śāntideva	endorses	a	radically	altruistic	ethics.			 I	think	his	argument	is	more	generally	applicable	whether	or	not	we	tether	it	to	reincarnation.	As	I’ve	read	Parfit,	we	may	revise	the	normal	justification	we	have	for	egocentric	future-directed	concern	through	larger	moral	considerations	for	our	future	surrogates.	Śāntideva,	centuries	earlier,	motivated	a	kind	of	exalted	altruism	out	of	this	key	insight.	He	did	so	by	blurring	the	distinction	between	self	and	other,	while	maintaining	the	commonsense	view	that	our	future	selves	provide	us	with	reasons	to	care	about	them.	When	we	maintain	this	aspect	of	the	commonsense	view,	but	shed	the	belief	that	this	future	self	is	something	more	than	a	surrogate,	then	instead	of	experiencing	a	nihilistic	breakdown	in	caring,	we	cultivate	a	transformative	and	relevantly	practical	stance	on	how	far	out	our	concern	should	extend.	Indeed,	Śāntideva	believes	it	should	extend	indefinitely:	we	should	care	
about	all	suffering	equally.	This	has	to	be	a	normative	point,	because,	empirically	speaking,	we	care	more	about	those	who	are	closest	to	us.		
	 153	
	 Śāntideva's	point	is	also	applicable	to	the	radical	changes	that	span	the	gap	in	a	single	lifetime.	For	if	we	take	the	Mādhyamika	seriously,	there	is	no	real	metaphysical	unity	between	me	at	10	years	old	and	me	at	30	(or,	perhaps	even	me	at	30	and	1	minute,	and	me	at	30	and	1.001	minutes).	This	is	one	good	reason	why	future	suffering	(in	perhaps	the	most	minute	slice	of	time	from	the	present)	does	not	afflict	me.	We	might	be	tempted	to	read	this	as	the	trivially	true	statement	that	future	suffering	does	not	afflict	me	now.	But	the	non-trivial	point	I	think	Śāntideva	is	trying	to	make	is	that	I	do	things	now	to	protect	a	body	whose	future	suffering	is	not	
mine	at	all.	I	learn	to	treat	myself	as	I	treat	others—as	other.	This	underlies	the	altruistic	conclusion:	I	should	dispel	the	suffering	of	others	because	it	is	suffering	like	my	own	suffering.	I	should	help	others	too	because	of	their	nature	as	beings,	which	is	like	my	own	being	(BCA,	8:94).					 Since	I	feel	responsible	to	the	surrogate-other,	who	is	only	conventionally	me,	there	is	no	reason	not	to	extend	this	courtesy	to	all	sentient	otherness.	Granted,	this	is	not	a	deductive	conclusion	drawn	out	of	the	verses	above.	However,	when	we	consider	the	idea	that	we	are	always,	in	some	sense,	concerned	with	what	is	other,	given	our	acceptance	that	no	real	metaphysical	unity	exists	between	this	episode	of	appropriative	self-identity	and	some	future	episode	of	appropriative	self-identity	(see	chapter	2),	we	can	learn	to	recognize	that	what	makes	this	other	“myself”	is	a	higher-order	act	of	appropriation.	If	we	can	learn	to	expand	that	sense	of	ownership	to	include	other	sentient	fields	that	are	less	directly	associated	with	ourselves	now,	we	can	at	least	negatively	recognize	that	no	metaphysical	barriers	prevent	us	from	being	altruistically	concerned	with	all	suffering.	Hence,	Śāntideva's	point:	
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Through	habituation	there	is	the	understanding	of	‘I’	regarding	the	drops	of	sperm	and	blood	of	two	other	people,	even	though	there	is	in	fact	no	such	thing.	Why	can	I	not	also	accept	another’s	body	as	my	self	in	the	same	way,	since	the	otherness	of	my	own	body	has	been	settled	and	is	not	hard	to	accept?	(BCA,	8:111-112).			 If	there	is	no	metaphysical	unity	between	my	body	now	and	my	body	in	the	future,	and	the	sense	of	self	is	explained	by	appropriation	(again,	see	chapter	2),	then	all	“coalescence”	of	appropriative	activity	is	a	play	of	distinct	sentient	episodes	directed	by	a	concern	whose	intentional	object	is	strictly	speaking,	other.	When	Śāntideva	enjoins	us	to	see	this,	he	believes	that	it	is	ethically	impactful,	because	we	can	learn	to	draw	this	relationship	between	self	and	other	to	such	an	expansive	level	that	all	suffering	(if	any	suffering)	becomes	important	and	ethically	relevant.	So	if	we	experience	ethical	concern	foundationally	as	responsibility	to	the	good	(however	we	define	it—even	if	only	as	a	regulative	idea),	then	we	are	responsible	toward	all	episodes	of	suffering	that	obstruct	the	good.	Moreover,	the	conventionally	constructed	self/other	distinction,	alone,	does	not	provide	a	good	reason	to	privilege	any	one	episode	of	suffering	over	another,	because	even	conventionally,	I	can	cultivate	an	experience	of	myself	as	an	other	to	whom	I	am	responsible.		 While	I	have	now	come	full	circle	to	a	No-Self	model	that	supports	a	uniquely	altruistic	vision,	I	have	dispelled	Martin’s	argument	that	the	Self/No-Self	question	is	irrelevant	to	practical	matters.	If	the	self	is	an	embodied	self	that	persists	in	time,	then	there	may	be	very	good	reasons	for	it	to	care	about	future	stages	of	itself.	In	short,	the	me-consideration	is	justified	when	we	get	clear	about	the	base	of	individuation	that	supports	unity	and	persistence,	and	when	we	ground	certain	anticipatory	concerns	in	the	physical	and	emotional	capacities	of	that	base.	
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However,	I’ve	also	shown	that	the	No-Self	Buddhist,	either	the	Mādhyamika	who	rejects	the	belief	in	continuities	and	a	base	of	individuation,	or	the	Buddhist	who	believes	that	the	ownerless	stream	is	a	base	of	individuation,	can	develop	a	uniquely	altruistic	perspective	that	is	decidedly	impactful	on	practical	reasons	for	action.	So	that	leaves	us	with	a	puzzle.		 Does	the	me-consideration	provide	more	robust	reasons	for	action	than	the	No-Self	view?	What	grounds	for	other-centricity	exist	on	the	Self	model?	Do	they	provide	any	sort	of	advantage	over	the	No-Self	view?	Could	the	No-Selfers	be	conflating	the	self	and	the	ego	or	are	the	Selfers	drawing	a	spurious	distinction	between	them?	I	argue	in	the	next	chapter	that	there	are	theoretical	epistemological	advantages	to	the	self/ego	distinction,	and	that	Selfers	are	therefore	on	firm	footing.	Still,	the	No-Selfer	might	believe	that	compassion	and	altruism	are	intimately	connected	to	the	No-Self	view.	But	the	Buddhist	version	of	that	view	also	construes	the	self	as	something	that	impedes,	rather	than	supports,	other-centricity.	If	No-Selfers	can	clearly	show	how	the	Self	view	produces	egoists	rather	than	altruists,	then	their	unique	model	of	altruism	stands	on	surer	footing.				 	
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CHAPTER 4. EXALTED ALTRUISM AND MEREOLOGICAL HOLISM 
4.1 Introduction  In what follows, I provide two broad accounts of selfhood: two general models that account for our sense of ownership and immersion in a first-person experience. Addressing the problem of how altruism is justified, I argue that both accounts provide us with reasons to pursue and perform altruistic deeds. One account provides ontologically minimal scaffolding, while the other provides an ontologically thicker account of how altruistic reasons can be robustly motivational in nature. The first account advances “the normative self,” a general model under which a variety of normative accounts of selfhood may fall. The second account 
advances what I’ll simply call, “the metaphysical view.”  The normative self owns its mental and physical states because of individuating a narrative history, which is strung upon an embodied, normative-emotional framework through avowals and disavowals. Such individuation has been 
referred to in the literature as “participation,” or, the forging of a “participant self.”1 The normative view offers an ontologically minimalist account of our capacity to 
recognize rational reasons for taking up another’s cause at our own expense. However, in section 4.2, I will argue that the normative account does not adequately                                                       1 Ganeri, The Self, 32 (see fn. 41). Ganeri borrows this from Laura Waddell Ekstrom 
“Keynote Preferences and Autonomy,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Review Vol. 59, 1999: 1057-63, also: Ekstrom, “Alienation, Autonomy, and the Self,” Midwest 
Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 29, 2005: 45-67. As quoted from Ekstrom by Ganeri, a 
participant self is “a self constituted by ‘a collection of preferences and 
acceptances…along with the capacity or faculty for forming and reforming that [collection],’ where a preference is a desire formed by a process of critical 
evaluation, and acceptance marks the ‘endorsement of a proposition formed by 
critical reflection with the aim of assenting to what is true’ (2005: 55).”   
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explain our capacity to connect directly with others in an experience of emotional wholeness, an experience that I believe is essential for both motivating altruistic deeds and for making sense of the epistemology of intersubjective, motivationally- emotive states. Of course, I owe an explanation of what I mean by “wholeness,” and I 
will develop that account through what I’m calling, “mereological holism.”  To this point, the metaphysical view offers an ontologically deeper account of an underlying sense of identification with others, which justifies concern for the well-being of others to the extent that concern for any suffering is justified. The idea here is that if I feel compelled to care and be motivated by my own suffering, it can make sense for me to care and be motivated by another’s suffering so long as that suffering can in some non-trivial sense be shared. While a similar conclusion is reached in the normative account, the metaphysical account supports its view based on aspectual metaphysics, or, mereological holism (to be explained in what is to come). To develop this point further, I will draw on the metaphysics of the Pratyabhijñā philosophy (the “Recognition School”) of the c. 10th century Kashmiri philosopher, Abhinavagupta. Without necessarily endorsing his theological commitments, I believe that his metaphysics are instructive for the contemporary view that reality is multivalent, and thus describable in both pluralistic and monistic terms, with each description providing an equally true count of objects that can be viewed as both a collection of individuals, as well as aspects of a single, but composite whole. So, for example, we can count the car in terms of many parts, and we can say that only the hood is dented. But we can also count the car as a single whole, and simply say that the car has been damaged, and the latter description is 
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not simply reducible to the former. This, I believe, provides a way of making sense of intersubjectivity—and shared motivations—while preserving the integrity of difference and pluralism.   For Abhinavagupta, realization of an underlying universal Self paradoxically both actualizes and overcomes (perhaps in the Hegelian sense of aufhebung!) the real presence of otherness, particularly, the otherness of other selves. He argues further that when we recognize our wholeness as a universal Self encompassing all individuals, we do not gain new information (that is, he does not offer this as an empirical claim), but rather, we clarify for ourselves what was already there to begin with—something akin to (but not identical with) unpacking an analytically derived claim from a concept clarified with greater depth. This is not to be confused with a Fregean sense/reference distinction, where the whole and the individual have distinct senses, but identical reference. According to Abhinavagupta, and his predecessor, Utpaladeva, clarifying for ourselves the nature of selfhood—understood as a self-reflexive unity of consciousness—discloses a background unity; we can re-cognize an original unity that lingers as an obscured, but background presupposition. We do not immediately recognize this original unity, because, according to Abhinavagupta, we are ontically “distracted/deluded” (moha) by the play of individuation and particularity, which Abhinavagupta describes as the universal self playfully “forgetting” itself (like an actor or child fully absorbed in a role).2 For Pratyabhijñā philosophers, the self allows itself to get absorbed in its role                                                       2 See Utpaladeva’s Vivṛti, verse I, 1, 5 (commentary on his auto-commentary to the 
Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā: the seminal work that deemed this school, Pratyabhijñā philosophy), quoted by Abhinavagupta in his commentary, cited from Isabelle Ratié, 
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as limited and individuated beings. I will argue that even if we are uncomfortable speaking of a universal Self, mereological holism provides tools for making sense of metaphysical pluralism (individuals emerging as aspects, and not properties of the whole) while also acknowledging the real existence of composite, whole entities. The relationship between me and you, self and other, then becomes something like 
bhedābheda, or, “identity-in-distinction.” In other words, I will develop a metaphysics of identity-in-difference that, in tandem with Abhinavagupta’s metaphysics, might provide a fresh view on what it means to share an emotional world and be motivated by the needs and feelings of others.   At first glance, Abhinavagupta’s Advaita-Śaivite metaphysics (monistic metaphysics of the Śiva devotees) seems not only out of place in a discussion of the contemporary moral psychological issue of how to motivate other-regarding actions, but also paradoxical if not outright contradictory. It attempts to acknowledge the real existence of different individuals, while also transcending that individuation toward a single, universal Self. It is surely not a form of solipsism, and yet, it concretely gravitates towards a selfing of the other. If we are uncomfortable with the theological overtones of this view, we can, instead, think of the universe in terms of a real whole, or better, a dynamic system undergoing transition-states. 
                                                                                                                                                              
“Otherness in the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy,” Journal of Indian Philosophy (2007) 35: 313-370, at 367 fn. 106. Abhinava quotes: “But otherness has as its essence nothing but an incomplete opinion of oneself (abhimāna) that is produced by distraction (moha) due to the self-concealing power (māyā) [of the Universal Self].” All 
references to Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta will be draw from Ratié’s translation and her source manuscripts.  
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Individuals articulate “aspects” of the whole rather than distinct properties.3 In the 
view I’ll develop, the universe is multivalent.4 With respect to individual selves, we can claim that as an aspect, individuated psychophysical streams are distinct and singular, but as another aspect, they are never insulated from one another in their 
“interests” or “emotions,” and each of them remains simply an expression of a composite whole. This means that we can describe individuals in distinct but equally true ways (which is what I mean by “mereological holism”). As one aspect, the person I witness on the news leaving pipe-bombs in New York City is “other,” and the whole does not bear his sins. Under another aspect, the whole suffers and 
therefore is that very predicament of aggression. I believe that something like this can be articulated out of Abhinavagupta’s view. I draw from his metaphysics to show how the metaphysical view contributes to a phenomenology in which an individual identifies with the suffering of others, and experiences the other’s need as overwhelmingly motivational. I believe that the normative view does very little to make sense of this emotively-charged experience. The minimalism of the normative view might justify altruistic considerations, in the sense of abstract principles, but it does not adequately explain how we sometimes transcend egoistic considerations, and how we sometimes forfeit our own advantage for the sake of another’s welfare. According to my metaphysically thicker model, the experience of transcending egoistic considerations may reach an exalted crescendo when psychological 
altruism affords the moral agent a glimpse of the truth that “I can act for the sake of                                                       3 Donald L.M. Baxter, “Altruism, Grief, and Identity,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, Vol. 70, No. 2 (March 2005), 371-383. 4 I borrow this directly from Baxter, Altruism, Grief, and Identity.  
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all because I am all.” This, in turn, speaks to a capacity to experience an extraordinary cognitive and conative richness, something akin to the spirit of the jovial gift-giver, who is unhampered by an underlying sense of scarcity and anxiety. This sort of experience defuses the natural inclination to prioritize self-regarding concerns. Out of the experience of exalted fullness, we can overwrite egocentricity. The outcome amounts to what I call, “exalted altruism.” This refers to a state in which our deliberations can take on an exceedingly other-centric tone, one that may be viewed as supererogatory from the everyday state of transactional reality. In this 
sense, the exalted altruist experiences “selflessness” of the everyday ego by deeply identifying with something that transcends her own personal needs and her own embodied history.   In making this point, I am also appropriating aspects of Śāntideva's Ownerless view without endorsing the full-fledged No-Self view. At the level of shared feelings, we can sometimes say that the feeling does not belong to a single unit; there is simply grief and suffering that requires attention. On the surface, this may seem to challenge what I’ve been endorsing throughout the entirety of this essay, namely, the Ownership view. In section 4.3, I will briefly explain how this tension arises, and how I wish to defuse it. In sections 4.4 and 4.5, I will articulate my final argument in broad strokes, and then proceed to defend it in the final segments of the chapter. Finally, in section 4.6, I will introduce the solution that the c. 7th century Buddhist idealist, Dharmakīrti offers with respect to the problem of intersubjectivity, or, other minds. I will do so to further develop my metaphysical view, which I build out of Abhinavagupta’s critique of Dharmakīrti and the account 
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of mereological holism that I provide in 4.7. While the metaphysics are, for me, mostly exploratory, I believe they are attractive from an ethical standpoint, insofar as they provide a motivationally compelling account of how we come to grieve and experience joy with others, and, consequently, how we sometimes share each 
other’s feelings, which includes the motivation to act on behalf of something that transcends our individual, narrative identities. My view supports the common sentiment that when someone grieves, suffers, or passes away, we can sometimes feel that a part of us has grieved, suffered, or passed away. I believe this metaphysics provides an attractive way of filling a motivational gap left open by the strictly normative account. In 4.8, I will conclude by connecting mereological holism to 
Abhinavagupta’s solution to the problem of intersubjectivity, and I will argue that this is an ethically attractive account of how we can directly share our world, and thus be motivated by something much larger than egocentrically present concerns.  
4.2 The Normative Self 
 In chapters 1 and 2, I argued that viewing the self as the unifying owner of embodied mental states provides an ethically (and naturalistically) attractive view. The view allows us to speak of “ownership” without positing a metaphysical entity, and without endorsing substance dualism. Ownership can refer to the practical fact that we exercise the capacity to endorse our mental states.5 While we can construe this in terms of higher-order deliberation, and avowals or disavowals, over first-order mental states, we can also view endorsement under the concept of authority.6                                                       5 See Ganeri, The Self, 323.  6 See Ganeri, The Self, 324, where Ganeri borrows from Bortolotti and Broome, “A 
Role for Ownership and Authorship in the Analysis of Thought Insertion,” in 
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We exercise a capacity to accept and/or acknowledge that a mental state is our own, and in cases of thought-insertion, this is made abundantly clear.7 When we exercise this capacity, we come to more directly author our own lives.8  But this authority is not necessarily the free-wheeling libertarian authority that a Cartesian entity exercises; for one of the first insights new meditators experience is the capacity to witness the compulsive and scattered unfolding of the contents of their mind as an uncontrollable parade of feelings, emotions, plans, and fantasies. Not only do we seem to experience perceptual passivity in simply coming face to face and body to body with objects in the world, but we also experience introspective passivity in bearing thoughts we might quite consciously wish away to no avail. For example, I’m having an important meeting with someone I deeply respect, and I sense faint sexual feelings emerging throughout the conversation. More importantly, though, I sense that they are, in fact, my thoughts—I’m not going to childishly shoulder the responsibility on someone else. While I am assailed by such feelings, I also see them as belonging to me. I may paradoxically feel like I am the owner and author, but also the passive victim of such thoughts. But a deeper sense of authority emerges from the fact that, when things are going right, I can ultimately disavow such thoughts. This makes sense of me claiming, “Those are not                                                                                                                                                               
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2008): 205-224, at 211. Ganeri cites 
Bortolotti and Broome’s concept of ownership in terms of a physical base, spatiality, introspective access, self-ascription, agency, and authority. 7 Ibid, 324.  8 Harry Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays 
(Cambridge University Press, Massachusetts), 170: “To this extent the person, in making a decision by which he identifies with a desire, constitutes himself. The pertinent desire is no longer in any way external to him. It is not a desire that he 
“has” merely as a subject in whose history it happens to occur, as a person may 
“have” an involuntary spasm that happens to occur in the history of his body.”  
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the kind of thoughts befitting to this situation.”9 The important point here is that I can exert authority over, and in this sense, author a thought by determining the weight it has in the constellation of my deliberations and actions. For example, in spite of my initial aggravation and desire, I consciously elect not to shout at or threaten the infuriating driver who has blocked me in my parking spot. All of this is obviously cloaked in normative terms. For example, what’s befitting of me is that I sufficiently see my lover as a partner in desire and sexual joy; but what’s befitting in our board-meeting is that I see her as my colleague and superior (say, when she is the director or chair). In this way, we respond to normative constraints in determining which mental states we come to own through our avowals and disavowals, and this capacity is bound up with our prior commitments.   Ownership as endorsement is also bound up with embodiment, because normative demands both emerge from commitments presupposed in speech-acts—declarations, promises, and assertions—and from emotively-charged attitudes that are realized in our bodies.10 The self, then, becomes a normatively constrained, but dynamic framework of attitudes, emotions, and beliefs. This shapes what it makes rational sense to do with our bodies and our embodied thoughts. The self is also co-realized with other selves in a public space, which is shaped by commitment-laden speech-acts and the normatively rich social roles that we adopt. This is the sense in                                                       9 Ganeri, The Self, 323, also cf. fn. 6. Through the lens of the Nyāya philosopher 
Vātsyāyana, Ganeri writes: “We are all too easily persuaded that motivations, desires, and ideas are ours when in reality they have nothing to do with us, a 
mistake of taking to be myself what is not myself.”   10 Ganeri, The Self, 325-326: Emotionally-charged endorsements and motivationally relevant shifts in attitude imply embodiment, because beliefs and attitudes would not have force without us actually inhabiting rather than merely observing emotional perturbations. 
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which a self is immersed in a first-person stance, and “takes a stand” on its identity in the various spheres of its social world. Borrowing from Laura Waddell Ekstrom, 
Ganeri calls this a “participant self,” who occupies and authors a first-person, embodied stance.11    This concept of selfhood is grounded in a physical, embodied structure, and to this extent, it makes sense to examine the neuronal correlates of consciousness (NCC). But the self also enjoys introspection and a sense of first-person “mineness” within that framework of participation and ownership. The participant self is a dynamic and complex entity that is unified in what it participates in owning of itself. This allows the self considerable flexibility in coming to identify with others through shared commitments in a “co-arising” and dynamic social order.   Now, one might ask, “What gives anyone ultimate authority over my natural 
right to do as I please?” He may further clarify, “By ‘natural,’ I mean my material capacity to reject any external authority (despite the consequences that may follow).” A crude Contractarian, in the classical Hobbesian sense, develops a picture of independent, rational agents coming together out of self-interest in some sort of original and explicit agreement.                                                        11 Ibid, 327: “Ownership…is now understood in terms of participation and endorsement, and so as implying the occupation of the a first-person stance and not merely the witnessing of a set of attitudes and emotions within oneself; and 
individuation (the question of ‘base’) is understood in terms of a common ownership relation obtaining between clusters of commitments, resolutions, and intentions, circumscribed by normative emotional response and implying agency 
and sentience and so embodiment.” This has been adapted from Ekstrom, “Keynote 
Preferences and Autonomy,” Philosophical and Phenomenological Review, 1999, 59: 1057-63. Ekstrom argues that the self is a “collection of preferences and 
acceptances…along with the capacity or faculty for forming and reforming that 
[collection].” 
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 However, the participant, or, normative self co-emerges in a social space.  Explicit agreements are not deliberated over with respect to background constraints. Instead, we have something like a dance of mostly unconscious and coordinated receptivity and interaction. For example, my capacity to determine the conditions that satisfy the use of a word in a particular context presupposes conventions that arise with and are sustained by other language-users. If I were to work as a projectionist in a retro, art-house movie theater, I could comfortably tell 
my assistant, “The film is running,” without provoking him to go on a wild goose-hunt for a film that he believes “ran off.” You, reading this passage right now, also understand that I am not referring to an assistant chasing after a plump, wild goose. This coordinated activity of sharing language and responding to appropriate meanings in given contexts is mostly reached without explicit agreements. Add the premise that my capacity to introspectively and publicly develop a sense of my individual identity is shaped by embodied and linguistically-constituted thoughts. This allows me to derive the conclusion that my sense of self is quite literally dependent upon others. In fact, as I pointed out in Scheffler (chapter 1), large portions of the action-guiding values that constitute our “self-interest” include the well-being and success of others in our life. We’re often unable to determine where 
our own success and another’s success part ways. The profit-sharing employee and 
the CEO can intelligibly claim, “Blue Steel Co. is flourishing,” while including their individual and collective success in the equation. We see this on a more intimate level in tight-knit families. The child’s success is partly constitutive of the parents’ 
success. And even if a parent does not acknowledge “success by association,” the 
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public might not view things as such. One might say, “Wow, you must be proud of 
her!” And while the “must” here is basically predictive, it can still retain some of its 
normative tone: “Whether you think so, you have something to be proud of; so enough with the misplaced humility: be proud!” From what I have argued, we can say that the socially immersed, normative self is required to take the needs of others seriously—in some instances, at its own expense—because the context demands it (in the same way that contexts provide implicit imperatives to use particular words with particular shades of meaning). The demand is not something mysterious. The demand may emerge in the very instant that I claim, “I am suffering, and you ought 
to lend me a hand!” If I consistently apply this imperative across appropriate contexts, then I recognize that it makes sense for you to make the same demand of me.12 Therefore, I have a reason to help you, even if I do not always desire to do so. This means that I can quite rationally act on that sense of obligation without having to prove that it serves me in some material way. In short, I can rationally be an altruist.   Now, this model is consistent with a Bundle-view of self, if that view leaves room for the notion of an embodied agent who has a say in ordering clusters of preferences, etc. that constitute her practical identity. However, the Mādhyamika claim that ownership and individuation are ultimately “empty” (śūnyatā) and erroneous concepts sharply distinguishes it from the normative view. From the normative perspective, there is a “resting place” (āśraya) for the self (see chapter 2); in other words, there is a real, albeit ontologically minimal, subject. The base of                                                       12 See John Searle, Rationality in Action, (Press, 2005), chapter 5.  
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individuation for a self emerges from a body capable of emotively-charged attitudes that are attuned to a normative framework. Whether a permanent, metaphysical entity underlies that framework may thus seem immaterial.   As I’ve pointed out, viewing selfhood in terms of ownership and participation adds another dimension to the stock arguments against ethical egoism. So long as our capacity to enjoy an independent life is premised on our ability and desire to align our intentions and actions with others, which is evident in the intention to communicate through the normative framework of language, we cannot believe that we are inherently privileged or subject to standards that transcend a general framework applicable to other selves. More importantly, the general framework we emerge from and implicitly commit to through communication does not always direct us to act in our own best interest. Assuming so betrays a depleted sense of what it means to be an inherently social self.  
4.3 Selves as “Ownerless” Owners: Revisiting Sidgwick’s Ethical Dilemma   In the previous chapters, particularly chapter 1, I addressed Sidgwick’s now classic thesis that egoistic and altruistic considerations represent fundamentally independent domains of concerns. In ethics, particularly applied ethics, we might struggle to justify which domain of concern has authority. For example, is it reasonable for me to sacrifice a percentage of my income, which could be spent supporting, say, my research and those things that bring joy and meaning to my life and my family, to support school-lunch vouchers for poor children in my state? Should I sacrifice my valuable office hours doing fulfilling and lucrative work to 
assist a student who has poor study habits and thus “needs my help” (after all, I’m 
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not in the business of teaching my adult college students how to organize their time and discipline their urges to procrastinate)? Of course, compassion, good-will, and various normative constraints (say, as a professor who must shoulder certain expected social responsibilities) provide me with reasons to contribute in a way that does not always directly benefit me in my personal life. And compassionately helping a student uncover his own incompetency and develop his talent is certainly one aspect of being an exemplary teacher (and not just a researcher). But the question is whether these reasons have some sort of authority over reasons of prudence and desire. For Sidgwick, the problem remained intractable, because ultimately our numerical distinction from one another gives us reasons that are sometimes mutually inconsistent, but enjoy equal authority. From the perspective of the individual, I am prudent, and concerned with long-term pleasure and fulfillment. From the perspective of the whole, I am concerned with the flourishing of the whole to which I contribute. But when I am numerically distinct from you, I retain the individual perspective. It seems utterly reasonable to promote what would serve me best. For example, it’s not so cruel to spend my Sunday watching football rather than answering my phone and consoling my chronically depressed friend, who always tends to reach out to me on my cherished day of relaxation. On the other hand, I am connected to a larger society and social network, and that requires that I promote the overall good. How do we judge which reasons hold greater authority?   A radical move is to deny what fuels this interminable stand-off; we might elect to deny the ultimate existence of numerical distinction. The Buddhists, particularly Śāntideva, present arguments that defuse the relevance of such a 
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distinction. For Śāntideva, the Owernlessness thesis—understood in terms of the 
Mādhyamika No-Self view—seems to entail that altruistic reasons have greater authority. I explained in chapters 2 and 3 why I think his argument ultimately fails. I can sum this up by saying that the No-Self view goes too far, because it destabilizes the authority of any reasons whatsoever. However, I believe that Śāntideva was on the right track in trying to disarm egoism at its core, namely, at the belief in ultimately individuated and owned constellations of psychophysical events that pit 
“my fair share” of goods against “your fair share.” This may seem contradictory to 
everything that I’ve tried to establish so far in this essay, because I have argued that we need some sense of ownership to make sense of our conventional and ethically salient reality. I’ve also claimed that the ultimate normativity of collective living (and language-use) provides us with a background of obligations and concerns that circumvent the problem of totally disparate domains of considerations remaining interminably at odds.   But in this final chapter, I want to further clarify and nuance what the Ownership view can mean. Conventionally, we need this view to make sense of our transactional reality—this much, any Buddhist would grant. However, the Buddhist might be right that achieving a sense of ownerlessness can motivate a transformative ethics. But I think construing this in terms of either “no self” or 
“without self” is not so conceptually fruitful. “The self” can also be viewed more substantially as an underlying synthesizer of otherwise disparate experiences. The 
self, as I’ve argued, allows us to make sense of communication, language comprehension, and arguably, memory in a way that epicycles of No-Self (or even 
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Without-Self) views do not. More importantly, it allows us to more easily make sense of our ethical transactions reaching their intended targets, and it supports our sense that compassionate concern for another is not defused over a possibly unbounded flow of ephemeral and radically individual person-events. From one level of description—say, a very narrow reading of Leibniz’s Identity of Indiscernables—when John is concerned for Sarah at 20 and Sarah at 35, he’s concerned with different people (given the distinctness of properties between A and 
B). But the depth of concern he may have for Sarah at 35 may incorporate her real past. Sarah contracts lymphoma at 35, and John views this as an even starker turn of events given that she recovered from a nearly fatal aneurism at 20, which led to a bicycle accident that crippled her for several years. If the Lockean determines 
Sarah’s personal identity by memory alone, then John’s sadness in the face of Sarah’s long-endured pain would be misplaced if Sarah radically dissociates from or completely forgets her past. But John experiences sympathy for Sarah, and the 
meaning and quality of that sympathy encompasses the stretch of Sarah’s life. He may be glad that she does not remember some of these tragedies, but his sympathy is for the whole person, and not just for her memories, or for distinct and ephemeral individuals over which he has imputed an illusive unity. Sarah is the self-same individual who, in Hegelian terms, is whole over a dynamic mediation of becoming: she is not any particular piece of changing content, and yet she is “substance” in the sense of maintaining her unity (self-sameness) amidst determinate difference.   Now, one may argue that Sarah’s life has integrity as a narrative, so the current state of “Sarah-ness” is pregnant with the outcomes and memories of past 
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events (related in the right way). One may further argue that “no self” doesn’t necessarily mean that she lacks unity and wholeness in her life. There may be a 
sense of synchronic unity that integrates the moments of her life (even when diachronic unity has been eroded), but it is not metaphysically deep. She has a sense of wholeness, but it is nevertheless “without self,” which means that there is no further underlying fact about what integrates her into a whole and rounded individual. In response, I believe there is an advantage to viewing the self as that very wholeness, that is, in viewing Sarah as a real continuant. The general advantage 
is that “wholeness” is a unifying term (in a way that I believe “without self” is not), and it can accommodate diversity and relational dynamics, both in terms of individual lives, and in terms of group dynamics, without abandoning either the thread that connects an individual to the moments of her life, or connects an individual to the social spectrum of differences that conditions her individual contribution to that whole. While we may want to eschew the view that individuals are radically autonomous and static rational agents, and in this sense, claim that we 
are “without self,” the notion of wholeness allows us to imagine a synthesis of differences that begets shared values (when thinking in terms of diverse groups), and it allows us to view the individual as a dynamic but integrated being capable of real change as opposed to being only a conceptually constructed vehicle that organizes for us what is really just a replacement of experiences and property-tropes across independent events. Moreover, an advantage lies in being able to accommodate radical asymmetry between Sarah’s “internal” narrative and our 
“external” narrative of her life; there is a real set of facts about what happened to 
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Sarah despite differences of opinion and memory. On a practical level, this will impact how we treat Sarah, and it will help us better determine the sorts of remunerations we believe she may deserve. In the case of radical dissociation (or a breakdown in diachronic unity), this may even justify paternalistic measures to treat Sarah, and help her recover what she has lost.   Now, with respect to the nature of personal identity, we may reach a conceptual impasse, and perhaps our only recourse lies in more or less grounded decisions (rather than arguments). Either we help her “recover” her past by collectively imputing a metaphysically empty narrative that we can train her to accept, or she can recover memories and associations with different events that have occurred over the historical unfolding of her real life. I believe the latter has the distinct advantage of requiring less counter-intuitive conceptual labor than what would be required to live as though diachronic unity were a conceptual fabrication. In other words, diachronic identity is the default for complex creatures like us. I also believe that we do not have a clear enough sense of what is involved in “conceptual imputation” to assume that our helping Sarah recover her past is some sort of 
collective work of the imagination (where “imagination” is understood in terms of 
falsification). Finally, I believe that when Sarah dissociates from the tragic events of her life, and John is nevertheless deeply impacted by those events, he is not mourning a different Sarah than the Sarah who is blissfully unaware of her tragic past. Despite their different narratives, there is simply the tragedy of Sarah’s life that one might uncover upon a larger view of the facts, which means that Sarah can get it wrong about herself.  
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 Now, if we accept, as I do, that it makes more conceptual sense to think in terms of real individuals and real continuant selves, an epistemic problem looms. We have immediate awareness of our own conscious states, but only indirect awareness of other conscious states. I find you grieving, and I am compassionately compelled to reach out and help you. Say that I do so at the expense of my own well-being. There is a general conceptual presupposition underlying this common transaction. I am referring to the fact that I am attuned to your grief, and I am motivated by something that transcends my private experience of grief. One may agree that my concerns can be directed at you and your well-being. But, one may further argue, I am ultimately just chasing the tail of my personal constellation of private feelings and desires. There is an epistemic question of how I come to know and incorporate your motivating feelings into my decisions. Even when I sense that I am motivated by your grief, I had better have access of some form or another to your feelings. Put another way, we had better be able to share our emotional worlds. If I endorse strict, naïve realism about ownership, then we are numerically distinct entities that own our individual psychophysical states. I’ve already explained why this is relevant to ethical actions, but I have not assessed the epistemology of knowing which sorts of motivating reasons drive us. I want to believe that you and 
your needs directly motivate my helping you (in the sense that we can intersubjectively share emotional worlds). If this were not the case, then altruism would be impossible, because I would always be one-step removed from the person whose needs I aim to serve. That does not mean that my actions cannot be described as altruistic. The problem is that the other I wish to serve only exists as if she has 
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feelings and needs that ought to be met. The source of my motivation to help is ultimately me, who has taken this indirectly experienced other as a perceptual object worthy of my consideration—any “source of normativity” that favors helping is grounded in the only values that I directly experience, my own. Thus, a kind of attenuated altruism is possible, but the ground of its value and motivation is fundamentally egocentric. So if a non-egocentric, motivating reason exists, I need to explain how I can know that what motivates me is not something entirely personal, private, and therefore, purely egocentrically present.   This is an iteration of the problem—at the level of motivation and reasons for action—of determining how we intersubjectively share a world of common perceptual objects, like tables, lamps, and meadows, for example. If it is only my grief that is directly present to me, then in the final analysis, I am acting on an egocentric consideration, because the good that guides my action is reflexive and ultimately self-regarding, and only indirectly other-centric. If it is your grief I aim to ameliorate, and I regard your need as intrinsically valid, then it remains to be explained how it might directly compel me in an agentive way. My point is not that we are always psychological egoists. I am making the epistemological point that to conceptually (not just empirically) rule this out, I must know that your grief has real purchase in motivating my action; I must be able to share it with you. And, in terms of value, I must recognize that the source of your value does not rest entirely in me. When it comes to non-egocentric altruistic action, the person that motivates my action needs to be the real and intrinsically valuable other. This is especially true when we admit that the hero may not want to sacrifice herself for a stranger by 
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stepping in front of a bullet, but she can somehow feel compelled (and even obligated) to do so. After all, the claim, “I didn’t want to be a hero, but it felt like the right thing to do…so I did it” is neither empirically unfounded nor logically contradictory. So how do we explain this?   A simple solution is that we do not have any sort of direct access to each 
other’s feelings and motivations, but we can infer them. Inferring the existence of other subjectivities does not provide us with direct access to each other’s feelings. We might explain emotional connectedness through physical mechanisms that in some billiard-ball causal fashion transmit information. From some such model we make progress in the area of, say, mirror-neurons, and these may explain the underlying physical mechanisms that support our capacity to empathize with each other, and in some analogical sense, experience each other’s grief. But in a way, 
we’re left with only a black box. How can these neurons experience, or partly constitute, grief that is both their own and not their own? An account that provides us with some sort of direct connection to each other can both satisfy our ethical need to explain altruistic action—and purge, once and for all, any traces of psychological egoism—while at the same time providing us with an epistemically satisfying account of how we come to know other minds (and thus other states of grief, pain, and sorrow that might motivate us to sacrifice our own well-being for 
another’s advantage). It’s just such an account that I wish to develop here, and in 
order to do so, I’m going to develop my account of selfhood in a way that I hope avoids the usual impasse between Bundle-theories and realism about the self. On the one hand, I wish to preserve the integrity of individual continuant selves, which 
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means that I will not offer a nuanced version of a Bundle-theory that views selves as property tropes related in the right ways. On the other hand, I will also relinquish the belief that our psychophysical states are, strictly speaking, always individually owned under all accurate descriptions of reality.    Let me initially motivate this through an analogy with theoretical physics. Think in terms of the distinct principles that distinguish systems and quantum field theory from linear, mechanistic models. For example, two protons accelerated in a particle accelerator each have measurable motions, and measurable velocities and energy states. They collide and then part ways. Observationally, we find that they still exist, but in their collision, new particles have appeared with measurable masses and electrical charges. Describing this with Newtonian mechanics and 
within the purview of Einstein’s “E = mc2” requires something like the claim that the incident particle motion of the two protons creates new objects. This means that some of the properties of the two colliding protons change into objects. Object/property ontology distinguishes the world of objects from properties, and no element of either transforms into the other. This would be like claiming that the height of the Eiffel tower can somehow transform into another Eiffel tower, or claiming that colliding planets can emerge from their collisions and beget a host of newly created planets (rather than merely broken off fragments of the former planets).13 Quantum field theory makes sense of this by radically departing from the mechanistic interpretation, while more deeply problematizing the notion of                                                       13 I borrow this example, and general description of the physics involved here from 
Bernard d’Espagnat, On Physics and Philosophy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006), 15. 
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“creation.” Observationally speaking, we simply do not have a clear formula that quantifies the concept of creation. So, we can instead speak in terms of transition-states of a dynamic system.14 Thus, instead of thinking in terms of metaphysically distinct absolutes (basically, atomistic and mechanistic thinking), we might think in terms of the transition-states of a single system, whereby the creation of a new particle (or individual) is just the transition of one state of a certain “something” into another state. Similarly, I’m recommending that we revise our view of distinct individuals with their private experiences, and examine something like transition-states of a non-linear single system, from which emerge shareable and interconnected emotional phenomena. The caveat is that we can describe this in terms of individuals that nevertheless bear the marks of quantum “non-locality” (that is, they are inherently connected, and in this way “share” information without appeal to mechanistic packets of information being traded at speeds that would have to move faster than the speed of light). This is the substantive difference 
between speaking in terms of “wholes” and speaking in terms of “emptiness” or “no-
self.”    When we’re viewed as numerically and metaphysically distinct entities, the gap between self and other is always looming. In one description of things, each of                                                       14 Ibid., 16: “…let us begin by observing that the notion of creation is not a scientific one: We do not know how to capture it, and even less quantify it. It is therefore appropriate to try and reduce it to something we can master. Now we do master the notions of a system state and changes thereof. We know how to calculate transition 
rates from one state to another. And the brilliant idea…just came from this. It consisted in considering that the existence of a particle is a state of a certain 
“Something,” that the existence of two particles is another state of this same 
“Something,” and so on. Then, the creation of a particle is nothing else than a 
transition from one state of this “Something” to another, and therefore we may hope 
to be able to treat it quantitatively.”  
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us directly experiences our own private mental occurrences; we only indirectly share a world of common perceptual objects. This leaves us in a certain ethical conundrum with respect to determining the authority of egoistic and altruistic reasons. It also generates an epistemological-metaphysical conundrum with respect to our capacity to understand and identify with each other’s grief while simultaneously recognizing the distinction between self and other.   The normative account might provide me with reasons to take your needs seriously by allowing me to see my needs as importantly bound up with your needs. Still, when it comes to reasons for altruistic actions, and compelling, emotively-charged motivations that support such behavior, an issue of identification and knowledge is left to be resolved. Mechanistically speaking, we might resolve this by analogy or inference. But if this proves tenuous, we can explore a metaphysics that is robust enough to provide a real identity between self and other, while preserving the commonsense distinction between individuals. The benefit here is that I can both respect your individuality, and yet truly share states of joy, grief, and pain with you. When I identify with you—or, more accurately, with your motivating suffering—any authority your needs might have in motivating me to act would be as reasonable as tending to my own suffering. But the trick here is not that my self-regarding considerations are really just other-regarding considerations (I explored this option in chapter 3). Rather, under one aspect, I’m able to identify with the whole, and thus be motivated to promote the well-being of the whole, and yet under another aspect, I can see myself as a historical and embodied individual who is distinct from that whole. I can see that at the individual level I might be at a 
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disadvantage in promoting your well-being, but at the same time, I can recognize your well-being as part of my well-being, and vice versa. I do not just reduce the whole of suffering to my own embodied, historical and egocentric existence. I’m able to see a genuine other whom I feel obligated to care for, while at the same time recognizing that the reasons and motivations I have to care for myself (at the individual, egoistic level of embodied existence) may operate at the larger level of the whole: it is not “my” self I am attending to at this larger level, but the shared 
experience of selfhood. In this sense, my empathy and compassionate motivations—and your grief and suffering—can both be “ownerless” with respect to our historical and embodied existence, but also owned within the worldview of an underlying whole, or, dynamic system whereby various transition-states manifest as both particular and non-local.   The key point I’m making here is that the normative account leaves open a 
gap in explaining motivation, and in explaining how we can share conative, 
motivational states. I may be able to provide authoritative reasons for altruism through the normative account, but this relies on a very suspicious claim. For example, John Searle provides a compelling account of why we may have desire-
independent reasons to promote another’s well-being.15 The outcome boils down to this. I believe that you have a reason to help me (if you can do so). My child is drowning, my arms are broken and in casts from a bicycle accident I sustained, and I solicit your help to brave the crashing waves and save him. Given the commitments that come with speech-acts, I can only sensibly call this a “reason to help me” if it                                                       15 Searle, Rationality in Action, chapter 5. 
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applies with universal scope (given various contextual constraints). But, as Searle points out,16 our capacity to be reasonable only makes sense if we are free to be irrational. So, we still need to make sense of an emotive force that compels you to risk your neck for my son. If you choose to ignore my need, then calling your selfishness irrational would not score me many points. You might reply: “Hey, what 
you call a ‘general reason’ is yet to be proven—isn’t that what’s precisely at stake—I have an authoritative reason to avoid the risk of drowning; you have a subjective reason to want me to help you; looks like we’re facing a tragedy here, and for that, 
I’m deeply sorry, but no dice! There’s nothing to adjudicate these competing reasons.” The problem is that you still see things as “me” and “my neck” versus the 
world. I’m not saying you’re wrong in doing so, but I’m asking how it is that you can transcend that basic concern, and share my dismay to such a degree that you go 
after my son. I’m of the mind that it’s not just duty that drives you, or some packet of information from my experience that mechanistically triggers something totally private in you. I want to employ a more metaphysically robust account of how an emotively-charged recognition might motivate you to risk your life for me.    Now, before directly proceeding with my argument, I need to address the central claims I wish to defend. Admittedly, my strategy is precarious because I toggle between an ontologically minimal account of selfhood and an ontologically robust view. But I will do just that.   
 
                                                       16 Ibid., chapter 5. 
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4.4 Two Chief Claims to Defend 
First Claim 
 There are two larger claims I wish to defend here. First, altruism enacts a 
type of freedom. This freedom is of a special sort: altruism shows us that the self is porous, and co-defined in relation to others. In this sense, its content is interdependent and not categorically individuated. And yet, the self is free to individuate itself—that is, autonomous—through the commission of both mundane and extraordinary acts of self-sacrifice. The self is capable of “gifting” itself to take up the cause of another as its own. This is akin to what the literature has called, “The Paradox of Altruism,”17 where the fierce independence and individuality that informs the psychology and praxis of a strongly altruistic person exists in tension with a deep sense of interdependence and emotional identification. Compassion, which I view, in distinction from sympathy, as inherently motivational, allows us to co-participate in an emotive state, and this can transcend the partition between self and other. This transcendence articulates a freedom otherwise unavailable to the empirically limited ego-self. On the other hand, transcendence also articulates a capacity that seems unavailable to certain versions of the No-Self view. The No-Selfer who endorses the view that the first-person stance resists a purely physicalist description has trouble explaining how a bundle or cluster of psychophysical events can account for anything outside that cluster, including, other psychophysical clusters. To genuinely experience the other as someone real and worthy of concern,                                                       17 Robert Paul Churchill and Erin Street, “Is There a Paradox of Altruism?” in The 
Ethics of Altruism, editor Jonathan Seglow (Southgate, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004), 89-106. 
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as someone whose cause one can feel obligated to take up at one’s own expense, is to be free from the limitations that come with viewing the self solely in terms of first-person immersion and “mineness.” This is one sense in which genuine altruism articulates the porousness and relationality of the self.   The idea of the “relational self” is supported by experiments in developmental psychology that seem to show that a sense of selfhood beyond that of a mere body reacting to stimuli emerges simultaneously with awareness of other selves, and this is evidenced by the infant’s capacity for achieving shared attention and coordination of action and intention with her caretaker even before developing a robust command of language.18 Research has shown that most infants get busy, early-on, coordinating their attention and intentions with their caretakers, whose mental states they in some sense perceive. When we mature and develop an enriched sense of selfhood—with all its intimations of first-person privacy, introspection, and subjectivity—we might more easily believe that we are essentially independent individuals (or uniquely singular and individuated subjectivities), and thus be naturally inclined to believe that our own welfare and sense of the good is somehow privileged (at least with respect to what it makes practical sense to care most about from our own, individual perspectives). But given that the self is only developed in tandem with a sense of other-personness (and not just bare otherness), losing sight of the robust reality of other selves, or, as in the case of severe autism, not robustly sharing attention with or fully recognizing the reality of other subjectivities, means that we have a weaker or more depleted sense of self. Couple                                                       18 See Sorabji, The Self, 24-30.  
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this with the idea that the sacrifices we endure in the altruistic act (however un-heroic or mundane that act may be) require a fairly developed will, one that exercises higher-order volitions in avowing or disavowing various impulses, beliefs, and desires. These higher-order volitions, and the commitments they both presuppose and enact, allow one to justify overwriting the instinct to prioritize 
one’s own welfare at the expense of others. When we remain egoists, entrenched in the belief that the world begins and ends with the individual, then we have not adequately exercised our deeper capacity for identification with others through motivating compassion; we inhibit the flourishing of our autonomy by not robustly enough identifying with a larger whole. Consequently, in this trenchantly egoistic state we are not robust selves, but only “self-ish.”   So the self is porous in both its capacity to identify with others through compassion, and in its capacity to imagine what it’s like to be in another’s shoes through empathic connection. And yet, the self paradoxically individuates itself by exercising its autonomy through self-sacrifice and identification with a larger whole. The self identifies with and is dependent upon the other person, and yet it achieves autonomy and distinction in the face of transcending its own egoistic inclinations. This is a somewhat conceptually unhappy statement, but I am emphasizing that there is a productive tension between identity and difference that arises as the self and other co-emerge. The egoist has the individuation game down, but misses out on the ethically extraordinary (but perhaps developmentally ordinary) capacity to identify with another by exercising the freedom to transcend the naturally egoistic compulsion.  
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 Why do I call this “freedom”? I do so because both the embodied state of being a self, which individuates us into personal beings with very personal histories, and the immersive sense of occupying a first-person stance naturally direct our attention to what is in the closest psychological and physical proximity: our own 
ego-selves, with their occurrent needs and desires. However, there is a tyranny at work in this proximity, because when the inward gaze falls too far into the rabbit hole of private, first-person experiences, it is both metaphysically and epistemically limited. What it can know, and consequently what it can do is limited; it shuts itself off from a whole range of experiences that are generated by compassionately communing with another. Over-emphasizing individuation threatens to perniciously limit the greater range of possibilities that are inherently open to one who identifies 
with a larger whole. So I am not using “freedom” in a completely libertarian Kantian 
sense. I’m also including creative and imaginative freedom in my account of what it means to identify with something larger than the private ego-self. This is the first big claim I wish to defend.  
Second Claim 
 Second, while I applaud the general Buddhist view that the self is not a single 
thing, whose essence is thinking (a la Cartesianism) or any other such singularly defining property, I believe that certain Mahāyāna Buddhist accounts of selfhood do not sufficiently support their chief practical aim, namely, altruistic compassion. This is due, in large part, to certain weaknesses in their understanding of selfhood. While I believe that some of these same weaknesses exist in contemporary reductionistic theories of selfhood, and some contemporary minimalist views of selfhood, 
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critiquing the weaknesses in the Buddhist views will be instructive, since their points of emphasis do not necessarily overlap with contemporary debates. The 
various Buddhist views I’ve developed here have not adequately accounted for what we mean by “selves.” I contend that the requirements of “having a self” (or better, 
being a self) are, from an ontologically minimalist perspective, bound up with normativity and participation. And, as we cannot have normativity without others, that is, without a public space, we can in some sense say that the self is constructed out of its normative and participant relationships. Normativity is essentially bound up with sharing a public space; thus, an adequate notion of self must include the individual in the context of its meaningful relationships to others, which in turn requires thinking of the self as self-other. However, rather than appealing to the relational view to derive the conclusion that the self is “empty” or “without self” (in the sense developed in the minimalist reading of Madhyamaka), we might instead view the self as something real, but also something far more extensive than the personal histories of individual egos. The self plays the role of unifier.  Be that as it may, selfishness is only possible against a background of shared space that is inherently imbued with normative requirements. These emergent requirements reveal the self as porous and always-already co-emergent with others. Getting a better handle on what constitutes selfhood means getting clearer about the inherent normativity and other-centric requirements involved in being a self. 
These “rules of engagement” are not directly desire-dependent or egocentric in nature. That is, I can only have self-regarding considerations against a background of other-regarding considerations, and these latter considerations are not ultimately 
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derivative of (in the sense of being less fundamental than) egocentric considerations; they co-arise with other-regarding considerations that are experienced and logically situated as being “externally” binding. This is another sense in which I claim that the self is “porous” and thus “open” to others by its very nature. So my case does not rest on moral psychology, alone, but also accommodates normativity, which is the condition for the possibility of communicating and coordinating action through language. The space created between self and other presupposes a background of mutuality and co-creation. Borrowing from my discussion of Levinasian-inspired “otherness” in chapter 3, I should add that this mutuality is inherently imbued with a sense of ethical command. That is, I am not only with others, but also in some sense obligated to respond to others as a basic feature of my encountering someone who cannot be fully reduced to a quantity or a mere object.   On the other hand, I will develop an account here that goes beyond the normative self, and I do this to make better sense of the phenomenology of mutuality and identification with the other. So in what follows, I will support the view that altruism is reasonable based on an analysis of the normative self, and I will also show how a felt (and thus motivating) altruistic obligation may be the upshot of a specific metaphysics. The heart of this dissertation lies in these two big claims.    In the next section, I will briefly take stock of the specific uses of the No-Self 
thesis I’ve covered throughout this dissertation. I’ll do so by more specifically addressing two Buddhist schools of philosophy that have been central to the 
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intellectual-dialogical history of Indian philosophy and Indo-Tibetan Buddhism: 
Vasubandhu’s (c. 4th century CE) Abhidharma-Sautrāntika metaphysics, and 
Nāgārjuna’s (c. 2nd century CE) and Śāntideva's (c. 8th century CE) Madhyamaka minimalism and deconstruction. This dissertation has not pretended to provide in-depth hermeneutics for these complex schools of Buddhist thought. I have rationally reconstructed much of what I’ve developed here as a preparatory work supporting further research in the ethical ramifications of contemporary theories of selfhood. Altruism and compassion are central practical concepts in Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy, because Mahāyāna Buddhism (at least in the texts I’ve covered here, 
particularly in Śāntideva) believes that altruistic motivations are in some sense a natural (if not logical) outcome of experientially recognizing the unreality of the self. Thus, deriving an agent-neutral and altruistic ethics from a revisionary metaphysics of selfhood is arguably a major philosophical program in Indo-Tibetan Mahāyāna, 
and to some extent, Theravāda texts. So there is much to be gained by bringing this program into conversation with the contemporary scene by extracting its more general and controversial philosophical commitments. While one cannot entirely ignore responsible philology, I have examined these texts as a philosopher and not an expert Sanskritist, philologist, or student of religious studies.    With that in mind, I will also assess another set of controversial philosophical contentions endorsed by the Buddhist scholastic, Dharmakīrti (c. 7th century CE). 
Dharmakīrti endorsed a brand of idealism, or, what’s been called in the classical 
Indian tradition, “mind only” (citamātra) metaphysics. While for Dharmakīrti the self is not real, he developed a philosophy of mind whereby mental occurrences are 
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self-reflexive and momentary, and he argued that the concept of selfhood emerges out of the self-reflexive nature of these momentary mental occurrences. For 
Dharmakīrti, mental occurrences are self-illuminating, that is, mental occurrences are inherently aware of their own awareness. Perceptual objects like tables, chairs, and lamps are a function of these self-reflexive and self-illuminating mental 
episodes externalizing themselves as “other.” Thus, Dharmakīrti collapses the ultimate distinction between subject and object. While Dharmakīrti must make sense of how these insulated and momentary occurrences relate and individuate themselves as the continuous stream of an individual self experiencing a world of external objects, he must also make sense of how an individuated stream of consciousness can come to experience other selves outside that stream. Thus, 
Dharmakīrti faces the task of explaining the experience of otherness in general, and the experience of other selves, in particular. The 10th century Kashmiri Śaivite, Abhinavagupta, leveled some damning critiques against Dharmakīrti’s metaphysics. I believe that the upshot of those critiques provides a fresh solution for making sense of other-centricity and altruism. I have argued that the link between Bundle and No-Self theories on the one hand, and agent-neutrality and altruism on the other, are not so logically compelling. So I’ll begin by defending the second big claim I made, my claim that the Buddhist No-Self view (anātman) does not have the resounding ethical implications many Buddhist thinkers believe it does. I will then go on to develop an account of otherness by using Dharmakīrti as a foil. I contend that my account provides a unique view of how we can come to know each other and come to share motivating feelings. These shared feelings can motivate altruistic 
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action, because they transcend ownership, and are therefore not derivative of (in the sense of being less fundamental than) the egocentric concerns of the agent who is motivated by them. Moreover, in so far as these shared feelings disclose an original, albeit not always consciously recognized unity, egocentric concerns are in this sense less fundamental because they presuppose background unity. I will elaborate on this in the final sections of this essay. For now, I will turn again to various general forms of the Buddhist No-Self view.  
4.5.1 The Practical Inadequacies of the Anātman Thesis: Critique of Chapter 3   What can a Buddhist mean by claiming that there is no self? I utilized 
Ganeri’s taxonomy in chapter 2 to sort out some of the ways in which the No-Self claim has logically functioned in the corpus of Buddhist texts. Let me now move from some general forms of this claim to more specific developments of the claim in the tradition of Buddhist philosophy.   While we may be tempted to believe that the No-Self view more generally refers to the absence of a Cartesian soul-self, and that No-Selfism is an attack against substance dualism, the view in the Buddhist context is more pointed and controversial. For example, one reading of the early Buddhist metaphysician, Vasubandhu, would have him argue that the term, “I” is not ultimately meaningful, even if it does provide some pragmatic use. For Vasubandhu and the early 
Ābhidharmikas (Buddhist metaphysicians), what we’ve erroneously taken to be a self is a complex and dynamic relationship among physical structures (rūpa) and a host of intentionalistic, mental phenomena. Buddhists claim that five skandhas, or, 
“heaps” of psychophysical phenomena produce the erroneous belief in a self. These 
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heaps consist of the following: physical matter and forms of experience (rūpa), affectively-charged perception (vedanā), normatively-relevant patterns of conceptual imputation (samjñā), normatively-relevant patterns of behavior underlying a sense of agency (samskāra), and the capacity to synthesize over diverse modalities of sensory input (vijñāna). This makes up a psychophysical 
“stream” (saṅtāna) of consciousness. The stream is the base/locus (āśraya), or, metaphysical base of individuation, while the “place” of this occurrence (ādhāra)—that which characterizes ownership of this dynamic complex—is metaphysically unreal. This is what Ganeri referred to as “No-Self View 2” (see chapter 2). So according to this view, ownership is unreal when assessing things from the ultimate, 
metaphysical perspective. However, “the mind” is not reducible to ultimately atomic physical structures. Mental phenomena are metaphysically distinct from physical phenomena. So this form of the No-Self view is anything but monistic and physicalist in nature. The chief point Vasubandhu raises with respect to the self is that it is an ethically pernicious error imputed over a dynamic relationship between mental and physical occurrences. Uncovering this error is both morally instructive and essential to Buddhist soteriology. Thus, while there may be many contemporary agnostics and atheists who believe in the meaningfulness of the term, “self,” without believing in the existence of a soul, Vasubandhu would argue that emphasizing the importance of the concept of self is ethically insidious, because it contributes to egocentric and selfish behavior, and it is anathema to Buddhist soteriology.    Now, I gave some strong reasons in chapter 1 why I believe ownership is essential for making sense of the human experience, both metaphysically and socio-
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linguistically. But we can still ask how Vasubandhu and other No-Selfers of his ilk consider this revisionary metaphysical view to be ethically illuminating and ethically liberating. In chapter 2, I covered some ways in which a Parfitian spin on this view might provide important ethical upshots concerning the nature of responsibility and punishment. But what normative value can the Buddhist view provide? What sort of ethical traction can a revision of essentialism about the self provide? In terms of the question of altruism and its practical and ethical role, it becomes two questions: How does this make sense of the felt, obligatory nature of altruism?  How does this justify altruism? While there may be some creative ways to account for altruism in the stream view of Buddhist No-Selfism, there has been an ongoing debate as to its normative applicability (as I illustrated in chapter 2). The ethical traction of normative-ethical requirements, especially as they pertain to any sort of altruistic mandate (if one exists), does not straightforwardly follow from the view that the experience of being a real continuant self is a conceptual fabrication.  However, I’ll try to motivate yet another way in which one might think that experiencing the unreality of the self leads to a normative conclusion. I will ultimately reject this strategy, but I do believe that, at least on the surface, it has some viability. I will develop this strategy by more precisely addressing the foil to this argument in the next section, namely, ethical egoism. I will examine whether ethical egoism is a moral theory (or simply a theory that undermines ethics altogether), and I will also argue that the theory is not a straw man; ethical egoism, at least on the surface, is a real contender, albeit a terribly flawed contender.  
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4.5.2 Numerical Distinction and the Egoist’s Strategy  Egocentric considerations arguably only make sense against the background belief that the ego perdures in some form or another. This is the “extreme claim” I discussed in chapter 3, and as I said there, it is usually wedded to the “me-consideration.” For example, when I consider the interests (understood more narrowly as needs rather than mere urges or inclinations) of a stranger, I am obviously forward-looking in my concerns. I care about what will happen to that person if deprived of her basic needs. Similarly, part of the reason I care about my future suffering is that it will be me who suffers in the future. While the logical importance of continuance (also called in the metaphysical literature, “persistence”) is the common factor in both cases, there is a disanalogy between self and other here. I can be temporally-neutral with respect to my own needs, that is, I can believe that I have good reasons now to delay opportunities and gratifications to promote the needs of my future self, because I am (or will be) that future-self. While my current socialist-leaning inclinations might view the needs of a future bourgeois-me as less than motivating, recognizing that it will be me makes some practical difference in my life now. I might still delay certain gratifications to ensure that some important needs are met for my future-self (especially when it comes to the fitness and health of my body and brain-functions). When it comes to the stranger whose needs I consider, I cannot say the same thing. The person I care about now may transform so radically that I have little reason to care about or work to promote her future. In the first case, there is a metaphysical relationship between me-now and the needs of my future-self that makes a practical difference about what I 
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should care about, but in the second case, that continuity does not exist. Thus, I cannot in any straightforward sense claim that the egoist is inconsistent in being temporally neutral with respect to prudential reasons, but agent-relative with respect to reasons for action overall (as Derek Parfit argues in Part I of Reasons and 
Persons). Caring about an overall state of affairs, as is the case in agent-neutral ethical systems, is substantively distinct from caring about the overall state of my temporally stretched life.   One might counter that this asymmetry is not ethically relevant. Just because I will not be Sally, but (trivially speaking) I will be myself, does not warrant ethically privileging my needs over Sally’s. A description of the logic and metaphysics of forward-looking agency does not necessarily entail a normative claim about who or what one ought to privilege. However, I can counter by pointing out that the strongest and most immediate reason to promote the needs of my future-self is that my life is intrinsically worthwhile, and the future will be another stage of that intrinsically worthwhile whole. If my life is intrinsically worthwhile to me now, then I simply care about my well-being as whole. When considering this in terms of time, there is no reason to favor one stage of that whole over another (I am, of course, bracketing discussions about how quality of life determines its worthiness; I am addressing the fact that we care that our lives have quality, and that normally our lives are simply valuable to us, which is why suicide is rarely a flippant act, but usually includes considerable conflict). But I do not have the same neutrality when it comes to others, because, to some extent, their worth and well-being is conditional in a way that my own is not. I can certainly feel shame when comparing my lifestyle 
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and choices now with the values and choices of my former self. Self-loathing may reach such a pathological point that I consider or attempt suicide. But this is a much more difficult prospect than damning a formerly respected friend who has become a brutal and morally depraved leader (we can imagine what the Jewish art dealer, Max Rothman must have felt when the eccentric Austrian artist he took under his wing became the monstrous Fuhrer of Germany). I can more easily disregard the well-being of a former friend who has now become a moral monster than I can disregard my own well-being (moral monster or not).  In other words, I require a reason of a different order that justifies my caring about another’s well-being. However in my own case, whatever adds to the case that I should care about my future, an essential presupposition is fulfilled in advance, namely, that it will be my intrinsically worthwhile future to care about. While this might not directly support the conclusion that ethical egoism is a superior normative theory, it certainly provides some support for the view that any other-regarding considerations I take seriously are less authoritative than self-regarding and prudential reasons. Thus, any action that promotes the needs of others at considerable expense to my own needs ought to raise a serious red flag. When I understand myself in terms of being a continuant self that is numerically distinct from all other selves, the worth of my own life shows up to me in a way that it does not with respect to others, and this makes a practical difference in considering who or what I ought to care about.   There are some objections to the picture I’ve developed here that I need to consider, and in doing so I will make the controversial claim that ethical egoism is not just a theory about ethics that denies the need for ethics; ethical egoism can be 
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construed as a contending ethical theory. The first objection is that one does not have an ethical reason to care about one’s future, only a prudential reason. So, again, it is of little concern to ethics that we value self-maintenance and well-being in a qualitatively different way than we value the well-being of others. Now, if it were true that prudential reasons are substantively distinct from ethical reasons (in the sense that the former sorts of reasons have no bearing on what it makes ethical sense to do), then it would seem that only other-regarding and non-prudential reasons count as ethical reasons, which would mean that ethics may overlap with but need not fundamentally include prudential reasons. But then, when considering conflicts that arise due to the demandingness of ethical reasons, we would need to arbitrate between two distinct domains, and it would be difficult to determine which sorts of principles (neither prudential nor ethical) could mediate the dispute. 
It’s better if the two sorts of reasons are more closely related. But I will elaborate on this after addressing the second objection. The second, and closely related, objection is that the claim that other-regarding considerations are somehow “derivative” of prudential reasons is absurd. What would such a “derivation” even look like? More 
importantly, if this were the case, then sacrificing one’s life would always be an error. I do not believe that the primacy of prudential reasons would entail that self-sacrifice is always an error, but I do believe that ethical egoism fails to provide a convincing account of situations in which self-sacrifice serves absolutely no prudential concerns. So the spirit of this objection is spot-on and damning for ethical egoism. I will develop this further in the following section. 
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4.5.3 Motivating Ethical Egoism  Consider the following two statements:   (1) Over all, things will be better for me if I do X.   (2) Over all, the world will be better if I do Y.   The first is a self-regarding consideration, and the second is a consideration for the greater good. We can modify (1), and state it this way:   (1)’ Over all, I will suffer less if I do X.   Qualifying this in terms of pleasure and pain (taking “suffer” in a narrow sense) allows us to call this an egocentric-hedonistic consideration. Likewise, we can modify (2), and state it this way:   (2)’ Over all, S will suffer less if I do X, and I am not S.   We can call this an other-centric consideration that can be agent-specific (where S = an individual) or group-specific (where S = a group of individuals). Now augment this other-centric formula as follows:  (3) S suffers less when I do X, and I believe I will suffer and things will be worse for me overall if I do X.  This is now an altruistic consideration. In this case, I weigh the burden of suffering more for the sake of others, without pursuing any ulterior self-regarding goals.     The problem I’ve been examining throughout this essay has centered on 
whether or not either the collection of egocentric considerations (1) and (1)’, or non-egocentric considerations (2) and (2)’ and (3) possess some authority the other lacks. One obvious position is that neither enjoys ultimate authority; rather, context 
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should determine whether it makes sense to suffer some amount for the greater good or whether one should forgo considerations of the greater good to suffer less. Likewise, in the case of altruistic considerations, context may dictate whether it is reasonable to suffer for the sake of another without believing one will gain a personal advantage by doing so. While altruistic considerations are a species of other-centric considerations, problems that arise with considerations of the greater good and problems that arise with altruistic considerations may be distinct. Suppose I grab a stranger from the clutches of an angry dog, believing I will be considerably mauled in the process, and believing that I have nothing to directly gain for myself by doing so. I am in fact mauled, and in some description of the world, it would have in fact been better for everyone that the stranger be mauled rather than me. In this case, I am not sacrificing anything for the greater good, nor do I intend to sacrifice anything for the greater good. But I am acting altruistically. So on what grounds would it make sense to do such a thing? Can I only appeal to compassion, conditioning, or sentimentality? If I do not believe that in any ultimate sense I hold a privileged position in this world, then surely, I don’t imagine that this stranger holds 
an ultimately privileged position. While it’s a tragedy he should suffer, it’s likewise a tragedy that I should suffer. There seems to be no rational grounds for claiming that I ought to act altruistically. I may in fact be conditioned or disposed to behave in such a way, but that does not directly count as a rational justification for my behavior, as I can be conditioned or disposed to act in any number of ways.   Why is this important for normative ethics? An ethical egoist may claim that any action one takes ought to benefit oneself in some way. If we put things in terms 
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of “maximization,” an ethical egoist may claim that maximizing one’s own self-interest (however we construe the latter) ought to have ultimate authority in dictating what actions one ought to take. Consider the objection that a system prioritizing prudential reasons is not an ethical system. It would follow that ethical egoism can’t be a contending ethical theory, because it clearly prioritizes prudential reasons above all else. We might view ethical egoism as a reactive position, particularly with respect to agent-neutral systems like utilitarianism. These systems claim that actions promoting the greater good of those relevantly affected are the right actions to take. Reacting to this, the ethical egoist might simply claim that one has a right to opt out of such sacrifices. But Kantian ethics—which would not sanction treating a person as only a means for some larger good—makes a similar claim, and Kantian ethics are surely not foundationally egocentric. So what sort of claim is the ethical egoist trying to make? I suggest that we more charitably read the 
egoist’s claim as a sincere, normative-ethical claim: one ought to favor states of affairs in which one in some way does better for oneself. The “ought” must be a 
moral “ought” rather than a prediction or description of what one would do (which would conflate a psychological thesis with a substantive, normative-ethical thesis).19                                                         19 This is a central problem that Korsgaard identifies with some confused, contemporary versions of egoism. The problem is that one might conflate what is supposed to be a minimalist view of practical rationality construed as purely instrumental reason—the view that in some broad sense we are always pursuing our own good (psychological egoism)—with the substantive, normative claim that we ought to pursue our own good. The purely descriptive claim is distinct from the prescriptive claim, and the latter is hardly self-evident, especially considering the complexity involved in ranking our own preferences. See, Christine M. Korsgaard, 
“The Myth of Egoism,” in Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays, eds. Peter Baumann and Monika Betzler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 57-91. 
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 Now, in a toss-up situation in which I can either rescue the other person at considerable losses to myself (with no foreseeable material gains for myself), or I can simply avoid the situation (and thereby gain the benefit of suffering less than doing otherwise), I seem to have a strong intuitive reason to favor the latter. Given that neither of us is ultimately privileged, and I have not, in advance, endorsed utilitarianism, I can defer to intuition (which, ex hypothesi, favors prudence). My life matters to me, and avoiding suffering whenever I reasonably can seems to be plain common sense. In other words, agent-relative reasons seem more basic and more intuitively palatable and motivational than agent-neutral reasons. Agent-relative reasons may be construed as follows:  (AR): For any agent A (A ought to favor an uncentered state of affairs in which A_____).  Agent-neutral reasons can be construed as follows:  (AN): For any agent A (A ought to favor the uncentered state of affairs W).   The first sort of reason includes A while the second is dictated by some state of affairs that does not reflexively include A. Utilitarianism operates by agent-neutral reasons. One way of defending altruistic actions is by appealing to an agent-neutral utilitarian calculation in which one ought to do X, because it would serve the greater good, and by doing X, one incurs considerable losses (with no long-term material advantage gained for the agent by incurring such losses). So utilitarianism, to some extent, requires the cultivation of an altruistic disposition. This virtuous disposition would allow one to make the necessary personal sacrifices sometimes needed for securing the greater good.  
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 In response, an ethical egoist might provide some intuitive arguments that do justice to our overwhelming concern for our individual well-being. First, our lives matter to us in a viscerally personal way. Our own suffering matters to us in a viscerally personal way, and we do not usually deliberate too deeply over whether or not to avoid our own suffering; on the contrary, we require more convincing to knowingly suffer for some cause or long-term goal. However, when it comes to 
considering another’s suffering, that sort of immediacy is often lacking. My suffering even a minor laceration by an angry dog is viscerally immediate in a way that the mauling of a hundred thousand others will never be for me, and that is mostly because I recognize and experience my own suffering directly, but when it comes to 
another’s suffering, that is not the case. The egoist might claim that knowledge of 
another’s suffering is derivative (in the sense of being indirect) rather than foundational (in the sense of being immediate). One can never directly experience 
another’s suffering, but at best, one can only imagine such suffering (however vividly one might do so). In this way, empathy is instructive to the extent that it allows one to envision what it might be like to suffer from another’s point of view. 
So egoism honors the derivative nature of understanding another’s pain. Therefore, 
motivational and epistemic asymmetry exists between one’s own and another’s suffering, and egoism honors that asymmetry.  Second, we do not want our preferred ethical system to be overly demanding (“ought” implies reasonable accommodation of our more stubbornly ingrained dispositions and ways of being). So, motivationally speaking, egoism reasonably accommodates our commonsense desire to avoid our own suffering and avoid ethical systems that are unpalatably 
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demanding. Finally, there may be irreducibly egocentric-hedonistic considerations that can never harmonize with considerations for the greater good. In such cases, one favors a state of affairs in which one suffers less, and favoring such a state of affairs does not bring about a maximally better state of affairs (that is, it does not serve the greater good). This means that there are powerfully motivated self-regarding considerations that reveal a stubborn and unbridgeable divide between egocentric-hedonistic and non-egocentric considerations. Say that I suffer from amnesia from a terrible accident, and in the hospital, I come to know that KPM rather than John Doe will suffer a terribly painful life-altering surgery. I reason that I must either be KPM or JD. I will naturally prefer that I am JD. I usually do not need a further reason for favoring a state of affairs in which I suffer less, but I do require some further convincing to favor a state of affairs in which I suffer more (for an individual or for the greater good). Ethical egoism honors these basic asymmetries; 
it’s a practical system that tethers ethical sanctions and commissions to the intuition that each of us matters to ourselves in a motivationally intense and basic way, and sacrificing our individual well-being for another must in some way provide us with an emotional, social, or value-driven pay-off that substantively includes our own flourishing (or good or whatever). Ethical egoism may even provide a utilitarian-leaning argument. The ethical egoist might claim that self-abnegation is a more harmful social disposition to cultivate (with less optimal pay-offs for the greater social good). She may argue that self-respect, in the form of prioritization of the betterment of the self within the strictures of a functioning social framework, requires mostly prioritizing self-regarding considerations. So, this is not a 
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philosophy of blind selfishness, but rather a philosophy of self-development, with 
positive “trickle-down” ramifications for the social whole. Our libertarian friends remind us that we gain more from the innovative spirit of self-possessed citizens than we do from condescending welfare bureaucrats and emotionally impulsive altruists: when the meek inherit the earth, they inherit a meek earth hindered by an erosion of creative and innovative possibilities (we need only think of Mill and Nietzsche, who provided some thinking in this direction).    Now, ethical egoism should not be conflated with psychological egoism, the view that an agent is always motivated directly by self-interest. What it does claim is that when one is in a toss-up situation, it requires more complex deliberation to justify suffering for the sake of another than it does to justify protecting oneself 
from avoidable suffering. It may be the case that I’m simply wired or conditioned to engage in more other-centric and altruistic actions, and in this sense strong psychological egoism is false; I’m certainly not always directly motivated by self-regarding considerations. However, the ethical egoist may respond that: (1) the world would be a better place if each individual mostly prioritized their own self-interest within the strictures of a stable social order; (2) most of our common sense moral judgments are consistent with egoism (that is, we can account for many of our moral norms by appeal to self-interest pursuing social strategies for self-flourishing); (3) given the strong weight of prudential reasons for action, ethical egoism is not an overly demanding ethical theory that goes against the grain of the human condition.    
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 Now, consider the objection that ethical egoism entails that self-sacrifice is always wrong. Say that I do myself considerable harm (and very nearly drown) to save a drowning stranger. I’m not a lifeguard or medic or first-responder, just an ordinary guy. The nuanced ethical egoist does not claim that it is always morally wrong to act without directly furthering my self-interest (so that by risking my neck for the drowning swimmer I’ve done something ethically bad, which would be a ridiculous claim). She might argue that altruistic deeds have some conventional nobility, and in some way further my social position and my personal interest staked in being, say, a courageous hero. After all, the ethical egoist is not a megalomaniac, and thus, an ordinary ethical egoist responds to and develops values out of her socially-attuned and socially-situated nature. Of course, if my action is strongly motivated by my personal vision of the good life, which includes being a hero who pursues dangerous deeds, then the action is not purely other-centric. But 
that’s fine, because we can at least provide a reason for pursuing an altruistic action that would otherwise remain mysterious (or at very least, difficult to rationally justify) without ignoring the evidence that people often do take such actions. This need not be a case of psychological egoism, because the self-regarding considerations that come with my personal vision of the good life are not always in the forefront of my consciousness, nor did they need to be when I took the plunge. However, at some point in my career as an agent, values that fulfill my self-regarding concern for realizing the best life possible for me have conditioned my dispositions, the motivations of which are now transparent. In this case, the ethical 
egoist might claim that I’ve acted consistently with my vision of the good life, and 
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pursuing this daring deed makes my life qualitatively better (albeit at a considerable quantitative risk).     However, one may object that this picture conflates prudential reasons with ethical reasons. Surely the ethical egoist is not committed to believing that all prudential reasons (and ultimately self-regarding reasons) are ethical reasons. To avoid this embarrassing problem, the ethical egoist would have to claim that not all first-order prudential reasons are ethical reasons, but insofar as there are ethical reasons for doing things, they must in some way appeal to (or at very least provide a structure for more adequately satisfying) prudential reasons. For example, I take important time away from my family and my money-paying projects to help a student struggling in my class. Whether the student does well will not in this context make one bit of material difference to my life. My reasons for helping this person are transparent—it just seems like the right thing to do (and not just because of my normatively relevant social role as an instructor, for in this case, I believe I’ve delivered amply on that front). But my now transparent disposition to help is a function of social training, and a strong explanatory candidate for my taking to such training (other than by direct force or threats) is that such character-dispositions achieve some sort of personal pay-off for me in terms of the overall quality of my life. This works well with the view that ethical reasons are ultimately grounded in social conventions that in one way or another allow individuals to thrive in communities by harmonizing their more immediate self-regarding reasons with social goods that provide a relatively stable framework for satisfying such reasons. In short, ethical reasons are grounded in larger, rational reasons for action. When 
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we distinguish between first-order and second-order reasons, we can avoid the embarrassing conclusion that ethical reasons are only prudential reasons. The point is that ethical reasons are derivative (in the sense of being explained and justified by other sorts of reasons), and prudential reasons provide the justificatory soil out of which ethical reasons emerge.   
 In terms of the stated objections previously considered, the ethical egoist can say the following. First, prudential and ethical reasons are closely related, but not identical. Ethical reasons have very little traction when too far removed from prudential reasons, and if ethics is to be a rational enterprise, it must be grounded in rational self-interest, which is socially-situated and sensitive to group dynamics. Complex, second-order ethical reasons are far less mysterious when we recognize how they ideally accommodate first-order prudential reasons. When the context radically shifts, and the relationship between first-order prudential and second-order ethical reasons is radically compromised, ethics becomes overly demanding and irrational. So, while the two sorts of reason are not identical, ethical reasons make rational sense by dovetailing out of prudential reasons. This explains why care of the self takes on ethical tones, where the line between prudential self-maintenance and ethical obligation can become fuzzy if not overlapping.    Second, ethical egoism can be an ethical system to the extent that it sufficiently accommodates our intuitive moral judgments (not to steal, lie, murder, etc.). Like all candidates for a good theory, it must convincingly explain the evidence (in this case, common moral judgments and their properties). Ethical egoism claims that prioritizing self-interest provides a credible principle from which to justify 
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other-regarding considerations. When all goes well, other-regarding considerations advance long-term self-interest and quality of life for the individual.    Ultimately, I disagree with this account. However, the ethical egoist might 
argue that reciprocity and cooperation, and the sense of obligation to fulfill one’s roles in such relationships, works on an egoistic foundation, because it suits one’s prudential interest to cooperate. Acting as if your needs have independent (or intrinsically valid) worth ultimately serves my long-term self-interest. Ethical egoism claims that it is right that we prioritize long-term interest, and that we ought to do so. Randian thinking would even claim that the world is better for such thinking. Thus, ethical egoism should not be confused for “blind egoism,” or, narcissistic megalomania, which would not count as an ethical theory at all. Moreover, the ethical egoist does not necessarily conflate her normative system with psychological egoism, but the system is certainly consistent with and buttressed by the psychological claim. If we were fundamentally motivated to prioritize self-interest above all other concerns (which Butler and others have shown us is conceptually problematic and empirically false), then ethical egoism is a better explanatory, empirical theory about what constitutes a morally good action. Therefore, ethical egoism is not an a-moral theory. However, it may be a bad theory.  Finally, in terms of self-sacrifice always being an error, the ethical egoist may claim that an individual might rationally develop character traits that value risk and danger, which are always premised on the possibility of loss, severe harm, or even death. These become transparent values that in some way improve the quality of the 
said individual’s life. So “self-sacrifice” is extreme risk that from a third-person 
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perspective is describable as sacrifice, but is only the outcome of a gambler suffering the ultimate loss. But I find this to be a weak response, since we have plenty of empirical examples of parents and loved ones directly sacrificing their lives for their nearest and dearest (where the only risk involved is in whether the sacrifice actually serves its purpose of saving the child or loved one). And, more importantly, we have empirical examples of individuals directly sacrificing their lives for complete strangers (where bias for loved ones falls from the equation). But the problem is that while not all acts of apparent self-sacrifice are always bad, the egoist seems to be committed to at least some of them being bad, and it is absurd to claim that these bad cases are premised on whether the sacrifice promotes the quality of the 
sacrificer’s life. If it is part of the sacrificer’s vision of the good life, then unless the egoist can show that this vision always serves the sacrificer in some substantive way, what we have here is a genuinely other-centric concern that values the overall 
state of things rather than just one’s own individual plight. Moreover, ethical egoism would radically part with the commonsense view that when, say, an adult occupant 
of an Aleppo apartment, which is under a bombing siege, rescues a stranger’s child from the apartment, knowing that it will most likely cost her own life, her action is not morally praiseworthy. The staunch egoist must view this as either a morally blameworthy act, or an instance of calculated risk that went wrong. Both alternatives seem intuitively absurd. I believe that this is a damning objection to the theory. Nevertheless, if the ethical egoist simply bites the bullet on acts of self-sacrifice, we might provide a counter-argument that strikes at the core of the 
theory’s metaphysical presuppositions.   
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4.5.4 A Rationally Reconstructed Buddhist Response  This is where the Buddhist might claim that the No-Self view has important ethical implications. She might claim that seeing through the illusion of a perduring ego removes the basic asymmetry that drives one to endorse the egocentric conclusion. Strictly speaking, a psychophysical stream accounts for the individuality that one believes is “owned” by one’s ego, or, “I-maker” (ahaṅkara). But the ego is only illusorily permanent; it is nothing but the sort of fleeting perceptions that Hume saw when he tried to introspectively verify the existence of a single and perduring self. For the Buddhists, the belief that one owns one’s mental and physical states is an error resulting from the ego’s belief that it is a permanent and fixed being underlying the career of the self. So perhaps the asymmetry dissolves with the experientially and conceptually recognized dissolution of ego-ownership. Now, if one claims that this dissolution might dissolve any reason one has whatsoever to 
care about anyone’s future (the “extreme,” moral-nihilism claim), we might employ 
something like Siderits’s argument (see chapter 2 for the argument Siderits has 
developed in reconstructing Śāntideva’s work). No one, strictly speaking, owns the stream of psychophysical events. Although ownership is an illusion, suffering, and its ethically-negative valence, is not. Thus, if a mandate exists to thwart needless pain-and-suffering events, it must operate over the whole of sentient fields of suffering, because no one can really claim ownership over a particular stream. With this argument, altruism becomes a basic mandate only (seemingly) trumped by practical and pragmatic considerations. For example, it may be most expedient in some instances to reduce the overall sum of suffering by privileging “my own” 
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suffering at the expense of another’s. However, the general mandate operates in a utilitarian-teleological fashion, and only justifies privileging oneself toward the end of reducing the overall sum of suffering.    I addressed rebuttals and counter-rebuttals to this line of argument in chapter 2. But the most damning problem I see here is that it’s not so clear that a 
“general mandate” to thwart suffering makes any sense when we dissolve ownership of suffering. Arguably, suffering is not the sort of thing that just hangs 
there, and even if it does, it’s not clear how and why it’s so bad when it’s not connected to the very real deprivation and anguish of an individual with a very real history and future that she cares about. In other words, the sort of existential anguish Buddhists seek to liberate us from, is articulated in the complex and concrete conventional relationships of transactional human existence. When we view things from the ownerless, ultimate perspective, we lose sight of the meaning 
of “suffering and anguish.” These terrible experiences emerge in a meaningful , social whole, and without viewing things from the perspective of our conventional identities, suffering loses its ethically-relevant valence. If Vasubandhu or Śāntideva want to argue that ownership and selfhood are not necessary to make sense of pain and suffering, they still should show how, from the ultimate perspective, any sort of deontic claims can be made about such suffering. They may argue that it’s a natural facet (svabhāva) of suffering that “it ought to be thwarted.” But for Śāntideva, the 
Mādhyamika, it’s hard to understand what that would mean, since the premise of his Buddhist philosophy is the Nāgārjunian view that nothing whatsoever has an intrinsic nature (niṣvabhāva). Now, if it’s convention that determines our normative-
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ethical relationship to pain and suffering, then why not just claim that it’s convention that produces asymmetry between self-regarding and other-regarding considerations, the very asymmetry needed in a defense of egocentric privileging? 
This is the “cherry-picking” problem I highlighted in chapter 2 (see Harris’s 
argument). The fact is, both Vasubandhu and Śāntideva will have to appeal to convention to win us back ethical relationships and normativity, and unless we 
provide a creative spin on “otherness” (the sort I developed in chapter 3), it’s hard to see how the claim that there is no self provides us with a normative-ethical justification for altruism. Moreover, the Buddhist would also have to appeal to convention to make sense of any practical (or purely rational) principles for justifying altruism.    While I’m obviously amenable to the view of otherness that I spun in chapter 3, I believe it has some serious shortcomings. If this is the case, then I’ve just about spun-out on forging a directly practical link between the No-Self thesis in Buddhism and any sort of normative grip that altruistic action may hold over us. I will now explain where I believe these shortcomings lie.  In chapter 3, I argued that Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy, understood as deflationary minimalism, is not commited to the belief in a perduring self, nor is it committed to Bundle-theory metaphysics. Bundle-theory, in one way or another, reduces the appearance of selfhood to a real stream of metaphysically individuated psychophysical events. However, I tried to defend other possibilities for the Buddhist philosopher by spinning a sort of mash-up of contemporary No-Self theories of mind and selfhood with Abhidharma-Buddhist metaphysics. The latter 
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believes that the concept of self erroneously appears over the interplay of real atomic psychophysical phenomena, and I claimed that, nuanced in the right way, we might develop an ethics of otherness that builds responsibility for others out of a revision of self-regarding and forward-looking concerns. I nuanced this by appropriating basic elements from the well-developed post-modern discussion of 
“otherness.” The idea was that even at the core of our most personal and egocentric 
concerns, we experience responsibility toward an “other” that we ourselves are (in an attenuated sense). Nevertheless, both Bundle-theories and Abhidharma metaphysics have practical weaknesses. For example, even if we can individuate streams of consciousness by appeal to either a physical body, or a collection of psychophysical phenomena forged through unique dependency relations (in the case of Abhidharma metaphysics and Parfitian Bundle-theories), the responsibility we have toward various dimensions and temporal stretches of this stream remain ambiguous at best, and grossly under-determined at worst. This motivated me to bring Madhyamaka irrealism into the mix. Madhyamaka can provide a more praxis-
driven gloss on the notion of “otherness,” because it eschews metaphysics altogether, while deconstructing realist and essentialist discourse. So in a sense it promotes conventionalist-pragmatic discourse that speaks directly to the field of practical relationships and convention-driven actions. Madhyamaka Buddhism adds 
two important possibilities to “solving” the problem of justifying altruism. First, Madhyamaka focuses on the lived experience of seeing our future and past selves as both the same and other. I made a case for how this works in Śāntideva's text. This 
“sameness” is not something metaphysically identical, nor is it grounded in a 
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physicalist commitment to enduring bodies; it is, rather, the capacity to appropriate (upādāna), or, more literally, “be fueled by” what is always experienced as other, and thus to feel a responsiveness, and consequently a responsibility toward what is other. This underlies our sense of unity (sameness) with otherness. We learn to 
relate to and “own” this otherness through appropriative identification. In this way, 
I’ve clearly stepped outside the post-modern, or, Levinasian discussion of otherness, 
because I’m actually trying to bridge the gap between sameness and otherness—something the extraordinary and irreducible “Other” in Levinas would never allow. However, in another sense, I’m in step with that conversation, because I’m trying to respect the inscrutability and distinctness of the other, by holding identification and distinction in a productive and yet never fully-resolved tension. What I wanted to add to this picture is that appropriative identification does not entail that when I consider this future surrogate, and believe that it is other than me now, I completely 
overcome the sense of separateness and distance in a blissful “oneness.” The argument of chapter 3 sees this appropriative identification—this collapsing of the gap between self and other—as one forged through an ethical commitment to caring for the other (who is our future-surrogate) as one’s own, and caring for the other as one worthy to be cared for. This means that distinctness and sameness must be gripped in a productive tension that is never fully resolved. So caring about oneself is instructive in caring about the other. This would do some contemporary justice to the Buddhist connection between no-selfhood and ethics.    The second facet Madhyamaka brings to the table is that not committing to any real base of individuation (see chapter 2), and endorsing deconstruction in the 
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practical way I developed in chapter 3, helps unravel a quite natural view that often impedes us from acting beyond our own egoistic inclinations: it deconstructs the self/other dichotomy, and shows us that no knock-down metaphysical reasons prevent us from acting altruistically, and no knock-down metaphysical reasons ultimately support the view that altruistic reasons are less fundamental than egocentric concerns. Madhyamaka can do this because it is not commited to either a physicalist base of individuation (a real and metaphysically distinct body), nor is it commited to real ownership, since it eschews the belief that any sort of intrinsically existing phenomena constitutes a metaphysically distinct stream (saṅtāna).20 
According to this view, “mineness” is a conceptual fabrication built out of appropriation, which then attempts to ground this concept in deep metaphysical structures. Thus, while no knock-down arguments prove that we must take the other into ethical consideration, the minimalist and anti-metaphysical approach of Madhyamaka helps tear down the barriers between self and other that seem to motivate the natural inclination toward egoism. To this point, I argued that no metaphysical barriers prevent us from being altruistically concerned with all suffering. Thus, Madhyamaka clears a space for far-reaching altruistic concern by undermining some of the usual appeals that motivate egoism. By embracing 
“otherness” in the way I nuanced it in chapter 3, we can argue that our actions are always-already responsive to what is “other.”   But there are several problems with this approach. First, this negative point is non-implicational. If I say that nothing prevents me from being unselfish, this does                                                       20 “The continuum of consciousness [saṅtāna], like a queue, and the combination of constituents [samudāya], like an army, are not real [mṛṣā—‘fiction’]” (BCA, 8:101).  
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not mean that anything necessarily motivates me to be altruistic. For example, I may claim that the flower does not smell bad, but this does not necessarily imply that it smells good (it may smell bland or neutral or like nothing at all to me). So the challenge is to show how not only the barriers come down, but also how a positive altruistic motivation can grip us and guide our actions in a way that reaches the power of an ethical command.  Second, I claimed that at the core of experience there is a sense of personal responsibility toward what is other, and that when we tear down the metaphysical barrier between self and other, and see all action extending out toward what is “not 
me” (and, “me” in an attenuated and appropriative sense) our sense of responsibility can mature and cast itself wide enough to conceptually encompass everyone. These far-reaching considerations resonate with the agent-neutral sensibility informing utilitarianism. But here’s the problem with this. While I can view myself as other in the way I described in chapter 3, this implies that either: (a) I maintain a robust personal bond with this other, or, (b) I experience depersonalization. The latter means that I lose my bond with this other, and thus it remains mysterious why I experience any responsibility. So I have overplayed my hand by conflating 
“responsiveness” and “responsibility,” especially when the later term carries a normative-ethical weight that the former does not. However, if I maintain a personal bond as stated in (a), I can argue that this “other” is never fully other. Or, put another way, there is a difference in the bond I have with my surrogate and those thin bonds I have with strangers and acquaintances that surround me now. So, 
there’s still the possibility that a metaphysical ground for ethically privileging some 
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relationships over others, like the one I have with my surrogate-self, remains intact. One may argue further that the best explanation for the sense of responsibility I have for my surrogate-heir lies in identifying with this other. If I fully identify with this future person as myself rather than as a surrogate, then I have an ordinary, self-regarding and prudential concern. Yes, things are attenuated, because I may not believe that deep metaphysical bonds connect me to this future person. However, something (conventional?) still makes this person especially relevant to me-now in a way that it does not with any other person. Granted, my relationship to this future person is also thin and abstract, but a good reason for caring about this future person is that he is, practically speaking, me. While I do, paradoxically, identify with and yet distance myself from this other-me, I can simply view this distance as a temporal issue. For example, an endurantist about time—someone who believes that all time is dimensionally present—may embrace a four-dimensional view of time, which is par for the course in Einstein’s Relativity. Thus, the endurantist may claim that the temporal distance between me-now and future-me does not mean that future-me is metaphysically distinct from me-now. The properties of future-me, like my receding hair-line and my growing tummy, are temporal parts of the whole of me, and future-me is only thinly related to me-now from the vantage point of the spotlight shining on this part of the block universe, the part I call, “now.” So, I have not really treated myself as metaphysically other. Future-me is only a temporally distinct but metaphysically non-distinct version of me. Therefore, I contest that the Buddhist-hybrid picture I developed in chapter 3 ultimately fails to cogently explain 
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how I take up another’s cause as my own, and how I come to view and feel this action as an ethical requirement.   However, the one element I’d like to preserve from chapter 3 is the claim that when all things go well, responsibility towards others resonates at the core of our lived experience. I do not believe we learn to care about others from scratch. However, barring congenital psychopathy, and sociopathology developed out of early childhood trauma, we do learn how to extend our narrow frame of other-regarding concerns (say, an infant’s focused concern for her caretaker) to encompass ever larger fields of fellow humans and non-human creatures. That is, we can learn to more widely generalize our inherent sense of concern and responsibility to others, particularly when we recognize that we are imbued—in adopting values and meaningful goals—by a network of interdependent others.   Thus, I want to argue the following. The No-Self views of the Buddhists I’ve drawn from do not adequately account for what we mean by “selves.” Herein lies the ethical problem. I believe that a more appealing model of what constitutes selfhood is ineluctably bound up with normative phenomena that makes better sense of the normative grip altruistic actions can hold over us. Obviously, then, I believe that altruistic action often does have normative grip. But altruism can also be viewed as supererogation. Phenomenologically speaking, we can say that altruism exercises our unique capacity to feel “whole” and “full” enough to give beyond what might be socially required of us. So we can think altruism in terms of ethical duty, and we can think altruism in terms of moral psychology—compassion and identification—and, 
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finally, we can think altruism in terms of supererogation.21 Another possibility lies in thinking altruism out of metaphysics, a point I will devote a section to by 
assessing the role of compassion in the Mahāyāna-Vijñānavāda (or citamātra) school of Buddhist idealism—a school I have not treated yet in this work—specifically, the work of the Buddhist scholastic, Dharmakīrti, and the critique of his school by the Kashmiri Advaita-Śaivist, Abhinavagupta. For the latter, altruism is made possible by a monistic metaphysics and soteriology of recognition and identification with the universal self. This self is an infinitely creative energy that emanates into an individuated reality. Abhinavagupta and his lineage refer to this 
as, “Śiva.” Although capable of individuation, the self remains ultimately whole, and inherently imbued with will (icchā) and cognition that is self-manifesting (svaprakāśa) and self-conscious (svasaṃvedana). Full recognition of the empirical self as the universal self presumably reveals the inherent “bliss” (ānanda) and 
“fullness” (pūrṇatva) that also characterizes the playful creativity of this dynamic and self-manifesting force. This recognition generates altruistic concern for the other. While the Śaivists believe that full self-recognition (identification with the universal self) transcends the ethical domain of “duty” (dharma) and “negligence of 
duty” (adharma), the enlightened Śaivic sage still is motivated to devote his work and energy to others without any ulterior, self-regarding motivations. In other words, he engages philosophy and rational theology solely for the sake of helping others achieve recognition of their identity in the universal self. While the                                                       21 These are conceptual possibilities, and in forthcoming work, I will more thoroughly distinguish the altruistic act from things like favors and acts of kindness, 
of which “gift-giving” may be one. The latter do not bear the ethical weight that altruism does.  
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enlightened, ultimate perspective may transcend many conventional ethical standards, the will remains operative (indeed, it is a fundamental aspect of the universal self). In this extraordinary state, the will is directed toward helping others, because the philosopher-sage who has secured identification with Śiva is “complete” 
or “full,” and thus not driven by self-regarding desires associated with an embodied and historical existence that is radically individuated. At this level, egoism is simply empty of meaning.22 But the main upshot that I am introducing is this: clarifying (or re-cognizing) this union with general selfhood provides us with a metaphysics that makes sense of how we can be compelled and compassionately motivated through 
empathic channels to behave altruistically. The idea here is that we are not metaphysically cut off from one another, and our emotional connectedness is not just a matter of thoughtful inference.   I will draw from Abhinavagupta’s metaphysical account of selfhood to develop the metaphysics of aspectual, mereological holism, which I believe can provide a promising account of the felt experience of obligation (and altruistic motivation) that comes with recognizing oneself in terms of a larger and dynamic whole. As far as metaphysics goes, there are important concepts the Śaivite introduces that fill motivational and epistemic gaps in the Buddhist and naïve realist accounts. To best develop this view, I’ll need to assess its foil (pūrvapakṣa), that is,                                                       22 See Isabelle Ratié, “Remarks on Compassion and Altruism in the Pratyabhijñā 
Philosophy,” Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 37, Issue 4, 2009: 349-366. In 
reference to Abhinava’s interpretation of Utpaladeva, she writes: “Because the essence of consciousness is a subtle dynamism of which will or desire (icchā) is the first manifestation, the subject who escapes the bondage of individuality does not cease to have any will; but his will is exclusively turned toward others—it cannot be selfish, given the completeness or the fullness (pūrṇatva) that the liberated subject has acquired by recovering a full awareness of himself” (355). 
 220 
the idealism and momentariness (kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda) views endorsed by Dharmakīrti. By “momentariness,” I am referring to the belief that reality is cinematically made up of self-manifesting and ephemeral point-instances, or, property-tropes. These property-tropes, according to Dharmakīrti, underlie the illusion of continuity.   Again, the challenge is to show how not only the barriers between self and other come down, but also how a positive altruistic motivation can grip us and guide our actions in a way that reaches the power of a felt, ethical command. I want to address the challenge in two directions. The first, I’ve already dealt with: the normative self emerges in a relational social-space, and thereby, integrates its practical identity through its higher-order, “participant” volitions. The second and more robust solution requires a metaphysical account, where as one aspect, the self remains individuated and distinct, but under another aspect, the self shares in a more general experience of selfhood. So, in the next section, I will assess 
Dharmakīrti’s metaphysics and Abhinavagupta’s critical engagement with them.  
4.6 Momentariness and the Problem of Other Persons in Dharmakīrti: an 
Advaita-Śaivite Response  How am I able to distinguish a non-sentient object from a conscious subject (pramātṛ)? I can reasonably infer that creatures exhibiting the same types of publicly observable traits as I do possess consciousness, and those with whom I can converse probably have first-person experiences and a sense of self. Stones and laptops do not look like me, nor do they behave like me. And most living things, like trees and weeds, do not exhibit agency; so they probably do not experience 
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anything. But what does it mean to “exhibit agency?” Perhaps “agency” refers to the self-directed action of complex language-users making various commitments and promises within a conditioned, causal order. Or, it may be enough to call someone an agent who exhibits characteristic behaviors that, like my dog’s behaviors, reveal some sense of flexible responsiveness, emotional aptitude, and sensory-motor integration. How, then, do I perceive someone’s agency?  As a start to answering some of these big questions, I begin with a manifest fact: stones, laptops, trees, and dogs do not appear to be extensions of my own mind. Even in a simulated or dream world, I view myself as one among many external objects, which means that I inherently employ a general concept of otherness (paratva). Otherness shows up in my experience of a distinct object, a mere “it.” But otherness also shows up in my experience of other conscious beings, which I designate with personal pronouns.   I also experience the immediate presence of perceptual objects, and by that, I mean everyday things like desks and mounting piles of paperwork. While I can attest for this immediate experience of presence in my own case, I cannot do so for you. As Wittgenstein humorously put things, I might believe that I have a beetle in my own box (or a private and conscious experience in my own head), but I can only tenuously infer that another body houses or generates private experiences. What’s worse, I cannot be sure that conscious experience necessarily requires a body at all, especially since my body can sometimes show up as just another object in a way that my occurrent, first-person experience cannot. While one thought may become part of the content of another thought—as in the case of deliberation and memory—
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the experience of presence, itself, is not the sort of thing that is publicly observable. Nor, do I believe, is it introspectively observable; “presence” is already in play from the moment I turn my attention inward. Therefore, consciousness does not show up as a thing among other observable things. It’s not as though I can definitively claim that my wife is conscious in the morning just because her eyes open. Still, I see her eyes open, and I know that she is conscious. This seems to me a small miracle!  Unconvinced that consciousness and subjectivity emerge from something purely inert, and unconvinced that it makes sense to believe that objects exist outside the minds that cognize them, Buddhist-idealists (Vijñānavādins) advanced a host of arguments attacking external-world realism and materialism. Their basic argument is that any X and Y that are invariably concomitant cannot be metaphysically distinct. An object of consciousness cannot be viewed as an independent object outside of some sensory experience of that object: wherever there is an experience of the harvest moon, the conscious experience always accompanies the perceptual object. These Buddhists capitalize on the fact that it makes little sense to say that there can be “something out there” that we are unable to perceive under any sensory contexts or modalities, which strict independence between objects and subjects would logically, although not necessarily materially, seem to entail. Cogent or not, I do not intend to elucidate the host of idealist arguments advanced by various citamātra, or, “mind-only” Buddhist philosophers. Instead, I wish to focus on the shape the problem of otherness takes within the framework of Buddhist idealism. At stake for the Mahāyāna Buddhist, among other things, is the very coherence of compassion and altruism: without a coherent 
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account of otherness, Buddhists struggle to provide a compelling account of other-centric motivations.   The representationalist model of perception that Sautrāntika Buddhists23 advanced left a gap for idealist arguments of the Yogācāra, Mind-Only and 
Vijñānavāda schools.24 For the Sautrāntika, we do not directly see the objects that support our perceptions. All perception is mediated. Along with the idealists, they believe that an intentional object of consciousness is the product of that very consciousness. Thus, we are only conversant with our ideas of objects, and we must 
infer an external support (ālambana) for these representations. Still, Sautrāntikas remain realists about external objects. This school posits the existence of external-world objects through inference (bāhyārthānumeyavāda). But if this inference is 
shown to be weak, then we’re left with only the objects of our own consciousness, a point that drives all species of idealism. The Sautrāntika philosophers argue that 
Vijñānavāda idealism is incoherent, because our perceptions represent multiple and qualitatively diverse objects. However, according to these same philosophers, consciousness is not multiple and qualitatively diverse, but simply a singular capacity to illuminate and represent (or take the mold of) what is diverse: the light is singular, but the objects that shine under its illumination are diverse. Thus, consciousness and the objects of consciousness cannot be equivalent since they bear distinct essential properties.    
                                                      23 This refers to the school of “sūtra followers,” or, Abhidharma-Buddhist metaphysicians. 24 For the sake of simplicity, I conflate the various strands of these idealist schools.  
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 The idealist can respond that “the awakening of residual traces” (vāsanāprabodha) from past lives, or, beginningless streams of consciousness, can account for the variety of perceptions. These traces are somehow “reawakened” in the flow of insulated and singular cognitions. We do not need to appeal to external objects, because the mind-stream that accounts for the image of diverse things bears residual traces of experiences, or, “seeds” (bīja) by which it generates an on-going experience of diversity. Poetically, we can say that consciousness dresses its experience in a perfume (vāsanā) of residual traces (vāsanā). For the Buddhist-idealist, the belief that objects are external to the mind is ultimately false, and we see this layered into the very definition of a “vāsanā,” by the fact that the term may also designate false perceptions and images.   Now, as realists about the external world, we can try to corner the idealist by asking what accounts for the variety of vāsanās. The idealist seems to regressively push the problem back: diversity, itself, is the very thing that needs to be explained. Nevertheless, for the Vijñānavādin, the stream over which we erroneously develop the belief in an enduring self is not a psychophysical stream. The saṅtāna (the streaming of isolated, but associated cognitions that we erroneously reify) is nothing but a series of momentary cognitions, or, ephemeral point-instances of consciousness. These give rise to new cognitions in a cinematic emergence of conscious moments. In contemporary metaphysics, we would call these property-tropes, or, instances of properties unbounded by an underlying or continuous 
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substance. Contemporary Stage-theory metaphysics25 also parallels this by advancing the view that reality unfolds cinematically and episodically rather than continuously.26 For Dharmakīrti and the Buddhists, this sort of metaphysics is 
consistent with the Buddha’s message that there is no underlying self-substance (ātman), and everything is, quite literally, impermanent (anitya). The subject (pramātṛ) is not an enduring metaphysical entity, but a conceptual error (vikalpa) of the imagination that arises out of these ephemeral cognitions. For Dharmakīrti, all cognitions are self-reflexively aware (svasaṃvedana), and this partly explains how we develop the false belief that a self endures through multiple cognitions.27 Cognizing X also means at the same time cognizing the cognition of X. The immersive first-person cognition that ensues retains the seed-like trace of its ephemeral predecessor, but the X that it sees is not really separate from the self-generating and self-reflexive point-instance. As Ratié puts it, for the Vijñānavādin, “the objects perceived by the subject have no existence outside of the cognitive series, objectivity is nothing but a cognitive event in which consciousness presents itself as external.”28 The world is a pure externalization of the mind, which is impermanent, something dying and being re-born in self-manifesting and ephemeral point-instances. So, my 
                                                      25 See Katherine Hawley, How Things Persist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 26 For Stage-theorists like Hawley, this view can solve various identity problems we encounter in thought experiments like the Ship of Theseus.  27 On svaprakāśa (self-luminosity) and svasaṃvedana (reflexive, self-consciousness), 
see Dharmakīrti, Nyāyabindu I: 10: sarvacittacaittānām ātmasaṃvedanam: “All cognitions and all mental phenomena are self-conscious.” Cited in manuscript of 
Dharmottara’s commentary, Nyāyabinduṭīka (see bibliography), cited in Ratié, 321.  28 Ratié, Otherness, 320.   
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seeing anything is just an ephemeral cognition that sees itself externalized as a distinct object while seeing that very seeing.   But if this is true, then the Buddhist must show how other selves show up to a self-illuminated and self-manifesting episode of consciousness. Even if the Buddhist bites the bullet and accepts solipsism, he fairs no better in making sense of the experience, or, sense of an external subject. Dharmakīrti’s endorsement of 
svasaṃvedana seems to dig him into this hole. A self-manifested cognition cannot be grasped by another cognition, because it would cease to be self-manifested, and become a mere object for another. However, the appearance of a subject who has self-illuminating cognitions cannot just show up as a mere object for the obvious reason that we lose the subjectivity of the subject; we reify and objectify the self-subject that was allegedly perceived. So by Dharmakīrti’s metaphysics, I cannot account for your immediate presence of experience, that is, your sense of selfhood, because I cannot come into direct contact with you.29   This is potentially damning to his larger project, because the ethics of compassion and altruism must preserve the integrity of other persons. But perhaps this is only a superficial problem. We might explain being motivated by another’s suffering through indirect apprehension of their pain. However, admitting that something exists externally to consciousness—like other streaming minds that project a reality—defeats the very premise of Buddhist idealism, namely, that we                                                       29 Ratiér, Otherness, 321: “Because cognition has this self-manifesting power as its characteristic, no given cognition can be manifested or grasped by another cognition, otherwise it would cease to be a cognition and become a mere object of cognition, which means that I can never take as objects of my consciousness 
someone else’s cognitions.”  
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cannot ultimately distinguish between the subject who is conscious and the object that only appears to exist externally to that consciousness. Why it should be different with respect to the otherness of other subjects, even if they are reduced to mere streams of associated and isolated cognitions, is not clear. The bigger problem that arises is that not being able to distinguish other streaming minds from this streaming mind that I erroneously call “myself” undermines my capacity to distinguish minds from mere objects. At stake is my capacity to make sense of even 
a general notion of “otherness,” since the boundary between mind and intentional object collapses altogether.30 Thus, the logic of this form of idealism threatens to undermine any normative grip that commands the Buddhist to cultivate impartial compassion for all sentient and suffering creatures. Duties notwithstanding, this brand of metaphysics also destabilizes the motivational rationality of the felt 
concern for another’s pain.   As a solution, Dharmakīrti bites the bullet on directly knowing other minds. He believes that we simply infer their existence, and so, we never directly know others.31 The best that we can derive is a general concept of otherness. In claiming 
this, Dharmakīrti puts his finger on an enduring problem. There is no instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa) that provides us with direct perception (pratyakṣa) of other 
                                                      30 Ratiér, Otherness, 321: “The Vijñānavādin fails to account for otherness because the others [who are other persons] cannot be ontologically distinguished from mere 
objects.”  31 Ratiér, Otherness, 324, who cites Stcherbastsky’s translation of Dharmakīrti’s 
Santānāntarasiddhi (“Proof of the Existent-Streams of Others”), sūtra 72: “General concept [of other mind] is not identical with other mind itself. If it were so, we 
would have cognized the form of other mind as clearly as that of our own.”  
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selves. The best that we have at our disposal is inference.32 The ethical problem that I see here is that your need may become a concern for my altruistic sensibility, but I cannot ultimately establish its authorship (so long as the inference proves tenuous): I cannot know how (and if) you motivate me. I cannot know how the purported experiences of your mind have any direct bearing on my motivations, nor can I know how it makes sense to feel that your well-being is intrinsically valuable. We see a similar problem in epistemological skepticism: if I cannot provide a clear and unwavering account of how I acquired my belief (in the “right way”) a wedge is left open for skepticism.33  The argument from inference does not seem to work in Dharmakīrti’s brand 
of idealism, and, even worse, it leaves Dharmakīrti unable to account for otherness.34 My goal is to show how the monistic-idealism of Abhinavagupta provides a cogent critique of the inference-strategy, while offering a new avenue for                                                       
32 Buddhist epistemology since Dharmakīrti (and his predecessor, Digṅaga) only accepts two pramāṇas (knowledge-producing instruments): direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). Of the latter, there are inferences made from causal associations (kārya-hetu), where X is seen to be the cause of Y appearing (e.g., fire being the cause of smoke arising), and svabhāva-hetu, where the nature of X, once clarified, includes Y (something like an analytic claim). A valid inference must have, among other things, a statement of invariable concomitance, where X is found to follow Y, and where the contraposition (vyaterika) also holds: ~X is found to follow from ~Y. For an excellent analysis of Dharmakīrtian inference and general problems in Indian logic, see: B.K. Matilal, The Character of Indian Logic (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998): chapter 5.  33 This, of course, lies at the heart of naturalized epistemology, which emerges as an 
answer to the “justified, true belief” account of knowledge that Gettier problems destabilize.   34 Ratié has provided a detailed and cogent argument addressing that point through 
her analysis of the Sautrāntika-Buddhist “externalists,” and Abhinavagupta’s 
commentaries on Utpaladeva’s Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā and its auto-commentaries. See, fn. 2 above.   
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“reading other’s emotions.”35 This new avenue fills what I believe is a basic epistemological and motivational gap in the purely normative account.  
4.7.1 The Problem of Inferring Other Minds, and the Possibility of Sharing a 
World  Dharmakīrti’s inference works like this. He experiences the action of speech to be invariably concomitant (vyāpta) with a desire that causes him to say or have 
the thought, “I want to speak.” This concomitance is of the kārya-hetu variety. In 
other words, Dharmakīrti believes that the desire enters into the causal history of the speech-act (or propositional thought); so, whenever the desire is absent, the propositional thought that can issue in speech is also absent. This insight can now serve as a generalizable premise in an inference. Devadatta speaks. Devadatta does not suffer from Tourette syndrome. Where there’s an absence of desire (or some relevant mental state), there’s an absence of speech, and where there’s an absence 
of a thought that can issue in speech, there’s an absence of desire (or whatever relevant mental state). Thus, Devadatta desires to speak. Unlike a stone or a lap-top, Devadatta is a mental stream.   But how does Dharmakīrti know that Devadatta is not just another product of his own mental stream? Well, that’s easy. He never experiences the relevant 
mental state that directly motivates Devadatta to say, “Hey, it’s me…Devadatta, and I want to be heard!” However, when Dharmakīrti speaks, he does experience the                                                       35Arindam Chakrabarti crafts much of this strategy. However, he does not directly connect this to the weakness of a purely normative account of altruistic reasons and 
selfhood. See Chakrabarti, “How Do We Read Others’ Feelings?  Strawson and 
Zhuangzi Speak to Dharmakirti, Ratnakīrti and Abhinavagupta” in Comparative 
Philosophy Without Borders (Bloomsbury Academic Publishers, 2015), Chapter 5.   
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relevant mental state underwriting his own thought. Furthermore, he cannot make sense of that mental state unless it is directed toward an audience of whom he wishes to be heard. This is the final premise supporting the inference that Devadatta is another stream (santānāntara). Dharmakīrti hears Devadatta speak, and part of 
Dharmakīrti’s own speech-act includes wanting to communicate and be heard by 
others when he speaks. This provides him with a concept of otherness, while Devadatta speaking provides him with a concept of other mental streams. Consequently, we develop a general concept of “otherness,” without ever directly perceiving the fact that other subjects exist. This also means that we never really directly share feelings—we can infer them, but they can never directly motivate us.   However, this line of thinking is exactly where Wittgenstein’s “beetle in a box” rears its head. The relationship between my own motivating mental state and a speech-form (or propositional thought) takes universal scope only when I assume in 
advance that the utterances of an allegedly distinct stream are not random occurrences. I never confuse Siri on my cellphone for a breathing, thinking, and conscious assistant. “She” is always only an “it” to me, and I never have to worry about giving it Christmas bonuses. If I have not established in advance that you have 
a “mental beetle” in your head, then I cannot assume that what I’ve introspectively discovered about myself applies to anyone but myself.   Abhinavagupta’s critique of the argument is that it both undermines our ability to make sense of our experience of other selves, and it undermines our ability to make sense of otherness as a well-formed concept. The problem lies in 
Dharmakīrti’s inference. Dharmakīrti believes he has secured a premise articulating 
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universal concomitance: whenever he utters something, he has some desire to utter something (barring Tourette Syndrome). Moreover, his not uttering something is explained by a desire not to utter something (even in cases where he has conflicting desires—like when he bites his tongue and chooses to withhold an utterance out of prudence). He hears Devadatta utter something. So he infers that Devadatta must have a desire as well, and this proves that Devadatta has a mind.   Dharmakīrti cannot help himself to the universal premise he provides. Just because I know in my own case that my utterances are underwritten by a desire to speak, which introspectively reveals that I am immediately aware of my own subjectivity, I cannot assume that such a relation holds between Devadatta, because I cannot publicly observe his desire without begging the question that he’s the type of entity that has desires in the first place. The problem here is that determining this is precisely what was at stake in the first place. So either I know in advance that Devadatta has a mind, thus begging the question, or I cannot help myself to the inference, thereby leaving me without the kernel of knowledge I had hoped to glean. I am hopelessly unable to prove the existence of another self. The critique, then, is 
that Dharmakīrti’s argument both undermines our ability to make sense of our experience of other selves, and it undermines our ability to make sense of otherness as a well-formed concept.  Dharmakīrti responds by appealing to the communicatory aspect of language. I do not just say things because I feel like saying things. I also want to be heard, and more importantly, this presupposes my capacity to communicate with others. My speech-act is always grounded in the background presupposition that I 
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am communicating to an audience who can potentially understand me. In this way, I 
can become the object for another’s thought-stream. This allows us to revise our belief in distinct selves (through independent arguments to that effect), while also explaining how we form the view that we are (relatively) distinct individuals. Presupposing an audience to whom one wishes to communicate is a background assumption underlying language-use. Thus, Dharmakīrti does not beg the question; he simply uncovers the ultimately erroneous appearances that make sense of our experience. This is the cherished outcome of any useful revision.   But the deepest problem is that Dharmakīrti maintains both his momentariness and no-self claims along with his idealism. Subjects and objects are not ultimately distinct. There are no selves to distinguish one mental stream from another. So the only distinction available rests in the content of the cognitions themselves. This means that Devadatta and I have numerically and qualitatively distinct cognitions. Potentially, then, the appearance to me of a vast ocean is only a smear of grey paint for Devadatta. Nevermind sharing emotions—nothing determines how we share any perceptual objects! The best that Dharmakīrti might supply here is a sort of Occasionalism. Cognitions provide an occasion for similar, but ultimately distinct, views of reality. Somehow, we share a collective illusion that supports conventional reality.  
4.7.2 Mereological Holism and Other Minds: A Metaphysical Solution to the 
Problem of Unity in Diversity (Bhedābheda) 
 Before diving into Abhinavagupta’s solution to the problem of otherness, I 
would like to sketch a metaphysics that both parallels the Śaivite system, and 
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collapses the numerical distinction that Sidgwick viewed to be an ethically intractable problem. The problem, as Sidgwick saw it, is that real numerical distinction between persons provides one with irreducibly egocentric reasons for action. This, of course, generates the question as to what sorts of reasons have authority—either generally speaking, or in particular contexts. But I believe that we can bridge the divide between egoistic and altruistic reasons by revising our commonsense metaphysics. I might say that with the passing of a loved one, some part of me dies. Can I so easily say the same when I hear of the tragic loss of 
innocent lives in Aleppo? If I’m of normal temperament, and I experience sympathy, and different intensities of compassion, then of course I feel the weight of the tragedy that has unfolded in Syria. We can chalk up the difference of compassionate weight in the two scenarios to different levels of emotional attachment. However, both the loss of my loved ones and the loss of strangers hold something important in common: I can only poetically speak of “a part of me” dying with these people. When I hear of a thief suffering dismemberment in a country with particularly stringent laws, I never confuse that dire act of punishment with the loss of my own hand. So in what sense do I share his grief? In what sense does a little part of me feel tortured when my government illegally subjects some of its political prisoners to waterboarding? My goal here is to show that, from one aspect, I lose nothing when another is dismembered. However, from another aspect, we all lose a part of ourselves in that brutal event.  
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Counting Problems with Parts & Wholes: Aspects vs. Properties  The Buddhist philosopher will argue that talk of either psychophysical or 
purely mental “streams” (saṅtāna) is just reification. More strictly put, we should describe the situation as a “stream-ing.” Moreover, even if we eschew the momentariness thesis, we can claim that the various dharmas (elements) that make up an object or a person are, strictly speaking, independent parts operating in concert. Any sort of whole that we posit is simply a product of a pragmatically useful, but conceptual fabrication. The chariot is not a whole above and beyond the parts out of which it is constructed. We are tempted to introduce such a notion in order to explain the dynamic and fluid unity that allows us to count composite objects. But believing that a “whole-chariot” really exists above the chariot-parts proves to be explanatorily bankrupt (so the Buddhist argues). If the chariot were to collide into a tree and find itself strewn into parts all over the road, we would not claim that the chariot exists in several locations at once. All we have are parts that were once related in various ways, and their hypostasized continuity is simply a matter of functionality. When the chariot still functions, but loses one of its wheels, we can speak of the whole chariot missing a part. Buddhists provide a number of arguments to this effect. For example, if the whole were something over and above the parts-in-relation, we could ask where this whole is located. Is it located in every part? If so, then the whole would be multiple. But the whole is distinguished from its parts by being singular. How can it be both one and many at the same time? Furthermore, if we insisted that the whole exists in its parts, we would have to believe that part of the chariot exists in the reins, in the carriage, and in the wheels, 
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etc. In other words, the whole is distributed throughout its parts. But this means the chariot-whole can be divided into “whole-parts” that are in the various chariot-parts that make up the chariot. Some part of the whole is in the reins, and some part is in the wheels, etc.36 But this introduces new parts, and the problem of whether such parts are identical with, imbued by, or distinct from some underlying whole would regressively reintroduce itself. Moreover, it would not explain what it was supposed to explain, namely, how these parts come together to constitute a whole.37 Finally, this generates a counting problem. Say the chariot was composed of 15 parts. Do we have 15 or 16 objects, the parts-in-relation as well as the whole chariot? Parsimony dictates that we keep the count at 15.  On the other hand, parsimony might dictate keeping the count at 1 (if we really go down the rabbit hole of counting constitutive parts, we’d have a nearly infinite count of electrons, protons, quarks, and parts within parts—something the work of context-sensitive sortals can help us avoid by keeping us tethered to medium-sized objects). So let’s just say we have a single object, a chariot. But then how do things add up when the chariot has a single, dented wheel? In one sense, we can say that the chariot is dented. In another sense, we can say that the front-left wheel is dented, but the other three wheels are not. Taken as a real composite, the chariot is dented. But viewed in terms of only parts, the front-left wheel is dented. Does this mean that a composite is a useful, but ultimately hypostasized entity? Can                                                       36 For a thorough, analytic account of mereological reductionism in Buddhist 
metaphysics, and Vasubandhu’s attack against the Nyāya belief in real wholes and real substances, see Mark Siderits, Buddhism as Philosophy (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2007), chapter 6, cf. 105-113.   37 Siderits, Buddhism as Philosophy, 109.  
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we do justice to the idea that there are real composites, and they are not simply conceptual fabrications woven over individual items?   On that measure, Nyāya philosophy appeals to a theory of substances and universals. So, a substance (say, tea) inheres in the atoms of which it is composed. Universals, like redness, inhere in the ruby ring and in the red paint. Naiyāyikas would further argue that a cloth is distinct from the threads of which it is composed, just as the universal quality, redness, is distinct from this particular red swath.38 Now if we were to accept such a robust metaphysics, then we would encounter familiar problems with positing the existence of real universals, and we would definitely add entities to a world that we may otherwise wish to pare down. A vast literature is devoted to this issue in both South Asian and Euro-American philosophy—so I do not intend to rehearse that enduring conversation. Instead, I would like to propose a view developed in Baxter.39 The idea here is that the chariot is exactly 15 things (in my simplified example), but at the same time, it is simply one chariot. The key point here is that if the chariot is genuinely one whole, then we have to devise a way to count the individuals making up that whole as numerically 
identical. Individuals cannot remain numerically distinct at the ultimate level, 
because then we would remain hampered by the “one versus many” argument (a                                                       38 Ibid, 110: Siderits reconstructs from the classic, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 
Vasubandhu’s Buddhist attack against the Nyāya view: “Suppose there is a piece of cloth on the floor, but I can only see a single thread of its fringe. We would not say that I then see the cloth. Why not? If it is because I am seeing just one part of the cloth, then the cloth as a whole is not in that thread. To see the cloth I must see more than just one thread. And if it is a large piece of cloth, I may never see all the threads 
at one time…but if I never see the cloth as a whole, then it is something that is put 
together by the mind, not something existing in reality.”  39 Baxter, Altruism, Grief, and Identity, 377. 
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favorite of Buddhist philosophers). Wholes would become mere playthings of the mind.    So how do we defend such a view? Like the Advaita Vedāntin, we can claim that distinction is ultimately illusory (māyā). Wholes are not reducible to parts-in-relation, because, in a Bradlyean twist, relations themselves prove illusory. There is simply an inexpressible whole (Brahman as nirguṇa: “without qualities”), out of which beginningless illusion generates the mistaken belief in pluralism. Some obvious problems plague this view (for example, the problem of explaining, without endorsing dualism, how a single block essence carves out a space of “beginningless 
illusion,” or, māyā within its omnipresent singularity). So let me illustrate another possibility.   Consider Leibniz’s Law. Ted is a handsome father and husband. Ted is also a media tycoon. These are various aspects through which Ted exists. As a loving husband, viewing women as his equals, Ted can object to one of his media outlets airing the Howard Stern show (a depraved show that objectifies women and applauds a multitude of lewd behaviors and outlandish pranks). But as a CEO, for some normatively relevant reason, he can give the green-light on airing the show. This is not a contradiction (although it generates an extreme tension with respect to his personal ethical loyalties and the normative requirements expected of him under the adoption of different social roles). However, when Ted is the CEO of a media empire on January 20th, 1995, then a bald Ted and a long-haired CEO of that empire on January 20th, 1995 would be a contradiction. Under all aspects of Ted considered in that moment, he will have baldness; so it’s a contradiction to say that 
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he is bald under all aspects in that moment, but not bald under the aspect of being a CEO. Baldness is a quality, or, property he bears whether he’s a father, a board-member, or a devout Catholic. So one individual cannot possess and not-possess some property under all aspects. But the same individual can certainly manifest in aspectually complex ways. To say that Ted under one aspect is identical to a composite whole, and under another aspect, is individuated as a particular entity is not to say that he has a certain quality and lacks a certain quality under all aspects of his current existence. This aspectual distinction is akin to saying that Ted is both a morally conservative husband, and a Media tycoon who gives the green-light to a morally reckless show. From one aspect, Ted is an individual; and from a different aspect, Ted is the whole (non-individual). These are not contradictory properties, but only different aspects. We can loosely think of this in terms of time and four-dimensional metaphysics. My thin, unwrinkled self is identical to my plump, wrinkled self, because I am one whole stretched out over time. Granted, in the current spotlight of the present, I cannot be both wrinkled and unwrinkled. But under the aspect of this individual slice, and under the aspect of time taken as a whole block, I can manifest what would be contradictory properties at any single instance. This means that one temporal slice of me has one quality, while another slice has another quality. This is no more contradictory than saying that the road is both straight and curved—one stretch is straight, while another stretch is curved under the aspect of a single, whole road. Likewise, the individual threads of the cloth are whole, and therefore, numerically identical, but under a different aspect, one burnt section of the fringe is black, while another non-burnt section retains its lush, 
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pomegranate-red hue. There is no illusion involved here. We can view reality as multivalent, and therefore, describable under different aspects of its manifestation.40   This view affords us a different angle into the problem of “the one vs. the 
many.” We do not have to claim that the whole is something “above and beyond” the parts in which it inheres. The whole is simply whole (a fitting tautology), and yet it manifests under the aspect of individuation and numerical distinction. We can count reality in two distinct ways. Likewise, we can count the chariot in two distinct ways. When we count it as one thing, then a dent in its wheel means that the chariot is 
dented. When I’m rear-ended, I can say that my bumper is dented—but not my hood—and that’s important when I need to locate the damage on my vehicle. But I can just as easily call my insurance agent and file a claim for my “dented car.”   Let me further elucidate, through an example drawn from classical-modern empiricism,41 the distinction between aspectual complexity and qualitative diversity. Empiricists in Hume’s era might have claimed that it makes sense to talk about a simple, partless property like a red-simple. Consider a red-simple and a blue-simple. The red is similar to the blue in being simple, but it is dissimilar in being a red-simple rather than a blue-simple. So this hypothesized simple, which, 
qua simplicity, is a partless entity, nevertheless shows complexity. It does not have the contradictory properties of being similar and dissimilar. Rather, it manifests aspectual complexity.42 Likewise, reality does not have the distinct properties of                                                       40 Baxter, Altruism, Grief, and Identity, 376-383. 41 Baxter provides this example in Altruism, Grief, and Identity, at 379. 42 Ibid., 378. 
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being one and being many; instead, reality may be viewed as aspectually complex, and this is what I mean by “mereological holism.”  
Aspectual Complexity and the Ethics of Other Minds 
 The view I’ve adopted here does not succumb to the problems of simple monism. When a loved one passes away, my family does not have to hold a funeral for me and my dearly departed. In this way, things remain economically parsimonious for my family, and we do not proliferate entities beyond the pale of what commonsense would accept. Obviously, I can participate in the funeral without requiring my own funeral. However, I can also experience a metaphysical absence in my core. In some sense, I’ve been buried away with this dear soul. In this other sense, numerical distinction simply does not apply. This view allows us to do justice to calling a bad carton of eggs a single thing, while admitting that one broken egg in the carton entails only eleven good eggs.   Earlier, I claimed that an inference to the existence of other minds leaves us with an ethically relevant epistemological problem. I cannot know how your grief and suffering directly motivates me, nor if its value lies in anything other than my egocentrically present values. I might accept this fact, and simply believe that your grief only indirectly motivates me. But this can lead us to pernicious solipsism. Moreover, the motivated force of my action only indirectly includes your suffering. By this view, I can never really know how your “external” grief motivates me 
“internally.” However, with mereological holism, I can now bridge this gap by saying that your suffering is my suffering under the aspect of the whole. Any intrinsic worth my life has is just the intrinsic worth of sentient life as such. Under this view, 
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altruism may amount to recognition of unity that transcends the concerns of the delimited ego. I recognize myself as the whole, and my ingrained identification with my narrative self is temporarily elided. In other words, I do not project my ego over the whole (as in crude solipsism), but simply recognize pervading unity. Your grief is real, and it really motivates action (and sometimes it directly motivates my action), because grief and suffering are real and shareable as such. Sidgwick’s dilemma falls away under the holism of aspectual complexity. Nevertheless, the 
difference between Śāntideva’s ownerless strategy and mereological holism is pronounced. Without a self that underlies (and under an aspect, locates) suffering, and without a unifying thread that allows one to retain and genuinely respond to a flowing stream of passing experiences, altruism and other-regarding considerations remain empty.43 Moreover, experiencing selfhood as such means that the reflexive nature of consciousness is partly constitutive of what existing as self amounts to. 
While consciousness can be “for itself” (in the sense of being reflexively aware) it 
can be “for another” (in the ethically relevant sense of caring for another) when it sees itself as other. But nowhere in this process does the concept of selfhood just fall away. Ownerlessness refers to the ego-self and not the unifying thread of selfhood in general.                                                            43 Perhaps even Śāntideva, at least rhetorically, could not resist such a solution: “If you think that it is for the person who has the pain to guard against it, a pain in the 
foot is not of the hand, so why is the one protected by the other” (8:99 in Crosby and Skilton; at 96). For this to make sense, the hand and the foot must be identifiable as a single, suffering body. If we extend this to cover suffering creatures in general, 
then the egoist cannot claim that it is ultimately every individual’s own responsibility to cure their own pain. However, Śāntideva resists such a move, because he tows the Buddhist belief that unity and continuity—as well as the self—does not ultimately exist.  
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 While Occam might not have approved of such an inflated metaphysics, this view provides us with the distinct advantage of locating our shared world—replete with shared feelings, and shared joy and suffering—in a field that reverberates with motivating forces available to us all. For the naturalistic-minded person—and for the materialist—this may not be as extravagant as it sounds. A field that manifests as a particle in a collapsed wave-function allows us to speak of the probability of a photon showing up in an exact location, while also allowing us to speak of an amorphous wave that defies exact location: we can speak of a holistic phenomenon 
that manifests as both wave and particle. No “ghost in the machine” is necessarily required in this model (nor is it inconsistent with this model). I employ this very loose analogy only to emphasize that a physical description of holism—and thus, 
ultimately “ownerless” and yet delimited manifestations of matter—can similarly make sense of things like quantum entanglement that by another description (of real, metaphysically individuated entities, occupying exact locations) would have to 
allow information to travel faster than the speed of light. Perhaps my “ethical 
entanglement” with your feelings allow us to remain numerically distinct while ultimately whole. In the holism I am developing here, altruism would be an emergent phenomenon located in the toggle between my sense of delimitation, and my sense of direct connectedness to a larger whole that transcends the limits of the ego.       
4.8.1 Self and Other Minds…a Bridge to Motivated Altruism 
 I argued that viewing selfhood in terms of a normative, participant self helps ground altruistic reasons. Also, this view of self may provide steps for contextually 
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determining the authority of altruistic reasons over self-regarding reasons. Basically, when I believe that a context affords me the right to expect (and in this sense, demand) help, I cannot consistently claim that, all things equal, your occupying that position does not generate the same demand. In this way, the 
demand manifests as an “external” constraint, and not a mere product of my subjective desires: it emerges out of background prior-commitments that make communication possible. Just as I believe that my starving child is a reason for those in a position to help to give up some of their time, resources, or energy to help him, anyone else has the same legitimate reason that applies to me in spite of my immediate inclination to ignore their problem. It is altruistic when I recognize and act upon the legitimacy of the demand, without its legitimacy originating in a personal desire or an expectation that I directly benefit from it. Even when we view altruism as supererogation, this view has much to recommend it. On the applied-ethical side, we may not ethically chastise the soldier who does not leap on the landmine. We may not ethically scold the unsuspecting citizen, who, while waiting for a subway car, leaps onto the tracks with a train only dozens of meters away to save the life of a person who has unwittingly fallen on those same tracks. If that were the case, then we would have a whole subway station of morally reprehensible people, and our claim would seem to entail that everyone of able body ought to be a hero. The normative view only claims that reasonable demands emerging out of the background commitments that communication presupposes have normative grip without direct appeal to personal desires and self-regarding considerations. This shows how it can be reasonable to act on behalf of another without immediate 
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concern for advancing one’s own agenda, and without concern for appeasing one’s own self-regarding wishes.    Still, my problem with this view is that it leaves motivators out of the story. 
While much of my argument seems to hinge on a strict distinction between “reason” 
(rational principle) and “motivation” (a holistic and emotive responsiveness that drives action), this sort of distinction shapes various strategies, and pre-determines various conversations and philosophical puzzles from the outset, puzzles that may otherwise fall away without such prior commitments determining the domain of discourse. The egoistic worldview thrives on just this sort of firm distinction. My believing that it is reasonable—or somehow required—that a stranger who lives thousands of miles away should assist my hurricane-ravaged family is precisely the issue of contention for the egoist. Certainly, if we accept in advance that this is a rational requirement written into the speech-acts that shape our social living, the claim would have some traction. But an egoist might not demand help from others (granted, he may want it, but we’re presumably not talking about only subjective desires or conative motivators at this level of normative analysis). He may believe that his demand is not legitimate, and that it ultimately lacks rational authority despite its emotive force. For example, he sees your new Tesla, and he wants it, but 
he’s under no illusion that his desire entails a legitimate demand; after all, desire alone (so the egoist argues) should not be confused for a principle of action. The egoist might argue that his desire to call out for help should never be confused for an authoritative principle. Likewise, your desiring help from the egoist needs some sort of principled grounding that legitimizes it. While that may be true, perha
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go too far to assume that a “principled grounding” arises from some purely cognitive domain that somehow needs to connect to a separate, motivating and conative domain. The larger problem that I believe underlies this contention is the view that rationality somehow conceptually exists beyond the pale of motivators. Unlike Kant, I would argue that emotive force and motivation is bound up with rational reasons—by that, I mean that without a proper emotional economy, rationality would have no bearing on our lives; and this is not just a contingent issue; rationality shows up experientially as felt and emotively charged reasons. Not only do I respect your inherent dignity, but I also feel your worth. I feel the worth of acting on principle, and that is part of experiencing my decision as a rational choice. Sometimes the principle shines so powerfully that it requires things of me at odds with my immediate inclinations, and I experience considerable cognitive and emotional tension. But I nevertheless feel the weight of its authority (and I don’t mean this trivially—its authority is communicated through an emotive and representational pathway that allows it to show up as a guiding value).   You might argue that, metaethically, this reduces moral values to conative forces, thus rendering talk of truth-values moot when it comes to moral judgments. 
But I’m suggesting that we explore the possibility of our capacity to really share—not merely infer—an emotional ground that dovetails into guiding values. The truth-value of the principle lies in a common ground of experience, which under one aspect shows up as a motivating, emotional force, and under another aspect, shows up as representational content, something like a demand or a commitment. We have something that is both belief and feeling. This view requires making sense of how 
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any such “common ground” exists. Can we directly share common feelings, or do we only indirectly infer them? The latter possibility is attractive when we view an embodied psychophysical organism as part of a closed system. This sort of biological 
computer would operate on inputs and “decision modules”—replete with decision-trees and evaluation functions that adjust themselves to perturbations in its nervous system. I am suggesting that this requires we view “sharing” as inferences that keep us one-step removed from the environment (and our fellow creatures) that afford 
“inputs” for the organic system. But just as in the case of a cell membrane, perhaps the borders of our psyches—our thoughts and feelings—are more porous than we imagine. What we need to do is make sense of the exchange of ethically relevant materials that penetrate the dynamic membrane of our practical, ethical, and emotion-driven lives.     On the ethical and epistemological front, this leads us to the problem of other minds. Empathy and compassion—not just pristinely principled reason—can motivate us to do what we feel is right. Sometimes the right thing to do is act on behalf of another without expecting (or desiring) anything in return. But how do I come to feel the gravity of your situation, how does your suffering or joy directly motivate my action, rather than remain an indirectly inferred data-point in a causal chain? Can I really know that your suffering motivates me to act strictly on your behalf? I do not believe that inference gets us there, partly because of its dearth of emotive force, and partly because I endorse the view that a third-person description of consciousness does not fully capture qualia and the “what-it’s-likeness” of a first-
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person experience. In other words, the conscious feeling of grief or suffering is not just another object in the world, like a lap-top, stone, or a tree.  I offer one basic argument to defend this latter point. Any good revision must make sense of my experience. I still see the sun setting daily, but I do not believe it actually sinks below the horizon. I know that the appearance is caused by the rotation of the earth (among other things). Still, the revision that allows me to dispense with my thought also provides an answer to why I experience things that way. The self-reflexivity thesis, endorsed by both Abhinavagupta and Dharmakīrti—a thesis that I endorse—is not explained by an objectified account of the first-person experience. You might provide an excellent account of the physical mechanisms that underlie immersion in an experience, but you can only do so by ignoring the first-person experience altogether. The revision has not explained my experience, but instead, it has explained it away. Similarly, as Abhinavagupta points out, self-reflexive awareness is not an object that I can perceive. Even when I introspect, this 
occurs against a background of awareness already presupposed by the “inward 
gaze.”   Something like this last point—the inherently reflexive and first-personal view of consciousness—underwrites various forms of idealism. Dharmakīrti, and other Vijñānavāda Buddhists, provide ample reasons for endorsing idealism. While 
the Pratybhijñā philosophy of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta also endorses 
idealism, it parts with Dharmakīrti in positing both a real self, and metaphysical monism. These views collectively amount to solipsism, which on the surface seems to perniciously undermine the coherence of other-centric and altruistic 
 248 
considerations. However, Abhinavagupta’s solution to the problem of otherness and other minds nicely parallels the mereological holism I have developed above. This is where I believe the metaphysical view has some distinct advantages in being able to better explain our sense that we share feelings, and these sometimes motivate selfless action. I will conclude by more thoroughly explaining how Abhinavagupta helps get us there, and what this might mean for altruistic action.  
4.8.2 “Guessing” the Existence of Other Minds: A Śaivite Account of Reaching 
Common Ground 
 In his Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā-vimarśini (IPV), Abhinavagupta comments upon Utpaladeva’s claim that “through action, knowledge of others is guessed (ūhyate).” Two things are puzzling in this claim. First, a superficial read of the claim might identify it as a form of behaviorism. I see Chakrabarti act in the right ways, and I assume that he is conscious just like me. Second, it seems that by “guessing” the agency and sentience of Chakrabarti (by observing his behavior), I’m only inferring that he has a mind. However, Abhinavagupta argues that Utpala uses the 
concept of “guessing” to avoid the claim that we infer the existence of other minds.44 At stake in the distinction between “guessing” and empirically inferring is the belief that consciousness cannot be objectified, and thus, empirically inferred. Your feeling                                                       44 Cited from Ratié, Otherness, 355. The IPV verse:   | ūhyata ity anena jñānasya prameyatvaṃ na nirvahatīti darśayati anyathā hy 
anumīyata iti brūyāt ||  
By “is guessed” (ūhyate), [Utpala] indicates that knowledge cannot bear to be an object (prameya), for otherwise he would have said [instead]: “is inferred” (anumīyata). IPV, volume I, 49.   
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is not an object that operates as a data-point in a causal chain motivating my action. Like the Buddhist idealists, the Advaita-Śaivite would not stand for explaining away the reflexive first-person experience through an objectifying third-person account. Your feeling is inherently first-personal and reflexive, something the description of a data-point or causal force does not directly explain.     But imagine if we adopted the inference model. Your suffering enters into the causal story of my decision to help you. But the only first-person presence I experience appears from a single vantage-point. I may act as if there were other minds with vantage-points, but “this immediate and singular presence” is all that I directly encounter. I do not need to commit to any metaphysical view of self here. On a purely empirical basis, I observe that the “I” is simply the vantage-point from which things are present in a first-person way.45 Other first-person experiences are only inferred, and remain within the fictionalist-domain of “as if” semantics. Acting for the sake of the common good, or solely for the sake of your well-being, would amount to me acting out of the presence of my first-person considerations. Granted, the target of my action—that is, a sentient-sapient creature for which things can matter—is objectified as a special sort of perceptual object, but as an object 
nevertheless. Any sense of “I-ness” that would connect my action to an agent, and not a passive or inert object, would be derivative of the only “I” that I experience—
myself (the one for whom things are present).46 This does not rule out the possibility of acting on considerations of the greater good, but it comes with the caveat that all                                                       45 Caspar Hare develops this view in On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects. 
He calls this “Egocentric Presentism.”  46 Ibid., see chapter 1. 
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of my considerations are derivative of egocentric concerns. These are not necessarily selfish concerns, but they are always egocentrically present concerns. In other words, I am unable to be directly motivated by your suffering, or immediately experience you as a self-aware person for whom I can altruistically act. We lose the possibility of a directly other-centric action, because we lose the possibility of directly encountering the other.   Abhinavagupta and Utpaladeva attack the inference hypothesis, because it objectifies consciousness. And yet, their monistic-idealism amounts to solipsism, and so the same sort of problem with respect to other-centricity also seems to emerge. However, Abhinavagupta develops Utpaladeva’s point further, and offers what I believe is a solution to the problem that is very much aligned with the account of mereological holism I developed earlier. To develop Abhinavagupta’s argument further, we need to look at some important premises driving his account. 
Key Premises [Premise 1]: Consciousness, understood as reflexive awareness, is a form of 
knowing, in the sense that perceptions include “self-grasping” (svasaṃvedana) 47 
and “internal grasping” (saṃrambha).  
                                                      47 By this account, it seems, any expression of sentience would be, simultaneously, 
sapient. So if I were willing to admit that my beloved dog is sentient—which I am willing to admit—then my dog would be included in the class of things that have knowledge. More problematic, however, is the idea that consciousness comes with 
“self-grasping.” The view that a self is only formed in language, and that any robust 
notion of “I-ness” requires complex language-use and a developed self-narrative would not permit bare consciousness, say of a toad or a horsefly, into the class of things that have a self. But this problematic notion is also compelling: conscious 
things may very well be “selves” at various orders of complexity. This issue goes well beyond what I can cover here.  
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o By “self-grasping” I am referring to the view that when P is cognized, the cognizing of P is also simultaneously cognized.  
o “Internal grasping” refers to my capacity to recognize that what is inert in my perception, say, this white sheet of paper, is indelibly manifested in a first-person experience; this is my conscious state cognizing a white sheet of paper. In this way, perception is always active and (at least in a broad sense) knowledge-producing (it manifests the knowledge of its own awareness).  [Premise 2]:  Knowledge, understood as an inherent facet of consciousness, does 
not “shine as an object” (na…jñānam idantayā bhāti).48 In other words, we do not experience the consciousness of other minds as a mere object, just as we do not experience our own minds as empirical objects replete with spatially locatable properties. 
o For Abhinavagupta, consciousness is self-manifested in the sense that it cannot be proved, but only presupposed in any proof. For it to be the sort of thing that we experience, say, introspectively as an object, would be unthinkable, because experiencing my consciousness already presupposes the very awareness I may aim to objectify. Viewing the self as background reflexive-awareness, explains why Hume and the Buddha could not find the empirical object they were introspectively seeking: self-awareness is empirically transparent.  
o The immediate grasping of my own conscious state is called “vimarśa,” and 
unlike Dharmakīrti, Abhinavagupta does not see the inherently conceptual                                                       48 See Ratié, Otherness, 356, where she quotes IPV. 
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nature of perception as error-producing, or something that covers over an initially non-conceptual and ephemeral property-trope. Instead, self-awareness is a self-standing background constraint.   These premises underwrite Abhinavagupta’s solution to the problem of other 
minds. The “guess” of which Abhinavagupta and Utpaladeva speak, amounts to a kind of recognition rather than a rational inference. Abhinavagupta and Utpaladeva would agree that we distinguish the conscious from the inert by observing agency, 
but this is not an ordinary empirical claim. In Dharmakīrti’s system, a kārya-hetu inference connects two independent events by locating one as part of the causal story of the other. But in his auto-commentary on the IPV, Abhinavagupta argues 
that our “guess” of other minds is an inference of the svabhāva-hetu variety. When I observe a closed-plane figure consisting of three and only three sides, I am grounded in calling this a triangle. I soon come to recognize that I am warranted in making the claim that the sum of two right angles is equivalent to the sum of the angles in a triangle by appealing only to the meaning of the terms involved. I was not initially in a position to make this claim, because I was initially confused about the nature of triangles and right angles. In this way, inferring that when I see the triangle, I also see the sum of two right angles does not provide me with independent, empirical knowledge. Similarly, when I see consciousness incarnated, say, in the speech-act of a person, I am not making an empirical inference between two independent events, one of which stands as the cause of the other (as in 
Dharmakīrti’s argument). Instead, I recognize that the very essence of consciousness includes action. In this sense, I am “guessing” (but not inferring) the existence of 
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other minds, because I am coming to recognize that what allows me to call this an 
“action” (and not just a mere event) grounds my calling this an incarnation of consciousness.   But how does Abhinavagupta ground such a claim? The key lies in Premise 1. Consciousness is viewed as inherently knowledge-producing in the sense that it 
discloses itself in the very act of cognizing. Now, in Dharmakīrti’s example of the speech-act/mental-state pervasion (vyāpta), we can distinguish a mental state from the action it underwrites. However, for Abhinavagupta, since perception is itself already an action (in the sense that it grasps an external object while simultaneously grasping itself), incarnated action is only the final stage of consciousness itself. The power of “internal action” (āntarī kriyāṡaktiḥ) is not something I infer. It is something immediately experienced, because to hypothetically observe consciousness grasping itself and grasping an object (say, as a third cognition observing the relation between the latter two) would, again, presuppose the very act of grasping I am attempting to observe. Consciousness does not see itself grasping itself as it might see a cup of tea on the desk. In the very act of seeing the tea, consciousness recognizes its own seeing. This may partly explain why I am shocked that what I was looking for was right in front of my eyes the whole time (literally), and yet, it is not as though upon learning this I see a new object filling space where, before, I was gazing at a mere void, or, an absence. Instead, I realize that in distraction (moha), I was indeed gazing at an object without explicitly recognizing the nature of the object standing before me. Consciousness was at work taking in its experience even in my distracted state.  
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 The idea here is that just as I recognize that the wave in the ocean is a partial state (aṃśa) of the ocean itself, I recognize that the action of the person in front of me is a manifested state of consciousness.49 This view is attractive, because it collapses the distinction between logical behaviorism and irreducible first-person awareness—we move past the problem Wittgenstein was getting at with his “beetle 
in a box.” We do not reduce the inherent first-person experience of consciousness to a mere set of describable actions and subjunctives. Nor do we puzzle over how to connect first-person thoughts with external behavior. In some sense, we actually perceive consciousness incarnated through the carrying out of what (logically, not temporally) begins as an internal, but sentient action manifesting in bodily movement.   When we couple this view with mereological holism, we provide ourselves with just the tools we need to share motivating emotional states. In one state of the whole, I am numerically distinct from you, and can experience the independent validity of your needs (and my own). However, I may also come to recognize (in the sense that I re-cognize a background unity that was always there to begin with) the inherently motivating state of suffering itself. Suffering is “owned,” because it belongs to a suffering-self. But the suffering is only delimited by the incarnated manifestation of the whole under the aspect of individuation. This is the sense in                                                       49 Ratié, Otherness, 359: “And just as, when we perceive a wave, we are not perceiving an entity that would be different from the river and that the river would produce while remaining ontologically distinct from it, but a mere aspect (aṃśa) of 
the river itself…in the same way, to perceive the other’s action is not to perceive an entity different from him or her, and merely related to him or her by a causality relation, for the relation between a subject and his action is not a relation of causality but a relation of identity—only the latter is a partial aspect of the former, 
his objective aspect.” 
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which Abhinavagupta would argue that my awareness of you is recognition of my own subjectivity,50 but not of the empirically grounded sort of ego-solipsism that 
“Egocentric Presentism” describes.51 I am not alone as a solitary ego. When we communicate with each other, and I recognize your suffering as the sort of thing that 
would prompt you to seek help, our subjectivity in some sense “fuses.”52 The degree to which I take your suffering seriously, and the degree to which it motivates me as it does you, is the degree to which it is possible for me to see past our distinctly self-interested trajectories, and act on behalf of the larger suffering I see before me. To see your suffering at this level is to see past the narrative and participant identity that shapes my social self, and recognize a will to act that responds to suffering as such. My delimited-ego is no longer the only ground of my action. Suffering itself moves me to act in the recognition that suffering requires action. Of course, at the applied level, the context will determine what sort of action suffering requires (for 
example, if we’re talking about helpful suffering, or suffering that warrants an act of omission). But I can respond to something beyond the constellation of 
“egocentrically present” empirical perceptions, because the motivation of my action does not need to be reduced to something my ego-self “owns.”   In this sense, I am merely pointing a way toward a metaphysical self. We may argue that unity across sensory modalities—my capacity to touch now what I saw then—requires a synthesizing self that allows me to experience the sensory                                                       50 Ratié, Otherness, 363: “To be aware of others is to recognize in them my own 
subjectivity.” 51 See fn. 42.  52 Ibid, 364: “For communication, according to [Abhinava and Utpala], is nothing but a partial fusion of the different limited subjects. Such a fusion is possible because the absolute consciousness is, in its essence, a free agency.” 
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wholeness of objects. We may argue that to make sense of a memory being more 
than an item of consciousness related to some earlier item in the “right way,” we need a unifying thread that makes these both experiences of a single self. But I am arguing that to make sense of my capacity to be directly motivated by suffering that is not just my own—and thus, not derived from strictly egocentric grounds—I must be able, in some sense, to directly experience manifested consciousness outside the boundaries of my narrative ego. The metaphysical self would simply be the background awareness that is presupposed in having a first-person experience, but not necessarily limited to a single vantage-point. Mereological holism is one way of providing a metaphysics that can support such a view, but the need for such a view is driven by the presuppositions of ethics. When I act for your sake, I am not just responding to stimuli locked into a closed psychophysical system. I can, in favored moments, transcend the ego, and be motivated to act in and for a larger whole that sometimes manifests as considerations for the greater good.                           
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CONCLUSION		 I	can	contract	the	notion	of	a	self	to	a	dense,	but	empty	space.	I	can	view	the	self	as	a	place-holder,	a	necessary	fiction	that	helps	organize	and	support	a	purely	biological,	thinking	system.	But	I	can	also	expand	the	notion	of	self	so	far	out	that	the	place	where	one	constellation	of	thoughts,	feelings,	and	emotions	leaves	off,	and	another’s	begins,	grows	vague.	The	Buddhists	believe	that	vagueness	shows	how	the	self	is	nothing	other	than	a	conceptual	imputation,	an	error	that	might	be	remedied	and	experientially	recognized.	However,	when	we	begin	with	assessing	the	self	outside	of	the	context	of	life	and	its	ethical	demands,	we	might	more	readily	avail	ourselves	of	puzzles	and	arguments	that	I	believe	hold	less	weight	considering	the	demands	that	others	often	place	upon	us.			 We	might	consider	the	metaphysical	question	of	the	existence	of	Self	to	be	entirely	distinct	from	the	very	practical,	ethical	question	of	what	this	contextually	situated	person	ought	to	do,	and	for	whom	this	person	ought	to	do	it.	But	in	chapter	1,	I	argued	that	ontological	(and	metaphysical)	commitments	carry	normative	force.	At	very	least,	“purely”	theoretical	beliefs	commit	us	to	various	other	beliefs,	and	in	this	way,	present	us	with	what	we	ought	to	do	(namely,	adopt	and	endorse	certain	beliefs).	Thus,	believing	is	a	kind	of	action,	and	therefore	our	ontological	commitments	and	non-commitments	will	impact	what	it	makes	sense	for	us	to	do,	as	belief	is	bound	up	within	a	cluster	of	dynamic	actions	and	responses	to	experience.		Claiming	that	selves	do	not	exist—in	the	way	some	Buddhists	have—is	consistent	with	acts	of	omission	that	we	would	usually	view	as	being	negligent	and	selfish.	The	Buddhists	believe	that	suffering	is	the	fundamental	existential	predicament	that	
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must	be	eradicated,	and	the	chief	culprit	of	this	disease	is	“clinging,”	or,	the	natural	selfishness	that	comes	with	believing	that	we	persist	over	time,	and	that	we	must	obtain	various	goods	for	ourselves	in	that	span	of	time.	This	highlights	the	natural	origin	of	self-regarding	and	self-centered	concerns.	From	this	perspective,	we	are	presented	with	the	problem	of	determining	the	origin	and	rationality	of	directly	pursuing	someone	else’s	concerns,	especially	when	the	pursuit	comes	at	a	considerable	cost	to	our	own	well-being.	Pursuing	our	own	good	needs	little	justification,	but	making	another’s	concern	the	sole	target	of	our	action	requires	some	explanation.			 The	Buddhist,	particularly	Śāntideva,	provides	an	ingenious	solution:	the	non-existence	of	a	persisting	or	substantive	self	means	that	the	suffering	we	witness	and	react	to	is	ownerless.	Put	simply,	I	have	no	reason	to	be	selfish,	since	there	is	
nothing	for	this	empty	self	to	obtain	or	lose.	To	this	point,	I	argued	that	either	the	conclusion	does	not	follow	from	the	premises—having	no	reason	to	be	self-centered	is	consistent	with	having	no	reason	to	care	about	others—or	we	need	to	commit	to	moral	truths	that	exist	in	the	fabric	of	being	itself;	namely,	we	must	commit	to	the	idea	that	self-aware	suffering,	even	if	ownerless,	is	inherently	bad.	But	if	we	can	have	something	like	a	basic	moral	truth	written	into	the	fabric	of	being,	then	it	would	not	be	preposterous	to	assume	that	selves	can	exist	at	the	most	basic	ontological	level,	especially	given	how	useful	the	concept	is	for	making	sense	of	memory,	the	synthesis	of	sensory	experience	that	unifies	objects	and	events,	synchronic	identity	(and	its	implications	for	self-regarding	concerns),	and	communication	through	language.			
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	 To	the	charge	that	our	normative	and	practical	identity	is	sufficient	to	make	sense	of	other-regarding	considerations	and	obligations—and	therefore,	metaphysics	is	again	left	to	the	dusty	armchairs	of	Baroque	thinkers—I	argue	that	even	a	normative	self	is	consistent	with	an	attenuated	form	of	rational	egoism.	The	normative	self	is	constituted	by	its	various	commitments,	many	of	which	are	inherently	other-regarding;	but	other-regarding	commitments	make	little	sense	when	they	are	not	grounded	in	background	concerns	for	our	own	personal	projects.	I	sacrifice	my	time,	time	that	I	can	devote	to	earning	money,	furthering	my	career,	or	simply	enjoying	the	free	play	of	my	senses,	to	help	my	son	complete	his	homework,	even	when	he	shows	little	respect	for	me	or	the	process	of	learning.	This	is	not	too	difficult	to	understand.	But	when	I	do	it	free	of	charge	for	your	child,	or	for	a	stranger’s	child,	what	sense	does	that	make?	I	am	endowed	with	a	healthy	dose	of	benevolence,	but	so	what.	My	personal	endowments	hardly	justify	obligations,	especially	obligations	on	your	part.	Show	me	that	we’re	all	better	for	expressing	states	of	compassion	and	other-centric	concern,	show	me	that	my	projects	are	supported	and	nurtured	by	such	virtuous	qualities,	and	now	I’ve	got	a	direct	reason	to	cultivate	other-regarding	virtues.				 I	explored	the	possibility	that	reasons,	produced	out	of	the	normative	sphere	of	speech-acts,	carry	“external	force”	to	the	extent	that	we	attempt	to	communicate	and	to	understand	one	another.	To	use	a	word	is	to	be	committed	to	its	contextually-shaped	meaning	regardless	of	what	some	individual	desires.	So,	it	is	possible	to	take	on	desire-independent	obligations,	that	is,	obligations	that	simply	come	with	being	a	language-user	participating	in	the	social	play	of	communication.	But	I	think	it	
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presumes	too	much	to	assume	that	when	I	plead	for	you	not	to	treat	me	inhumanely,	that	I	believe	that	my	pleading	necessarily	provides	you	with	a	reason	to	respect	my	wish.	Certainly,	if	I	believe	this	to	be	true,	then	the	reason	should	apply	universally,	and	in	this	way,	I	now	have	a	reason	to	respect	your	humanity	despite	my	immediate	or	occurrent	desires.	But	the	very	issue	at	stake	is	whether	my	pleading	really	is	a	reason	for	you	to	promote	my	well-being.	Certainly,	you	may	understand	why	I	wish	for	you	to	stop	torturing	me—and	in	this	way,	my	speech-act	works	in	the	context—but	nothing	in	my	pleading	necessarily	requires	that	you	(or	even	me,	for	that	matter)	recognize	an	external	obligation	to	stop.	Plain	old	wishes	do	not	amount	to	commands.	A	greater	affective	force	must	be	in	play	to	charge	that	reason	with	any	sort	of	compelling,	obligatory	force.				 When	I	view	the	self	as	non-substantial,	or,	an	empty	place-holder	for	a	
singular	point	of	view,	then	I	am	presented	with	a	kind	of	pernicious	solipsism.	I	cannot	account	for	subjectivity	other	than	my	own,	but	I	can	indirectly	infer	that	you	enjoy	“presence,”	or,	the	first-person	experience	of	a	world.	This	view	may	have	some	ethical	benefits.	I	am	faced	with	the	problem	of	harmonizing	my	self-regarding	considerations—my	mildly	hedonistic,	self-centered	considerations—with	considerations	of	the	greater	good.	I	would	like	to	be	able	to	help	myself	in	helping	you,	and,	likewise,	I	would	like	to	avoid	self-abnegation	while	acting	upon	and	taking	other-regarding	considerations	seriously.	When	I	treat	you	“as	if”	you	enjoy	a	perspective,	and	to	this	degree,	I	take	your	“as	if”	needs	into	consideration,	then	I’m	acting	out	of	my	egocentrically	present	experience	of	subjectivity,	and	I	am	ultimately	doing	so	for	the	sake	of	something	that	matters	to	me,	namely,	“you”	(the	
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indirectly	inferred	first-person	experience	that	is	not	directly	present	to	me).	In	some	sense,	then,	any	other-regarding	consideration	will	be	derivative	of	(or	secondary	to)	the	only	present	considerations	that	I	can	act	upon,	my	own.	So,	I	reach	out	to	help	you	“as	if”	you	have	needs	like	my	own.	I	sacrifice	my	energy	and	well-being	for	you	“as	if”	your	needs	matter	to	you.	But	I	happily	exist	with	you	in	a	web	of	fictional	intersubjectivity	that	ultimately	only	begins	and	ends	with	me.		 		 My	problem	with	this	is	that	it	underestimates	my	capacity	to	recognize	subjectivity	and	consciousness,	incarnate,	and	manifesting	on	the	very	sleeves	of	your	actions	(or	better	still,	as	your	actions).	As	I	argued	in	chapter	4,	to	see	you	as	an	agent	is	not	a	theoretical	assumption	I	must	make	(A.I.	bots	notwithstanding),	it’s	something	I	simply	recognize	when	clear-headed.	I	do	not	usually	confuse	the	rolling	rocks	for	children	gleefully	rolling	down	hills.	When	I	watch	the	child	leap	from	the	swing,	I	watch	her	will	incarnate.	I	see	agency	in	the	flesh.	The	data-point	is	not	a	set	of	molecules,	or	some	substantial	entity	that	I	can	measure.	Rather,	I	can	be	immediately	familiar	with	action	as	an	extension	of	will.	Not	only	can	I	possess	familiarity	with	other	minds,	but	I	can	also	distinguish	these	minds	from	non-minds	without	availing	myself	of	complicated	inferences	to	the	best	explanation.	In	short,	I	
share	a	world	with	you.	We	might	even	go	so	far	to	say	that	this	primordial	“we”	is	the	background	out	of	which	“I”	has	a	point	of	view.			 In	8:99	of	Śāntideva's	Bodhicaryāvatāra,	Śāntideva	challenges	the	egoist:	“If	you	think	that	it	is	for	the	person	who	has	pain	to	guard	against	it,	a	pain	in	the	foot	is	not	of	the	hand,	so	why	is	the	one	protected	by	the	other?”	If	my	pain	is	privileged	simply	because	it	is	viscerally	experienced	as	being	distinctly	mine,	then	why	should	
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I	care	so	much	for	a	distinct	part	that	does	not	constitute	my	selfhood.	The	hand	is	distinct	from	the	foot,	so	why	does	it	bother	to	massage	the	aching	foot	when	it	does	not	directly	experience	any	pains	itself?	The	crying	child	is	not	me	or	my	own,	so	why	should	I	bother	myself	with	its	pain?	When	it	comes	to	my	body	parts,	the	answer	is	painfully	obvious:	they	are	both	parts	of	a	whole,	and	in	this	way,	a	pain	in	the	foot	is	a	pain	in	the	hand	is	a	pain	for	the	whole	person.	Situated	in	context,	I	may	have	to	focus	on	the	exact	location	of	this	pain	(the	doctor	stitches	the	laceration	of	my	foot,	not	my	hand).	But	from	another	description,	I	am	simply	in	pain,	and	require	attention,	whether	I	locate	the	pain	in	my	head,	my	foot,	my	back,	or	my	thoughts.	Śāntideva's	point	is	compelling	with	respect	to	another’s	pain,	when,	despite	his	Ownerless	view,	he	seems	to	argue	that	we	may	share	each	other’s	pain.	I	both	recognize	a	distinctly	located	instance	of	pain—the	pain	of	another—and	I	recognize	pain	writ	large	over	the	whole.	Likewise,	I	never	remain	smug,	because	“only	my	foot	is	aching,	not	me.”	My	aching	feet	are	simply	a	description	of	the	whole	me,	suffering	in	this	very	moment.			 Just	as	the	concept	of	self	unifies	and	synthesizes	an	otherwise	chaotic	panoply	of	dislocated	events	and	sensory	experiences,	it	can	also	unify	instances	of	needless	suffering,	and	motivating	pleas	for	help.	The	self	is	an	inherently	recognized,	but	not	empirically	measured,	source	of	unity.	Kant	taught	us	this	much.		But	when	the	dynamic	flow	of	events	rests	upon	a	substantial	base	underlying	and	threading	our	experiences,	then	it	can	unify	not	only	my	own	world,	but	also	our	world.	The	vagueness	arguments	the	Buddhists	offer—the	fact	that	the	“one”	cannot	be	both	one	and	many—and	the	Ownerless	thesis	they	offer	to	motivate	unselfish	
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behavior,	can	actually	work	in	favor	of	positing	a	unifying	self	that	synthesizes	distinct	experiences.	Composites	can	be	real.	We	can	speak	both	of	the	whole	house,	and	of	its	termite-rotten	foundations.	The	house	has	monetary	value	as	a	whole.		This	can	be	measured	by	parts	that	only	show	up	as	“parts,”	because	they	belong	to	a	whole.	The	house	can	be	accurately	described	as	one	and	many.	Hegel	taught	us	this	much.	Likewise,	my	debilitating	loneliness	may	be	described	and	recognized	as	more	than	an	infinitely	dense	and	singular	point	in	a	lonely	private	world.	It	is	“ownerless”	(and	thus	capable	of	being	co-owned)	to	the	extent	that	it	can	be	shared	with	you,	who	may	or	may	not	elect	to	recognize	and	act	upon	that	instance	of	suffering.			 I	recognize	that	a	heavy	price	comes	with	the	sort	of	monism	I	am	endorsing.	Empirically,	this	is	far-fetched	and	does	not	address	the	real	or	very	useful	distinctions	that	push	knowledge	forward.	Moreover,	I	seem	to	be	reifying	an	abstract	unifying	principle,	a	conceptual	scheme	that	is	useful	in	categorizing	and	clumping	our	world	together,	but	proves	to	be	lame	with	respect	to	honoring	the	rich	variety	of	distinct	items	that	make	up	our	world.	“Nature”	is	not	a	thing,	it’s	a	variety	of	things	that	are	sometimes	usefully	designated	in	the	singular.	Hume	taught	us	as	much.			 However,	vagueness	and	counting	and	Sorites	problems	plague	our	conceptual	categories.	Medium-sized	objects	turn	out	to	be	many	things	depending	upon	which	categories	of	analysis	are	most	useful	to	a	context.	And	this	problem	arises	in	the	context	of	empirical	knowledge	and	the	reductionist	program.	The	program	seems	most	successful	when	it	privileges	a	particular	reduction-base,	a	set	
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of	foundational	structures	that	we	can	say	(or	hope)	accounts	for	the	self,	the	medium-sized	object,	the	molecule,	the	electron,	etc.	Believing	that	reality	has	some	privileged	base	of	analysis	is	a	regulative	ideal	that	motivates	reductionistic	explanations,	and	to	the	degree	that	such	reductions	proffer	greater	control	of	our	environment,	they	remain	compelling.	This	may	even	operate	at	the	level	of	ethical	analysis.	The	belief	that	I	can	come	to	know	your	pain,	and	learn	what	you	need	may	motivate	me	to	analyze	our	experiences	into	a	base	of	shareable	elements.	The	problem	is	that	unifying	things	to	the	point	of	a	Parmenidian	“One”	amounts	to	an	inscrutable,	and	ultimately	inexpressible,	block	that	does	little	to	explain	what	we	as	individuals	ought	to	bother	ourselves	with,	and	in	this	world,	we	must	bother	ourselves	with	quite	a	lot,	particularly,	ethically	salient	social	relationships.			 I	am	not,	therefore,	recommending	that	we	are	all	the	properties	of	some	one,	grand	thing.	I	am	exploring	the	possibility	that	reality	shows	up	under	different	aspects	of	itself,	aspects	that	support	speaking	in	terms	of	individuals,	and	aspects	that	support	speaking	in	terms	of	a	whole	composite.	Properties	operate	at	the	level	of	aspectual	descriptions,	they	are	not	the	aspects	themselves.	My	foot,	described	as	an	individual,	has	a	laceration	that	needs	mending.	My	body—as	a	whole—requires	mending,	because	the	whole	thing	has	been	compromised.	When	I	can	view	your	pain	as	a	property	of	you	as	an	individual,	but	I	can	also	recognize	it	as	our	pain—or	“pain	as	such,”	recognized	under	the	aspect	of	a	whole	flow	of	suffering—then	I	can	directly	know	of	pain	existing	outside	the	borders	of	my	skin,	and	I	can	therefore	be	motivated	to	mend	a	pain	that	is	not	distinctly	my	own.	I	can	be	motivated	to	mend	a	pain	that	is	not	isolated	inside	the	sphere	of	my	own	private	experience.	By	saying	
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this,	I	am	not	intending	to	reify	some	singular,	block	“whole.”	I	am	simply	recognizing	that	mereological	vagueness,	and	endless	reductions	that	find	deeper	and	deeper	levels	of	analysis	proceed	because	they	do	not	“bottom	out”	in	a	privileged	set	of	material	things.	They	are	aspects	of	a	dynamic	“bringing-forth”	that	can	be	described	as	“whole”	to	the	extent	that	speaking	about	boundaries	at	this	level	is	meaningless.	When	it	comes	to	my	capacity	to	be	motivated	by	a	target	that	is	not	derivative	of	my	embodied	history	and	constellation	of	personal	concerns,	the	reasons	I	have	for	helping	you	are	supported	by	my	capacity	to	acknowledge	you,	in	the	literal	sense	that	I	come	to	know	you.	In	this	way,	I	can	sometimes,	like	a	character	acting	in	a	play,	embodying	a	narrative	and	emotional	field	much	larger	than	“Kevin,”	act	as	you	(as	us).	Therefore,	I	can	act	for	you.	Unwittingly,	Buddhist	No-Selfism	and	interdependence,	becomes	a	truly	interdependent	whole,	bridging	the	empty	space	between	self	and	other	through	the	ownerless	(or,	under	certain	descriptions,	unbounded	and	co-ownable)	flow	of	a	shared	Self.																 	
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